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statistical information for the BVI. Mr Cassell, the Chief Auditor in Montserrat 
deserves special praise, for providing all the early financial statements for the 
Montserrat Social Security Board. The volcanic crisis caused much disruption and it 
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was no easy feat laying hold of those documents. Many thanks. Mrs Alex Phillips, 
Clerk Of The Dominica House Of Assembly has to be given special mention for 
trusting me with the Hansards, while I went to get the relevant sections copied. 
How do I thank the directors, staff, board members and the various stakeholders of the 
social security/national insurance institutions in the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States? As in "To Sir With Love, " if they wanted the moon I would try to 
reach it, but I would rather they allowed me to give my heart. The Directors of the 
Scheme have been so supportive of my research and have made available to me 
research material, statistics, their staff and even office space to facilitate my work. To 
them, I say a big thank you and I want them to know that without them, the study 
would not be what it is. 
I say thank you to Mr. Timothy Hodge, Director of the Anguilla Social Security 
Board and his staff. I must make mention here of Mr. Elkin Richardson, who not only 
organised many of the meetings for me but served as my chauffeur and provided 
much background information. Elkin, I owe you one! Mr. Lennox Gardner, Director 
of the Antigua and Barbuda Social Security Board and his staff, in particular, Mrs. 
Joseph and Mrs. Daphne Minnott. Mrs. Antoinette Skelton, Director of the British 
Virgin Islands Social Security Board and her staff, in particular Mrs. Yvonne Thomas, 
Mr. Clarence Faulkner, Mr. Joseph Williams and Mr. Alwon Smith. Ms Janice Jean 
Jacques, acting Director of the Dominica Social Security Board and her staff, 
especially Mr Sylvester Mark, Mr. Francis Letang, Mr. Augustus Etienne and Mr Jn- 
Baptiste. Mr. Ashton Frame, acting Director of the Grenada National Insurance 
Scheme and his staff, especially Mrs. Janice Thomas, Ms Marcelle Charles and Mr. 
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Sam. Mr Kenneth Scotland, director of the Montserrat Social Security Board and his 
staff, especially Mr Jemmott Rawlins and Ms Paulette Ward. Mrs. Sephlin Lawrence, 
Director of the St, Christopher and Nevis Social Security Board and her staff, 
especially Ms Paulette Eddy, Mrs. Dianne Holdip, Mrs. Sonia Edwards and Ms 
Angela Liburd. Ms Emma Hypolite, Director of the St. Lucia National Insurance 
Scheme and her staff especially Mr. Louis Augustin, Mr. Lincoln Mathurin and Mr. 
Khalicharan. Mr. Reginald Thomas, Executive Director of the St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines National Insurance Scheme and his staff, in particular Mrs. Betty 
Medford, Mr. Richard Williams and Ms Donette Arundell. I wish to also thank here, 
Mr. Hudson Savarin, former Director of the Dominica Social Security, who always 
responded to my calls for assistance. 
I wish to singly out Mrs Jennifer Astaphans, Mrs Jennifer White, Mrs Edith Bellot- 
Allen and Mr Vernon Shaw for speaking and acting on my behalf when it mattered. 
Many, many thanks. 
Friends add colour to our lives and are the family we choose and I say thank you to all 
my friends, those near and far, those who I talk to regularly and those who we speak 
just once in a while, those who though we have not communicated or seen each other 
in years, are always in my heart and have me in theirs. It is not possible to name 
everyone here, but you know who you are. My friends, I give thanks for you daily 
and I ask God to keep you in the palm of his hands, guiding, protecting, blessing, 
loving and lighting the way. , 
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On this j oumey I reconnected with some childhood friends in Tortola, whom I had not 
seen and spoken to in more than 16 years in some cases and definitely at least ten in 
all the cases, and yet when we met, it was like we had seen each other just the day 
before. I tell you this is what true friendship is: loving even in absentia, and just like 
good wine, getting better with age. Orine, Loftus, Miriam, Evans, Eluid, Centura, I 
love you my dearest friends. Lyndon, Julia & Shalyn added to the joy on this stop. 
While on the fieldtrip in the Caribbean, I stayed by several friends who made me feel 
so at home, that for once in my life, I felt completely at ease at homes other than 
family. Every act of kindness weaves throughout the tapestry of our lives and these 
people who I will mention next will have blessings forever because of their kindness. 
Just as an elephant never forgets, I will never forget these acts of kindness. I say 
thank you to Jennifer Astaphans, for putting me up in St. Lucia. I felt so at home, that 
I took over the entire house!! Marcia, who keeps me in tune with the spirits and 
Mom Burrowes, whose faith is an inspiration provided shelter on the second stop in 
Barbados. Thankfully, I only stayed four days, for I was fed with so much love that 
any longer, I would become an elephant!!! Then unto to Lisa, Roger and Gaby in 
Trinidad. These three deserve special, special thanks for we had met only once 
before, but you would never have known had I not told you! Then the next stop took 
me to Michelle and Telbert in St. Vincent who put up with me for two weeks and 
stored my stuff for an extra one, while I went off to Germany to attend a conference. 
I made them late on most mornings but not a word of complaint. They also "threw" 
me a bash that was worthy of any banquet. I have to mention here Michelle's Mom, 
Ms Steele and her sister Andy, Jerry, for looking out for me, Wayne and Descima, my 
Warwick buddies who took me sightseeing and made me late for my appointment 
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with the Board Chairman! I have to say sincerest thanks to Mr. Creighton, Chairman 
of the NIS Board in St. Vincent who rescheduled the appointment, what a man! Then 
to Grenada, a special thank you to Mrs. Cheryl Fletcher and her Mom, who arranged 
my stay and got me a much-reduced rate for my accommodation, and Mr Campbell 
for friendship and those wonderful breads. I say thank you to Merrill and her husband 
for renting me the beautiful apartment at such a good price. It was on the beachfront, 
and for the first time on this trip, I was able to indulge in a little sea bathing! So you 
see, contrary to what most thought when they heard I was off to the Caribbean for five 
months, I was not sipping pina coladas on the beach everyday!! In St. Kitts, my 
friend Susan provided not only her home but also her brand new Honda CRV, which 
made moving around so much easier. In Anguilla, my cousin Vandalyn, her husband 
Pat and family, Esther, Leroy, Vandalyn, Vernice, Licie, Shantelle surrounded me 
with love, and mangoes! In Tortola, I was completely at home with my friend 
Roseann, and the reunion with my childhood friends made this a very special stop. 
Then on to the last legs in Antigua and Montserrat. In Montserrat, Flo not only 
provided warmth and friendship but arranged the meetings, collected most of the 
information and just smoothed the way. I say thank you also to Pat for her support 
and friendship. In Antigua, Asman, Janet and Jaleel provided the needed 
encouragement and tranquillity to keep me going to the end. 
Some of my friends I have met on this journey, and they have been true companions. 
They include Donna, my friend, housemate and source of much laughter; Tony, a 
gentle soul with a midas touch in the kitchen! Edgar, for looking out for the entire 
Caribbean community on campus, Maura for just being Mau; Kala, my crazy 
Jamaican sister, with whom there is never a dull moment, Katia, who waited on the 
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Viva day, Maureen, Ivan, Anupama, Sanjay, my Lakeside flatmates, Feda, who is like 
asister. Hazel joined me on the journey in almost the closing stages and her presence 
was truly divine inspiration, for it was her idea to get the thesis to Professor Theodore 
by a BWIA steward that really sowed the seeds which led to the thesis reaching him 
with enough time to prepare for a viva in December. Hazel, many, many thanks. To 
all the Caribbean Riddim members, especially the founding members, for providing 
the Caribbean warmth and love here in cold Britannia! 
There have been friends who've been there for the long hauls and always: Karen, my 
best buddy from third form in high school and on whom I can always count on. The 
bouquet of twelve long stem roses to mark my birthday this year was a confirmation 
of the message that "it has pleased The Father to give me good things, " Thank You. 
Roseann, who has never allowed our fiames of friendship to die, Eleanor, for 
remaining the same, Girlie, my source of laughter, madness, love all bundled in one, 
Rosebud, who never fails to bring joy to my heart, Miglena, my teacher on anything 
related to opera, classical music and the theatre; Barenboim was a real birthday treat! 
Miriam, for just being larger than life, Rosie, for always being in my comer, Eddie, 
forjust being Eddie, Yvonne for reminders to "walk in your destiny". Rawle, Stephie 
& Carl for friendship, Ms Laf for the best coconut bread that reassures that all will be 
okay, Tessa, for her radiance and optimism, Dr. C, for encouragement, Dianne, Betty, 
and Mrs. R for showing that distance does not diminish friendship. Little M, Sandra, 
Novella, Dawn, Mrs Mills and Othine for friendship. Aunty Emmo, for faith in me 
and for always preparing my special meals on the day I return home. Arthur, Sheba, 
Nestor and his family for unconditional love and friendship. FEJ always tells it as it 
is and can always bring a smile to my heart no matter the situation. 
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Clare, for love, always being there and who I can call on at anytime, Ghandi, her 
husband, and my four little children, Rajiv, Raschida, Louise & Raffiq, whose 
continuous demands, "Aunty, when are you coming home? " served to keep me 
focused on my goal. Susan, for loyalty, unwavering friendship and faith. 
My friends in the Ministry, especially Father Celsus Augiste, Father Frank Powell, 
and Sister Janet Obiru for friendship, constant prayers and love. On the last leg of the 
journey, when a bit of frustration was setting in, Fr. O's inspired words "hey hold on, 
the closer it gets the more difficult it will seem, its only a trick of the enemy, " sure 
served to put things in perspective. 
George deserves a paragraph just for him. We often say to people "Whatever would I 
do without you? " and many times, we could do what we did without them easily. But 
for George, when I ask that question, the answer is I would have found it so much 
more difficult without you. George has been a pillar of strength, an encourager and 
motivator, a shoulder to lean on and in short, George is family. We have been 
through it all: the good times, the bad times and the downright horrible times, and our 
friendship has stood the test not just of time and distance, but circumstances. George 
K, from my heart to yours, many, many thanks. 
My family is God alive to me. The Lord knew that I would need a very special family 
to bring me up and surround me with the love to ensure that I did his work, and he 
chose this one. I would not trade them for all the riches of this earth. My family is 
my biggest fan club, they envelope me with love and have so much faith in me, that 
sometimes, I have to remind them that I am only human! Two songs epitomise my 
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relationship with my family: they are "the wind beneath my wings" and "I am 
everything I am" because they love me. 
Daddy, Elkin Bernard has always stressed the importance of education and excellence 
and instilled a faith that the only limitations we face are the ones that we create 
ourselves. He did not think that graduating from the University of the West Indies 
with first class honours was anything special which needed to be rewarded with a 
giftM Let's see whether he believes this achievement warrants a small token of 
recognitionM Throughout this journey, his parting words at the end of each phone 
call was "Val, remember to reach for the stars and let my love surround you. I love 
you 
C4 onme, my sister-mother, who truly made me into who I am. She characterises 
unselfish love and giving and taught me to do everything I did with everything I had, 
and if I could not do that, then I should not do it. She is the one who reminds me of 
the "diction thing" and I know that she is always in my comer. My family says that I 
am just like her, and so I guess that's why we sometimes don't see eye to eye, but 
through all disagreements, one thing that is never in doubt, is the love we have for 
each other. 
Eluid, my other father, for love, care, unselfish giving and for demonstrating that we 
express our love not so much by what we say but by what we do and how we do it. 
His words of advice when I was leaving for my first degree in 1985, "Valda, the only 
place where success comes before work is in the dictionary, " continues to serve me 
well. 
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Cleo, my link to the family in Europe, who loves me unconditionally and who has 
opened many doors for me at the ILO. Throughout the journey, she provided regular 
phone calls just to "see how thing are going", books, material, home and good old 
family time. Isla has to get special mention here, for she is part of the family, and she 
treats me like her sister. Thanks Isla for all those special things you do to make my 
stay in Geneva so much fun and so full of love. Doumbia never tires of teasing me 
about the husband; now that this journey is over, maybe the husband will be part of 
the next! 
Mayor, my eldest brother who is so proud of me and who has been waiting for 
graduation day for about a year now. The end is near and soon that day for which he 
has long so much for is at hand. 
Edgar, the world's handsomest brother who has a heart of gold, and who provides 
inspiration to be strong and to keep to my goals. 
Athenia, my crazy, crazy sister, for whom Frank Sinatra sang the song, "I did it my 
way! " She loves and gives with all her heart and asks for nothing in return. She has 
kept my hopes alive and has furnished me with all sorts of material to keep my heart, 
mind, body and soul all in harmony. 
Josephine, the example of unconditional love and giving. She made sure that I never 
forgot, (as if I could! ) that we are family and that family looks out for each other. She 
keeps spoiling me and I have to often say to her, "No Joan, save your money! " She 
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also gets mad with me for thinking that "she is older than me. " Like Cleo, she has 
provided the family in Europe. 
Catherine, my number one fan in the world. The most excitable person I know who 
can make the most mundane thing the most exciting, most important and worthy to be 
praised!! I have to keep saying to her "Cam, you are too silly, stop! " Towards the 
end of this journey, she took over the conversion of the Excel Appendices into Word, 
a most tedious and time-consuming task, with such enthusiasm and joy all because 
she loves me. Thank you Carnos! Jean Claude understands the importance of family 
and knows how much Catherine and I mean to each other and deserves many, many 
thanks for suggesting that Catherine "walk the final walk" with me on this journey. 
We did not hesitate in "running" with that suggestion! 
Yolanda, Eddie and Harvey believe in me and that faith keeps me going on. Shirley 
deserves special mention here for her love and kindness. 
My nieces and nephews are my children to whom I have not given birth. They 
provide me with so much joy, laughter, love, motivation to excel and a little bit of 
heartache to make this real. Sekani, Kondwani, Anya, N-neka, Kenton, Kerry, 
Pernella, Yannick, Gem, Junior, Pat, Zani, Zane, Cory, Bassi, Zienna and Kyla, I love 
you. 
The rest of my family especially my cousins in the UK, especially Jeanne, Andrew, 
Carla and Charmaine and Aunty Vonie for always enveloping me with love. 
Marna, Ilma Veronica died when I was six, however, she has never left me. She is my 
guardian angel and her presence in my life is as real as if she were alive. Mama, I say 
thank you for being my guide, inspiration and angel. Julie, Clement and Nora are my 
siblings who have also gone onto the great beyond, and they too are always in my 
heart. 
Finally, to God, for choosing me to undertake this work, I give all the praise, glory 
and honour. I thank him for all his blessings, angels, love, direction and peace that 
surpasses all understanding. This has been the period when I was the least financially 
secure, yet I never went without and it was the time when I was most secure in my 
heart, soul and peace of mind. A real affirmation that I am worth more than the 
ravens, who neither sow nor reap, yet God takes care of them, how much more will he 
take care of me (Luke 12: 24). What a mighty God I serve. Amen. 
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There Is No Lasting Peace 
Without Social Justice 
There Is No Social Justice 
Without Social Security 
There Is No Social Security 
Without Sound Financing 
(International Labour Organisation's International Financial And Actuarial Service (ILO 
FACTS), November 26,1998) 
There is No Sound Financing 
Without Good Governance 
There is No Good Governance 
Without Persons of Integrity 
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ABSTRACT 
Social security systems have come under attack with claims that they negatively 
impact savings, capital formation and the labour supply. This, together with the near- 
bankruptcies of some social security systems have led to a series of reforms, including 
the privatisation of the system with the assignment of individual accounts to 
contributors. There have, however, been little efforts in isolating the cause of the 
failure of the social security systems and in the identification of the factors which may 
enhance performance. It is this gap, which this study attempts to fill by investigating 
the relationship between governance, performance and administration of the social 
security systems by addressing the key question "How do governance factors impact 
on the performance and administration of social security systems in the Member 
States of the Organisation Of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)? " 
The success of any study is crucially dependent on the quality of the data, and one of 
the advantages of this study is the ease of access to not only the primary data but also 
the senior social security stakeholders in the OECS. The homogeneity of the systems 
is also an advantage for any differences will be more sharply put in focus. A 
triangulation method combining multivariate analysis using panel data compiled for 
this study and interviews with policy makers and senior officials in the social security 
system in the OECS will be employed to address the key question of this dissertation. 
The interview analysis is important for governance is not only what it is, but also very 
importantly what it is perceived to be and the analysis provides the context for 
understanding the governance relationships in the OECS. 
The main findings of the study are that autonomy and independence of the social 
security organisations, accountability, transparency, diversification of the investment 
portfolio, professional expertise, partnership-building among the stakeholders and 
involvement of the plan participants at the board level are important in enhancing the 
performance and administration of the social security organisations. The results of 
the analysis also suggest that it is important to ensure that the persons chosen to 
represent the plan participants at the board level are persons of integrity with the 
requisite qualifications and qualities. 
This study, it is hoped will inform and lead to a re-examination of the reform debate 
to include the role of governance in the reform and sustainability of social security 
organisations worldwide. 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Question 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the relationship between governance 
and performance of social security organisations. The key question to be addressed is 
"how do governance factors impact on the performance and administration of social 
security systems in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)? 
Bismarck introduced the first social security system in 1898 in Germany, which 
provided for the replacement of income to the worker or his dependants in the event 
of certain contingencies, such as sickness, death or old age. The system catered 
principally for the employed person, and served as a benchmark for the introduction 
of social security systems in other places. 
Beveridge in 1942, in reviewing the social security system in the United Kingdom, 
made some recommendations, which would not replace the Bismarckian system but 
enhance it. Beveridge recommendations acknowledged that workers were not the 
only class needing protection from contingencies, but everyone needed protection. 
And so by advocating universal coverage, Beveridge changed the nature of the social 
security system. He placed greater emphasis on solidarity between persons and on 
redistribution, as workers were the ones who contributed to the system, but everyone, 
including the unemployed, benefited. 
This principle of universal coverage is the major contribution of Beveridge to social 
security and has influenced the evolution of social security worldwide. However, it is 
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also one of the main factors leading to calls for the reform of social security systems, 
on the grounds that it leads to perverse redistribution and a decline in savings and 
capital formation. 
In recent years the calls for reform have been relentless and have given rise to what 
Aaron (1982) called "a growth industry for economists in the United States. " It is, 
however, arguably, not only for economists in the United States, judging by the 
volume and speed with which papers on social security are written by researchers in 
other parts of the world. In his seminal paper Feldstein (1974) attacked the social 
security system in te ted States and argued that the system led to a reduction of 
national savings and economic growth. He subsequently called for the funding and 
privatisation of the system and for contributors to manage their individual accounts 
(Feldstein, 1976,1997). This would provide coverage only for workers, as the 
unemployed would have no contributions that could be managed. It did not matter 
that Leimer & Lesnoy (1982) proved that there was a programming error and that 
Feldstein's (1974) estimations were wrong. The calls for privatisation continued 
unabated. 
Then in 1981, the Chilean social security system which was on the brink of 
bankruptcy as a result of mismanagement (Mesa Lago, 1990) was privatised. Chile 
thus became the first country in the world to take such action. This increased the calls 
for the privatisation of social security systems, and when the World Bank joined the 
fray with the publication of its seminal book "Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to 
Protect the Old and Promote Growth, " in 1994, the calls reached feverish level. The 
World Bank argued that social security led to a decrease in savings, perverted 
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redistribution and that government management was inefficient. It recommended the 
privatisation of social security systems and the establishment of three main pillars of 
support. The World Bank declared its way the "[correct way]" (Holzmann, 2000a) 
and began not only recommending but also playing a vital part in the privatisation of 
social security systems in other parts of Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
In the meantime, opponents, many associated with the International Labour 
Organisation and the International Social Security Association, joined the debate and 
argued that it was the responsibility of the State to provide for its citizens as espoused 
in the United Nations Human Rights Declaration of 1948 and by the various ILO 
Conventions on social security. The "war" continued unabated for many years, with 
each side keeping to its ideological stance. It is only in recent times, from about 
1999, that both sides have started giving ground and recognising that there is some 
validity in both their arguments. The World Bank, while still arguing it's way is the 
correct way, agrees that there is need to provide some basic protection for all citizens 
and the ILO agrees that the individuals have a responsibility to provide for their 
retirement and thus make alternative, complementary provisions to meet the various 
contingencies. 
However, while this debate and "war" waged on, an important element was forgotten 
in the many reform efforts of the last twenty years. That forgotten element is the 
"governance" of the social security systems. While those advocating privatisation 
blamed the system for reducing saving and encouraging governments to over-spend, 
little, if any, attention was placed on determining the reasons behind the poor 
performance and even bankruptcy of the system. The World Bank advocated 
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privatisation on grounds of govenunent's inefficiency, but as evidence in Chile and 
other countries showed, privatisation is not a cure for inefficiencies. Private finns can 
be just as inefficient as the public sector. 
It is only as the two sides take a more objective view of the issues that attention been 
given to the govemance of the systems. "Social Security Pensions: Policies and 
Reform " edited by Gillion et al (2000) devotes a chapter to the need for governance in 
social security organisations and outlines principles of good governance for social 
security systems. 
Research on the impact of governance in the public retirement systems in the United 
States (but not on the social security system there) includes Mitchell & Hsin (1997), 
Usccm. & Hess (1999) and Useem and Mitchell (2000), all of whom use data from the 
PENDAT files to analyse the impact of governance on the performance and portfolio 
composition of public retirement pension systems. Munnell and Sunden (1999), using 
the same PENDAT data files, analyse the impact of economically targeted 
investments on the performance of public retirement systems in the United States, 
while Srinvas & Yermo (1999) and Smivas, Yermo & Whitehouse (1999) analyse the 
impact of regulatory restrictions on the performance of the private pension systems in 
Latin America. However, no attempt is made to link governance of social security 
systems to their performance. 
The dissertation will attempt to identify and offer explanations as to how governance 
factors impact on the performance and administration of the social security systems of 
the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The OECS is selected for this 
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study because it has largely been ignored in the literature. The systems are also 
nearing maturity and it would be instructive if methods for enhancing the 
sustainability of these systems were put forward while there is still time to implement 
them. The OECS is made up of small states and this study could also offer directions 
for social security in microstates. Additionally because the systems are defined 
benefit, partially funded, publicly managed systems, the findings could be relevant for 
systems of this nature in both the developing and developed world. The homogeneity 
of the OECS group in terms of structure is also an advantage for any differences will 
be brought more sharply in focus. 
The dissertation argues that governance is a key component in the battle to maintain 
the sustainability and viability of social security systems, as the board and 
management confront the -many challenges, including that of demography. It also 
maintains that governance can play a role in reducing the negative macro-economic 
distortions, often accredited to social security systems. 
Panel data will be utilised in identifying the governance factors, which impact on the 
performance of the social security systems. The work of Mitchell & Hsin (M&H) 
(1997), which analysed the governance factors impacting on the performance of 
public retirement systems in the United States, will be used as a starting point for the 
analysis of this study. The two performance measures, rate of return and stock fund 
ratio, used by, M&H will also be used in this study, but there is a difference in the 
measurement of these variables. It will also expand on the independent variables used 
by them. In particular, it will not only look at the percentage of plan-participants but 
will also among others, look at the appointing authority of the board and director and 
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the dual chairmanship of the board and investment committee. Interviews were also 
conducted with social security stakeholders in the OECS to provide context, for in 
order to understand governance it is important to understand the context and operating 
enviromnent. It also provides the opportunity to give voice to the concerns and 
perceptions of the social security stakeholders on the functioning of the social security 
organisations. 
The success of any study is crucially dependent on the quality of the data and the ease 
of access to not only the primary data but also to the ministers, boards, executive 
directors and senior social security stakeholders in the OECS has been a distinct 
advantage of this study. 
1.2 Outline of The Dissertation 
Chapter Two presents the social security literature. As indicated earlier, the social 
security literature is broad, and in this chapter the focus will be on the transition of 
social security systems and the reform-taking place in the 1980's and 1990's. The 
arguments for and against the reform of social security systems and the identification 
of the major types of reform will be presented in t he chapter. A significant portion of 
the chapter will be devoted to the reform effort in Chile, as this was the first system to 
be reformed and served as a benchmark for subsequent reform initiatives. 
In Chapter Three, the evolution and reform efforts of the social security systems, as 
well as the provisions for private pensions in the OECS are discussed. The refonn 
initiatives implemented in the OECS will be identified and the role of social security 
in the economic development of the OECS will be examined. The private pension 
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landscape of the OECS will be discussed and the findings from interviews with 
insurance companies and social security stakeholders in relation to private pensions 
will be presented in this chapter. 
In Chapter Four the corporate governance literature is presented. The focus is on the 
role of the board's composition of the board in organisational performance. The 
corporate governance literature is also analysed in the context of the social security 
organisations in the OECS. 
Chapter Five presents the methodology. A triangulation method combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods has been employed in the study. Panel data 
analysis is used to identify the governance factors that impact on performance and 
administration of the SSO. The dependent and independent variables are described. 
The methodology and selection of the interviews are also presented. The work of 
Mitchell and Hsin (1997) on the impact of governance on the performance of the 
public retirement systems in the USA and the way in which this study builds on that 
research effort are presented. 
In Chapter Six the results from the panel data are analysed and discussed. This 
chapter reveals that governance does matter and that the board's size and composition 
affects performance. It also suggests that governance can be used in the fight to make 
social security systems sustainable and thus enable the organisations to manage their 
challenges, including the much "talked about" ageing crisis. 
hh, 
Chapter Seven presents the findings from the semi-structured interviews and provides 
an in-depth analysis of the challenges facing the organisations. It analyses the areas 
where the qualitative and quantitative methods yield the same results and also where 
they differ. 
The conclusions and policy recommendations appear in Chapter Eight. It highlights 
the contributions of this study and identifies future research interests. 
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CHAPTER TWO - REFORM OF SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the literature on social security and sets the foundation for the 
remainder of the dissertation. The literature on social security is immense and this 
chapter will concentrate on a brief analysis of the evolution of social security and the 
reform efforts taking place in the area. It will present the transitioning of social 
security systems from one form to the next and will examine the reasons for the 
transitions. 
In exploring the debate on the reform of social security systems worldwide, the 
position of the international organisations, in particular the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the World Bank (WB) will be presented. The refonn of the 
Chilean system will be analysed in-depth, because it was the very first social security 
system to be privatised and it has served as a benchmark for reform efforts elsewhere. 
A brief analysis of the second-generation reforms in Latin America and Central and 
Eastern Europe is also provided as well as a look at the UK pension system. 
2.2 Evolution of Social Security Systems' 
The ILO (1983) defines social security as the protection furnished by a society to its 
members in the event of certain contingencies, including sickness, old age, survivors, 
death, maternity, unemployment, industrial accidents and occupational hazards. 
Most industrial countries cover the entire range of the contingencies, including 
medical care. The less developed countries provide a limited range mainly, sickness, 
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maternity, old age, survivors' benefits, and employment injury. Very few developing 
countries provide unemployment insurance and complete medical care. 
ZZI Bismarckian Model 
The first social security scheme dates back to 1883 under the Bismarck government in 
Germany. Bismarck introduced three bills between 1883-1889 to protect the working 
population of Gennany against the risks of sickness, disability, accidents and old age. 
In 1883, the Sickness Insurance Bill was enacted, followed by the Accident Insurance 
Bill in 1884 and the Old Age and Infirmity Bill in 1889. This tripartite legislation, 
according to Arthur and Thyer (1995) comprised the first comprehensive system of 
social insurance instituted by a modem industrial state on behalf of its working 
population. They argue that this legislation was one of the first to recognise the role 
of the state in maintaining the economic security of workers; a direct contrast to the 
laissez faire principle of minimal state intervention. 
Bismarck's principles included: 
1. Coverage and funding of benefits compulsory on the part of both employers 
and employees. 
2. Benefits calculated and distributed according to the principles of social 
adequacy and individual equity. 
3. Liability for industrial accident insurance resided with the employers, 
regardless of fault (Arthur and Thyer, 1995). 
Arthur and Thyer (1995) argue that while historians often acknowledge Bismarck as 
the father of the modem welfare state, his role has often. been overlooked by social 
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workers. This, they argue, is misguided as, until the tripartite social legislation by 
Bismarck, state provision for economic security and health of its members had been 
partial, fragmented and lacked an explicit socio-political rationale. It was Bismarck 
who first enunciated that the state had an "obligation " to provide for the economic 
security of its working citizens, albeit a shared obligation, requiring contributions 
from the state, employers and employees to fund and administer the scheme. 
Beveridge, in reviewing the social security system, decided that the state's obligation 
was not only to provide income security for the working citizen's but was also an 
obligation for all citizens. 
ZZ2 Beveridge Model 
In 1942, after reviewing the UK pension system, the Beveridge Report was published. 
The report raised several themes, and while not all of his recommendations were 
adopted, his model served as an important blueprint not only for the UK, but also for 
other countries seeking to establish or reform their pension systems. It was deemed to 
be the "document, which set the agenda for [the] post-war welfare state, " 
(MacGregor, 1992). 
Beveridge based his recommendations on three assumptions that were necessary for 
success in social insurance. These were family allowances, comprehensive health 
service and full employment. These assumptions were translated into three principles: 
universalism, unity and integration. According to Perrins (1992) the principle of 
universalism "represents Beveridge's essential contribution to the modem notion of 
social security. " The principle of unity should be seen as one of unifonnity and 
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equality both of obligations and rights in relation to the various contingencies covered 
by social security. This is embodied in the flat rate of both contributions and benefits. 
The principle of integration encompasses the integration of social insurance and social 
assistance, co-ordinated with policies for health care, guaranteed income and full 
employment (Perrins, 1992). The purpose of this was to strengthen social security's 
guaranteed income function on the one hand and maintain or restore people's capacity 
to work on the other, while promoting full employment and thus securing the financial 
stability of the system. This, Perrins (1992) asserts, had an ambitious aim to wipe out 
class distinctions and promote national unity with the aid of the universality and unity 
of the social security system. 
Beveridge foresaw social security as being "first and foremost a plan of insurance - of 
giving in return for contributions, benefits up to subsistence level, as of right and 
without means test, so that individuals may build freely upon it, " (MacGregor, 1992). 
His vision for social security can be seen in context of his earlier writings on social 
insurance. In 1924, in his book "Insurancefor All and Everything, " he outlined five 
ways by which the income of a family maybe destroyed permanently or for a time: 
industrial accident, sickness, unemployment, old age or death of the breadwinner. 
These he argued are "all threats to security, risks of economic life and disorders 
endemic in modem society. They are disorders of society rather than of the individual 
and society has a responsibility to minimise these risks, as they cannot be eliminated 
altogether". It is this view which framed his recommendation for the collective 
provision for mitigating the risks and for advocating universal coverage. 
kk6. 
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To appreciate Beveridge's recommendations, it is important to remember that the time 
in which he wrote was when the family unit was seen as the central and most 
important unit of society, with each family unit having a male breadwinner. The 
predominant view was that society had to protect the earnings of the breadwinner to 
ensure that he and his family did not suffer from wants, which could lead to crime. 
While there were those who opposed social insurance arguing that each person was to 
fend for himself and take measures to protect his earnings, the view that it was a 
responsibility of society was the predominant view. 
Today the view that it is an individual's responsibility to protect his earnings and 
prepare for life's 'contingencies appears to be in the ascendancy and this has led to 
calls for the privatisation of social security systems. This call gained momentum in 
1974 with the publication of a seminal piece of work by Feldstein, in which he argued 
that Social Security negatively impacted on savings and capital formation. 
Privatisation of the Chilean system in 1981 and the publication of the World Bank's 
"Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote GrowtW' in 
1994, also served to strengthen the calls for privatisation of the social security 
systems. There are however still those who see social security as a component of 
social protection which is a fundamental human right, and which plays a crucial role 
in fostering social cohesion and in preserving human dignity (Beattie, 2000, Scholz et 
al, 2000). 
These differing positions opened a huge and politicised debate, with proponents and 
critics on both sides. Neither of the parties wanted to concede any ground to the other 
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side and it is only in more recent years that there has been evidence of a compromise 
by the parties. 
2.3 The Debate on Reforming Social Security Schemes 
The call for reform of social security schemes began in the 1960's, though Barr 
(1987) notes that in Britain, the debate on the impact of national pension systems 
dates back to 1909. However, the most earnest economic analysis of the impact of 
social security on the economy, national savings and capital accumulation began in 
the 1970's, following serious financial problems in the US social security system, the 
publication of the seminal article by Feldstein in 1974, and the reform of the Chilean 
social security system in 1981. Consequently, Aaron (1982) notes that "research on 
social security influences on personal saving, labour supply and the distribution of 
income, has become major growth industry among economists in the United States. " 
Considering the volume that has been written on social security in the last thirty years, 
by economists and other writers from Latin America, Europe and elsewhere, it is 
arguably a growth industry worldwide and not just for economists. 
2.3.1 Reasons Behind the CaMfOr Reform 
In the early years, the main reasons behind the call for reform was the fact that the 
opponents of social security believed that social security was an individual 
responsibility and not that of the State. They argued for the "right to work" or for 
decent maintenance if there was no work and linked the desire for social security with 
the demands for minimum wage, family allowances and full employment policy. 
Ernest Bevin believed that true "social security" would be fostered mainly by full 
employment and good wage standards rather than by any "social ambulance" scheme 
(MacGregor, 1992). 
The main reasons advanced for the recent efforts at reform of social security systems 
are the negative impact of social security on savings, labour supply and capital 
formation, perverse redistribution, inefficiency of public management and the 
increasing old age dependence (Feldstein, 1974, World Bank, 1994). Feldstein (1974) 
is credited with re-opening the debate on the impact of social security on savings and 
capital accumulation (Aaron, 1982, Barr, 1987), and in the next section a brief 
analysis of his paper is presented. 
2.3.2 Feldstein's Seminal 1974 Paper on the Impact of Social Security 
Feldstein (1974) in addressing the question of the impact of social security on savings 
adapted the consumption function used by Ando and Modigliani (1963) by including 
social security wealth variable and incorporated this analysis in a life cycle 
hypothesis framework. He argued that social security by providing income during 
retirement reduces the amount of saving during the working years. However, he 
conceded that social security, like pensions, has a dual impact: (i) it reduces personal 
saving because it substitutes for household assets and (ii) it also increases personal 
savings because it lengthens the period of retirement over which accumulated assets 
will be spread. The net effect will thus depend on the relative strength of the two 
forces. He used time series data from the United States from 1929 to 1971, excluding 
the years 1941 - 1946. 
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He differentiated between two measures of social security wealth: gross social 
security wealth (SSWGt) and net social security wealth (SSWNt). SSWGt is the 
present value in year t of the retirement benefits, which could eventually be claimed 
by all those who are either retired in the labour force or already retired in year t. 
SSV; Nt equals gross social security minus the present value of the social security 
taxes to be paid by those who are currently in the labour force. Feldstein employed 
different assumptions about real interest rates and growth rates of real per capita 
income to construct the values for the SSWGt and SSWNt. He also included 
corporate retained earnings as a variable to serve as a proxy for the pennanent 
componcnt of capital gains. 
Feldstein's equation estimation was as follows: 
Ct -"2 Ci + 
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He concluded that social security substantially depresses personal savings, as the 
rnarginal propensity to consume social security wealth was much higher than the 
propensity to consume ordinary wealth. He estimated that social security halved the 
savings rate which would lead to a decrease in capital stock of 38% and a reduction in 
GNP by 11 % to 15% depending on the assumptions made. 
Lesnoy & Hambor (1975) argued that Feldstein's work had to be viewed with caution, 
as the values and statistical reliability of his key regression coefficients were sensitive 
to both the model specification and the period of estimation. It will be remembered 
that the SSWGt and SSWNt are both subjective measures depending on interest 
assumptions made. They also argued that factors like the other income security 
programs - unemployment benefits, health insurance, private pensions - and 
education have increased substantially and these may have influenced saving 
behaviour. 
Munnell (1977) used the same data set and replicated the Feldstein's study. Her 
findings were consistent with Feldstein's though the coefficients were significantly 
lower. Burkhauser & Tumer (1982) however, argued that determining the effect of 
social security on saving in a consumption function leads to an overstatement of 
social security's negative effect on saving. It was however Lesnoy & Leimer (1982) 
who found a programming error in the original estimation of Feldstein, and in 
replicating the model using the corrected data found that social security had a positive 
effect on savings. 
Several other studies have yielded different results with some yielding a positive 
effect and others a negative and this has led Aaron (1982) to conclude that time series 
data is not a useful measure to analyse the impact of social security on savings and 
capital formation. This has however, not stopped researchers using both the 
consumption model and time series to analyse the impact of social security on savings 
and capital formation (Kotlikoff & Summers, 1981; Modigliani, 1988; Blundell 
Johnson, 1998; Borsch-Supan & Schnabel, 1998; Kapteyn & Vos, 1998; Wise, 1998). 
Following the publication of Feldstein's paper, the advent of the Chilean Reform and 
the publication of the World Bank's seminal book in 1994, many persons have called 
for the full funding of social security systems (Feldstein, 1976,1997; James, 1995). 
Hemming (1998) however, asserts that while the theoretical arguments tend to be 
consistent with the view that funding will lead to higher savings; the empirical 
evidence is not conclusive on this matter. He posits that the argument that a pay-as- 
you-go (PAYG) system will lead to a decrease in national savings ignores a few vital 
points, namely: 
* If PAYG encourages persons to retire early, people will save to achieve full 
economic independence as they now have to provide for a longer retirement; 
4, Persons desire to leave bequests to their family will encourage savings; 
* Social security does not, in and of itself, provide full retirement income security. 
It is often argued that full funding will lead to an increase in national savings but 
again, the evidence on this is not conclusive. In 1980, Chile registered a 21% gross 
national saving when the social security was financed on the PAYG basis, while in 
1991, following the move to a funded system in 1981, it was 18.8% (Uthoff, 1993). 
Holzmann (1997) found that there, was an increase in national savings and worker 
productivity following the Chilean reform of its social security system, but attributed 
most of it to the higher growth rates in the Chilean economy. 
Samuel (1993) argues that there is no doubt that national pension schemes in the 
Caribbean have had a positive impact on savings but the evidence on investment is 
not as encouraging. He cites St. Rose (1982) who concluded "the schemes have not 
had a deleterious effect on the growth of savings deposits ... and during the period 
estimated balances of the various schemes amount to 37% of savings deposit balances 
which means an increase in financial flows. " St. Rose (1982) also estimated that 
during the same period the ratio of investment to GDP declined. This observation, 
Samuel (1993) argues, highlights the absence of strong linkages between saving and 
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investment in small dependent economies, one possible explanation for this being the 
investment of these funds by the national pension schemes. 
In the reform debates, which ensued following the publication of Feldstein's paper, 
and the conversion by Chile to its new system, the international organisations have 
taken positions on both sides of the debate. In the next section the positions of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the World Bank (WB), the two 
international organisations at the forefront of the debate are presented. 
2.4 The Position of the International Labour Organisation and the 
World Bank 
The ILO is often regarded as the bastion of workers' and labour rights and the ILO 
has played an instrumental part in the establishment of social security systems in 
many parts of the world. The ILO provided technical assistance in establishing social 
security systems to many countries, including those in the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, 
Europe, the Americas and even the former East European States. According to 
Holzmann (2000), when no one else was allowed into the East European countries, 
the ILO had a presence there. The International Social Security Association (ISSA) 
plays a leading role in the research efforts on social security and its position on social 
security is closely identified with that of the ILO. The ILO and ISSA have taken joint 
positions on various issues, especially with regard to the refonns of social security 
systems (Gillion & Bonilla, 1992; Beattie & McGillivray, 1995). 
The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are relative latecomers to the 
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social security arena, with the WB taking the lead in the reform initiatives. The 
World Bank announced its presence on the social security arena with the publication 
of the seminal book "Averting the Old Age Crisis" in 1994, which documented its 
position on social security and announced what the WB tenned "the correct way, " for 
social security organisation. In the early years the IMF's position was closely aligned 
to the WB, with the two organisations publishing joint statements on their positions 
(IN4F, 1993), obviating the need to consider the views of the IN4F separately. 
Z4.1 The Position of the International Labour Organisation 
The ILO's position on social security is encapsulated in Conventions 35,37,38,102 
and 128. Conventions 35,37, and 38 of 1933, the Old Age Insurance (Industry etc); 
the Invalidity Insurance (Industry etc) and the Invalidity Insurance (Agriculture) 
respectively, recommend that steps be taken to ensure that: 
(a) Employers contribute to the formation of the financial resources of the 
insurance Scheme; 
(b) The public authorities contribute to the financial resources of the insurance 
scheme; 
(c) The pension scheme be administered by institutions not conducted with a view 
to profit; 
(d) Representatives of the insured persons participate in the administration of all 
the insurance institutions (Gillion and Bonilla, 1992). 
Convention 102 Social Security (Minimum Standards) of 1952 contains 
recommendations on minimum standards with regards to the main branches of social 
security: medical 'care, sickness benefit, unemployment benefit, old-age benefit, 
employment injury benefit, family benefit, maternity benefit, invalidity benefit and 
survivors' benefit. 
Articles 71 and 72 deals with some common provisions and stipulates that: 
(a) The cost of the benefits provided in compliance with this Convention and the 
cost of the administration of such benefits shall be borne collectively by way 
of insurance contributions or taxation or both in a manner which avoids 
hardship to persons of small means and takes into account the economic 
situation of the Member and of the classes of persons protected; 
(b) The total of the insurance contributions bome by the employees protected 
shall not exceed fifty per cent of the total financial resources allocated to the 
protection of the employees and their dependants; 
(c) The Member shall accept general responsibility for the due provision of the 
benefits provided in compliance with this Convention, and shall take all 
measures required for this purpose; it shall ensure, where appropriate, that the 
necessary actuarial studies and calculations concerning financial equilibrium 
are made periodically and, in any event, prior to any change in benefits, the 
rate of insurance contributions, or the taxes allocated to covering the 
contingencies in question; 
(d) Where the administration is not entrusted to an institution regulated by the 
public authorities or to a Government department responsible to a legislature, 
representatives of the persons protected shall participate in the management, 
or be associated therewith in a consultative capacity, under prescribed 
conditions; national laws or regulations may likewise decide as to the 
participation of representatives of employers and of public authorities; 
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(e) The Member shall accept general responsibility for the proper administration 
of the institutions and services concerned in the application of the Convention. 
(f) A periodic payment shall be paid throughout the contingency and in the case 
of old age benefit; the minimum benefit shall be 40% of the previous carnings 
of the employee. 
Convention 128 concerning Invalidity, Old Age and Survivors' Benefits, 1967 
incorporates the revision to Conventions 35,37 and 38 of 1933. It incorporates 
many of the requirements of Convention 102. It also stipulates (Article 6) that a 
Member may take account of protection effected by means of insurance which, 
although not made compulsory by its legislation for the persons to be protected: 
a) Is supervised by the public authorities or administered, in accordance with 
prescribed standards, by joint operation of employers and workers; 
b) Covers a substantial part of the persons whose earnings do not exceed those of 
the skilled manual male employee. 
c) Consists of Periodic payments which shall be paid throughout the contingency 
and in the case of old age; the minimum benefit should be 45% of previous 
eamings of the employee. 
Both Conventions 102 and 128 allows for Member states to not provide for all the 
contingencies based on economic ability and also allows for exclusion of some classes 
of workers, example, seamen, seafarers and public servants. It also recommends a 
means and income test for benefits and for the exclusion of workers if they are out of 
state for a prolonged time, 'though it advocates equality of treatment for all residents 
be they nationals or not. 
These conventions provided the blueprint which the ILO used in advising countries on 
the establishment of social security schemes. The ILO typically recommended a pay- 
as-you-go or partially funded defined benefit, publicly managed social security 
scheme. In most of the cases, it appears that the ILO concentrated on ensuring that 
there was tripartite management, minimum standards legislation and periodic actuarial 
reviews. Though the ILO stressed the importance of good governance, the inclusion 
of "not-for-profit" clause in Conventions 35,37 and 38, may have served to send a 
contradictory message and may have led to a misconception that "not-for-pro it' is 
synonymous with "no profit. " 
This principle of "not-for-profit" may have played a major role in social security 
schemes not paying much attention to effective management. In Latin America, there 
is evidence of many of the social security organisations engaging in projects that were 
not financially viable, but were deemed to be socially desirable or for the interest of 
workers. This, combined with generous benefits without the corresponding increase 
in contributions and other factors led to the eventual bankruptcy of many of the Latin 
American social security systems (Mesa Lago, 1989; Wallich, 1983). This opened the 
way for the entrance of the World Bank into pension reform, and for its 
recommendations for a privately managed, fully funded, defined contribution system. 
The ILO does not consider a defined contribution system to be a viable social security 
system as it does not provide a guarantee of a minimum pension for workers. 
In the early years, many of the social security systems conformed to the Conventions. 
With the advent of the refonns, the tenns of the Conventions are being violated - 
example, with respect to contributions being from both employers and employees, 
employees being guaranteed a minimum of 40% income replacement and the tripartite 
nature of the board. This highlights the inability of the ILO to enforce compliance to 
the Conventions, despite their ratification. This also suggests the need to review the 
Conventions if they arc to remain relevant in the new order of social security 
provisioning. 
The ILO also provided technical assistance in the early years for much of the 
mandated actuarial reviews. The actuarial reviews do not focus on the efficiency of 
operations per se, but rather provide an indication of the funding of the organisation. 
Actuarial reviews also study the implications for the reserves and expenses of 
demographic changes and actuaries usually advice on the need for the increase of 
contributions and benefits. The reviews usually then conclude with a determination 
of the "actuarial soundness" of the system for a certain period of time. 
This verdict of "actuarial soundness" without much regard for the overall efficiency 
of operations may foster a culture of complacency. In 2001, when some social 
security systems in the Caribbean are beginning to show signs of financial stress, 
some board members and management still take comfort in the fact that the last 
actuarial review concluded that the system was "actuarially sound. " One social 
security director remarked that the actuarial review is his "second bible". Reliance on 
a "second bible" that provides only a partial analysis of operations may prove to be 
detrimental. This, may be one of the reasons why another director commented that 
"some of the problems we are now experiencing are because of the recommendations 
made by the actuary, which were implemented. " Most of those recommendations 
pertained to increases in the level of benefits and expenditures. However, 
governments do not always implement the recommendations made by the actuaries, 
especially with regard to increases in the contribution rate. 
The ILO, however, is taking measures to address this shortcoming. In a recent 
communication it has advised on the inclusion of technical observation on 
"possibilities to improve governance and management of the scheme (in our case 
primarily financial governance and management, i. e., staff training, improved 
procedures and controls for investments, statistics, accounting, budgeting). "' 
2.4.2 The Position of the World Bank 
The World Bank has been at the forefront calling for not just the refonn of social 
security but for implementing what they deem to be the "correct way, "a dominant 
second pillar of a fully funded, defined contribution, privately managed fund. The 
WB argues that there are three main aims of social security and social protection: 
redistribution, saving and coinsurance. Saving involves income smoothing over a 
person's lifetime; redistribution involves shifting lifetime income from one person to 
another and insurance involves protection against the probability that recession or bad 
investments will wipe out savings, that inflation will erode the real value, that people 
will outlive their own savings and that the program fails. The World Bank argues that 
to achieve the goals of a social security system, the three aims have to be managed 
separately. 
I Email dated July 6 2001, from Hiroshi Yamabana, FACTNET secretary on the subject, "Important: 
Conference Conclusions: New Items in Actuarial and Social Budgeting Reports. " FACTNET is a 
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The World Bank (1994) argues that public schemes that combine all three functions 
are problematic, for both efficiency and distributional reasons. When the systems are 
young and immature, politicians are tempted to promise generous benefits to the early 
retirees, without paying attention to the subsequent contribution rates that will be 
required from later cohorts. This then leads to a situation where the high contribution 
rates are seen as taxes by the workers and this leads to evasion; strategic manipulation 
by workers; an increase in the informal sector and unemployment; lower national 
output; and an increase in early retirees, which reduces the stock of experienced 
workers. There is however, no empirical evidence to support these assertions about 
the impact of high contribution rates. These arguments also seem to overplay the 
consequences of high contributions, as in many instances the social security 
contributions is seen as a tax on employment, increasing the employers' costs by the 
rate of contribution (ISSA, 1996). This point is revisited in Chapter Seven. 
Evasion, unemployment and growth of the informal sector are more likely to be 
effects of the economic realities rather than high contribution rates. Usually, high 
contribution rates are often as a result of economic realities. In Chapter Seven, some 
reasons for evasion in the OECS are presented. The evidence on the negative impact 
of social security on national output as discussed earlier is inconclusive. 
The WB also argues that the PAYG method of financing separates the benefits from 
the contributions, produces low costs and large positive transfers to the first covered 
generations and misses an opportunity for capital market development. - To redress the 
perceived ills of traditional social security systems, the World Bank recommends a 
network of actuaries and other professionals working in the social security field established by the ILO 
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three-pillar system to meet the three aims of social protection, that of redistribution, 
insurance and savings, respectively. The three-pillars comprise: 
(1) A first pillar, which could take one of three different forms -a means-tested, 
minimum pension guarantee to a mandatory second pillar, or a universal or 
employment-related flat rate. It would have as its main objective poverty 
alleviation and coinsuring against several risks, and it would be publicly 
managed. 
(2) A second pillar of mandatory savings that would be fully funded and privately 
managed. Although, it was not directly spelt out, the second pillar is expected 
to be defined contribution. It could take one or two forms, either individual 
accounts or occupational accounts. The World Bank noted that mandatory 
systems required careful regulation. 
(3) Voluntary occupational or savings plan to provide extra protection for those 
who so desire. 
This position drew very heavily from the experience of Chile, which had r6ormcd its 
system in 1981 and had adopted a multi-pillar system, with a big second tier that was 
defined contribution, fully funded and privately managed. The publication of 
Averting the Old Age Crisis really gave the World Bank a foothold into the social 
security arcna, especially with regard to the reforms of existing systems. This well- 
written book took a very strong anti-government stance and championed the case for 
individual rcsponsibility for rctircment provisions. The World Bank has bccn almost 
on a crusade in recommending and implementing its multi-pillar system approach to 
in 2001 for the improvement of actuarial, investment and operating practices of social security systems. 
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countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe. This is one of the key differences 
between the ILO and the World Bank. 
The World Bank states its position in a forthright manner and presents it as the 
correct way, whereas the ILO relies to a large extent on voluntary compliance with its 
various Recommendations and Conventions. Even in Social Security Pensions (2000) 
the position of the ILO as to what is considered the correct way is not presented. 
Instead a series of options, some of which appear contradictory are offered. 
Additionally, while Averting the Old Age Crisis was published under the World 
Bank's name, Pension Reform was not published under the ILO's narne, but by 
members of staff, with the usual disclaimer that these were not necessarily the 
position of the ILO. This may be a minor point, but it transmits an important message 
concerning the conviction of the organisation to its position. In contrast, the 
confidence, assertiveness and aggressiveness of the World Bank in putting forward its 
position, may have been influential in creating the huge role they play in pension 
reform throughout the world. 
The ILO was initially very critical of the multi-pillar approach, especially the heavy 
emphasis on the second pillar, as it was argued that this placed too much risks on the 
worker and also exposed the govenunent to unknown liability given the guarantee of 
a minimum pension (Gillion and Bonilla, 1992; Beattie & McGillivray, 1995). 
Further criticisms came from Beattie and McGillivray (1995), who in response to 
Averting the Old Age Crisis took issue with the report's assertion that public pension 
systems have failed both socially and economically, and argued that many of the 
shortcomings identified with the PAYG systems apply equally, if not more forcibly, 
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to private pension systems. They assert that the strategy advocated by the Bank of 
dispensing with social insurance systems in favour of mandatory saving plans would 
result in unacceptable high degree of risks for workers and pensioners, increases in 
age pension costs and the imposition of a heavy burden on the current generation of 
workers. McGillivray and Beattie (1995) argue that a more efficient and less 
disruptive approach to retirement pension would be to focus on measures to rectify 
design efficiencies and inequities in existing schemes. Another approach may be the 
determination of the role of governance factors in enhancing operational efficiencies, 
administration and performance of those schemes. 
In more recent times, the ILO has come around to the idea of a multi-pillar system. In 
Social Security Pensions: Development and Reform, Gillion et al (2000) posit that all 
countries need to develop pluralistic designs and flexible structures for their social 
security systems, and that to meet the goals of alleviating poverty in old age and 
providing low-risk retirement benefits, multiple sources of benefits are usually 
needed. They make different recommendations for developed and developing 
countries. They argue that the best approach for developed countries can be 
characterised as a multi-tiered system, with the tiers being determined by their risk 
and redistributive characteristics. They propose four tiers as follows: 
Tier I which is means-tested, financed from general revenues and has as its 
objective anti-poverty; 
Tier 2 which is PAYG; 
9 Tier 3 which is mandatory and defined contribution in nature; 
* Tier 4 which comprises of voluntary savings and non-pension sources of income. 
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Gillion et al (2000: 18), maintain that this approach is not about a particular number of 
tiers, but about the recognition that retirement income should be provided from 
different sources to diversify the risks. To a very large extent, the ILO's recent 
recommendations are similar to those proposed by the World Bank, with the major 
difference being in the second pillar. The World Bank is in favour of a mandatory, 
defined contribution, fully funded, privately managed system, while the ILO favours a 
mandatory, defined benefit, PAYG, publicly managed system. 
There is not a very specific recommendation made for developing countries. They 
state, "For developing countries with low coverage, priority needs to be given to 
expanding coverage. This could be done by having special programmes designed for 
workers in the informal sector, or by having a national programme that includes most 
workers while only higher income workers are required to participate in a more 
expensive programme. In order to keep costs low for poor workers, the basic 
programme could provide only disability and survivors' benefits, or could provide 
retirement benefits starting at a relatively high age, such as 65 or 70. " 
Gillion et al. (2000) provide no options for developing countries with high coverage, 
and the recommendation with respect to the "poor workers" contradicts the principle 
of alleviating poverty in old age. This is the group most vulnerable and most unlikely 
to have sufficient personal funds to fund their retirement, yet it is this very group for 
whom the recommendation is made that retirement benefits begin at an advanced age 
or that only disability and survivor's pension be provided. This does not appear to be 
in keeping with ILO's goals for social protection systems, its various standards and 
conventions governing social security and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. 
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This recommendation is arguably worse than the World Bank's, for under the World 
Bank's approach, those "poor workers" would at least have some measure of 
protection, albeit inadequate. This rather shows the wavering stance of the ILO in the 
face of opposition. Queisser (2000) however, sees this compromise as the adoption of 
a "pragmatic" approach with the international organisations now aiming at mutual 
understanding, co-ordination and co-operation in member States and recipient 
countries. Appendices la and lb present a more detailed comparison of the ILO's 
and WB's approach to social security reforra. 
These reforms have resulted in a series of transitions as countries strive to find an 
optimal social security system, and in the next section, the transitioning process of 
social security systems is presented. 
2.5 The Transitioning of Social Security Systems 
The traditional social protection system took one of two forms: the social insurance 
system as advocated by Bismarck and the social assistance scheme advanced by 
Beveridge. The Bismarckian system was a contributory system with contributions 
made typically by the employer and worker, and benefits were usually of a defined 
nature. The Beveridgian model was usually tax financed, but could also be 
contributory and the benefits were either means-tested or a universal flat rate was 
applied. Beveridge favoured the universal flat rate as he felt that any system that 
provided an opportunity for discretion or withheld benefits if an individual had other 
means was not insurance (Beveridge, 1924). 
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There are seven main variations of social security systems arising from these two 
forms (presented in Table 2.1), though in recent times, notional defined contribution 
systems were introduced in Sweden and Poland, whereby the financing is still 
maintained on a pay-as-you-go basis, but in calculating pension benefits a notional 
interest rate is applied to the contributions made by the contributors, giving it an 
element of a defined contribution system. Cichon (1999) has likened this system to 
"old wine in a rather elegant new bottle, " as he argues all the purported benefits of the 
notional defined contribution system can be achieved by a standard career-average 
earnings-related defined benefit formula, with actuarial reductions or increments 
which are financed on the basis of a general average premium or constant contribution 
rate. There are also currently few, if any, publicly managed, fully funded, defined 
bcncfit systems. It is however possible to have one more variation, a privately 
managed, partially funded, defined benefit system. However, to protect the interests 
of contributors private pension funds are expected to be fully funded, though some 
private pension funds do become underfunded, thereby in effect becoming partially 
funded systems. In a recent survey Bacon & Woodrow, a firm of actuaries found that 
seventeen of Britain's 100 biggest companies have pension schemes that are 
underfimded by millions of pounds, with one company estimated to be in shortfall of 
nearly E170 million (The Guardian, August 15,2001). 
Table 2.1 
Rtructure of Social Securitv Svstems 
Type/Management Funding 
_ 
Deflnition 
_ Private Fully Funded Defined Contribution 
_ Private Fully Funded Defined Benefit 
_ Public Fully Funded Defined Contribution 
_ Public Fully Funded Defined Benefit 
Public Partially Funded Defined Benefit 
_ Public Pay- s-You-Go Defined Benefit 
_ 
_Public 
Tax Financed Flat Rate Benefits 
The social security systems in Latin America have undergone three transitions: the 
first was from a publicly managed, fully funded, defined benefit system to a publicly 
managed partially funded, defined benefit system. The second has been from a 
partially funded publicly managed defined benefit system to a PAYG and the third 
from a PAYG system to a privately managed fully funded defined contribution 
system. The main reason for the first transition was mismanagement which 
manifested itself in increased benefits without the corresponding increase in 
contributions, poor investment decisions and preferential application of the eligibility 
criteria to favour particular groups. The increasing system dependency only served to 
exacerbate the problem. In the case of the first transition, there was no deliberate 
decision to make the transition, and the system became a partially funded system in 
effect by default as the system gradually became underfunded. The second transition 
was also as a result of default rather than a deliberate political decision, and was due 
to political pressure, lack of administrative efficiency, inflation and legal rigidity, 
caused by contribution rates being fixed in legislation (Mesa Lago, 1989). 
In explaining the situation in Chile, Wallich (1983) argues that the change to PAYG 
was not due so much to a conceptual evolution in thinking about financing, but was 
the response of the institutions to the difficulties of maintaining their reserve fund 
intact in the inflationary Chilean environment. In this environment, the investment 
policies followed by the institutions, and later the investment guidelines codified by 
the government in 1952 made the inadequate capitalisation of the surplus inevitable. 
These policies, she argues, had been largely in responses to pressures from affiliates, 
who wished to see the trusts funds used in a manner which benefited them, being 
made available to them in the form of loans and mortgages rather than invested in the 
economy at large. 
The third transition in Latin America, contrary to the previous transitions was a result 
of a deliberate political choice. The PAYG systems had become largely bankrupt and 
in an effort to reduce the governments' obligations as well as enhance the credibility 
of the system, the governments opted for a privately managed, fully funded, defined 
contribution system. Chile became the first country in the world to make that 
transition, followed by other countries in Latin America and Central & Eastern 
Europe. 
The social security system in United States of America (USA) and Finland made the 
transition from a publicly managed, fully funded, defined benefit system to a partially 
funded one as a result of a deliberate political decision. In the case of the USA, it was 
argued that a partially funded system would be one way of limiting the influence of 
pressure groups and of safeguarding the economy. It was also argued that a funded 
system would amass too much funds which would not only give the government too 
much control in the private sector, but it would also have the ability to distort the 
financial scctor (Tyncs, 1996). 
In the Caribbean the transition was from a publicly managed, fully funded, defined 
contribution system to a partially funded, defined benefit system. The main reasons 
advanced for the change was to offer a more comprehensive package of benefits to 
employees which would serve to improve their quality of life, especially during old 
age, and to facilitate economic development. The introduction of the partially funded 
defined benefit systems was expected to deepen the financial sector (Hansards of the 
OECS). This argument is odd given that one of the advantages advocated for moving 
to a fully funded system is the opportunity for financial market deepening. 
In the case of the Central & Eastern European States the transition was from a 
publicly managed, PAYG, defined benefit systems to a fully funded, private 
management, defined contribution system. This transition took place after the 
reunification of West Germany and East Germany, and was mainly a result of high 
system dependency ratio caused by liberal disability and early retirement eligibility 
criteria (Fultz & Ruck, 2000). Fultz & Ruck (2000) argue that while PAYG systems 
are often described in terms of their vulnerability to demographic factors, the 
problems in the CEE states were caused not by changes in demography but by 
changes in the labour market. This argument reflects those of Augusztinovics (1999), 
who argues that in a changing environment, system dependency can be much more 
strongly affected by employment opportunities than by pure demographic trends. She 
goes on to argue that the transition economies of CEE may become a testing ground 
for an unprecedented and harmful divergence between system and demographic 
dependency. 
There appears to be no example of a transition from a tax-financed system to another 
type of system. Australia provides the best example of a tax-financed system. The 
system was introduced in the 1890s and this form of financing was chosen because it 
was argued that a compulsory contributory approach would be bureaucratic and 
complicated, and would not solve the problems of the non-contributors to the system, 
example, the sick, the elderly poor and the unemployed. It was also believed that it 
would be objectionable to "people of British origin, " and it would result in higher 
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prices or lower wages as employers tried to offset the costs of the contributions. 
There have been several reviews of the Australian system, but in every case the 
recommendation has been the maintenance of the system (Dixon, 1983), though the 
review in 1988 recommended, in addition, the expansion of the occupational 
superannuation schemes (Stanton & Dapre, 1998). There has always been a 
prevalence of occupational pension schemes in Australia, thereby weakening the last 
argument submitted for the introduction of the tax-financed system. Based on the 
recommendation of The Social Security Review appointed in 1988, the establishment 
of occupational schemes became mandatory in 1992 (Stanton & Dapre, 1998). 
2.5.1 Evaluation of The Transitions 
The experience of those countries which have made transitions suggests that there are 
different levels of difficulty in making the transitions. It appeared to have been easier 
to make the transition from a fully funded system to both a partially funded and 
PAYG systems than in reverse. It also appeared easier to move from a defined 
contribution system to a defined benefit system than it was to make the opposite 
move. In a defined contribution system the accrued rights depend solely on the 
contributions made and the rates of interest earned on that contribution, whereas in a 
defined benefit system the benefits are dependent not so much on the contributions 
made, but on factors relating to length of service, the accrual rates granted for each 
year of service and earnings, among others. This is one of the reasons why 
recognition bonds or compensatory pensions had to be offered in Chile and the other 
Latin American countries when the third transition took place. 
There does not appear to be any particular difficulty in moving from public to private 
management except that measures must be put in place to safeguard the contributions 
of the pension plan members. There appears to be no example of any developed 
country privatising the core social security program or converting it into a defined 
contribution system, even if a second tier of personal savings or occupational pension 
plans are encouraged. A fuller discussion of the recent reforms undertaken in Chile, 
the other Latin American Countries and the CEE states will be presented later in this 
Chapter. 
In Latin America, the social security systems were first converted from fully funded 
system to PAYG and are now being reformed into fully funded systems. There were 
however, two major differences in the return back to fully funded systems. The new 
systems introduced in Latin America are not only fully funded, but they are defined 
contribution and privately managed. It is the two latter components, especially the 
privatisation of the systems that have received most attention, and account for a large 
part of the reasons why the schemes in Latin America are deemed to have 
revolutionised social security. There is, however, the other view, that the reforms 
have abandoned the principles of social security and protection for workers, because 
of the heavy reliance on the performance of the capital market. The warning to the 
British workers about the drop in the pension benefits, as a direct result of changes in 
the economy, suggests that the fear of inadequate pensions is real, particularly in 
respect of defined contribution schemes (The Guardian, August 16,2001). 
However, it should be pointed out that the only new component of the reforms in 
Latin America is the private management of the schemes, as fully funded, defined 
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contribution schemes have been in existence in the form of provident funds. The 
government guarantee of a minimum pension in the event that the pension from the 
reformed system is inadequate is a -new component, only to the extent that this 
guarantee is dependent on the performance of the schemes in a private setting. This 
guarantee means that government is partially underwriting the system and in so doing 
accepting contingent liabilities. The issue of contingent liabilities of these guarantees 
will be addressed in more depth later in this Chapter. 
Private management is also often seen as the harbinger of efficiency, and in the case 
of Chile, this may have been appropriate, but the management of the scheme does not 
have to be private for it to be efficient. We have examples of publicly managed 
schemes, both fully funded and PF that are efficiently managed. Finland, Netherlands 
and Singapore provide good examples. Finland also presents a case where though, 
publicly managed, there is no government control and no government interference in 
the management of the schemes (Herbertsson et al, 2000). 
The factor that constitutes the real challenge to workers is not the fact that the 
schemes are funded or privately managed, but whether the system is defined benefit 
or defined contribution. It is the defined nature of the contributions that changes the 
system from one of social insurance to one of individual accounts, though it is often 
confused with whether the schemes are funded and/or privately managed. 
The defined contribution nature of the scheme places the risk of investment and 
longevity firmly with the worker, as the benefits are unknown. One of the advantages 
often cited for the defined contribution system is that the contribution is defined and 
will not change unlike the PAYG system, which is often subject to increases in 
contribution rates. However, there is a risk that the contributions established now, 
may be insufficient to provide an adequate pension forty years from now, given 
inflation and other risks. British workers were warned that maintaining the current 
contribution rate of 10% in their money purchase schemes (equivalent to defined 
contribution systems) may see their pensions reduced by half the expected amounts 
due to the low rates of interest and low inflation (The Guardian, August 16,2001). 
The fall in the financial markets in the aftermath of the tragic events in America on 
September 11,2001, also underscores the tremendous risks faced by those with 
defined contribution systems. In the week after the event, the US stock market closed 
at the lowest level since the great depression of 1929. 
Diamond (1998: 8) makes the point that a defined contribution system does not require 
adjustment to avoid insolvency, but it does require adjustment if it is to adapt to 
changing circumstances. He asserts that without any adjustments, as mortality rates 
fall, a defined contribution system has shrinking replacement rates, while a defined 
benefit system has growing revenue needs. He expounds that even an indexed 
defined benefit system will face circumstances that change beyond what was built into 
the indexing, and if these adjustments are done well, a defined benefit system is 
economically more efficient at spreading risks than a defined contribution system. 
However, he maintains that the quality of the political adjustment of the system is 
central to the comparison of different systems. The quality, he contends, of both 
systems as providers of retirement incomes depends on political responses in terms of 
frequency and quality of adjustments. Given the importance of the reforms in Chile 
on the evolution of social security systems, it is now appropriate to look at these more 
closely. 
2.6 The Evolution of the Chilean Pension Scheme 
Many writers have traced the evolution of the Chilean pension system (Queisser, 
1998; Wallich, 1983; Mesa-Lago, 1989; Barrientos, 1993; AGAFP, 1994). During 
1924 - 1925, the Social Insurance Service (SSS) for blue collar workers, the Social 
Insurance Fund for Private Employees (EMPART) for white collar workers, and the 
Civil Servants' and Journalists' Fund (CANAEMPU) were fonned. In the ensuing 
years, many other schemes were founded to provide coverage for the different groups, 
including the police, bank employees, racetrack employees, self-employed and 
municipal workers. 
By 1970, there were hundreds of institutions and programs: thirty-one for old-age 
pensions, thirty for seniority pensions, thirty for disability pensions, thirty-five for 
health maternity, fifty-five for social welfare, and dozens more for family allowances 
and unemployment. To compound the problem, each institution had its own 
legislation, administration, financing and benefits, with notable differences among 
them. At least half a dozen agencies supervised the system, but there was no central 
co-ordination. The principles of unity, uniformity, and solidarity did not operate, but 
there was, at least, in the private sector institutions, tripartite representation in the 
administration of the system, (Mesa-Lago, 1989). 
The system granted protection against the social risks covered by the ILO's 
Conventions: age, disability, invalidity, death, unemployment, occupational risks, 
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sickness and family allowances. However, there was much inequality in the system, 
with a lack of uniformity in terms of contributions, benefits, and coverage. This 
inequality reflected the status, earnings and influence of the workers covered and 
contributed greatly to the preservation of social and economic inequalities into old age 
(Barrientos, 1993). 
The C. ean government made several attempts to reform the system, but it was not 
until 1980-81 that there was any measure of success to the reform efforts. In 1960, 
the Committee for the Reform of the Social Security System in Chile described the 
system as: 
o Uneven and discriminatory in favor of the higher-income groups; 
* Inadequate as to both coverage and benefit levels; 
4, Fragmented, because of the number of administrative and inspection institutions 
involved, and of the huge variety of schemes; 
Regressive, in the sense that the supposed solidarity did not really exist, since 
groups earning higher incomes and thus able to bring more pressure to bear 
obtained benefits that were not available to less fortunate groups; 
* Bankrupt. (Castillo, 1993) 
This fragmentation and wide variation in benefit entitlements led to high cost, which 
was exacerbated by the maturity of the system and the evasion of payments by both 
employees and employers. In 1955, there were 12.2 active affiliates for every 
pensioner, while, in 1980, this ratio was 2.5 to every pensioner. In twenty-five years, 
the cost of the system had risen five-fold. In the 1970-80, the fiscal deficit of the 
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system reached 28% of public spending, and in 1980, the social security expenditure 
was 11% of GDP (AGAFP 1994, Barrientos 1993). 
It was against this backdrop that the government decided to take firm measures to 
reform the system. In 1980, the government passed Decree Law 3500, introducing 
the new pension system. Under this new system, individual capitalisation accounts 
were created, and were managed by Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP). 
All workers joining the workforce after January 1,1983 were compulsorily affiliated 
with an AFP, while it was voluntary for the others. 
The government also provided incentives for existing workers to join the new system, 
and many did as the govenunent issued Bono de Reconocimiento, (Recognition 
Bonds) for their contributions under the old system. These bonds were calculated to 
correspond to the present value of a pension replacing, for a full contribution period, 
80% of the member's average income in the 12 months prior to June 1979. The 
bonds carry a real interest rate of 4%. They are calculated at the point of transfer, and 
redeemable at retirement, when the amount is transferred to the individual's 
capitalised account. 
2.6.1 How the New System Works 
Under the new system, workers pay 10% of earnings, defined as earnings above the 
legal minimum wage and up to a maximum of 60 Unidades de Fornento (UF). 2 There 
is an additional premium, currently 3%, which is used for meeting disability and death 
2 UF are adjusted daily for changes in the index of consumer prices. This index is widely used by 
business and government as inflation adjusted units of value (Barrientos, 1993). 
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pensions and the administrative expense of the AFP. This additional premium is set 
by competition, and was initially much higher, approximating 7%, in 1981. Workers 
can also voluntarily increase their contributions, and it is tax-exempt up to a 
maximum set limit. Affiliates are ftee to choose any AFP and can change AFP every 
four months. The government guarantees a minimum pension for anyone who has 
contributed to the scheme for 20 years and whose accumulated capital is insufficient 
to cover the minimum payment and the pension entitlements. In the event of default 
by an AFP, the government will make good any shortfalls, and assign the accounts to 
another AFP. 
The government supports the scheme in the following manner: 
4, A pension guarantee in the event of bankruptcy of a private fund; 
eA topping-up entitlement for pensions not reaching a certain minimum; 
o Strict regulation and supervision of the AFPs; 
*A limit for the number of entitled persons under the first pillar, namely a 
maximum of 300,000 (in 1990). Government will decide the exact number and 
the precise definition of eligibility in the future. This avoids a firm legal pledge 
toward the individuals to support them in the case of need, unless they have 
contributed to the second pillar. (Nitsch, 1996) 
The affiliates to the system are entitled to the following: 
e An old age pension at the age of 60 for women and 65 for men; 
e Early retirement providing that there is sufficient funds in their account to 
generate a pension equivalent to at least 50% of the average updated deductible 
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income for the past 10 years, provided that the amount is equal to or greater than 
110% of the minimum state-guaranteed pension; 
Trading of his recognition bond on the market, or assign it to an insurance 
company or an AFP for an annuity. 
At retirement, the affiliate has three options: 
1. Purchase a life annuity; 
2. Programmed withdrawals from an AFP; 
3. A deferred annuity with a programmed withdrawal 
Z6.2 Analysis of the New Pension System 
The debate on the impact of the new system has been intense and numerous. There 
are those who herald the new system as the new direction, and others who see it as no 
more than a forced saving scheme (Gillion & Bonilla, 1992). Others also see it as a 
dereliction of duty by the State in its protection of workers. Barrientos (1993) states, 
" by making individual capitalisation compulsory and the sole form of pension 
provision, the Chilean government has gone further in placing pension provision 
within the private sector. " It is this placing of the funds in the private sector that has 
attracted the most debate. 
Gillion and Bonilla (1992) argue that while the Chilean scheme is often seen as the 
epitome of "private" approach vs. the "public" approach, this dichotomy does not 
accurately reflect the realities of the scheme and plays down the role of the State in 
providing both guarantees and regulatory mechanisms. This view is also shared by 
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Myers (1996) who observes that "as for retirement benefits, there is one extremely 
important feature that many devotees of the Chilean approach either do not know 
about or do not recognise: prior service credits are granted, on a very generous basis, 
to people who were in the old system. " These service credits are paid for entirely by 
the government and not at the time when the person enters the system, but when the 
person retires. ý This means that the government has huge general revenue obligations 
extending for decades, which increases its contingent liabilities. 
The guarantees provided are not only possible contingent liabilities but also imp icit 
contingent and conjectural liabilities for the government. Heller (1998) argues that 
even where the government has not given an explicit guarantee, to the extent that the 
organisation is forced to invest in government securities, this arrangement imposes an 
implicit conjectural liability for the government. 
A conjectural liability is incurred when govenunent recognises a liability to protect an 
organisation in the event of downside risks. This conjectural liability, Heller (1998) 
argues, anses in situations where government has imposed restrictions on the 
investment decisions of the social security systems to "protect" against adverse risks. 
He posits that the Singapore and Malaysian provident fund cases would appear the 
most obvious examples where the governments direct involvement in the specification 
of portfolio choices or on the utilisation of a pension fund's assets would give rise to 
such a liability. 
it can be argued that, the Chilean govenunent faces a conjectural liability in event of 
bankruptcy of any of the AFPS, as the new system was a government's decision and 
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restrictions were placed on the investments of the AFPs. The fact that in the event of 
bankruptcy by one of the AFP the government guarantees the balances of all affiliates 
and oversees the transfer of the accounts to another AFP appears to be sufficient 
evidence of the recognition of a conjectural liability to the affiliates of the system. 
The proponents of the Chilean method argue that the reform has led to capital 
accumulation, the deepening of the financial sector and the reduction of labour market 
distortions (Holzmann, 1995). Myers (1996) counters that argument by claiming that 
the amount of money that is put into the economy is very small. He goes finther by 
saying that funds are laundered: the government borrows money to pay the prior 
service credits and the minimum pensions, and then it issues debt. As the pension 
insurance companies buy the debt, the effect is similar to PAYG systems where 
monies from current workers are used to pay current beneficiaries. In Chile, he 
argues, this is just done indirectly. 
Myers (1996) also highlights a problem of "having too much money. " He contends 
that there will not be enough investments in Chile to accommodate the huge sums of 
money and questions the uses of the money, whether it will be used for foreign 
investment, new sources of investment or loose loans and poor investment, even 
thievery. - On the other hand, it is exactly this reason, the huge sums of money that the 
reform generates, that is used as the basis for arguing that there will be capital 
widening and deepening. The proponents of the refonn, particularly the WF and 
World Bank, claim that the funds will lead to the demand for more instruments, and 
because the regulation is an inherent part of the system, this would lead to capital 
widening. 
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Holzmann (1997) employed the Exogenous-Growth (EG) model to test for financial 
market deepening in Chile. He used the following financial market indicators - 
market capitalisation ratio (MCR), total value traded ratio (VTR), tumover ratio (TR) 
and stock market index (SMI) - as proxies for financial market deepening and 
liquidity. He hypothesised that rising investment needs of the pension funds, the 
instruments thereby created, and the competitive set-up of the privately managed 
pension funds made the financial market deeper, more liquid and more competitive. 
He concluded that the results "seemingly" confirmed this claim. He, however, 
cautioned, "all this evidence does not establish a watertight proof that the 
establishment of pension funds has been the decisive factor, or even only an important 
component, for the impressive development of financial markets since the mid-1980s. 
The empirical evidence is only consistent with the claim. " 
One of the factors on which there appears to be some agreement is the high 
administrative cost of the Chilean system, though there are different interpretations of 
this fact. The administrative cost of the Chilean system ranges from 12-20% of 
contributions. While many argue that it is comparable with the cost of other privately 
run pensions, such as defined benefit pension schemes, and insurance companies, it 
compares unfavourably with other government run pension systems, where costs 
range from 1-3% of contributions. 
The high costs of the system have been attributed to the following: 
* The high marketing and sales costs. The right of transfer owned by members, and 
the frequency with which they transfer have resulted in companies expanding 
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efforts to keep members and to attract members from other AFPs. The number of 
selling agents increased from 2000 in the mid 1980s to nearly 15,000 in 1994. 
Vittas (1995) theorises that the more modest rise in active contributors suggests 
that the high costs of selling agents may inflate the overhead costs of the system 
without a commensurate increase in effective coverage and accumulated assets. 
* The high cost of individual annuities. According to Diamond (1998) Chile relies 
on individual annuities with no provisions for group formation for annuity 
purchase. 
Diamond (1998) argues that privatisation has been seen to be the route for greater 
efficiency and lower costs, and the most surprising aspect of the Chilean system is the 
costs. He argues that these high administrative costs of private markets raise two 
questions: 
The extent to which a system with many small accounts is desirable, because 
compulsory savings are less attractive when costs are eating up a large fraction of 
savings; 
2. Whether there are alternative designs, with more government or more employer 
involvement that would keep costs down. In the Chilean case, the collection of 
the contributions is left to the market. 
Queisser (1995) acknowledges that the costs of the system are high, but argues that 
since the net real returns have been very good, the costs have not affected members' 
retirement capital negatively. Vittas (1995) appears to concur and argues that the 
significance of the high operating costs tends to be exaggerated. What matters, he 
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argues, is the net investment return, and the Chilean system has produced very high 
returns, amounting to over 10% over the first fourteen years of operation. 
These two positions seem to suggest that once returns are "higW' then the costs do not 
matter. This does not appear to make much sense, for the lower the costs, the higher 
the return and the greater the benefits and security to the workers. One also has to 
question what is meant by the use of the words "high" and "very good, " and to 
enquire about the basis used to arrive at that conclusion. Queisser (1995) recognises 
this point for she cautions that it cannot be expected that such returns will prevail in 
the long term; therefore the costs of the system remain a problem to be tackled. 
The Chilean system has often being praised for its high returns. According to Arenas 
de Mesa and Bertranou (1997), during the period 1981-95, the system averaged a real 
investment yield of 12.8%, accumulated assets of US$ 25.1 billion and accounted for 
39.9% of GDP in 1995. They claim that about 61% of the funds accumulated during 
the 1981-95 period were made up of investment returns and the remaining 39% were 
due from contributions. 
It is generally believed that this high rate of return is not sustainable, as they have 
been due more to the macroeconomic environment in Chile rather than the managers' 
investment proficiency (Holzmann, 1997). When the economy returns to a more 
stable growth pattern the accumulation of the funds will do so at a slower pace. 
Even if the returns were to continue, with lower costs, members would earn a higher 
rcturn. Notwithstanding his argumcnt, Vittas (1995) concedcs that whcn invcstment 
returns in Chile decline to more sustainable levels, the high operating costs could have 
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a bigger effect on net returns. The evidence suggests that this may be sooner rather 
than later. In October 1997, after 17 years of operations, only four companies were 
recording profits although the accumulated results show that eight AFPs recorded 
positive net results (Queisser, 1998). 
Gillion and Bonilla (1992) argue that the high real rates of return -achieved are not 
unique to Chile, as other markets around the world also experienced high real rates of 
retum. They estimated a-realistic long-term real rate of return of 3%, but Castillo 
(1993) argues that the long-tenn interest rates for the funds will be in the range of 
5.5% to 6.5%. Arenas de Mesa and Bertranou (1997) note that while the AFPS have 
indeed produced high returns, in 1984,1992 and 1995, the AFPs returns were lower 
than that offered by the banking sector to their savings accounts. It would be 
interesting to compare the average return of the banking sector's saving accounts over 
that time period. The return in 1992 and 1995 were negative, but two years does not 
make a trend. A trend of at least ten years from 1995 - 2005 would be useful to 
provide more conclusive answers. 
One of the main advantages advanced by proponents of the Chilean system is that the 
government provides a guarantee, on profitability. However, this is not exactly 
correct, as it does not guarantee a positive return. In 1995, the average return of the 
AFPs was negative two and a half percent (-2.5%). The government guarantees 
relative as against absolute profitability, (Arenas de Mesa and Bertranou, 1997; 
Gillion and Bonilla, 1992). This means that the return guarantee is based on the 
average return earned by the AFPs over the last twelve months. The AFPs must 
generate each month a return that is not less than the lower of. 
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(a) The average profitability over the previous 12 months of all the funds 
administered by the AFPs minus 2 percentage points; or 
(b) 50% of the average profitability over the previous 12 months of all such fund. 
The AFPs are required to establish a Fluctuating Profit Reserve, which is part of the 
members' fund and comprises those profits in excess of the minimum stipulated 
above. They must also maintain a Guarantee Reserve of at least 1% of accumulated 
funds, minus the value of the investments in other funds and investments in bonds 
issued by the General Treasury of Chile or by the Central Bank of Chile maturing 
within 30 days of the date of acquisition (Gillion and Bonilla, 1992). These reserves 
are used to meet any shortfalls in the returns of the AFP, below that of the minimum. 
Where the reserves are inadequate to meet the returns, the government makes up the 
difference and the AFP is dissolved. The assets are then transferred to another AFP. 
The government has imposed restrictions on the composition of the portfolio, but the 
restrictions are maximum limits. Bertranou (1997) claims that the limits have been 
placed to reduce risk through diversification of the portfolio, to finance the transition 
by making public securities the most important financial instrument of the portfolio 
and to protect the financial markets in which the AFP trade securities. In the early 
years of the reform, foreign investment was prohibited, but in 1985, that restriction 
was lifted, and a maximum of 9% was allowed. Many of the AFPs have, however, 
not invested in foreign securities and at the end of 1995, only 0.2% of the portfolio 
comprised foreign investment. 
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Vittas (1995) contends that the minimum profitability requirements coupled with the 
tight investment regulations and the one fund per company rule have resulted in 
nearly uniform investment portfolios. A beneficial effect of this, he argues, has been 
the absence of big disparities in investment returns across companies. However, the 
uniformity of investment portfolios undermines one of the rationales for having a 
competitive decentralised system, which is the competition for accounts through a 
more effective allocation of funds and the achievement of higher returns. Diamond 
(1996) concurs and states that the guarantee that no fund performs much worse than 
the average of all funds, creates an incentive for fund portfolios not to differ too much 
from the average fund, since the AFP bears some of the down risk but none of the up 
risk (except through increased enrolments). 
This leads to "herding behaviour, " and the much-vaunted advantage of the system, in 
giving affiliates choice of portfolio, has not been realised. Srinivas, Yermo & 
Whitehouse (2000) studied the impact of investment regulations on the performance 
of the pension funds in Chile, Argentina and Peru and concluded that regulations 
impact negatively on performance, create distortions in asset management and limit 
opportunities for diversification. They advocate the liberalisation of the regulatory 
regimes to allow for investments in a wider array of instruments. They also 
recommend the evaluation of performance against market benchmarks rather than 
industry averages. 
Valdes-Prieto (1999) took issue with the conclusions and recommendations reached 
by Srinivas et al. He argues that the assertions that the regulations jeopardises 
performance may be true for Mexico, where pension funds are prevented from 
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investing in equity and foreign investment, but do not hold for Chile, Argentina and 
Peru. He argued that Srinivas et al dismissed the Argentinean case, which 
contradicted their conclusions on the basis that a third of the portfolio was not 
marked-to-market, but was based on historical costs. He adjusted for that valuation 
and the results still showed that the Argentinean case outperformed the benchmarks. 
He also cited the results for the Peruvian data, which under perfortned the benchmark 
used by Srinivas et al. Peru has a more liberalised environment than the other Latin 
American countries. These factors he argues, disproves the conclusions reached by 
Srinivas et al that regulations negatively impacted on performance. 
Valdes-Prieto (1999) also posited that there were "benevolent rationales" to keep 
investment limits on the portfolios. He argued that the limits would foster 
diversification, reduce the moral hazard problem, limit the replacement risks for 
workers and limit the conflict of interest between the pension fund managers and 
contributors. Other reasons justifying regulations on investments include the lack of 
financial sophistication of the contributors, and the underdeveloped state of the 
financial market. The issue of worker knowledge of his/her pension arrangements 
will be discussed in section 2.10. The government also, by making pension saving 
mandatory, has an obligation to protect the people's funds and to guard against overt 
corruption and incompetence. 
Another point most people agree on is the low compliance rate of contributors. Data 
provided by the SAFP, El Sistema Chileno de Pensiones (1994,1996) indicate that 
the rate of affiliation is 95%, but the real coverage is 60% of the employed labour 
force. Evasion is estimated at 44% of the affiliates (Arenas de Mesa and Bertranou, 
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1997). This high evasion rate has caused many to fear that the Chilean pension 
reform will not provide adequate pensions for the retired and that there will be huge 
demands on the state's guaranteed minimum pension, which will lead to high costs for 
the government. It also serves to undermine the position of the World Bank (1994) 
that the cause of evasion is high contribution rates and the reduced link between 
contributions and benefits. 
Myers (1998) argues that not only is there a situation of "Nannygate, " of not covering 
low-paid employees because of ignorance or laziness, but there is also the planned 
underreporting of wages for low-paid workers. This, he claims, is because to be 
eligible for a pension, all that is required is 20 years of contributions, and there is no 
use reporting wages higher than what is necessary. He argues that the problem is 
rooted in the benefit design. Gillion and Bonilla (1992) support that view asserting 
that the gains in efficiency and (contribution) compliance expected from the transition 
to a privately administered system have not been fully materialised. They state that 
the proportion of members of the new scheme who paid contributions regularly fell 
from 76% in 1983 to 71% in 1988 to 53% in 1990, and that the proportion varies 
between funds. 
The figures reported by the SAFP shows an improvement of about 4% in 1996, with a 
reported compliance of 60%. They claim that the compliance rate ranges from 45% - 
55% among lower paid workers and 80% -90% for better-paid workers. The reasons 
are unclear but they hypothesise that as they near retirement, some lower paid workers 
delay contributions to qualify for the minimum state pension, supporting the 
arguments made by Myers (1998). They account for the higher compliance of higher 
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paid workers by arguing that it may be easier to keep track of and collect 
contributions from them. But irrespective of the reasons for evasion, one of the likely 
impacts is an increase in the recourse to the minimum state guaranteed pension. 
These factors strengthen the argument of those who claim that the government 
guarantees create contingent and conjectural liabilities, and that these liabilities may 
turn out to be more costly than the traditional pay-as-you-go systems (Heller, 1998; 
Beattie & McGillivray, 1995; Gillion & Bonilla, 1992). 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the Chilean reform, it was seen as a blueprint for 
change and sustainability of social security systems, and several reform initiatives 
were undertaken based on the Chilean model. These latter reforms known as "second 
generation reforms" (Queisser, 1998) were carried out mainly in Latin America and 
Central and Eastern Europe. In the next section a brief analysis of those reforms are 
provided. 
2.7 Second Generation Reforms 3 
These reforms have been mainlyin Latin America and Eastern Europe. The systems 
in Latin America faced similar problems to that experienced in Chile and included the 
uneven and inequitable distribution of benefits, the exclusion of the urban and rural 
poor, the exertion of pressure by the politically powerful groups, maturity of the 
system and financial difficulty (Queisser, 1998). The systems in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), faced financial stress following the unification with Germany, for 
More detailed information on the pension reform and its implications can be derived from Gruber & 
Wise (1997), Holzmann, Packard & Cuesta (2000), Kane (1995), McGreevey (1990), Mitchell and 
Barreto (1997), Rocha, Hinz & Gutierrez (1999), Rofman & Demarco (1999), Vittas ('1997) Vittas 
(1998a), Vittas (1998b). 
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during the transition, they had to cover new risks, officially not known before 
(unemployment) or ignored (poverty) (Holzmann, 1997b: 195). The World Bank 
played a leading role in the second-generation refonns and in each case the new 
system was a variation of the Chilean model. Appendix Ic provides a detailed 
summary of the reforms undertaken in Latin America and Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
Queisser (1998) asserts that the overall performance of the second-generation Latin 
American reforms has been satisfactory: expansion of the financial sector and the 
development of the infrastructure and an increase on savings and growth. However, 
the failures appear to overshadow the alleged successes of the reform. Affiliation to 
the new system has been slower than expected, with the exception of Uruguay and 
there has been no substantial increase in coverage. 
The private pension fund companies have not performed well, with many suffering 
from huge operating losses, even amidst the high fees paid by affiliates in commission 
and management fees. In Argentina, Colombia and Peru, a substantial number of 
them are running large operating losses, and in Peru only three had broken even by 
the end of 1997 and between 1993 - 1997, the industry as a whole, lost more than 
two-thirds of its initial capital. In Colombia, during the first three years, losses 
amounted to about 70% of the initial capital and by mid - 1997, only one company 
had broken even (Queisser, 1998). 
This failing of the private pension funds lends support to the argument that private 
management is not a panacea for poor operating performance and inefficiency, so 
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often claimed by the proponents of reform. It strengthens the case for the 
identification of the governance and other factors, which impact on performance, if 
the systems, private as well as public, are to remain viable. 
The accumulation of the pension funds has not been as dramatic as in Chile. By the 
end of the third year of operation, the Chilean pension industry had accumulated 
assets corresponding to roughly 8.6% of GDP, while in Argentina, the country with 
the highest accumulation of the second-generation countries, the accumulated assets 
represented only 3% of GDP. In 1997, the accumulated assets represented 2.8% in 
Argentina, 1.3% in Colombia, 0.2% in Mexico, 2.1% in Peru and 1% in Uruguay 
Queisser, 1998). All of the countries have imposed restrictions on the investment of 
the accumulated funds and on the number of funds offered to affiliates. Most offer 
only one fund, with Colombia offering three funds: one each for mandatory retirement 
savings, voluntary savings and severance benefits. 
The return guarantee that most of the countries impose, has also led to "herding 
behaviour" by the pension schemes, similar to that experienced by the AFPs in Chile, 
with very little differentiation in their portfolios. This means that affiliates have 
limited choices and not the wide choices that competitive market was expected to 
bring. There is also little foreign investment in the portfolio, even when there are no 
restrictions. It is too early to evaluate the impact on the government of the minimum 
pension guarantees of the system. Like, with Chile, these arc contingent and 
conjectural liabilities on the government. The reforms in the CEE are relatively 
young and it is too early to evaluate the performance of the reforms. These reform 
initiatives have evoked strong sentiments on both sides of the debate and in the next 
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section an attempt is made to move beyond the ideological stance and identify the 
issues of the refomi debate. 
2.8 What is the Reform Debate All About? 
The debate is often presented as one about the financing and structure of the social 
security systems (World Bank, 1994; Queisser, 1995; Vittas, 1998; Wallich, 1998; 
James, 1997), but it is arguably one about privatisation and the value system of a 
society, which in turn affects its attitude towards redistribution and solidarity. 
Miles (1998) suggest that much of the discussion of the relative merits of funded and 
unfunded schemes is as much about the relative efficiency of public against private 
sector provision, and the desirability of redistribution to the less well off, as it is about 
funding per se. This view is supported by Ostaszewski (1997b) who argues "nowhere 
else, neither in politics, nor in economics, nor in finance, is this a debate about 
prefunding. If actuaries continue debating this as a 'prefunding versus payg' issue, 
then actuaries will become equivalent to mediaeval scholars debating devils on a 
pinhead. [The debate is about ... privatisation] " (emphasis added). 
While financing and management are often used interchangeably, they are separate 
issues. Privatisation is a management issue, while the question of funding or PAYG 
is a financing issue. When this separation is made, the advantages of privatisation are 
not as impressive as when clouded with the financing issue. 
Barr (1987) also joins the debate and argues that the main issues dividing the 
proponents of PAYG and funded systems (that funded systems are safer, offer more 
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freedom and impose greater financial discipline) have little or nothing to do with the 
central issue of paying pensions. He argues that it "depends largely on views about 
social justice, " and on whether redistribution is viewed as advantageous or not. 
Kingson and Williamson (1998) share Barr's view, and argue that there is a disturbing 
tendency to reduce social security discussions to mere accounting exercises of the 
financial cost of the program. This, they argue, overlooks the value of a social 
security scheme as a source of national social cohesion and as an expression of the 
contributions and obligations of each member of the national community. 
They view the debate as fundamentally about a society's sense of responsibility to 
each other; and about the basic protection that each worker should be assured of for 
themselves and their families in old age, disability or on death of a loved one. It is 
also about the mix of public and private efforts that should be encouraged to assure 
that security. In essence, the moral basis of social security rests on the assumption 
that a society has a stake in the well being of its people and along with social security, 
this value is worth preserving. This view is also shared by Beattie (2000) and Scholz 
et al (2000) who see social security as a fundamental human right and as an important 
element in fostering social cohesion. 
Before this chapter closes, analysis of the British pension system is presented to 
highlight the importance of transparency and accountability in the management of 
social security systems. 
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2.9 Pension System of the UK 
Coverage of the UK state pension system is virtually universal for people under the 
pension age. Anybody in work and earning more than E60 a week (about 15% of the 
average male earnings) is covered, as is anybody not working who is unemployed, 
disabled or home looking after children of school age. The UK social security system 
was heavily influenced by Beveridge, and after his report on social security provisions 
in the UK, the National Insurance Act of 1946 was passed. It incorporated many of 
Beveridge's recommendations in respect of pensions, unemployment and disability. 
These benefits were to be universal and flat rate, financed by flat-rate contributions by 
employees. 
Beveridge recommended that benefits should be introduced gradually, but full 
benefits were introduced more rapidly and benefit levels rose in line with living 
standards. By 1965, the benefit levels had doubled in real terms and the flat-rate 
contributions required to finance the increased benefits became particularly 
burdensome on the low paid, resulting in the introduction of eamings-related 
contributions (Whitehouse, 1998). The eamings-related contributions led to the 
introduction of "graduated pensions, " which were eventually closed in 1975 (Blundell 
& Johnson, 1997). 
Over the same period, employers' provision of supplementary pensions grew and by 
the mid 1960's, almost all public workers were pension members, along with a 
significant number from the private sector. In the 1950's about 25% of employees 
belonged to a pension plan, and that number rose to over 50% in the mid 1960's 
(Whitehouse, 1998). This trend continues in the present: of the workforce in the mid 
1990's, 75% are "contracted out" of the second tier State Earnings Related Pension 
Scheme (SERPS) into private occupational and personal pensions. Almost 50% of 
pensioners' income come from non-social security sources, and the proportion is 
increasing (Blundell & Johnson, 1998). 
These factors explain why Blundell and Johnson (1998) argue that the UK's pension 
system is not well described by an analysis of the social security element. They also 
partly attribute the solvency of the pension system to these factors. They reveal that 
tax rates necessary to finance the system are not predicted to rise despite the fact that 
the number of people over state retirement age is predicted to rise from 15.7% of the 
population to over 24% in 2050. 
Among men universal coverage has been a fact virtually since the introduction of the 
current regime in the late 1940's. For women, the move to universal coverage is only 
just being completed. This is because of three separate changes: 
(1) The greatly increased level of economic activity among women; 
(2) The introduction in 1978 of Home Responsibilities Protection which 
effectively credits contributions for women with dependent children 
(3) The phasing out of what is known as the married women's rate of National 
Insurance Contributions. This feature allowed married women to pay much 
reduced social insurance contributions in return for foregoing rights to the 
basic pension in their own right. However, since 1978 no new entry to that 
lower rate has been allowed (Blundell and Johnson, 1997). 
The basic pension remains by far the most important element in social security 
spending on the elderly. There are also important income related benefits: 1.5 million 
of the 10 million pensioners are dependent on the minimum means-tested income 
support benefit, which is available at higher levels than the state's pension. However, 
many fewer persons who are entitled to claim the means-tested benefit do so because 
of the stigrna attached (Financial Times, December 4,2000). 
The Social Security Act 1975 introduced the State Earnings Replacement Pension 
(SERPS) (Whitehouse, 1998). The SERPS was implemented in 1978 with the 
intention that it would start paying out full benefits 20 years later. It was designed to 
provide a pension equal to one quarter of earnings during the best 20 years of 
earnings, with full inheritance by surviving spouses. The current contribution rate is 
10% for employees and 10.2% for employers. The Upper Earnings Limit (UEL) caps 
contribution rates for the employees but not the employers (Blundell and Johnson, 
1997). 
From 1999, the SERPS accrual rate will fall gradually and will result in a drop in the 
replacement rate from 25% to 20% of best twenty years and a reduction in survivors' 
benefit from 100% to 50% of the spouses' benefit by 2027-28. The fall in the accrual 
rate was introduced in the Social Security Act of 1986 following concerns about the 
generosity of SERPS and the ageing population resulting in unsustainable levels of 
expenditure in the future. There is no provision for early retirement under the basic 
pension and SERPS. Persons are allowed to opt out of SERPS and by 1997 about 
three-quarters of eligible workers (those eaming above the Lower Eamings Limit 
(LEL)) were not covered directly by SERPS: half are in occupational schemes and 
another quarter in Personal Pensions (Blundell and Johnson, 1997). 
Whitehouse (1998) argues that the "contracting ouf' option was developed to avoid 
the opposition of established, mainly employer-provided pension funds. This 
"contracting out" feature is unique to the British pension system. The contracting out 
option allows employers and employees to pay a lower rate of social security 
contributions if employers agreed to pay a "guaranteed minimum pension" (GMP) to 
employees. This option was first only allowed for those with occupational schemes, 
but in 1998, it was extended to individuals who took out personal pensions or 
belonged to group money purchase schemes (Blundell & Johnson, 1997; Mitehouse, 
1998). 
There are however, growing fears that the pension provided by the money purchase 
schemes will be inadequate. It was estimated that in 1991, a 30-year-old man who 
contributed 10% to a money purchase scheme would have received a pension 
equivalent to 55% of his final pay at 65. A 30year old, who takes out such a pension 
in 2001, is expected to receive only 24% of his final pay at 65 (The Guardian August 
16,2001). 
2.9.1 Pension Reform in the UK 
Whitehouse (1998) posits that since SERPS was introduced with a cross-party 
consensus, many believed that the pension system in Britain had reached a steady 
state, but this was not to be. He contends that SERPS was introduced without long- 
term projections of its future costs and when forecasts showed that there was a serious 
potential problem as contribution rates would rise from 15% to 35%, the Thatcher 
administration, imbued with an ideology of privatisation and a desire to re-examine 
all aspects of public pension spending decided to act. This led to a series of pension 
reform initiatives in the 1980's and 1990's that reduced the generosity of the state 
pension provision and extended opportunities for contracting out. 
Whitehouse (2000) provides a chronological order of pension reform initiatives in the 
UK from 1978 - 1999, viz: 
1978 SERPS introduced 
1981 Price indexation of basic state pension 
1985 Proposal to abolish SERPS and replace with private, mandatory 
provision 
1988 Personal pension option introduced 
Defined contribution occupational schemes encouraged 
SERPS replacement rate cut from 25% to 20%, survivors' 
benefit halved; earnings measure changed from 20 best years to 
lifetime average; overall, long run costs halved 
1995 Technical change to SERPS indexation; long run costs cut by a 
third 
Women's state pension age to increase from 60 to 65 by 2020 
1996 Mandatory contribution to defined contribution plans related to 
age 
1997 Outgoing Conservative Government proposes "basic pension 
plus, " moving the whole of state pension provision onto a 
private defined-contribution basis 
1998 State second pension to replace SERPS 
Stakeholder schemes announced 
Social assistance and basic pension merged into new 
46minimum income guarantee" to be uprated in line with 
earnings 
1999 Treasury launches pooled-pension-investment vehicle 
In 2001, the Stakeholders' pension was implemented but the initial take-up was much 
less than anticipated. Four months after the implementation of the system, only 
224,000 pensions were taken out, out of which only 50,000 were new policies. The 
remainders were transfers from existing systems (The Guardian, August 16,2001). 
This low take-up may be due to the caution following the mis-selling of the pensions 
when workers were allowed to "contract out. " The poor financial performance of the 
capital markets in the past two years may have also instilled an element of caution. 
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From the above, it can be seen that there have been several reform initiatives in the 
pension system in the UK, some parametric and some major. The frequency and 
volume of the changes give support to those who argue that the state pension schemes 
are volatile and risky, and subject to political risk and hence they argue for the private 
and individual account schemes (World Bank, 1994, Borsch-Supan, 2000). However, 
in the next section, a look will be taken of the mis-selling crisis of the private 
pensions, emphasising the risks passed on to the workers by contracting out. 
2.9.2 Mis-Selling of Personal Pensions 
Many persons as demonstrated above contracted out of the state pension, and for 
some it proved to be a mistake. This gave rise to the mis-selling debacle. Whitehouse 
(2000) opines that lack of both information and impartial advice played a major role 
in the debacle, but it is difficult to isolate the number of people who were affected and 
the value of the loss. 
Whitehouse (1997 & 2000) identified four examples where mis-selling may have 
occurred: 
e Those who were too old, so SERPS offered a better option than personal 
pensions; 
* Those with small earnings who were burdened by the huge transaction costs; 
9 Those who were persuaded not to join an employer's pension plan and take 
out a personal pension instead; 
* Those who transferred their pension out of a current or previous employer's 
plan into a personal pension. 
He, however, acknowledges that it is difficult to work out how persons were affected, 
as defined benefit schemes use a formula based usually on tenure and earnings, and 
both of these are ex-ante conditions and hence difficult to measure. Employees who 
take out a personal pension usually lose the employers' contributions, especially if the 
employer provides an occupational pension scheme. Only 15% of employees with 
personal pensions receive an employers' contribution and only 5% of those who 
provide a pension scheme will contribute to a personal pension instead (Whitehouse, 
2000). This would be one way in which employees could lose as employers' 
contributions usually make up 70% of contributions in occupational pension plans. 
According to Whitehouse (2000) there are about 645,000 potential cases of mis- 
selling, about 11% of personal pensions sold. So far 255,000 have been settled, and 
the total compensation paid by personal-pension providers totals fl. 2 billion or 
E5,300 per case. 
This brings us to the related issue of worker knowledge and understanding of their 
pension entitlements and the pension options available to them. The Office of Fair 
Trading's survey (1997) showed that only 44% of people had sought information 
before making their pension arrangements and they were mainly those who had taken 
out a personal pension: (82% of those with a private pension had sought infonnation 
prior to making that move, compared with 50% of those with an occupational plan 
and 20% of those without private arrangements). The survey also revealed that there 
was a significant discrepancy between actual pension entitlements and perceived 
entitlements and benefits. Less than a third of those surveyed could estimate the 
value of the basic pension within a range of ± 7% (and ± 10% for a married couple's 
entitlement). 
Another survey conducted by the Nationwide Building Society (1998) found that 55% 
of people admitted to having no idea of the value of the basic pension. In relation to 
SERPS and private pensions, only 21% were close to knowing what the acronym 
SERPS meant and knowledge of private pensions was mixed: more than 80% of 
employees with a personal pension knew that it would provide a defined contribution 
pension, while 9% thought it was a defined benefit pension. 
A Department of Social Security survey conducted in 1997 reveal that there are 
significant differences in knowledge of contracting out between public and private 
sector occupational scheme members. All public schemes are contracted out, but 
around 30% thought their scheme replaced SERPS and a quarter did not know 
whether they were contracted out or not. In the private sector 60% said they were 
contracted out, when the number contracted out is about 85%, and a quarter of the 
workers in the private sector did not know whether they were contracted out. There 
also appears to be lower awareness of SERPS among those without a private pension 
(Whitehouse, 2000). 
A study by Towers and Perrin (1999) states that less than half of employers believe 
their employees understand their occupational pension, and far more employees claim 
they do understand than they actually do. Tammy Mattson of the employee benefits 
consultancy says "73% [of employees] may understand that they have a pension plan 
in place, but if you ask them if it will be adequate, they clearly do not understand 
what their income will be or ... what will happen when they move jobs, " (%itehouse, 
2000). These findings shed some light on the reasons behind the mis-selling debacle, 
for if employees do not understand the mechanisms of their plans; it is easier for them 
to make wrong decisions and to be mis-informed. It also leads one to question the 
extent to which contributors understand the reform initiatives introduced by various 
govemments. 
A similar, though not identical survey of worker knowledge of pensions in the US 
found that pension misinformation and missing information is widespread and there is 
a huge information discrepancy concerning provisions for early retirement: two thirds 
of the respondents provided wrong answers to questions relating to early retirement. 
The answers were more accurate concerning provisions of normal retirement. The 
study found that good information appears more prevalent among unionised workers, 
workers in large firms, the better-educated, higher-income workers and those in senior 
positions. The study also found that whites and women were also more 
knowledgeable about their pension provisions (Mitchell, 1988). Mitchell argues that 
the findings clearly shows that regulations currently on the books have not resolved 
the issue of worker ignorance regarding key pension provisions and that research is 
needed to determining the best and least-cost mechanisms of generating better 
pension, especially to the less advantaged workers. 
These findings and the experience of Britain with the mis-selling of the pensions 
highlights the risks faced by the workers, so clearly articulated by Gillion and Bonilla 
(1992) and McGillivray (2000a). It is arguable that the workers in Latin America and 
Central and Eastern Europe do not fully understand the choices laid before them and 
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the oft-quoted advantage of the right to change AFPs, may be one of fiction rather 
than reality. 
2.10 Conclusion 
Providing social security for all the world's population is an ideal and a right 
enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, but achieving this goal is far from 
easy. There are so many factors that make this difficult: distrust of the system and the 
intentions of government, poverty, the growth of the informal sector, lack of 
knowledge of the rights and benefits of members, lack of resources - human, capital 
and informational - mismanagement and government intervention and interference, to 
name a few. 
There are several means by which social protection could be provided. The choices 
are often differentiated on the lines of funded/PAYG or privatisation/public 
management, but the real choice is between individualisation and solidarity. Which 
of these two systems provide the greater opportunity for ensuring that social 
protection reaches everyone? The system based on solidarity provides the greater 
opportunity for so doing. After this choice is made, the other questions pertaining to 
the financing and management of the schemes then need to be addressed. Again, the 
criterion should be the system providing the greater opportunity for extending social 
protection to all: Is it PAYG or funded? Is it public or private management? 
While some argue that a funded system is not necessarily safer or that it provides 
greater immunity against the ageing of the population (Barr, 1987, Beattie & 
McGillivray, 1995), a funded system provides the opportunity to cam interest and 
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provide the system with a greater probability of liquidity and thus flexibility in the 
face of crisis. In addressing the public/private management issue some contend that 
public management is perverse and inefficient (World Bank, 1994, Borsch-Supan, 
2000). It was argued earlier that most of the advantages purported for privatisation 
are possible in publicly managed system. It is argued that what matters are not 
whether the management is public or private but whether the management is efficient 
and effective, and the governance structure in place. 
Another aspect of financing deals with whether the system is contributory or not. A 
non-contributory system has the advantage of reaching everyone but it also runs 
greater insolvency and political risks as governments can choose almost unilaterally 
to reduce or even cease benefits to certain classes of persons, if they deem the system 
too expensive. It is also more vulnerable to the economic downturns of the country, 
as it competes with all other government spending. A contributory system, on the 
other hand, not only provides property rights to the contributors, but also provides the 
opportunity to separate the administration of the scheme from the general government 
finances, thus providing greater probability of solvency on a long term basis. 
This still leaves the problem for those in the informal sector and those outside the 
work enviromnent as a result of disability, unemployment or caring for the sick and 
old. Providing coverage for this group is one of the core principles of the Beveridge 
Model of social security, for it is only when this group is covered, that the system can 
claim to be truly universal. So which system leads to greater opportunity for social 
protection for all? A multi-tier system comprising of- 
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*A first tier of social assistance to alleviate poverty and so targets all those in 
need and unable to contribute to the second tier either fully or on a regular 
basis. This tier may also comprise of a flat basic pension to which everyone is 
entitled. 
*A second tier that is contributory funded and defined benefit. The management 
may be either public or private. A defined benefit second tier is favoured 
because it fosters redistribution, solidarity and offers workers a guaranteed 
minimum pension. 
oA third tier comprising of private savings. 
9A fourth tier comprising of occupational schemes. 
Notwithstanding the preferred structure given, there is no one perfect system. There 
are advantages and disadvantages with respect to all the systems and countries should 
choose a system that fits not only their economic and demographic profile, but one 
that is also compatible with their social and values profile. It is also argued that 
irrespective of the system adopted, good governance, effective and efficient 
management are critical for success. 
In the next Chapter, the social security organisations (SSO) of the OECS are 
introduced. The evolution and role of the systems, an analysis of the reform 
initiatives undertaken and the existing private pension enviromnent will be presented. 
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CHAPTER THREE - THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ORGANISATIONS IN THE ORGANISATION OF THE EASTERN 
CARIBBEAN STATES 
3.1 Introduction 
Having discussed the general issues facing social security systems and social security 
funds in the last Chapter, the purpose of the present Chapter is to focus the debate on 
the social security organisations (SSO) of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS). The main objective is to set the scene for specific analysis of 
governance issues by tracing the evolution of the social security organisations, 
examining the reform initiatives and looking at the private pension provision in the 
OECS. 
In section two, a brief of the OECS is provided, followed by the evolution of the 
social security systems in section three. In section four, the emergent themes during 
the introduction of the systems are discussed. In section five, a discussion of the role 
of social security in economic development is presented, followed by the reform 
initiatives undertaken in the OECS in section six. The interview findings with the 
insurance companies and with the stakeholders with respect to private pension 
provisions are presented in this section. The reciprocal agreements between the 
Member States of the OECS and the Caribbean Community and Common market 
(CARICOM) is analysed in section seven, followed by an examination of the private 
pension arrangements in section eight. The conclusions of the chapter are presented 
in section nine. 
3.2 The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean Statesý 
The Treaty of Basseterre established the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States on 
June 18,1981, with seven countries - Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, 
Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The 
OECS was established amongst other things to promote co-operation among the 
Member States and to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. 
Two other countries, Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands are associated members 
of the OECS, taking the group's membership total to nine. 
These countries were all former British Colonies, but six have gained political 
independence with only three, Anguilla, British Virgin Islands and Montserrat still 
dependent territories of Britain. The countries cover an area of 1,612 square miles 
and have a combined population of a little over half a million persons. Agriculture is 
the mainstay of the economy in the majority of the countries, with tourism, light 
manufacturing and construction contributing significantly in some of the other 
countries. The chief agricultural export is bananas followed by sugar and spices. 
3.3 Evolution of Social Protection in the OECS 
The governments in the OECS, like many governments throughout the world, have 
been concerned with introducing social protection systems for their population. 
During British rule, while provisions were made for colonial officers, very little 
provision was made for the rank and file of the population. There were some Poor 
" Information relating to the objective of the OECS was sourced from the official Web page of the 
OECS Secretariat. Information relating to the population, economic and demographic data was 
sourced from the official web page of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. 
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Relief Laws and Friendly Societies providing for some segments of the population but 
these were inadequate and did not reach the mass of the population. 
In the 1950's most of the countries gained associated state status, which was a 
precursor to independence with more local persons participating in the internal 
governing of the islands. In the early 1950's there was a concerted effort by the local 
government to improve and enhance the social protection measures and requests were 
made to the British Colonial Office for assistance and direction. On the 
recommendations of the Colonial Office, national provident funds were introduced in 
most of the islands, and these were later replaced by national insurance or social 
security systems. 
Six of the nine countries under study introduced a national provident fund as a 
forerunner of the social security/national insurance system. Three countries, 
Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda and the British Virgin Islands did not. Antigua had 
actually passed the National Provident Act in 1970, but never implemented it. There 
was a change of govenunent shortly after the Act was passed and the new govenunent 
opted instead for the more comprehensive social security system. National Provident 
Acts were never passed in Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands. 
The initiative for a more comprehensive approach to social protection for workers 
originated in St. Kitts & Nevis (Fletcher, 1976; Compton, 2001; Manning, 20015). 
5 Information attributed to Compton (2001) and Manning (2001) throughout this paper was derived 
from a personal interview conducted with Mr Francis Compton, on 26 January 2001 and Mr Manning 
on March 30,2001. Mr Francis Compton served as first executive director of the National Provident 
Fund in St. Lucia and the National Insurance Scheme until 1996. Mr Manning was the first executive 
director of both the St. Kitts & Nevis Provident Fund and Social Security board. He retired in 1995. 
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Serious discussions on the possibility of establishing a pension scheme for the sugar 
workers in St. Kitts began in the early 1950's. In September 1951, the St. Kitts Sugar 
Factory established a non-contributory pension scheme, which provided a modest 
income to persons over 50 years, who had worked continuously for a minimum of 10 
years. In 1952, a committee comprising representatives of workers, employers and 
government was established to determine the feasibility of introducing a contributory 
social security scheme, but concluded that the time was not ripe to introduce the 
scheme but instead recommended an increase in the public allowance for poor relief. 
About the same time, the St. Kitts-Nevis Trades and Labour Union successfully 
negotiated with the Sugar Producers Association to pay a small pension to weekly 
paid estate workers who met certain established criteria from the beginning of 1954. 
From 1957 - 1960, the Labour Department conducted a survey to obtain data, which 
was to serve as a basis for designing a Sugar Workers' Pension Scheme. Nothing 
came of it, as the United Kingdom Actuary Department was awaiting the results of 
the 1960 Census before it could make recommendations regarding the introduction of 
a pension scheme. In the meantime, proponents of the scheme realised that a non- 
contributory pension was not sustainable and in 1963 requested actuarial advice from 
the British goveniment (Fletcher, 1976). 
In 1964, Charles E Clark, an actuary was sent to St. Kitts to advise on the 
establishment of a contributory provident fund and concluded that a provident fund 
would be a more suitable vehicle for providing for retired workers. He recommended 
that though the final decision would be that of government, discussions should be held 
with employers and trade union. , 
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It can be seen that from a very early stage, tripartism was encouraged and 
recommended as an important element in the functioning of these organisations. 
After receiving the Clark Report, the Colonial Office informed the Administrators in 
the other islands and enquired about their interest in discussing the introduction of a 
provident fund. George G Newton, an actuary, was sent to conduct a feasibility study 
in the other islands. He recommended that a provident fund should be established in 
the islands and made the following recommendations: 
e The establishment of a Provident Fund, on a contributory basis, separate from 
the normal financial machinery of government to cover all adult employed 
persons except pensionable government employees; 
A contribution rate of 10% of earnings up to a ceiling shared equally between 
employers and employees; 
An investment goal of maximising the yield on funds consistent with security 
of capital; 
9 Seeking of technical advice in organising the schemes and training the staff, if 
the Funds were to be instituted (Fletcher, 1976). 
The governments accepted the recommendations and the provident funds were 
introduced at various times, between 1969 -1972. The delays, in some countries, 
were caused by the change in government. The first country in the OECS to establish 
a provident fund was St. Kitts in 1968, followed by Grenada in 1969, St. Vincent, St. 
Lucia and Dominica in 1970 and Montserrat in 1972. The Fund in Grenada deviated 
from the "Newton Model" by covering only agricultural workers, requiring 
contributions only from employers and establishing the fund as part of government 
normal financial machinery (Fletcher, 1976). Anguilla broke away from the unitary 
state of St. Kitts and Nevis and Anguilla in 1967, and was therefore not part of the St. 
Kitts and Nevis Provident Fund. 
Table 3.1 
Summary Of Benefits Provided By The National Provident Funds In The OECS 
Country Year of Legislation Benefits 
Anguilla n/a National Provident Fund Act 
was never passed in Anguilla 
Antigua & Barbuda 1970 Old Age, Survivor, 
Incapacitation, Emigration Grant 
Never Implemented 
British Virgin Islands n/a National Provident Act was 
never passed 
Don-dnica 1970 Age, Unemployment, Sickness, 
Survivor, Incapacitation 
Grenada 1969 Old Age, Loss of Earnings, 
Sickness, Death - only for Agricultural 
workers. 
Montserrat 1972 Age, Sickness, Incapacitation, 
Survivors 
St. Kitts & Nevis 1968 Old Age, Survivor, 
Incapacitation, Emigration Grant 
St. Lucia 1970 Age, Unemployment, Sickness, 
Incapacitation, Survivors 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 1970 Age, Survivors, Incapacitation, 
Emigration Grant 
Source: Adapted from Fletcher (1976) pg. 8. 
According to Compton (2001), the governments in the Caribbean were always more 
interested in introducing the more comprehensive social security fund, but the British 
Government and to some extent the ILO and ISSA were of the view that the islands 
were too small to sustain a social security fund. There appears to be some 
confinnation for this view, for according to Fletcher (1976) the Colonial Office "was 
responsible for nudging the St. Kitts Government towards the Provident Fund 
Approach, " and the "govenunent leaders had constantly emphasised that the 
Provident Fund scheme was only the first step towards a complete system of social 
security. " This is further affirmed by the official records of the debate in Parliament 
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during the introduction of the Bills to make the social security systems law in many of 
the OECS countries and from a report by the ILO/UNDP Caribbean Office (Hansards 
of the various OECS Member States, Joseph, 1975). 
The provident funds provided some coverage for workers but because the 
contingencies covered were limited and also because the payment was paid in one 
lump sum, it was deemed to be inadequate to meet the needs of the public. It also did 
not solve the problem of income replacement in retirement, for the money was 
received in a lump-sum at retirement and many of the recipients frittered away the 
money shortly after receipt and went on to become charges on the state. In addition, 
the national provident funds had accumulated a sizeable reserve and some 
governments saw the potential for even larger accumulations under a social security 
system (Ministry of Agriculture, St. Kitts, 1977; Dominica Hansard, 1975; St. Vincent 
and The Grenadines Hansard, 1986). This move to a more comprehensive coverage 
was recommended and encouraged by the International Labour Organisation, and the 
ILO provided technical assistance to the governments in establishing the system 
(Dominica Hansard, 1975; Joseph, 1975). 
3.4 The Introduction of Social Security System in the OECS 
Social security systems were introduced to provide income security and improve the 
standard of living for workers, increase national savings and wealth and strengthen 
the financial capacity of the countries. The systems initially targeted all employed 
persons in the formal sector between the ages of 16 to 60 in most countries and 15 to 
65 in a few. It was contributory, with contributions being made by both employees 
and employers, usually on an equal basis. 
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The system introduced in the OECS is more Bismarckian than Beveridgian, with the 
emphasis principally on employed persons. None of the systems in the OECS can 
claim to be fully Beveridgian as none provides universal coverage, though a few 
provide non-contributory pensions on a limited scale. The systems providing a non- 
contributory pension - those in Antigua, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines - can be said to be closer to the Beveridge model than the others. They 
are all defined benefit systems, and this element of solidarity is a feature of the 
Beveridge Model. As the systems evolve and coverage is expanded, both in terms of 
benefits offered and population served, it will move closer towards the Beveridgian 
model. 
3.4.1 Benefits Provided Under the Social Security System in the OECS 
Table 3.2 details the benefits offered as well as the year in which the social security 
organisations came into being in the different countries. As mentioned earlier, 
Antigua and Barbuda was the first of the OECS islands to introduce a social security 
scheme in 1972. The other OECS islands all introduced social security schemes 
during the 1975 - 1987 period. Four other Caribbean islands, Jamaica, Barbados, 
Guyana and Trinidad had established social security systems in 1969,1970,1970, and 
1971, respectively. 
At the inception of the social security systems all of the islands introduced the 
following benefits: sickness, maternity, invalidity, survivors, funeral grant and old 
age. Coverage for employment injury and for the self-employed persons was 
introduced subsequent to the introduction. However, the self-employed persons, 
though encouraged, arc not yet mandated to contribute to the system in Anguilla and 
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St. Vincent & The Grenadines, but they are encouraged to contribute. Anguilla has 
also not yet introduced the employment injury benefit. In five of the islands non- 
contributory pensions are provided, though the criteria for qualification are not 
uniform. 
Table 3.2 
Summary of Benefits Provided by the National Insurance/Social Security 
Schemes In The OECS 
Country Year of Legislation 
INC 
Benefits 
Anguilla 1980 1982 Old Age, Survivor, 
Sickness, Maternity, Invalidity, Funeral 
Grant, Employment Injury 
Antigua & Barbuda 1972 1973 Old Age, Survivor, 
Sickness, Maternity, Invalidity, Funeral 
Grant, Employment Injury, Social 
Assistance 
Dominica 1975 1976 Old Age, Survivor, 
Sickness, Maternity, Invalidity, Funeral 
Grant, Employment Injury, Medical 
Care 
Grenada 1983 1983 Old Age, Survivor, 
Sickness, Maternity, Invalidity, Funeral 
Grant, Employment Injury, Social 
Assistance 
Montserrat 1985 1986 Old Age, Survivor, 
Sickness, Maternity, Invalidity, Funeral 
Grant, Employment Injury 
St. Kitts & Nevis 1977 1978 Old Age, Survivor, 
Sickness, Maternity, Invalidity, Funeral 
Grant, Employment Injury, Social 
Assistance 
St. Lucia 1978 1979 Old Age, Survivor, 
Sickness, Maternity, Invalidity, Funeral 
Grant, Employment Injury, Social 
Assistance 
St. Vincent & 
The Grenadines 1986 1987 Old Age, Survivor, 
Sickness, Maternity, Invalidity, Funeral 
Grant, Employment Injury, Social 
Assistance 
Source: Acts of Incorporation of the Respective Countries. Legend: INC = The year the Act took 
effect 
It is interesting to note that Dominica and Grenada provided for unemployment 
benefits under the National Provident Fund Act, (though in Dominica unemployment 
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benefits were never actually implemented). Unemployment benefits are not provided 
for in any of the OECS islands through the Social Security Act or the National 
Insurance Act. Despite the fact that unemployment is recognised as a major problem 
facing the OECS countries and that past contributors are likely to be part of the 
unemployed population, there appears to be a reluctance to provide benefits for them 
on the grounds that it may encourage laziness and indolence but also to on the basis of 
costs. 
Alleyne (1998) argues that while within the Caribbean there is a strongly held view 
that unemployment benefit programmes are detrimental to social security and should 
be avoided, the available evidence does not support that view. He draws on the 
experience of Barbados, the only Caribbean country to implement unemployment 
benefits to support his position. He contends that since unemployment benefits were 
introduced in 1981, there has only been one occasion, during the early 1990's when 
the organisation experienced pressure. He also makes the point that in the event of 
short-term difficulties the system can draw upon the Consolidated Fund of the 
goveniment. 
This however does not provide any assurances, for if, as is argued, unemployment in 
the Caribbean is high and chronic, then the resort to the Consolidated Fund may not 
be a short-term measure but become endemic, leading to severe pressures on the 
system and calling to question its viability and sustainability. It is recognition of the 
potential long-term problems that may arise, which has led to Urquhart's (1991) 
position that the experience of Barbados has certainly cautioned all other Caribbean 
countries to be wary of the pitfalls with this benefit. 
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This dissertation does not intend to provide a detailed analysis of the merits of the 
benefits provided by the social security systems. This issue, however, was 
highlighted to bring into focus the need for systems to incorporate the peculiarities of 
their envirorunent rather than be wholesale importers of systems from outside, as 
argued in Chapter Two. Given the high rates of unemployment and the importance of 
the informal sector, it can be argued that any social security system in the Caribbean 
should have taken these factors in account, and a system of social protection for these 
groups should have been a priority. It is perhaps not too late and social security 
systems in order to continue to be relevant to the lives of the people of the OECS will 
have to take these factors into consideration. 
3.4.2 Coverage of The Social Security System 
In Montserrat and St. Lucia, civil servants were and are still excluded from the social 
security systern. The government provides coverage for civil servants, in the event of 
sickness, maternity and old age. In these two countries, the civil servants were able to 
effectively lobby for their exclusion from the system, on the grounds that they were 
already covered for most of the contingencies by government in a non-contributory 
pension system. In Anguilla, civil servants were initially part of the system, then they 
were exempted, and their contributions refunded in 1983. They were later reinstated 
in 1987. 
There are now on-going discussions to embrace the civil servants as part of the social 
security system in both Montserrat and St. Lucia. In fact, the process has progressed 
beyond discussions in Montserrat and a study has been completed to determine the 
feasibility of merging the government pension with that provided by the social 
security organisation. 
The self-employed were excluded at the inception of the systems and a large segment 
of the working population was thereby excluded from coverage. This was chiefly on 
the advice of ILO/UNDP experts who argued that not only was a proper study not 
conducted, "it would be too much for a young country to bear at its present stage of 
development, " (Joseph, 1975). In the 1970's the countries were predominantly 
agricultural and farmers and others in the agricultural community made up a large 
proportion of the workforce. This was also the group least likely to have alternative 
arrangements and more susceptible to the vagaries of nature, yet the group was 
excluded from coverage. 
In addition to agriculture, workers in the tourism sector are also susceptible to the 
vagaries of nature and to seasonal employment. In 1995, the situation of the tourism 
workers was brought home very forcefully with the devastation caused by Hurricane 
Luis in Anguilla. The passage of the hurricane destroyed many hotels and employees 
were without work during the repair stage of the hotels. This meant that no social 
security contributions were paid on their behalf or by themselves and they were 
therefore ineligible for many of the short-term benefits. 
Urquhart (1991), in addressing the issue of seasonal and casual workers, submitted 
that while no difficulty arises when claims are for long-term benefits, problems arise 
when claims are made for short-term benefits. This, he argues is "discriminatory and 
inequitable and warrants serious study and resolution. " The problems for the long- 
term are as serious, if not more so. Seasonal workers will be required to work over a 
longer period of time to become eligible for a pension and because the pension is 
calculated usually on the best three of the last ten years of employment, seasonal 
workers may also receive lower pensions. This point was allegedly raised by the 
sugar factory workers prior to the implementation of the social security system in St. 
Kitts and Nevis (Osbome, 200 1)6 , but their voices appear to have gone unheeded, as 
the eligibility criteria for benefits are uniforni for all categories of workers. 
The coverage figures for 1999 (twenty-seven years after the first social security and 
twelve years after the last social security/national insurance system was established in 
the OECS) will highlight the high level of informal workers in the OECS. The figures 
reveal that the countries with the lowest coverage are the Windward Islands of 
Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, the islands with greater dependence on 
agriculture, mainly banana exports. This provides some confirmation of the high 
level of infonnal workers in the islands. 
Table 3.3 
Contributors as a Percentage of the Labour Force & Unemployment In The 
OECS 
Country Percentage Unemployment 
(1999) 1970 1980 1991 
Anguilla 93.6 n/a n/a 6.3 
Antigua & Barbuda 88.3 n/a n/a 6.7 
British Virgin Islands n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Dominica 30.4 8.1 18.6 9.9 
Grenada 64.5 10.1 17.4 15.2 
Montserrat 66.4 8.6 13 2.5 
St. Vitts & Nevis 84.1 8.2 10.3 3.1 
St. Lucia 47.1 9.2 17.2 14.5 
St. Vincent & The Grenadines 54.2 12.9 23.5 19.8 
Source: Adapted from Nicholls (200 1). 
' Information gleaned from interview with Mr Osborne, a former sugar factory employee on March 28, 
2001 in St. Kitts. 
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As was earlier demonstrated this group of workers in the informal sector, is one of the 
groups most in need of coverage, for it is highly vulnerable and least likely to have 
alternative provisions for retirement. Given the decline in the importance of 
agriculture and the falling world prices for the agricultural exports of the region, this 
group will face enormous pressures in retirement. They may prove a huge burden on 
the coffers of government in some countries and the social security system in others, 
where a non-contributory pension is payable. It is quite conceivable that the fanners 
will not be content with the minimum pension payable and given their numbers may 
be able to exert pressure on government to pay a much higher pension to them. 
According to Nicholls (2001) because of a deterioration of the terms of trade in 
bananas and cost-cutting measures, it is likely that the unemployment rate in the 
Windward Islands in particular has risen further. These new unemployed, he states, 
have added to the already large informal sector. He argues that this presents a 
problem of financing and expenditure for the social security systems. 
This will, however create a greater problem of financing than expenditure as none of 
the systems in the OECS provide unemployment benefits. The larger portion of 
unemployed persons will pose great challenges for the systems as it reduces the 
contribution base and thus increases the system dependency. This will therefore make 
it imperative that the social security systems not only control costs but also enhance 
the returns on their investments. It requires a re-think of the role of the social security 
organisations and places greater emphasis on good governance and management of 
the systems and the investments. These issues will be dealt with in greater depth later 
in the Chapter and in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
Contrary to the opinion of Urquhart (1991) and some governments (Dominica 
Hansard, 1975) the programmes in the Caribbean did not attempt to protect all classes 
of society. It appears to be a huge failing that the social security systems in the 
Caribbean did not address fully the concerns and peculiarities of the Caribbean 
society at its inception. Efforts have been made to rectify this failing by mandating 
that all employed persons, those in the formal as well as the informal sector, are to 
contribute to the social security organisations. However, compliance of the informal 
sector has been poor. As a manager of one of the social security organisations asserts, 
it is ironic that when it was optional for the self-employed to contribute to the system, 
no effort was made by the organisation to "reach" them and to convince them of the 
benefits ofjoining the system. However, now that it is mandatory, the organisation is 
spending lots of money "begging" them to contribute, with little success. It is 
important that the social security organisations improve their compliance mechanisms 
for evasion leads to a "free-rider" problem with the contributors subsidising the 
defaulters. 
in addition to social security, there are some provisions for the poor, disabled and 
orphans, but they are arguably not very comprehensive and the benefits provided are 
inadequate. However, it must be noted that with respect to the orphans and 
abandoned children, there is a much greater effort by the government to provide 
assistance and this includes free education with transportation, books, uniforms and 
meals provided (Documentation from and Discussions held with officers at the Social 
Welfare ministry in OECS). 
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In all of the countries, there is some measure of private pensions provided by the 
employer and in some cases individuals as well, but it has been difficult to ascertain 
the true extent of coverage. Interviews with some insurance companies in the OECS 
islands reveal that in recent years there has been an increase in demand by both 
employers and individuals for packages structured for retirement. The insurance 
companies believe that there still exists huge scope for increasing coverage. In 
addition, more and more trade unions are including the provision of private pension as 
part of their collective agreements on behalf of workers. However, it appears that for 
many people in the OECS, social security will be their main form of income in their 
retirement. The issue of private provisions in the OECS will be discussed in more 
detail later in the Chapter. 
3.5 Emerging Themes During the Introduction of the Social 
Security Systems and Their Characteristic 
in all of the countries in the OECS, the introduction of the social security system was 
seen as a mechanism for enhancing the standard of living of workers. It would 
provide protection against various contingencies while employed, but more 
importantly would provide a pension, giving the workers a level of independence and 
dignity in old age. However, for some governments, the introduction of the social 
security organisations provided an opportunity and the means to facilitate economic 
growth as well as deepen the financial sector. 
It is posited that the attitude of government would shape and influence the 
relationship with the social security organisations. This attitude would lead to distinct 
characteristics, which would persist even with changes in govermnent, as the 
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precedence would have been established. The characteristics of the themes are 
detailed in the Table 3.4. This table was compiled from information from the 
Hansards, which record the debate during the introduction of the social security 
system and from early files of the social security organisations and speeches by 
ministers of social security. 
Table 3.4 
Emergent Themes Framing the Relationship Between Government and the 
Social Security Organisations In The OECS 
Safety Economic Development 
Hands-Off Approach by Gov't 
Limited/High percentage of 
Gov't bonds and loans 
At below market rate 
Timely payment of interest 
and principal payments 
Timely Payment of contributions 
Possibly restrictions on investments 
Anguilla 
British Virgin Islands 
Montserrat 
St. Kitts & Nevis 
St. Vincent & The 
Grenadines 
Hands-On Approach by Gov't 
High percentage of Govt paper & 
loans to statutory bodies at lower 
than market rate 
Arrears and non-performance of 
investments by Gov't & its agencies 
Delinquency with regards to contributions 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Dominica 
Grenada 
St. Lucia 
A government whose priority was on the preservation of the funds accumulated is 
likely to impose greater restrictions on the investment of the funds and adopt a 
paternalistic approach in its relationship with the organisation. Though it would 
demand frequent reporting, it would not necessarily interfere in the management of 
the organisation. It would limit its lending of the funds at below market rate and 
would honour its obligations of interest, principal and contribution payments in a 
timely manner. 
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In contrasts, a government who saw the system as one of facilitating economic growth 
would attempt to influence the investment decisions and would view the funds 
accumulated as a cheap and easy source of funds for government projects. There 
would be heavy borrowing at below market rate and there may be late payments of 
not only interest and principal due but also of contributions. The government could 
even regard the funds accumulated by the social security system as an extension of the 
government's Treasury and make little distinction between the two. 
A perusal of the financial statements will reveal that in the early years of the system's 
organisations in Antigua, Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia, there was a substantial 
proportion of the portfolio invested in government securities and socio-economic 
loans. The statements also reveal that from inception, there has been default on some 
of those loans and arrears on both contributions and interest payments. In Antigua, 
fixed deposits of the Social Security organisation were also used to secure 
government borrowings at the commercial banks (Antigua & Barbuda Social Security 
Board (ABSSB) Annual Report, 1974). 
Though Nicholls (2001) argues that excessive fiscal deficits financed by social 
security have not been a feature of the region's economic performance, the evidence 
seem to paint a different picture in some of the countries. In 2001, the government of 
St. Lucia owed EC7 $40 million in interest arrears only. This excludes contribution 
arrears. The government of Dominica as at July 2000, owed EC $21.7 in arrears on 
interest and contributions. The goverranent of Antigua owed EC$ 192.5m in arrears 
of contributions and interest as at December 1999. In St. Kitts and Nevis and St. 
7 The EC$ is fixed to the US$ at US $1 = EC $2.70. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, the heavy investments in the government-owned 
commercial bank may provide indirect support for government's projects. This 
relationship between the social security organisations and the government has given 
rise to a big debate as to whether social security should finance economic 
development or whether it should focus solely on the provision of benefits and in 
particular retirement benefits. A brief look at the debate will be introduced in the next 
section. 
3.6 What Role for Social Security in Economic Development? 
The Acts of Incorporations in the OECS are very vague in their stated roles for the 
social security organisations in economic development. It is however, understood that 
the main purpose of the organisations is to maximise investment returns, following 
the general principles of safety, yield and liquidity, to enable the schemes to fulfil 
their obligations to contributors. There is however, in the OECS a clearly understood, 
and in most cases explicitly stated objective of facilitating national economic 
development, though it is not articulated in the Acts of Incorporation. A glance at the 
annual and other reports of the social security organisations (SSO) will reveal the 
expectation, if not the clearly stated role by the ministers and chainnen of the boards 
as to the role of the SSO in economic development. 
The SSO's executive directors 8, cognisant of the fact that a healthy economy is vital 
for the success of the organisations, acknowledge that as the main mobiliser of 
I The Social Security chief executive officers are usually called directors, but to avoid confusion with 
other directors of the board, especially in Chapter Four, they will be referred to throughout the 
dissertation as executive directors. 
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savings in the countries, they had a role, albeit secondary, to assist in economic 
development. 
The role of social security in economic development is a bit contentious, as some 
pension fund experts do not advocate such a key role for the social security systems in 
economic development., They argue that social security's primary role is to finance 
retirement income and while it may increase domestic saving and have other positive 
effects, there are other measures more effective to achieve these macro-economic 
objectives -(Thompson, 1998, McGillivray, 1998). Others, however, believe that 
social security, as it is traditionally structured, impacts negatively on the economy 
impairing the competitiveness of nations and they advocate reform including 
privatisation of the system (Feldstein, 1974, World Bank, 1994). This reform is 
expected to improve the economy, and in particular, facilitate the development of 
capital markets. 
Notwithstanding the arguments, there may be a case for social security to play a role 
in economic development in developing countries, given that it is the largest mobiliser 
of savings in the countries (Samuels, ' 1993). One of the major problems at the 
moment is the fact that facilitating economic development is an implicit, rather than 
an explicit objective. This leads to investment decisions taken in an ad hoc rather 
than in a planned approach, which would facilitate the attainment of competing goals. 
This view finds support with Theodore and La Foucade (1999) who disagee with 
Gutierrez's (1989) suggestion that the social and economic utility of social security 
investments should be considered after the other conditions of safety, yield and 
liquidity, have been satisfied. They argue that all these principles need to be 
considered as a whole, given that the social security systems command a large portion 
of resources in countries strapped for financial resources. Theodore and La Foucade 
(1999) go on to argue that "in the context of small island economies where the social 
security schemes are clearly major potential investors, it would seem to be rational for 
these institutions to be actively involved in the production efforts of these economies. 
Their active participation in the creation of productive capital and in the progress of 
social and economic value becomes even more critical, when one considers that 
capital has become even more scarce since the fiscal crisis and the balance of 
payments problems that precipitated the advent of structural adjustment. The fact is 
that it is the capacity of these countries to produce more real output that will provide 
the opportunities for higher standards of living. Investment of social security reserves 
should therefore contribute as far as possible to capital fonnation. In this way the 
social security schemes will be readily complying with the criterion of social and 
economic utility. " 
Mounbaga (1995) concurs with this position. While recognising that the investments 
had to meet the criteria of safety, liquidity and yield, he argues that the investment of 
the reserves has to comply with the criterion of economic and social utility. This is 
because "social security has an important role to play in mobilising supplementary 
national savings for the creation of productive capital and health and social 
infrastructures. " 
The role of social security in the economic development of countries has also been 
rccognised by those charged with assessing the financial soundness and viability of 
the schemes. In the Third Actuarial Report of the St. Vincent and Grenadines Scheme 
(1996), the actuary wrote, " probably no other institution will be able to accumulate as 
much economic power in St. Vincent and the Grenadines as the National Insurance 
Scheme. The economicfuture of St. Vincent and the Grenadines is in part in the 
hands of the [National Insurance Scheme] 9. Strategic planning of its investments is 
essential. " This view can be extended to all the other OECS countries. Even the 
ILO's Panel of Experts (1983) recognised that "good management of the investment 
policy of social security funds can and should help to complement the national 
economic policy in various ways. " 
The Singapore case clearly demonstrates the need to incorporate all of the objectives 
into a coherent single policy framework, as failure so to do will lead to imbalances in 
the system and in the non-attainment of the financial objectives of the system. In 
Singapore, the Central Provident Fund (CPF) was and is expected to provide not just a 
pension but is actively used as a means of facilitating economic growth and directing 
investments into areas desired by the government. The CPF activities include in 
addition to the provision of retirement income, homeownership, pre-retirement 
investments, life, home and health insurance, loans for tertiary education and 
compulsory medical savings account. 
As Asher (1999) observes, the CPF is not "simply a social security scheme, but one 
which is the primary socio-economic-political planning and engineering tool for 
policy makers. " This view is echoed by Shome and Saito (1980) who opine, "CPF 
has played a major role in the development of Singapore's social infrastructure and 
The emphases are mine. 
has made possible a general sharing of capital wealth created in the economy. " While 
the system may have achieved the economic objectives, it is questionable as to 
whether it will achieve the retirement income objectives. 
Asher (1999) reveals that the CPF will be inadequate to provide the benchmark 
retirement income, and that the amount provided will be inadequate for many citizens. 
One of the reasons for this is the manner in which the funds are invested. The funds 
are required to be invested solely in government bonds, and there is no transparency 
in the investment process and the returns earned. He argues that the government 
ascribes an investment rate, which is lower than the rate actually earned, and this in 
effect implicitly taxes participants. This suggests that the CPF in Singapore may have 
been able to meet its various mandates, if it was allowed to invest more freely and if it 
was actually credited with the interest it earned on its assets. 
Another possible reason may be the fact that the investment of the CPF funds was not 
carried out using a portfolio management approach. The government's focus was 
chiefly centred on economic development, paying insufficient regard to the primary 
objective of ensuring adequate retirement income for contributors. This makes the 
case for a portfolio management approach to the investment of social security funds, 
where all the objectives are considered together, rather than in isolation, and 
investment decisions are taken in the light of this. This would lead to the schemes 
defining clearly their objectives, and risk/retum tolerance, which would lead to the 
establishment of investment guidelines that would guide investment decisions. The 
portfolio management approach would clearly spell out the responsibilities of the 
board and management as fiduciaries acting on behalf of contributors. It would 
ensure a systematic approach to the management of the portfolio and would also 
strengthen the position of the social security organisations (SSO), providing them 
with a tool for managing the partnership with the government. 
This would also necessitate the establishment of adequate systems of control and 
governance to manage the portfolio. This approach calls for greater clarity in the 
definition of the relationship between the board and the management with the 
contributors. The trustee relationship which exist between the board and the 
contributors, is currently not well articulated, and this lack of clarity may be another 
reason why the SSO find it difficult to resist efforts of the government to direct the 
investment of the reserves. In the next section, the reform initiatives carried out in 
the OECS since the inception of the social security systems are discussed. As 
mentioned above, the reforms have been parametric in nature rather than structural. 
3.7 Reform Initiatives of the Social Security Systems in the OECS 
According to the classification of refonns by Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt (1999)10 
the social security systems in the OECS underwent a major reform when the transition 
was made from the national provident fund (NPF) to the social security systems. The 
social security organisations assumed the assets and liabilities of the national 
provident funds and members became automatic members of the social security 
organisations. There were what some social security executive directors term "very 
'0 They define minor reforms as changes made to existing public schemes primarily to delay fiscal 
problems, but sometimes to correct existing inequities. These include changes in the eligibility criteria, 
contribution and benefit structure or administration of the scheme. Major reforms are those which 
substantially change the system of pension provision from defined benefit to defined contribution or 
vice versa, or from payg to fully funded or vice versa. The introduction of a new system plus any 
changes to an existing payg system that includes a mandatory defined contribution pillar are also 
classified as major reforms. 
generous" transition measures, as the balances accrued by contributors under the NPF 
were converted to contribution credits, entitling them to immediate entitlement to 
benefits. 
In two of the countries, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the 
accounts of the national provident funds were not merged with that of social security 
and are managed separately from those of the social security organisations. Upon 
retirement, former national provident fund members will receive a lump sum amount 
consisting of their contributions made plus the interest earned on the amount from the 
national provident fund and their pension from the social security system. This latter 
method is less expensive and has no financial implications for the social security 
system, though it increases the administrative requirements as the records for the NPF 
system are to be maintained separately. However, in 1988, the members of the NPF 
in St. Kitts and Ncvis were allowed to draw down their balances in their accounts, 
and many took advantage of that opportunity. 
Since the introduction of the social security system, the reforms undertaken have been 
minor and have been parametric in nature. The change has been mainly of the 
contribution ceiling, rather than the contribution rate. The rates have only been 
increased with the introduction of the employment injury benefits, when the 
employers' contributions have been increased in the range of 1% - 2%. Please refer 
to Table 3.5 
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Table 3.5 
Parametric Reforms Undertaken by the OECS Social Security Organisations 
Year Contribution Rate Income Ceiling 
Per Annum 
Benefits" 
Anguilla 
1982 10 24,000 A, S, I, SI, M 
1994 10 36,000 A, S, 1, SL M 
1997 10 48,000 A, S, I, SI, M 
1999 10 60,000 A, S, I, S1, M 
Antiaua 
1972 10 A, S, I, SI, M, 
2000 10 A, S, 1, SI, M, EI, SE 
British Virgin Islands 
1980 10 US$ 10,400 A, S, I, SI, M, 
1991 10 US$ 13,800 A, S, I, SI, M, EI, SE 
1998 10 US$ 18,096 A, S, 1, SI, M, EI, SE 
Dominica 
1976 8 EC$ 12,000 A, S, I, SI, M, MI, 
1983 8 EC$ 24,000 A, S, 1, SI, M, MI 
1985 10 EC$ 24,000 A, S, I, SI, M, Ml, EI 
1986 10 EC$ 24,000 A, S, 1, SI, M, MI, EI SE 
1989 10(7) 
12 EC$ 30,000 A, S, 1, SI, M, MI, EI, SE 
1991 10 EC$ 36,000 A, S, I, SI, M, MI, EI, SE 
1994 10 EC$ 46,000 A, S, I, SI, M, MI, El, SE 
1995 10 EC$ 60,000 A, S, 1, SI, M, MI, EI, SE 
Grenada 
1985 10 EC$ 30,000 A, S, 1, SI, M 
1988 10 EC$ 36,000 A, S, 1, SI, M 
1995 10 EC$ 36,000 A, S, I, SI, M, MG 
1998 11 EC$ 36,000 A, S, I, SI, M, MG, El, RAP 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
1978 10 EC$ 24,000 A, S, 1, SI, M 
1984 10 EC$ 48,000 A, S, 1, SI, M 
1986 10 EC$ 48,000 A, S, 1, SI, M, EI 
1993 10 EC$ 62,400 A, S, I, SI, M, EI 
1996 10 EC$ 70,200 A, S, I, SI, M, EI 
1998 10 EC$ 78,000 A, S, I, SI, M, El 
St. Lucia 
1979 10 EC$ 8,400 A, S, I, SI, M 
1985 10 EC$ 12,000 A, S, I, SI, M 
1991 10 EC$ 30,000 A, S, I, SI, M, EI 
1993 10 EC$ 36,000 A, S, I, SI, M, EI 
2001 10 EC$ A, S, I, SI, M, EI 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
1987 5 EC$ 20,400 A, S, I, SI M 
1995 5 EC$ 31,200 A, S, 1, SI M 
2000 6 EC$ 39,000 A, S, I, SI M, EI 
Source: Data Provided By The Respective Social Security Organisations & Compiled From financial 
statements and other reports. 
II A= Age pension; S= Survivors'; I= Invalidity, SI = Sickness, M, Maternity, MI = Medical, EI 
Employment Injury; Se = Self-employed 
12 The Self-employed contribute 7% of their net income quarterly and the minimum contribution is 
$10.50 per quarter. 
The other changes include the introduction of new benefits, mainly employment 
injury and the extension of coverage to the self-employed. There have also been 
amendments to the legislation to strengthen the legal authority of the social security 
organisations to enforce compliance. The legislation has added the power to garnish 
physical and financial assets in St. Lucia, the British Virgin Islands and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines. In Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica and St. Kitts and Nevis, the 
legislation allows for the impounding of the physical assets of defaulting employers. 
In St. Lucia, the Law was amended to increase the retirement age to 65, but because 
of the heavy opposition by the public, this has been deferred. There has however, not 
been a comprehensive review of the legislation in any of the islands, though this is on 
the agenda for 2001 for the Antigua & Barbuda Social Security Board. 
The signing of the Reciprocal Agreements between the OECS and CARICOM 
Member States may also be classified as a reform initiative, given the implications for 
the organisations. In the next section, a more in-depth look will be taken of the 
implications of the reciprocal agreements. 
3.8 The OECS And CARICOM Reciprocal Agreements 
This section will not look at the specifics of the Agreements in any detail, but instead 
will provide an overview of the Agreements and analyse their implications for the 
social security organisations. 
The governments of the OECS and the wider Caribbean community for many years 
have attempted to work in unison on policies to foster co-operation, free movement of 
persons within the community and economic growth. This was the main reason for 
the attempted Federation in 1958. Even after the failure of that attempt in 1962, the 
countries still saw the need to work together and various organisations have been 
formed to foster that co-operation. Two of the more lasting and significant have been 
the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) formed by the Treaty 
of Chaguaramas in Trinidad in 1973 and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
formed by the Treaty of Basseterre in 1981. 
In June 1991, by the Declaration of Grand Anse, seven member governments of the 
OECS signed the Convention on Social Security in the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States to provide for reciprocal agreements on social security between the 
States" . In November 1993, the CARICOM Agreement on Social Security was 
signed, and the reciprocal agreements were applicable not only to the OECS member- 
states but to the entire Caribbean community, thus widening the coverage for 
workers. Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands were not signatories to the initial 
Convention. Anguilla has since signed but the British Virgin Islands are still not 
party to the reciprocal agreement. Following the signing of the Conventions and 
Agreements, Member States had to pass the enabling legislation in their respective 
countries. By 1999, all of the signatory governments had passed the necessary 
legislation. 
The main purpose of Conventions and Agreements was to foster unity among the 
member states in the area of social security, as this was recognised as a way of 
encouraging functional co-operation and regional unity. The Conventions and 
" It should be noted that the idea of a reciprocal agreement between the Caribbean countries was 
proffered by John Compton, the then Premier of St. Lucia, during the debate introducing the National 
Provident Fund Act in St. Lucia in 1970. 
Agreements protect workers entitlement to benefits and afford equality of treatment 
when workers move from one country to the next. Under the CARICOM Agreement 
the benefits covered are invalidity, disablement and old age or retirement pensions. 
The OECS Convention provides more comprehensive coverage and in addition to the 
benefits covered under the CARICOM Agreement, it also provides additional benefits 
from coverage of employment injury and occupational diseases, funeral benefits and 
sickness and maternity benefits. It can be seen that the CARICOM Agreement 
focuses solely on the long-term benefits, while the OECS covers both the short tenn 
and long terin benefits. All workers, including those aboard ships, with the exception 
of those in the diplomatic and equivalent status are exempted, as these persons are 
exempted from contributing to the social security system. They, may, however 
register on a voluntary basis. 
The signing of the Agreements has serious implications for the social security 
organisations and requires a commitment of time and resources, if the true benefits of 
these reciprocal agreements are to be realised. The integrity of the record keeping 
takes on geat importance. The information must not only be accurate and readily 
available to provide the information to one of the other social security organisations, 
but it is important to keep track of the movements of the insured persons in and out of 
the system. In countries, where the eligibility criteria differ with respect to benefits, 
mechanisms will have to be introduced to ensure that neither persons nor the social 
security institutions are disadvantaged. It calls for harmonisation between and among 
the social security organisations with respect to their computer systems, so that the 
systems can "talle' to each other, and this will speed up the delivery of service and 
ensure the accuracy and validity of the claims made. 
There are also implications for the management of the systems. The importance of 
good governance becomes pointedly obvious as the potential of increased claims 
against the systems rises. To qualify for a minimum pension in all of the systems, 
about ten years of contributions are required. Prior to the establishment of the 
Reciprocal Agreements, persons who had contributed for less than ten years would 
only qualify for a grant, and in some cases no benefit, if they had left the country, as 
social security does not provide a refund to contributors. 
However, with the advent of the Reciprocal Agreements, all service is accumulated 
and each social security is then responsible for paying the portion of the pension, 
based on the number of years contributed. For example, if a person worked for three 
years in Dominica, four years in Anguilla and another four years in St. Lucia, prior to 
the reciprocal agreements, that person most likely would receive no pension from any 
of the systems. He would not have met the eligibility criteria for the award of a 
pension. In most cases, he would receive a grant only from the place of last 
employment. With the reciprocal agreements, the person will now receive at least a 
minimum pension, with Dominica responsible for paying 27% and Anguilla and St. 
Lucia 36.5% each of the pension due. 
The reciprocal agreements have benefited workers and will foster greater movement 
of persons within the countries. However, countries need to review their employment 
law, for though both the OECS and CARICOM have signed agreements on the free 
movement of labour within the communities, work permits are still required for 
citizens of the member territories. At the Heads of Government meeting of the 
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OECS leaders in June 2001, it was agreed that there would be free movement of 
people between the Member States from January 2002. 
The Reciprocal Agreements have strengthened the income security for workers in the 
OECS by providing more flexible eligibility conditions for benefits, particularly in 
regards to old age benefits. 'This may serve to further increase the role of social 
security as an important source of income in retirement, even with the existence of 
private provisions. In the next section, the private pension enviromnent in the OECS 
is presented. 
3.9 Private Pension Provisions In The OECS 
It is not possible to provide a comprehensive coverage of private pension provisions 
in the OECS, because of the inadequacy of the data. However, this section will draw 
heavily on the survey results compiled by the Eastem Caribbean Central Bank 
(ECCB) and on interviews held with social security stakeholders, insurance and 
finance companies in the OECS in 1999 and 2001, to provide a landscape of private 
pension provisions. 
3.9.1 Interview Findings 
In this section, the findings from the interviews conducted with the nine insurance 
companies and the two finance companies in the OECS as well as findings in respect 
of private pension provisions by the social security stakeholders will be presented. 
The main purpose of interviewing the insurance and finance companies was to 
determine the type and number of retirement packages offered by the companies to 
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provide a picture of the private pension landscape in the OECS. A secondary purpose 
was to glean some insight into the perception of the insurance and financial sectors of 
the services offered by social security organisations. The latter finding will be 
presented in Chapter Seven and a full description of the methodology and selection 
process will be presented in Chapter Five. In this section, findings from a survey to 
determine the private pension arrangements by the ECCB will also be presented to 
complement the information gathered from the interviews. 
Private Pension Provisions By Social Security Stakeholders 
Thirty-seven employers were interviewed in the OECS as part of this study and of 
that number sixteen provided a pension plan for all employees. One company in St. 
Vincent & the Grenadines provided a pension to management only and one in 
Grenada (a construction company) offered the plan only to established workers. 
Table 3.6 
Private Pension Plans in the OECS 
Country SSO Tunions EmpAssoc Employers TOT 
Anguilla 1 0 1* 0 2 
Antigua & Barbuda 1 0 0 4 5 
British Virgin Islands 1 0 0 1 2 
Dominica 0 1 0 3 4 
Grenada 1 1 0 3 5 
Montserrat 0 0 n/a n/a 0 
St. Kitts & Nevis 1 0 1 2 4 
St. Lucia 1 1* 0 1 4 
St. Vincent & 
The Grenadines 1 0 0 2 3 
TOTAL 732 16 28 
No Interviewed 9 30 19 37 95 
Source: Interviews pension plan to take effect by year-end 200 1. 
In addition a number of companies, especially in Antigua, provided a thrift plan for 
employees. This is in essence a defined contribution system, whereby employees 
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contribute up to about five percent, matched by the employer and upon retirement 
receives the accrued balance plus interest. In many cases, employees are guaranteed 
a minimum return, usually 5% on their balances in the thrift account. All of the 
employers interviewed provided a gratuity to employees upon retirement based on the 
length of service. 
Two trade unions, Dominica Police Welfare Association and the Grenada Teachers 
Union, offer pension plans to members, while one, the St. Lucia Teachers Union is in 
the advanced stage of planning and hope to implement the plan by year-end 2001. It 
is of interest that the unions with private pension plans are all professional unions. 
Some of the general trade unions are also planning to introduce private pension plans 
to members and one trade union in Antigua & Barbuda is in the advanced stages of 
introducing a medical plan for not only its members, but for all workers in the 
country. 
Two of the employers' associations, the Hotel and Tourism Association in Anguilla 
and St. Kitts & Nevis expect to introduce a pension plan for their members to offer to 
their employees by year-end 2001. Seven of the social security organisations also 
offer private pension plans to their employees. Most of the pensions were mandatory 
for all employees who had passed their probationary period, except in the instances 
when the plan was offered only to senior or permanent employees. The majority of 
the plans offered full vesting after five years, while some had partial vesting after 
three or fiveyears and full vesting after ten years. Only one company of those 
interviewed, Jonas, Brown & Hubbards in Grenada offered immediate vesting to 
staff. Only one plan harmonised its benefits with that offered by the social security, 
and this was a non-contributory plan by an international company. In that case, 
employees on retirement will get the difference between their pension entitlement 
from the company and that offered by the social security organisation. In all other 
cases, employees will receive full benefits from both the social security and the 
private pension plans. 
Some companies disbanded their pension plans at the inception of social security in 
their respective countries but there appears to be resurgence in the implementation of 
private pension plans in the OECS. The main reason for the introduction of private 
pension plans was to provide additional income to employees, as the social security 
pension is expected to be inadequate to allow staff members to continue to enjoy the 
standard of living to which they had grown accustomed. It was also seen as a 
mechanism for attracting and retaining professional staff and a reward for service to 
the organisation (Interviews, 1999,2001). Some of the plans were also introduced 
as a result of negotiations with trade unions representing employees. The plans are 
managed mainly by insurance companies, but some are managed in-house and by 
commercial banks. 
3.9.1.2 ECCBs Survey of Employers 
The ECCB also surveyed employers in the OECS to determine how many of them 
had pension plans. Four hundred and forty-six questionnaires were sent and one 
hundred and thirteen responses were received, giving a response rate of twenty-five 
percent. Thirty-five plans reported the existence of a pension plan giving a response 
rate of 31% based on the number of respondents and a mere 8% based on the number 
of questionnaires sent out. Plans were administered in-house in 31% of the cases, 
51% by insurance companies and 11% by banks. 
The Inland Revenue Departments in the islands were also contacted by the ECCB to 
obtain information on the number of registered plans. This information is not 
complete, as pension plans are not required to be registered in any of the countries, 
except for St. Vincent and the Grenadines. In the islands where income taxes are 
payable, to obtain income tax exemptions, the approval of the Inland Revenue is 
requircd. Thrcc countrics, Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda and St. Kitts & Ncvis do not 
charge income tax and so there is no such requirement. Table 3.7 below provides 
information obtained by the Inland Revenue Departments in the OECS with regard to 
registered pension plans. 
Table 3.7 
Registered Pension Plans with the Inland Revenue Departments In The OECS 
Country Registered Managed By 
Insurance Company Bank Other 
Anguilla 
Antigua & Barbuda 
British Virgin Islands 
Dominica 
Grenada 
Montserrat 
St. Kitts & Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent & 
The Grenadines 
TOTAL 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
13 8 4 1 
12 0 12 0 
14 3 4 7 
3 n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a nla 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
27 10 n/a 17 
31 6 
100 27 
n/a 25 
20 50 
Source: Nero & Felix (1999) "Review of Retirement Situation in the ECCB Area, " 
A list of the employers surveyed or the companies registered by the Inland Revenue 
Department was not available and it is possible that the persons interviewed are 
included in the listing above. 
3.9.1.3 Insurance Companies And Private Pension Provisions 
The insurance companies play a pivotal role in the management of private pensions in 
the OECS with many of the private pension plans designed and administered by 
them. There are eight major life insurance companies operating in the OECS with 
four providing pension services. Of these four, two companies dominate the market, 
with sixty-seven percent of the group plan market and seventy-five percent of the 
annuity market. Of these two companies, one has the majority share of the group 
plan market (46%) and the other the annuity market (72%) (ECCB, 1999). 
Table 3.8 
Group Plans and Annuities Administered by Life Insurance Companies in the 
OECS 
Country No of Group 
Plans 
Value of 
Group Plans 
EC$m 
No of 
Annuities 
Value of 
Annuities 
EC$m 
Anguilla 0 0 0 0 
Antigua & Barbuda 7 6.5 211 4.1 
British Virgin Islands n/a n/a nJa n/a 
Dominica 1 0.33 445 2.86 
Grenada 29 19.2 815 5.66 
Montserrat 4 3.69 14 0.2 
St. Kitts & Nevis 4 0.57 28 0.11 
St. Lucia 17 22.5 276 2.3 
St. Vincent & 
The Grenadines 14 16.55 242 2.85 
TOTAL 76 69.34 2031 18.08 
Source: ECCB (1999), "Review of Pension Provisions in the ECCB Area. " 
A reference back to Table 3.2 would reveal that the countries with the lowest 
coverage of social security has the highest coverage of private annuities and group 
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pension plans. In an attempt to explain the reason why there was a higher incidence 
of coverage in the Windward Islands, the ECCB (1999) asserts that this may because 
of a higher tendency to save through insurance and the aggressive nature of agents in 
the Windward Islands. 
This may account in part for the high incidence, but it may also be due to the fact that 
a sizeable portion of the workforce, the self-employed and informal sector were 
initially left out of social security arrangements and so these persons had to seek 
alternative cover. It may also suggest that the introduction of the social security 
systems, despite the negative public perception and resistance (to be discussed more 
fully in Chapter Seven), heightened the awareness for the need to plan and prepare for 
retirement. It may also indicate an appreciation by social security members that 
social security is just one pillar in the plan for retirement. While social security is 
expected to form the basis of retirement income, it will be inadequate to meet all 
retirement needs, especially in countries where the contribution ceiling is 
significantly below the average wage. - This may be akin to the "recognition effect, " 
postulated by Cagan (1965), which asserts that when an individual is forced to 
participate in a pension plan he recognises for the first time the importance of saving 
for his retirement. 
The insurance companies indicate that in recent times, there has been a growing 
awareness of the need to provide for additional income in retirement and increased 
demands for both annuities and group plans. In some cases, the insurance companies 
have aggressively marketed their products especially the annuities, but in other cases, 
they have been invited by employers to structure a private pension for employees and 
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to conduct retirement planning seminars. The insurance companies however 
identified three challenges in expanding their coverage further that of (i) affordability, 
(ii) lack of co-ordinated efforts by government and (iii) a still lax approach to 
retirement by the population, especially among the young. 
The insurance companies argue that the government has an important role to play in 
stimulating the market for private pensions and medical benefits coverage. They 
argue that if government would take the initiative of having a private medical and 
pension plan for civil servants, this would signal to private companies the need for 
making the same provisions for their employees. It is suggested that it would also 
exert pressure on companies to provide a private pension, as employees would 
demand this as a minimum condition of work. However, the insurance companies 
also acknowledged that cost may be a factor why there arc not more annuities and 
group pension plans, however, if the demand increase, costs should fall. 
This presents an opportunity for partnership building between goverranent, social 
security and the insurance companies in sensitising persons of the need for and in 
providing complementary pension provisions that are affordable and appropriate to 
the needs of the insured persons. 
3.9.2 Regulation OfInsurance Companies And Private Pension Plans 
In the countries, where tax is payable, the goverranent is fairly generous offering 
income tax deductions on contributions. To obtain this deduction, the companies 
must apply to the Inland Revenue Department. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is the 
only country requiring mandatory registration of all pension plans and the review of 
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the applications is a joint exercise between the Inland Revenue Department and the 
Legal Department of Government. There is however no monitoring of the pension 
plan for adequacy of funding, separation of assets from that of the company and other 
issues of control, and the requirement of approval for tax deductions has been 
described by the ECCB as "starnp and file regulation. " 
The supervision of pension plans are thereby non-existent, and this will have to be 
addressed as a matter of utmost urgency as the provision of private pension plans rise. 
Another area requiring attention is the regulation of the sale of annuities by the 
insurance companies to ensure that the annuities are not only correctly priced but that 
they meet the needs of the people to whom they are sold. The governments of the 
OECS will do well to learn from the Robert Maxwell scandal and the mis-selling of 
private pensions in the UK. As the demand and market for private pension provision 
increase, government will have to institute measures to ensure that workers rights, 
funds and interests are protected. 
3.10 Conclusions 
This chapter looked at the social security enviromnent in the OECS. It presented a 
historical perspective of the evolution of social security systems, from the inception 
of the national provident funds to the introduction of the social security systems. It 
identified the reform initiatives, which has taken place in the OECS, and argued that 
the reforms instituted after the introduction of the social security systems have been 
minor reforms of the parameters. The private pension environment was also 
presented, and in that section, the findings from the interviews conducted with 
insurance companies in the OECS was presented, as well as with the stakeholders 
with respect to the provisions of private pension plans. This, as indicated earlier, in no 
way gives a complete picture of the private pension provisions in the OECS, but 
demonstrates that companies and workers in the OECS are sensitised towards making 
alternative and complementary arrangements to social security for their retirement 
security. There is however still the opportunity for expansion, for given an estimated 
labour force of 284,994 (as at 1991), and the data gathered by the surveys, the ECCB 
estimates that for every 140 persons in the labour force only one has an annuity or 
individual retirement policy. 
The implications of the introduction of the OECS and CARICOM reciprocal 
agreements were also discussed. A detailed analysis of the portfolio composition of 
the social security funds will be presented in Chapter Five. 
In the next chapter the governance literature relevant to addressing the research 
question will be presented. It will be limited to the role of board composition on 
performance and applied to the social security organisations in the OECS. 
CHAPTER FOUR - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
"For any company that hasn't done well, one of the solutions starts with the board, " 
Robert S Miller (cited in Byrne et al 1997) 
4.1 Introduction 
The last chapter provided a historical analysis of the evolution of social security 
systems and the reform initiatives undertaken in the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS). It also presented the private pension environment and 
discussed the implications of the introduction of the reciprocal agreements between 
the social security organisations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the corporate governance literature relevant 
to addressing the key research question, "how do governance factors impact on the 
performance and administration of social security organisations (SSO) in the OECST' 
In this regard the focus will be on the role of board composition on performance. The 
corporate governance framework of the SSO will be presented and this will be applied 
to the literature. 
4.2 Corporate Governance In A Social Security Context 
Corporate governance has largely been identified with the private sector. The concept 
dates back to the 1930s, however, the importance of good corporate governance was 
brought to the fore with a series of recent scandals, example, the Maxwell Pension 
scandal, BCCI, Barings debacle, Kidder Peabody and the Sumitomo Copper scandal, 
in the 1990s. These scandals demonstrated clearly the importance of an effective 
system of internal control with an emphasis on the separation of functions, 
accountability and transparency of operations. In short, they demonstrated that good 
governance was a vital component of effective management and hence the 
sustainability of organisations. 
In the social security context, the need for corporate governance is as legitimate as for 
private sector organisations. It may even be argued, that there is a greater need for 
good governance, as unlike the private sector, social security contributors have no 
choice as their contributions are mandatory, and so cannot opt out of the system. 
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addition, they cannot diversify their "investmenf'in the social security fund. Itisthus 
vitally important that the persons charged with the management of the social security 
systems do so in the sole interest of the contributors and the system. It is also 
important that this is done in a transparent manner and that the board members and 
management are accountable to the contributors. 
Berle & Means (1932) have been credited with opening the debate on corporate 
governance. They argue that the need for corporate governance is a consequence of 
the separation of power from the owners to the managers of organisations. Berle & 
Means (1932) argue that as organisations become larger and shareholders hold stock 
"' It can be argued that persons who evade the system are exercising a choice, however, it must be 
borne in mind, that these persons are cornmitting an offence and can and are in some cases, brought 
before the Courts to obtain payments. Even in Chile, where contributors have a choice of AFPS and 
Britain where they can opt out of the state system, these choices are limited, and these choices are part 
of the social security system. In Chile, apart from evasion, a person cannot decide not to join the 
system; neither can someone in Britain opt out unless they can prove that the individual or company 
pension is at least as generous as the govermnent system. 
in more and more companies, the shareholders no longer had the time to monitor the 
operations of the organisations. They contend that because of the separation of 
power, there exists conflict between the owners and managers, and so systems to 
manage the conflicts need to be implemented. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) 
define corporate governance as "the integrated set of internal and external controls 
that harmonise manager-shareholder (agency) conflicts of interest, resulting from the 
separation of ownership and control. " 
Gillion et al (2000) define governance of social security institutions as "the processes 
of consultation and decision making which determine the structure of the scheme, the 
institutional arrangements responsible for its administration, and the managerial and 
administrative functions, which relate to the implementation and supervision of social 
security schemes. It is also concerned with the interrelationship between national 
policy, national management and scheme management. " 
The definition by Gillion et al is more specific to social security schemes. It talks 
about processes rather than relationships: processes of consultation, administration 
and supervision. These are important elements of governance, but for these elements 
to have meaning or rather to serve as a system of control, there has to be some level of 
account i ity. 
The definition by Gillion et al (2000) alludes to the interrelationship between the 
national economy and the scheme's management, but does not mention how the 
systems impact on each other. It can be argued that national systems of governance 
influence and impact on the system of governance at the social security level. This 
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finds support with Iglesias & Palacios (2000) who from a study of 80 countries found 
that governance at the macro level affected and influenced governance at the micro 
level. 
The OECD (1999) sees corporate governance as involving "a set of relationships 
between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. " The OECD's definition echoes some of the sentiments of Berle & 
Means as both speak of the relationship between management and shareholders, but 
the OECD's definition goes a bit further by extending the relationship to the board 
and other stakeholders. This is consistent with the arguments in the more recent 
literature on corporate governance. The earlier writings on corporate governance 
view management as including both the board and top management of the firms 
(Berle & Means, 1932; Rostow, 1959; Baran & Sweezy, 1966, Mizruchi, 1983) and 
the more recent literature separates the two. 
In the more recent literature, the board is seen as the mechanisms for control of 
management and management is defined as the "top full time officers of the 
organisation, " (Hernian, 1981). Mizruchi (1983) suggests that one possible reason for 
the change in the definition of management may be the widely circulated study of 
Burnham (1941) which presented an incorrect interpretation of Berle & Means' 
definition of management. Burnham (1941) claimed that Berle and Means (1932) 
argue that management was "in control of the policies and the boards of directors of 
the companies". This however, is not in keeping with Berle and Means (1932) 
definition, where no separation was made between the board of directors and the 
management of the company. However, even when a separation of the board and 
management is acknowledged, the board is the body assigned with the policy 
formulation and direction, while the management is seen to be responsible for the 
implementation of the policies and the day-to-day operation of the company. 
4.3 Agency Theory 
As mentioned earlier, agency theory is used to study the impact of governance on 
social security organisations. Agency theorists argue that the board with its legal 
authority to hire, fire and compensate management, safeguards invested capital and is 
therefore an important element of corporate governance (Williamson, 1984; 
Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Agency theory analyses the managerial incentive 
problems that are induced by the separation of corporate ownership and corporate 
decision-making (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Kosnik, 1987). The theory defines the relationship between 
management and stockholders as a contract between agents and principles in which 
the agent's behaviour is conditioned by the incentive structures that are implicitly or 
explicitly incorporated in the contract. 
Agency problems arise in corporations because the agents stop bearing the full wealth 
effects of their own decisions if they do not own a substantial part of the corporation's 
equity. Under those conditions, the agents are likely to engage in behaviour that 
benefits their personal wealth or power but that is opportunistic and inefficient from 
the principals' point of view (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kosnik, 1987). Examples of 
such inefficient managerial behaviour are the excessive use of company resources for 
managerial "perks", which may range from free lunches to private jets (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Kosnik, 1987), the adoption of a short-terin risk-averse attitude in 
strategic investment decisions for the sake of stability and the protection of 
management's own control position (Lambert & Larcker, 1985; Kosnik, 1987), or the 
excessive pursuit of diversification as a strategy to increase the firm's size and the 
managers' associated prestige and status (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Kosnik, 1987). 
In the social security context, the relationship is more complex, for practically all 
board members and management are members of the system 15 and thus shareholders, 
and should be interested in protecting their interests as well. However, as will be 
demonstrated later in the chapter, there exists a conflict of interests, which may 
impact negatively on performance. In Chapter Two, cases of social security systems 
in Latin America becoming bankrupt due to mismanagement, even where the board 
members and managers were members of the system were presented. 
In the next section, the functions of the board will be examined as the board plays a 
major role in the governance structure of the organisation, and also because a 
substantial part of the governance literature is devoted to the impact of the board's 
composition on performance. 
4.4 What Are The Board's Functions? 
As mentioned above, agency theorists see the board's functions as hiring, firing and 
compensating management and safeguarding the invested capital of the organisation. 
The Corporate Directors Guidebook (1978) states that the fundamental responsibility 
of an individual corporate director is to "represent the interests of shareholders as a 
" In a few instances, some board members are not members of the social security system. This arises 
where the board members are either civil servants or self-employed in countries where these groups are 
not mandated to contribute. 
group. " This responsibility can be extended to the entire board as the board is made 
up of individual directors. This responsibility in turn, obligates the board to act with 
care in fulfilling its responsibilities, to be loyal to the organisation, and not to allow 
personal interests to function to the detriment of the shareholders it represents 
(Brodsky & Adamski, 1984: Feuer, 1974; Stohr, 1975, Kesner & Johnson, 1990). 
This then places the board in a fiduciary relationship with shareholders (Stohr, 1975; 
Kesner & Johnson, 1990). 
The Association of Investment Management and Research (AIMR) Standards of 
Practice Handbook (1996) defines a fiduciary as "an individual or institution charged 
with the duty of acting for the benefit of another party in matters coming within the 
scope of the relationship between them. " It states that the duty required in a fiduciary 
relationship exceeds that which is acceptable in many other business relationships 
because the fiduciary is in a position of trust. Fiduciaries it argues "owe undivided 
loyalty to their clients and must place client interests before their own, " (pg. 83). 
AIMR (1996) goes on to explain that to hold someone to a fiduciary duty generally 
means to hold him or her to a higher standard of loyalty and care than the standard to 
which most people are held. AIMR charges that the fiduciary must always act 
prudently and with discretion regarding the assets of others and a fiduciary is charged 
with having more knowledge than the average person. AIMR asserts that conflicts of 
interest may arise between the fiduciary and the client and the imposition of a 
fiduciary duty attempts to eliminate any conflicts or improprieties by imposing a high 
standard of loyalty and care on the fiduciary. 
This means that board members owe a duty "over and above" to the shareholders and 
stakeholders whom they serve, and the interest of the organisation must be paramount 
in all decisions. It emphasises and reinforces the view held by Zald (1969) that board 
members are servants of the organisation. Board members are to serve and to be of 
service to the organisation and to the shareholders/stakeholders. 
From a survey of the literature, the board's functions can be placed in three 
classifications: the board serving as (i) a means of control, conflict resolution and 
maximisation of shareholders' wealth, (ii) a mechanism to ensure continuity of 
management and (iii) a source of information and advice to management. 
Brudney (1982) sees the board of directors as performing two main functions, both 
identified to the first classification above. He argues that the board main functions are 
to goad managers to perform adequately their wealth maximising task and to ensure 
managers' integrity in dividing corporate assets between themselves and stockholders. 
This is consistent with the views of the agency theorists who see the key role of the 
board as being an effective governing and monitoring mechanism (Boeker, 1982), and 
which is also echoed by Kesner & Johnson (1990), Byrne et al (1997), Williamson 
(1985) and Baysinger & Hoskisson (1990). Kesner & Johnson (1990) argue that the 
primary responsibility of the chairperson of the board is the evaluation of the 
management's performance in light of shareholder's interest. It can, however, be 
argued that this is not solely the function of the chairperson, but of the entire board. 
The role of the chairperson is to manage and provide direction and leadership for his 
board and management but this does not detract from the responsibility of the 
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individual board members. Baysinger & Hoskisson (1990) carries this point finther 
by arguing that the efficient management of shareholder-manager relations is an 
important function of the board and that shareholder's interest must be safeguarded by 
controls on management. Byme et al (1997) take a slightly broader view of the 
control function and posit that a board's responsibilities lie in ensuring that strategic 
plans undergo rigorous scrutiny, managers are evaluated against high performance 
standards and the succession process is planned. This argument incorporates the 
agency theorists' position in relation to the board's role as one of hiring, firing and 
compensating management. Williamson (1985) sums up the first classification of the 
functions of the board as "a governance structure safeguard between the fimi and 
owners of equity capital and secondarily as a way by which to safeguard the 
contractual relation between the firm and its management". 
Consistent with the second classification of the board's functions, Zald (1969) posits 
that boards of directors were created and recognised in law in order to ensure 
continuity in the management of organisations. They are, he argues, charged with the 
proper use of resources in pursuit of organisational goals, and prudent action includes 
appointing and perpetuating effective management of the organisation and overseeing 
the work of such management. The board, Zald (1969) argues, acts as "the agent of 
the corporation, " to oversee organisational activity, on behalf of the owners. He 
emphasises that while the board is often seen as agents of the owners, legally, the 
board is "the servant of the corporation, " vested with corporate control. This is a very 
important distinction and is consistent with the fiduciary responsibility of the board as 
argued by Stohr (1995). 
120 
In relation to the third classification, Mace (1976) states that in the 1960's chief 
executive officers (CEO) and directors opined that boards serve as sources of advice, 
counsel and discipline to management, perform a corporate conscience role and were 
the "in-place" legal entity to replace the CEO if he had to be replaced for any reason. 
Parsons (1960) sees the board as a mediating structure between the organisation and 
the larger society. This is consistent with his distinction of the three levels of 
organisational structure - technical, managerial and institutional. The technical level 
corresponds to the techno structure, the managerial to top management and the board 
to the institutional. In the same vein, he sees the role of management as policy 
formulation and decision-making. If management's role is policy formulation and 
decision-making, Parson, is thus suggesting that the true power lies with the 
management and the board is mainly to secure the resources needed from the external 
environment to facilitate management's decision-making. Mace (1976) however, 
contends that there has been a major re-thinking by boards of their roles, functions 
and responsibilities. He asserts that boards are no longer content with a passive role 
and view themselves as responsible to the owners - the stockholders. 
4.5 Who Is In Control: The Board or Management? 
From the foregoing, it appears that there can be little doubt that the board is in control 
of the organisation, given that it is responsible for hiring, firing, setting policy, 
evaluating performance, compensating, counselling and disciplining. However, there 
are those who argue that the board in theory is in control of the organisation, but in 
reality, it is not: management controls the organisation. Management is in charge 
because of the control over the information flow (Zald, 1969; Mace, 1971; Daily & 
Johnson, 1997) and the nomination and appointment process for the board (Bacon & 
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Brown, 1975; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). The dual role sometimes played by the CEO 
serving also as the chairman of the board (Kesner & Johnson, 1990; Daily & Johnson, 
1997) and the similarities and common interests shared by the board and management 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995) also serve to undermine the independence, separation and 
control of the board. 
Bacon & Brown (1975) suggest that the CEO may use his/her control over the 
nominating process to choose board members who, at the very least are not 
antagonistic to what he/she chooses to do. Westphal & Zajac (1995) longitudinal 
study of 413 Fortune/Forbes 500 companies from 1986 and 1991 supports this 
suggestion. They found that social psychological and socio-political factors lead 
CEOs and existing board members to favour new directors who are demographically 
similar to them. They also found that the party who obtains its preference is 
dependent on the relative influence of CEOs and boards. 
Their findings indicate that (i) in firins in which the CEO is relatively powerful, new 
directors are likely to be demographically similar to the incumbent CEO; (ii) when the 
boards of directors are more powerful than the CEOs, new directors resemble the 
existing board rather than the CEO and (iii) increased demographic similarity between 
CEOs and the board is likely to result in more generous CEO compensation contracts. 
It may be the "demographic similarity " of boards rather than the board as institution 
that may give rise to the ineffectiveness of boards. In such an environment there may 
be little difference of opinion, limited number of new ideas, and persons following 
group norms even when they are opposed to the course of action decided upon. 
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People often forget that they are the "servants of the organisation, " and governance 
structures become even more important to ensure that persons fulfil their fiduciary 
responsibility., It also means that shareholders/stakeholders have to become more 
vigilant and activist to ensure that their best interests are served. This can be done 
through demands for financial statements, statement of accounts, annual general 
meetings and periodic independent perforrnance reviews. 
The concept of influence and power determining the choice of board members is 
voiced by Hennan (1981), Alderfer (1986) and Zald (1969). Hennan (1981) argues 
that because of their involvement in the day-to-day operations, management has 
gradually assumed control over the corporation. He however contends that the board 
of directors, as well as stockholders, and other outside elements can serve as 
constraints on the activities of the company. This constraint can be the power of the 
board to oust management, though Herman concedes that this is rare and is exercised 
mainly in times of poor performance. The most effective constraint that can be 
exercised on the management and the board is that of accountability. In the case of 
management, accountability is to the board and shareholders and in the case of the 
board it is to the shareholders. Where persons have power but no accountability, there 
is wont to be abuse of that power and ineffective representation of the 
shareholders/stakeholders interest. 
Aldcrfcr (1986) asserts that the CEO's influence will be determined by the stage of 
his career, his openness to questions by the board and the subgroup dynamics of the 
board. Alderfer (1986) also contends that the CEO style may be the most important 
factor shaping the dynamics of board-management relationship. The CEO, he offers, 
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is able to do this by the kind of issues he brings to the board, by the quality and 
timeliness of the information provided and by the responses to questions posed by the 
board. However, Zald (1969) argues that in any relationship, each party brings into 
the relationship resources and it is the balance of those resources for specific 
situations and decisions that will detennine the relative power enjoyed by the board 
and management. 
Byrne et al (1997) argue that for a board to be effective, it has to provide strong 
oversight that goes beyond simple rubber-stamping the CEO's plans. They argue that 
perhaps the most important quality of a board is the presence of directors who are 
active, critical participants in determining a company's strategies. They also advocate 
the independence of the board from the management and a limit on the number of 
inside directors on the board. 
However, Westphal & Zajac (1995) argue that the commonly held assumption that 
outside directors are more likely to exercise independent judgement in board decision- 
making may be suspect. It, they reason, ignores the possibility that from a social 
psychological perspective, outside directors who are demographically similar to CEOs 
may be akin to inside directors. The issue of the inside/outside director will be 
explored in much greater detail in the next section of this chapter. 
Byrne et al (1997) recommend the barring of directors and their firms from doing 
consulting, legal or other work for the companies on whose boards they serve. They 
also advise against interlocking directorships, whereby CEOs serve on each other's 
board, and believe that perks, such as pension rights cause directors to align 
themselves too closely to management. The Cadbury Report (1993) also 
recommended that directors should be free from any business or other relationship, 
which could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgement, 
apart from their fees and shareholding. Byrne et al (1997), however, contend that the 
best guarantee that board members will act in the interest of shareholders is the 
ownership of significant stockholdings in the company that they oversee. 
in the social security context in the OECS, there is not uniformity in the balance of 
power. In some organisations, the ministers hold the balance of power, in others the 
boards and yet others, the executive directors. Some of the factors, which emerge for 
the differences, are the level of autonomy and independence from government's 
control, expertise and experience, personality and character. 
4.6 Board Composition 
The board composition is seen as the major factor affecting the performance of the 
board and consequently of the CEO and the organisation (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; 
Kesner & Johnson, 1990). The board is seen as comprising inside and outside 
directors and arguments are presented both for and against the different 
classifications. 
Inside directors are employees of the organisation, who usually hold a high level 
executive position and devote substantial full time attention to the affairs of the 
corporation or one of its subsidiaries (Corporate director's Guidebook; Kesner & 
Johnson, 1990). Persons who have been former employees or are otherwise closely 
associated with a firm are also classified as inside directors (Cochran, Wood & Jones, 
1985; Judge & Zeitharnl, 1992). On the other hand, an outside director is defined as 
an outsider or non-executive director, who is not an employee of the firm (Kesner & 
Johnson, 1990). The classification of the director is expected to determine his/her 
objectivity, commitment and dedication and thus determine the level and quality of 
the contributions to the organisation. Outside directors are usually deemed to be 
better but this position is not held by everyone, and in the next section the different 
positions will be presented. 
In the social security systems in the OECS, most of the board members would fit the 
classification of outside directors, with only the executive director being the insider. 
However, in a few instances, the deputy director, though not legislated sits on the 
board and some of the directors recruited outside the organisations were former 
employees of the social security organisation, and would fit the classification of inside 
directors as described by Cohran et al (1995). It is also arguable that an outside 
director who has served in that capacity for a substantial length of time, say in excess 
of ten years, may also be deemed as an "insider. " He would be party to many of the 
past decisions and may be defensive about them. This may be one of the reasons why 
the Cadbury Report (1993) recommended that non-executive directors should be 
appointed for a specified term with no automatic reappointment and that any 
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directors' contract in excess of three years should be done with shareholders' 
approval. 
4.6.1 Inside vs. Outside Directors 
Kesner & Johnson (1990) assert that inside directors bring specialised knowledge and 
experience because of -their direct involvement in the day-to-day organisational 
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activities. Judge & Zeithaml (1992) share this position and see inside directors as 
providing valuable insights and information to boardroom discussions thus allowing 
the boards to be more involved in the strategic decision-making process. This, 
Rosenstein (1987) asserts leads to a balance between informed discussants of strategy 
and objective monitors of strategic behaviour. All of this, Judge & Zeithaml (1992) 
argue results in greater board participation in the strategic planning process, better 
information flows, innovation of strategies and strategic change, higher levels of 
spending on corporate research and development and a lower incidence of golden 
parachutes in Fortune 500 firms. 
Bacon & Brown (1975) argue that inside directors raise issues that the CEO may 
otherwise ignore and they serve as a direct communications link between the board 
and the remaining organisational members. It is, however, difficult to see inside 
directors bringing to the agenda items that the CEO would otherwise ignore, given 
that these directors report directly to the CEO and in many cases sit on the board at 
his invitation, or because of his lobbying for their inclusion. 
This view is supported by agency theorists (Mace, 1971; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 
1972; Kesner & Johnson, 1990; Louden, 1982). Agency theorists argue that because 
inside directors well-being are tied directly to the financial success of the finn, their 
loyalty to top management is likely to be based on the CEO's competence (Farna, 
1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Insiders, who work for the CEO on a daily basis, 
cannot be expected to exercise their duties properly in monitoring and controlling his 
performance (Mace, 1971, Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1972; Kesner & Johnson, 1990). 
Loudon (1982) sums up the position of inside directors reporting on the CEO by 
arguing t4it is unreasonable to think that a subordinate director can successfully 
challenge the chief executive at board meetings. " 
Baysinger & Hoskisson (1990) maintain that the involvement of inside directors is a 
conflict of interest as inside directors' ties with the CEO can compromise their 
effectiveness as decision controllers in the cases in which management opportunism is 
the cause of financial losses. However, Mizruchi (1983) suggests that while the 
conflict of interest is a legitimate concern, it is a bit overdrawn and the key issue is 
one of incentives. Though, the conflict of interest problems are relevant and 
important in the discussion of the inside director, Mizruchi makes a point, when he 
argues that incentives are what will decide whether inside directors submit to the 
demands and wishes of the CEO or take an independent stand. The balance of power 
is also relevant here, for if the CEO does not enjoy the confidence of the board, this 
may provide the opportunity for the inside directors to challenge the position of the 
CEO, contrary to the position of Louden (1982). Williamson (1985) submits that "so 
long as the basic control relation of the board to the corporation is not upset, 
management's participation on the board ... permits the board to observe and evaluate 
the process of decision making as well as the outcomes ... an important function in 
view of the inadequacy of formal procedures for grievance. " 
Kesner & Johnson (1990) on the other hand posit that outsiders are placed on the 
board for three main reasons: (1) the breadth of their experience and knowledge, (2) 
the contacts they have which may enhance management's ability to secure scarce 
external resources and (3) the independence they have from the CEO. They contend 
that while insiders bring depth to the board with their specialised knowledge of the 
company, outsiders bring breadth (emphasis added). Outside directors have 
experiences which span various companies and industries (Bacon & Brown, 1975; 
Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1980; Williams & Shapiro, 1979); often play an important role 
in securing scarce resources and in influencing or controlling external organisations 
(Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Kesner & Johnson, 1990); are better able to 
provide independent assessments of actions taken by the firm and insure that there are 
proper "checks and balances" on management (Vance, 1983). 
Pfeffer (1972) argues "organisations use their boards of directors as vehicles through 
which they coopt, or partially absorb, important external organisations, with which 
they are interdependent. " Pfeffer suggests that this strategy of co-optation involves a 
trade-off between the loss of some degree of privacy of information and control and 
the continued support of the external directors. Outside directors are deemed to be 
less influenced by the relationship with the CEO and are able to monitor the actions of 
the CEO and in fact top management. According to Knepper (1978) "an outside 
director's independence should be 16 his most distinguishing characteristics ... [and he 
is] expected to exercise a healthy scepticism and an alertness to possible wrongdoing 
on the part of corporate insiders. " Boeker (1992) contends that outside directors can 
fulfil this monitoring role more effectively since the inside directors' objectivity will 
be impaired by their dual role as full time managers. 
There are however, researchers who argue that the outside director is not as 
independent as many suggest and while the key role is to safeguard shareholders' 
interests, the position of the outside director is sometimes compromised. Baysinger & 
16 My emphasis. 
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Hoskisson (1990) argue that outsiders often lack the type of information needed to be 
truly effective in controlling decisions. Kosnik (1987) notes that the theory of 
managerial hegemony depicts the board as an ineffective governing institution and 
attributes its ineffectiveness to the outside directors' lack of independence from the 
incumbent management, though empirical evidence to support this theory is scarce. 
The theory of managerial hegemony describes the board as a legal fiction: a co-opted 
appendage institution that despite its formal governing power over management is in 
fact dominated by the corporate management. This domination makes the board 
ineffective in alleviating conflicts of interests between management and stockholders 
(Galbraith, 1967; Mace, 1971; Herman, 1981; Vance, 1983; Wolfson, 1984; Kosnik, 
1987). 
The extent to which outside directors are able to perform the roles expected of them 
and serve as independent barometers of performance will depend on several factors. 
These include, but are not limited to, area of expertise and competence, knowledge of 
the organisation and the industry in which the organisation is situated and 
appreciation of the needs and demands of shareholders/stakeholders. Personal 
integrity and commitment to the standards demanded by professional organisations, 
the ability to be impartial in the evaluation of options and recognition of the mandate 
to serve are also factors influencing the performance of boards of directors. The 
ability to separate social ties from business decisions is also important for as Westphal 
& Zajac (1995) argue the social relationships may compromise the independence of 
the outsider director. Ultimately, however, the performance of directors will depend 
not so much on thcir classification as on thcir cxpcrtisc, knowlcdge, profcssionalism, 
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and very importantly, integrity. In the next section, the corporate governance 
literature is analysed within a social security context. 
4.7 Where And How Does Social Security Fit Into The Corporate 
Governance Literature? 
Social Security institutions are not organised as private corporations. Social security 
organisations do not have profit as an explicit objective though they are mandated to 
invest the funds of the board given due consideration to safety, liquidity and yield. 
They are either established as departments of government or as statutory bodies by 
government. Their main aim is the provision of benefits to the contributors and in 
some countries to all citizens who meet various criteria whether they contribute or not 
to the system. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, social security systems are financed 
on different basis, PAYG, partially funded or fully funded, and the method of 
financing will detennine the extent to which the organisations have reserves to invest. 
The "not-for-profit" objective, as was also highlighted in Chapter Two, played a key 
role in the manner in which social security organisations have gone about their 
business. 
The fact that these organisations are also subject to goverranent directives is also 
another important element in understanding how the organisations operate. In the 
corporate governance literature the board is seen to be the institution that has the 
power to fire, hire and compensate, and thus serve as a mechanism to ensure that 
management acts in the best interest of the shareholders. With social security 
organisations, the power to hire, fire and compensate, not only management but also 
the board, lies with the minister responsible for social security. Hence the minister is 
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the one, who theoretically, and in many cases in practice, wields the power in the 
relationship. 
Though most of the social security organisations are established as separate entities 
with a right to sue and be sued in their own narne, they are often not treated as 
autonomous institutions. The comments made by Romano (1998) in an address on 
the reforms at the National Insurance board (NIB) 17 of Trinidad & Tobago is relevant 
to the social security organisations in the OECS. He declared that the 'WM is not an 
autonomous agency. " He went on to explain that "while its board is tripartite in 
nature, representing Government, Business and Labour, and it does not operate on a 
Government subvention, that is, it is self-financing, it is still subject to ministerial and 
hence Government influence, and to a certain degree, control. By law it is subject to 
ministerial and hence governmental approval in critical areas of its operations, for 
example, its human resource function, the structure of its benefits and contributions, 
and its investments. " 
This makes the early definition of management in the corporate governance literature, 
where the board and top management are deemed to be "management, " more 
applicable to social security. The later definition where the board is seen as the 
control mechanism and the management refers to the full time top executives of the 
organisation is not as applicable. This gives rise to a situation where the minister 
assumes the role of management and the board, in addition to his role as regulator. 
This opens itself to abuse of power and gives rise to a series of questions: 
Can the minister effectively provide that system of control? 
" Trevor Romano was the director of the NIB at the time. He passed away in December 2000. 
& Does he/she possess the expertise to carry out the responsibilities assigned? 
* What then is the purpose of the board if the minister is the one with the control? 
e Is there a conflict of interest between the Minister's role of regulator and that of 
putting forward government's request for loans or other investments? 
* What impact does this have on the management by the board and the executive 
director? 
These questions will be addressed in the following section, using the SSO in the 
OECS to provide the analysis. 
4.7.1 Synopsis of the Social Security Arrangements in the OECS 
Each of the OECS islands has a social security/national insurance organisation 
established as a statutory body with the right to sue and be sued in its own name. 
These statutory bodies are not part of any government department and are established 
as separate entities, but each falls under the mandate of the Minister of Social 
Security. In some countries, this portfolio is held by the Prime Minister, in others, the 
Minister of Finance and in others by the Minister of Health (refer to Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 was compiled from the Acts of incorporation of the various countries and 
demonstrates the appointing authority for the governance structure of the 
organisations. This clearly shows the similarities between the social security systems 
in the OECS, but it also highlights the differences. In chapter six we test whether the 
differences are important determinants of performance. 
In all of the islands, the board is appointed by the minister, cabinet or governor- 
general or governor-in-council. This is a differentiating fact from private 
organisations, where the boards are appointed by the shareholders. The appointment 
process by the government has led to charges of politicisation, which usually sees the 
appointment of persons on political patronage rather than on merit. This issue is 
discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Table 4.1 
The Appointing Authority For the Governance Structure In The OECS 
Governance Structure Appointing Authority 
18 ANG ANT DOM GRE MON SKB SLU SVG BVI 
Board Min Gov Min Min GovC Min Min Cab Min 
Chairman of 
the Board Min Gov Min Min GovC Min Min Cab Min* 
Deputy chairman Min Gov Min Min GovC Min Min Cab Min* 
Government Rep Min GovM MinN MinCab n/a MinN Min MinCab n/a19 
Employees'Rep Min Govc MinN MinR GovCc MinC MinR MinC MinC 
Employers'Rep Min Govc MinN MinR GovCc MinC MinR MinC MinC 
Director GovC PSC Min DOW GovC DOD+ DOW Cab Gov 
Deputy director N/A PSC BOD BOD GovC N/A BOD Cab Gov 
Investment 
Committee Min Min Min Min Min Min Min Min Min 
General Staff BOD Dir* Dir* Dir+ BOD BOD Dir+ Dir* BOD 
Source: Acts of Incorporation of the respective countries 
In all of the islands, except Dominica, there is a tripartite board with members 
representing labour, business and government. There are however, significant 
variations in how the board members are selected. In Grenada and St. Lucia, the Acts 
stipulate that the recommendations arise from the respective workers and employers' 
bodies, but the implementation process is different. In Grenada, the nomination 
Please see Appendix 2 for the Legend of the abbreviations. 
The Acts in the British Virgin Islands and Montserrat do not make any specific reference to the 
nomination of the government representatives. However, it is safe to assume that those nominations 
are made by the appointing authority: the Minister in the case of the BVI and the Governor-in-Council 
in the case of Montserrat. 
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ensues from the Trade Union Council, while in St. Lucia, the trade unions are 
requested to make nominations individually, and the minister selects the 
representatives from the names submitted. There is however, no direct feedback to 
the unions inforraing them of the persons selected. In all other cases, the groups 
nominate their representatives in consultation 20 with the minister. In some cases, like 
Anguilla, there are no - provisions for consultations or recommendations from the 
interest groups, and in the case of Dominica, there is no mention of representation 
from the interest groups. 
However, the minister still has power over the nominations as he has the discretion to 
recognise the body, bodies, person or persons from whom the nominations will arise. 
This point was clearly articulated by the Minister of Labour, Social Security and Co- 
operatives of Trinidad and Tobago when in an address to Parliament on the national 
insurance system in 1972, he informed the House that "The minister's residual 
discretion now lies in his recognition of associations and representatives of the 
py interestgroups . 
The minister, cabinet or governor appoints the executive director in five out of the 
nine islands. In three others, the board appoints the executive director, but in the case 
of two islands, Grenada and St. Lucia, the appointment is made on the approval of the 
minister, thus the power resides with the minister. In St. Kitts, though the executive 
director is appointed by the board, the remuneration and terms of conditions is done 
'0 The emphases in this section are mine. 
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with the approval of the minister, and this in effect gives him the power of 
appointment. 
A read of the debate in Parliament during the passage of the Bill to establish the 
Social Security/National Insurance Board and comments made by trade unions, 
employers organisations and the general public in the OECS reveal very little concern 
about the power entrusted in the minister. From the available information, concern 
appears to have been raised only in the British Virgin Islands. The Opposition was 
very concerned about potential government interference and mismanagement and 
during the Committee Stage of the Social Security Bill, the Opposition requested 
several amendments to ensure that there were "checks and balances" on government 
so that the money of the Fund would not be "frittered away. "" 
It is therefore not surprising that this is the only island where the chairman and 
Deputy chairman of the board are appointed with the concurrence of the Leader of 
the Opposition. It was also as a "check and balance" that the Opposition insisted that 
the terms and conditions of the appointment of the executive director, the 
remuneration of the board and other committees are to be determined by the 
Legislative Council, where both Government and Opposition have a vote. 
We note wide-ranging power residing in the office of the minister. In all of the 
islands, except Montserrat and Antigua & Barbuda, where it is the Govcmor-in- 
Council and Governor-General respectively, the Minister has power to terminate the 
appointment of the board members "if in his opinion " the member is unfit to continue 
office or incapable of performing his duties. In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the 
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Minister may terminate the appointment solely because he "thinks it expedient so to 
do. " The Social Security Act in St. Kitts and Nevis initially stipulated that the 
Minister could terminate the appointment of any memberfior misbehaviour, physical 
or mental incapacity, " but the Act was amended in 1983 to the wordings used in 
Table 4.2 which summarises the tenninating authority in the islands. 
Table 4.2 
The Terminating Authority in Respect of the Board Members and the Directors 
In The OECS 
Country 
Anguilla The Minister may declare the office of 
any member vacant, if in his opinion, the member is unfit to continue office 
or incapable of performing his duties. 
Antigua & Barbuda The Governor-General may declare the office of 
any member vacant, if in his opinion, the member is unfit to continue office 
or incapable of performing his duties. 
Dominica The Minister may declare the office of 
any member vacant, if in his opinion, the member is unfit to continue office 
or incapable of performing his duties. 
Grenada The Minister may declare the office of 
any member vacant, if in his opinion, the member is unfit to continue office 
or incapable of performing his duties. 
Montserrat The Governor-in-Council may declare the office of 
any member vacant, if in his opinion, the member is unfit to continue office 
or incapable of performing his duties. 
St. Kitts & Nevis The Minister may terminate the appointment of the chairman and deputy 
chairman, if he thinks it desirable or expedient so to do. The office of the 
Workers' and Employers' representatives can only be terminated on the 
advice of the respective organisations. 
St. Lucia The Minister may declare the office of 
any member vacant, if in his opinion, the member is unfit to continue office 
or incapable of performing his duties. 
St. Vincent & 
The Grenadines The Minister may terminate the appointment of any member if he 
thinks it expedient so to do. 
Tortola The Minister may declare the office of 
any member vacant, if in his opinion, the member is unfit to 
continue office or incapable of performing his duties. 
Source: The Acts of Incorporation of the Respective countries. 
This table was also prepared from the Acts of Incorporation and highlights the power 
entrusted in the minister, and emphasises the points made earlier about the minister 
having the power of control that is normally assigned to boards in private 
corporations. The ability of the board and the executive director to fulfil the mandate 
with which they are charged and to ensure the long-term viability and sustainability of 
the schemes may be compromised by this concentration of power in the hands of one 
person. 
The Acts, apart from Grenada and St. Lucia, are generally silent on the termination of 
the executive director, but since they, except in St. Kitts & Nevis are members of the 
board, it can be argued that their appointment can be terminated on the same grounds 
as the other directors. However, it can be argued that because the executive director 
is an ex-officio member of the board, who is appointed on a separate work contract, 
he/she cannot be terminated on the same grounds of the other board members. In 
Grenada and St. Lucia, the Acts stipulate that the board, with the approval of the 
minister may terminate the appointment of the director for inability to exercise the 
functions of the office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or from any 
other cause) or for misconduct. 
4.8 Who Is In Control of the Social Security Organisations in the 
Organisation Of Eastern Caribbean States: The Government/ 
Minister, Board or Executive Director? 
In the corporate governance literature, the relationship is between the board- 
management-shareholders, while in the social security industry, the relationship is 
much broader and includes both a macro and micro level relationship. There is the 
relationship with the goveniment-minister-board-management-contributors- 
beneficiaries. It is this complex relationship, with each party having different needs 
and interests that make it important to reconcile the differing interests. The minister 
has the power to appoint, dismiss and compensate the board and the executive 
director. Given that the minister is a member of cabinet, he/she usually informs 
cabinet of his choices for the board, and in many cases, other cabinet members also 
have an input. 
There is very little evidence that the executive director influences the appointment of 
the board in the OECS. In Dominica, the management of the organisation was asked 
for the first time in 2000, to make recommendations for the board, and some of their 
recommendations were accepted. In the British Virgin Islands, the executive director 
was asked for recommendations and not one of the persons put forward was 
appointed. In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, when the government changed in 2001 
and the board was disbanded, the executive director in a meeting with the minister 
requested that in the interest of continuity, the minister consider re-appointing some 
of the previous board members. This request was not granted. 
In many of the countries, the Acts give the minister the power to give specific and 
general directions to the board, investment committee and executive director. The 
Acts make little provision for separation of functions and the potential exists for 
serious conflict of interest, as the minister has power to direct the day-to-day 
operations, participate in the policy formulation and decision-making, as well as 
regulating the operations of the board. The board submits yearly to the minister 
reports of its financial operations, investment and other activities. The minister 
appoints or approves the appointment of the external auditor and actuary, who are 
both to give independent assessment of the perfonnance of the board. This is the 
reason why Romano (1998) argued that the social security organisations, though 
meant to be autonomous, are not, as they are subject to government interference in 
every aspect of their operations. 
This situation is open to abuse and the situation with the Medical Benefit Scheme in 
Antigua & Barbuda demonstrates so clearly what happens when there is no separation 
of functions and hence no system of internal control. The Medical Benefit Scheme is 
a statutory organisation established "for the provision of such financial and other 
assistance towards the costs of medical benefits, to such class or classes of persons in 
such circumstances and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by 
regulations, " (Medical Benefits Act, 1978). The Medical Benefit board consists of 
seven persons appointed by the minister for a period of three years and he has the 
power revoke any appointment if he "considers it expedient so to do". 
The Funds of the Scheme are vested in the board, which is charged with the 
administering of the Scheme. Though the board is charged with the administration of 
the Scheme, the minister is assigned such power, that it almost makes the board and 
the director appear redundant. The director who is the chief administrative officer of 
the Scheme performs his functions under the supervision of the minister who may 
"give such direction. to director or other person or body having duties under the 
Social Security Act, 1972, in connection with any matter concerning the Scheme 
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including the disposition or disbursement of anyfunds belonging thereto as he may 
think necessary or desirable "(Medical Benefit Act, 1978). 
The Act goes on finiher to stipulate that any such direction shall be in writing under 
the hand of the minister or some person lawfully authorised by him in that behalf and 
every person or body to whom it may be directed shall be bound to obey the same. 
The Act goes on to stipulate that all monies collected on behalf of the scheme shall be 
deposited into a general account, disbursement from which shall be made only on 
written instructions of the minister. In addition, two or more persons designated by 
the Minister shall control all other accounts of the Scheme. 
The entire structure of the Medical Benefit Scheme violates all elements of good 
internal control. The minister not only appoints the board and director, he, and not the 
board provides supervision of the director. He also authorises payments from the 
accounts and he is the one to whom all financial reports are to be submitted. In 
essence, the director and board are under the direct control of the minister. 
In a case of misappropriation of funds, the Prime Minister of Antigua & Barbuda 
ordered the three top personnel of the Medical Benefits Scheme to be prosecuted and 
ordered the dismissal of the entire board (Outlet, 6/4/01). This followed an interim 
report of an audit into the allegations. The report charged, "as a board with fiduciary 
responsibilities for a scheme, they failed to establish or provide for the establishment 
of a controlled environment in which fraudulent activities as well as errors would not 
go undetected in the ordinary course of business. Inlact, they allowed inefficient 
management employees to personally benefit from the Scheme's operations, " (Outlet 
20/4/01). 
Given the wide ranging powers assigned to the minister by the Act, a board could 
only be allowed to establish a "controlled environment", if the minister allowed it so 
to do. This is because the minister could disburse funds as he wished and controlled 
the bank accounts. This arrangement suggests that if monies were misappropriated, it 
had to be in complicity with the minister, given that his "written approval" was 
needed before any disbursement from the Scheme's bank account could be effected. 
If disbursements took place without his signature, then the Act was being violated and 
if he did nothing about it, then the minister would be also responsible. So whichever 
way, the minister would be guilty either by commission or omission. 
The Outlet Newspaper claims that the minister gave a direct order that drugs should 
be procured from another supplier whose prices were in some cases 900% more 
expensive than the prices of the previous suppliers. It also drew attention to a letter 
from the minister dated May 18,2000 informing the Superintendent (director) that 
effective immediately all orders are first submitted to the Ministry for approval before 
the order is placed (9/3/01). There is also a reproduction of a letter from the minister 
addressed directly to the Accountant requesting that he pays a bill for legal work 
undertaken on a project funded by the Medical Benefit Scheme (9/3/01). 
This breaks the chain of command in the organisation, but given the powers entrusted 
in the Act this is within the ambit of the powers of the minister. Given such a 
situation, it cannot be said that the board or the director were the ones in control. The 
control and power were entrusted in the office of the minister, and given the terms of 
the board in the corporate governance literature; the minister was effectively 
functioning as the board. After calls by several organisations, including the 
Employers Federation, the Leader of Opposition, the Chamber of Commerce (Outlet, 
16/2/01,9/3/03) and the press, the Governor-General has established a public inquiry 
into the allegations at the Medical Benefit board. The Prime Minister has since 
dismissed three of the ministers implicated in the scandal, including the minister 
responsible for the Medical Benefit Scheme (Montserrat Reporter, 27/7/01). 
The lessons from this scandal are instructive for executive directors and board 
members of the social security organisations in the OECS as the legislative 
framework of the two systems are similar. Though the Acts stipulate that the persons 
receiving the directives from the minister are bound to give effect to those directives, 
management and the board will be held accountable for any alleged wrongdoings. 
This really reinforces the point made earlier that personal integrity is an important 
quality needed for persons with fiduciary responsibilities. Executive directors and 
board members have to be willing to take a stand and resign if needs be, if the 
directives given are clearly not in the best interest of the organisation. 
While the minister has a significant level of power, it is not fair to credit him with all 
the power. The board also wields or has the potential to wield power, though more so 
in some countries than others. The Fund of the institution is vested in the board and it 
is responsible for its administration and in some cases the investments. The board in 
all of the cases appoints all officers or employees of the board, save the executive 
director and Deputy director, though in some cases the board appoints the deputy 
director. St. Kitts & Nevis is the only case, where the board appoints the executive 
director, but the minister determines the terms and conditions. However, the main 
areas of the board's power are in its advisory role to the minister and its control over 
the executive director, with regard to administrative and investment decisions. The 
board's role is to advise the minister on all matters referred to it and to provide reports 
of the operations and investment activities of the board. 
It is in this capacity, the board gets to influence the decisions taken by the minister. 
Another area where the board has the opportunity for exerting control is in the day-to- 
day operations of the institutions. While the executive director is responsible for the 
day-to-day operations, in many of the cases, he/she is subject to the directions of the 
board and this means that the executive director can only act if the board approves. In 
a few cases, the Minister perforras this role, and in those cases, the board's power is 
limited. However, because the board does not have the power to hire, dismiss or 
compensate top management and also because it is the board which submits the 
annual reports to the minister, the board of the social security institutions according to 
the agency theorists is part of management. The minister is the one who carries out 
the function of the board. 
The investment committee is the committee charged with the investment function of 
the board. This committee makes recommendations on the investments and these 
recommendations are then subject to the approval of the board or the minister. The 
executive director is then mandated to carry out the decisions recommended by the 
investment committee after approval by either the minister or board. 
The executive, director is charged with the day-to-day operations and the 
implementation of decisions from the board and or minister. It appears that the 
executive director has little power over decisions, but because he/she is a member of 
the board and investment committee, the executive director has the potential to 
influence the decisions taken at those meetings. And in cases, where a decision has 
been taken against the advice furnished he/she has the opportunity to have any 
objections recorded. 
Here, the influence of the executive director will be dependent on many factors, 
including strength of character, knowledge and expertise, respect commanded among 
the board and investment committee members, past record (so length of service may 
play an important role) and his preparation. The executive directors, as noted above, 
have little control over the board's nomination, as this is a function carried out by the 
minister after consultations with the interest groups that he chooses to use. In Chapter 
Seven, it will be demonstrated that while the nomination process always follows the 
"letter of the law", it does not always follow the "spirit of the law". As mentioned in 
the previous section, there is little evidence that the executive directors in any way 
influence the nominations, and so the findings of Bacon & Brown (1975) are not 
replicated here. 
The findings of Zald (1969), Alderfer (1986) and Herman (1981) may find support 
here, for the executive directors because of their involvement in the day-to-day 
operations have greater knowledge and expertise than the board members. The longer 
one is in the position, all things being equal the greater the influence especially as the 
board changes and so the executive director has the opportunity to manage the 
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relationship and determine its character. However, one has to guard against the board 
becoming a rubber stamp and the executive director becoming a "self-perpetuating 
oligarchy" (Mizruchi, 1983). 
Byrne et al. (1997) argue that ownership of significant equity holdings in the company 
is maybe the most effective means of ensuring that board members remain 
independent and act as a form of control over the activities of management. The 
executive director and board members of social security organisations are generally 
all members of the system and are contributors and beneficiaries of the system, but 
given the number of social security institutions that have suffered serious problems 
from mismanagement, this condition does not appear to hold in social security 
organisations. This may, suggest that ownership of or in the social security 
organisation is not the main factor in the governance framework. This may because 
ownership is not as explicitly stated as in a private company. Accountability, 
transparency and integrity may be more important determinants of good governance 
and consequently of performance in social security organisations. 
4.9 Impact Of The Governance Structure Of The SSO In The 
OECS 
From the previous section, it is evident that there are conflicts of interest in the 
governance structure of the social security organisations in the OECS. The 
government through the minister is meant to provide the oversight function for the 
SSO and in essence serve as the regulator for the organisation, yet the Act provides 
for the minister to give "direct, general and specific directions" to the board and in 
some cases directly to the executive director. 
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Two things are wrong with this: on one hand there is a conflict of interest as the 
regulator cannot be providing oversight on decisions that he has directed and 
secondly, by giving direction directly to the executive director, the chain of command 
is violated. This violation can result in decisions being taken that the board is 
unaware of, yet the Act clearly states that the Fund is vested in the board with the 
power to administer the Fund according to the Provisions of the Act. In addition, the 
Acts have all established the social security organisations as independent autonomous 
institutions with a "right to sue and be sued in its own name. " This autonomy is not 
and should not be compromised by the Government's guarantee in the event of lack of 
funds. 
Many of the governments see the social security organisations as means of ready cash, 
as they are the largest mobilisers of savings in the OECS (Samuel, 1993). While the 
social security funds can be invested in government securities and projects, these 
investments have to be done in the context of the other investments that the 
organisation already owns in its portfolio. Many of the investments made by the 
organisations on the directives of the minister have been done in an ad hoc rather than 
a systematic manner. It would be much better if the social security organisations met 
with government to discuss government's needs and after careful analyses of the 
various projects, in light with their existing investment portfolio, detennine the areas 
in which they can assist the govenunent. This would ensure that the organisations 
adopt a portfolio management approach to their investment and so ensure that 
decisions taken do not jeopardise the organisations finances and consequently its 
ability to meet its main mandate, which is to provide for the benefits of the 
contributors and beneficiaries. 
The boards of the social security institutions do not carry out the functions associated 
with boards by the agency theorists and this limits the ability of the board to serve as 
an oversight of management. The fact that the minister may also give general and 
specific direction to the board which it must give effect to, may also limit the ability 
of the board to function effectively and to honour its fiduciary obligation to the 
contributors and beneficiaries of the social security organisation. This has led to a 
few board members resigning office because of the incompatibility of the requests and 
their fiduciary obligations. The executive directors may themselves be constrained 
from effectively carrying out their fiduciary responsibilities. 
These factors are responsible in a large part for the SSO's perfonnance. While none 
of the social security organisations in the OECS have gone bankrupt, some of the 
organisations are showing signs of increasing financial pressures, for example 
Dominica and Antigua & Barbuda. This is evidenced by rapidly declining funding 
ratios, increasing levels of non-performing government and government related debt. 
In Dominica, the funding ratio has declined from II years in 1990 to 8 years in 1997, 
with a corresponding increase in total expenses in relation to total income, increasing 
from 42% to 65% in the same time period. In Chapter Three the arrears of 
contributions and interest payments owed to the social security organisations by the 
governments of Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia were 
discussed. If this situation is not addressed the organisations may find themselves on 
a brink of crisis that will have nothing to do with the ageing population and the 
partially funded nature of the organisation: factors so often cited as reasons for the 
financial problems of social security systems. 
A closer look at Chile and the other Latin American social security organisations 
revealed that mismanagement of the organisations was one of the main reasons for the 
schemes poor financial performance and bankTuptcy, and not solely the fact that the 
schemes were PAYG, defined benefit or publicly managed, as is so often cited. This 
mismanagement was a result of a series of reasons including government interference, 
poor investment decisions, and the favouring of one interest group over another (Mesa 
Lago, 1989; Holzmann, 1998; Wallich, 1998; Queisser, 1998). This is one of the 
reasons why it is important to determine the role of governance and to identify the 
governance factors, which impact on the performance of social security systems. 
4.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the corporate governance literature relevant to the research question 
was presented and analysed in a social security context. The literature demonstrated 
that corporate governance, in particular board composition, plays an important part in 
an organisation's operation and performance. The corporate governance structure, as 
outlined by the Acts of Incorporation of the social security organisations in the OECS 
was also introduced and a discussion on the inherent conflicts in the structure of the 
systems was also presented. 
In the next chapter, the data and methodology to answer the key question, "how do 
governance factors impact on the performance and administration of social security 
systems in the OECST' will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE, - THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
The last chapter dealt with aspects of corporate governance literature which had a 
direct bearing on the possible link between board composition and social security 
performance. The governance framework of the social security organisations, in the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was presented to illustrate the 
reality of corporate governance in a social security context. 
In this chapter, the data and methodology for addressing the key question, "how do 
governance factors impact on the performance and administration of social security 
organisations in the OECS? is introduced and explained. In section two, the previous 
work done on governance in the public pension system in the United States of 
America (US), which forms the starting point for the present study is discussed. In 
section three the questions to be tested are presented. In section four, the data are 
introduced and described and in section 5, the qualitative methodology is introduced. 
In section six, the sources of other data are presented and the conclusions are provided 
in section seven. 
5.2 Previous Work Done On Governance In A Public Pension 
Setting 
There appears to be no study that has analysed the role of governance on the 
performance and administration of social security organisations, but there are a few 
studies, which look at the impact on public pension plans in the United States. 
Previous studies investigated the determinants of actuarial assumptions used by 
pension plans and in the detennination of the required contribution ratio (fIsin & 
Mitchell, 1994); the determinants of administrative efficiency (Hsin & Mitchell, 
1997); and the determinants of investment performance (Mitchell & Hsin, 1997). 
Other work has looked at impact of investment in "economically targeted investments 
on performance (Munnell and Sunden, 1999) and on the determinant of investment 
strategies and the impact of those strategies on performance (Useem and Hess, 1999; 
Useem and Mitchell, 2000). 
The work by Mitchell & Hsin (1997) will be used as a starting point of this study. 
Consequently, the remainder of this section will be devoted to providing an analysis 
of the Mitchell & Hsin's (1997) paper. Mitchell & Hsin (M&H, 1997) sought to 
address the issue of why some pension plans appear to be well managed and 
attempted to identify the structural design features associated with good pension 
management outcomes. To address these questions, they used the PENDAT file of 
1991, comprising a cross-sectional survey of 201 public employees retirement system 
(PERS) in the US, covering a total of 269 separate retirement plans. The respondents 
of the survey represented 73% of state and local active pension plan participants and 
71% of state and local plan assets in 1990. This however, may not be representative 
of all plans, since they are among the largest and are probably better managed and 
funded than the smaller plans. 
They used four dependent variables, two representing asset perfonnance and two 
representing funding analysis. The asset performance variables were the rate of return 
of 1990 and a five-year annualised return for the period 1986-1990. The use of a five- 
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year annualised return, however, makes it impossible to compute traditional measures 
of pension performance variability over time. The funding analysis variables were the 
stock fund ratio and the flow fund ratio. The stock fund ratio expresses pension plan 
assets as a fraction of the pension benefit obligation, while the flow fund measure is 
the ratio of actual to required contributions for the year. 
While both measures are subject to manipulation as the ratio is dependent on the 
assumptions made, because the pension plans report the stock fund ratio in 
accordance with the principles of the Government Accounting Standards Board, it is 
less likely to be manipulated. The flow fund, on the other hand can be easily 
manipulated and a study by Hsin & Mitchell (1994) concluded that "required 
contributions reported by public sector pension plans are endogenously 
determined ... and ... environmental factors have both a direct effect on the level of 
reported required contributions, and also an indirect effect on the actuarial 
assumptions selected. " On that basis, the use of flow fund ratio as a dependent 
variable, and thus measure of performance is considered to be inappropriate. 
The explanatory variables for this study were classified into five groups and though 
the classification was the sarne for explaining the dependent variables, the 
composition of the classification differed. The five categories were (i) pension board 
composition, (ii) board management practices, (iii) investment practices, (iv) 
reporting requirements and assumptions, and (v) other factors that reflect regulations 
at the state level governing budget and funding practices. A detailed description of 
the variables is provided in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 
Variable Definitions used by Mitchell & Hsin (1997) 
Dependent Variables 
YRIROR Annual (1990) rate of return 
YR5ROR Average (1986-1990) annualised rate of return 
AST/PBO Reported pension systems assets/PBO measure of cumulative liabilities 
FLOWFUND Annual actual/required employer plan contributions 
Explanatory Variables 
A Pension Board Composition 
BDELAC Fraction of pension board elected by active employees (%) 
BDELRT Fraction of pension board elected by retired employees 
LAIBONS board is covered by liability insurance 
BBDENOK board is required to authorise benefit amounts 
BDACTOK board is required to authorise actuarial assumptions 
B Pension Management Practices 
ADINVST Administrative costs charged to pension investment income 
INVINHS Investment staff of pension portfolio partly (or fully) managed in-house 
ACCINHS Accounting staff needs of pension system partly (or fully) met in-house 
TOP10MG Some investments handled by top 10 performance bracket managers 
TOPl0*EXT Plan investments exclusively handled by top 10 managers 
C Pension Investment Practices 
PRUDMAN Pension board required to act according to "prudent man! ' rule 
INSTATE Fraction of pension investments, which must be directed in-state (%) 
STKMAX Maximum limitation on the assets in the pension portfolio 
D Pension Reporting Practices 
INDINVPF Pension system obtains independent investment performance evaluation 
FREQVAL Frequency of independent evaluation 
REPSOLO System issues own financial report (not integrated with other budgets) 
GIVERPT Plan participants receive annual financial report 
AMORTPER Amortisation period for past service liabilities 
AMORTMS Amortisation period but not stated 
ACTUARUC Pension system uses unit credit method of computing pension liabilities 
E Pension Assumptions 
COLA Benefits are partially (or fully) indexed after retirement 
WDOT Future salary growth assumption required to compute PBO 
WDOTMS Salary growth assumptions not stated 
PORTABLE Employees moving within state may carry benefit accruals to new plans 
NEXPROR Interest rate assumptions used in computing PBO 
EXPRORMS Interest rate assumption not stated 
INFL Cost of living assumption required to compute PBO 
INFLMS Cost of living assumption not stated 
AVRETAGE Average retirement age used in computing PBO (yrs) 
AVRETAGEMS Average retirement age not stated 
SSINT Plan integrated with Social Security 
F Other Factors 
FUNDLAW State has legal funding standard for pension system 
DEFPOS State law does not prohibit carryover for state budget deficit from one year to the 
next 
TCHRPLAN System covers at least some teachers and other school employees 
ASSETS Actuarial value of pension system assets, typically at market value ($M) 
ASSETSQ Squared value of assets 
BOND Pension system assets held in corporate and government bonds 
STOCK Pension system assets held in stock 
BENNOCUT State has law guaranteeing benefit amounts 
BENTIERS Benefits differ according to worker hire date 
ISUNION At least some employees covered by the pension system unionised 
SPECTAX Special or dedicated tax is source of employer contributions 
LJNEMPD Recent (1990) level of unemployment minus the long run (1981-1989) average level 
of unemployment level in the state 
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Controls were included for plan size, type of plan and covered employees and in some 
cases portfolio composition was incorporated on grounds that plans with less risky 
holdings would have lower returns. The standard deviation of the returns may have 
been a better measure to capture the risks of the portfolio than controlling for the 
portfolio composition. Portfolio composition appears to be more appropriately used 
as an explanatory variable on performance. 
Some of the explanatory variables used do not appear to be appropriate in testing the 
effect on performance and some of the factors included under the classifications do 
not appear to be pertinent. Included under board composition are the coverage of 
liability insurance, authorisation of benefit amounts and the pension assumptions. 
These appear to be more akin to a classification of policy and practices than of board 
composition. The classification of pension assumptions appears to be more relevant 
as independent variables if the dependent variable was investment policies, which 
could in turn be an independent variable for measuring rate of return. 
The model postulated by Mitchell & Hsin (1997) was: 
Y, = ao + aXI + a2X2 + a3X3 + a4X 4+ a5Z + ei (1) 
Y2 = bo + biXi + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X 4+ b5Z + e2 (2) 
Where Yj measures investment performance; Y2 measures funding variables; X1 - X4 
represented vectors of variables reflecting pension board composition, board 
management practices, investment practices, reporting requirements and assumptions 
and Z represented a vector of other variables. The disturbance terms were assumed to 
be distributed normally with zero mean. 
They concluded that with regard to asset performance (1) public pension boards 
having more retiree-trustees experienced lower investment returns (2) returns did not 
differ depending on whether a pension board had in-house or external managers, even 
from the "top-10" group and (3) public pension funds required to devote a portion of 
their assets to state-specific projects earned lower returns. However, none of the 
results was significant when regressed on both measures of asset performance; the 
one-year return (1990) and the annualised five year return (1986-1990). The results 
of the presence'of retiree- trustees and the practice of in-state investment were only 
significant on the one-year basis and not on the five year basis, and the practice of in- 
state investment was significant only at the 10% level. 
Munnell & Sunden (M&S, 1999) using the same data source as M&H (1997) did not 
duplicate their findings with regards to the effect of in-state investment on 
performance. They found a statistically significant positive coefficient on in-state 
investment when returns were averaged over five years and an insignificant 
coefficient for annual return. , They however, argue that their results should be 
dismissed, as it is anomalous on theoretical grounds and not consistent with patterns 
in later years. They ascribed the difference in findings to the treatment of missing 
values. M&H imputed missing values, while M&S did not. 
Though they did not highlight the result, if administrative costs were charged to 
pension investment income, it reduced the rate of return, and this was significant at 
155 
the 5% level when regressed on the five-year average. These results indicate that the 
variables used may not have been more appropriate to explain the return on assets, 
and this is supported by the low R2 of 11.3% and 12.4% on the one-year and five year 
rate of return, respectively. 
M&H (1997) emphasised the results of the stock fund and not the flow fund because 
"stock funding data are better than flow funding data. " One wonders then why they 
used it knowing that it was not a reliable measure of funding performance. They 
concluded that better public pension funding was associated with a pension system 
having in-house actuaries and with board members required to carry liability 
insurance; public pension funding was lower when states had experienced fiscal 
stress, and when employees were represented on the pension system board and that 
funding did not appear sensitive to statutes guaranteeing benefits, or by legal funding 
requirements, or by the ability of states to carry budget deficits from one year to the 
next. The R2 of 28.9% was much higher for the stock fund ratio than the asset 
performance, suggesting that the explanatory variables were much better at explaining 
the funding analysis than the rate of return. It is interesting that M&H ignored the 
results that were significant at the 10% level on the funding analysis but placed great 
emphasis on it for the rate of return. 
Notwithstanding the limitations identified of the M&H study, it serves as a useful 
starting point for investigating the relationship between governance, perforinance and 
administration in the social security organisations in the OECS. M&H used a cross- 
sectional analysis, however the study conducted here on the OECS uses panel data. 
By using panel data,, not only will there be a greater number of observations, but it 
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also allows the opportunity to distinguish the effects of variables that would not be 
possible using only a cross-sectional approach. A more detailed analysis of the use of 
panel data is provided later in the Chapter (section 5.6). M&H imputed values for 
missing data. If a pension plan had valid data on all but one or a few explanatory 
variables, a value of 0 was assigned and a missing value indicator was given a value 
of 1. If the plan lacked a value for a dependent variable a sample selection term 
derived from a Probit non-reporting equation was incorporated in the regression 
equations. This practice has inherent dangers and it was decided that in this study, if 
data were missing the observation would be removed from the data set. This reduces 
the number of observations, but it is believed that this is more appropriate than 
assigning a value of 0 which can be particularly misleading or imputing a value. The 
standard deviation of the returns will be used as a measure of risk. However, because 
the standard deviations are not available for the returns of the social security 
organisations in the OECS, standard deviation is calculated based on the past returns. 
Ideally, ex ante risk measures should have been used as the use of ex post values 
theoretically introduces a degree of endogeneity, but this is likely to be of a low order. 
Two methods were used to calculate the standard deviation, a constant and rolling 
standard deviation based on the historic returns. 
A key area of difference between the M&H and this study is in the explanatory 
variables. The explanatory variables in this study will focus on the board nomination 
and appointment process as well as the board composition, the portfolio composition, 
the investment practices and other factors, which includes the sex of the executive 
director and the political status of the country. The explanatory variables in this study 
are believed to be more endogenous than the ones used by M& H. There are only 
three common explanatory variables in the two studies: the percentage of plans 
participants on the board, the use of external managers and the use of in-state 
investment, and the latter may even be defined differently. The dependent variables 
are firstly the rate of return from the inception of the social security organisation to 
1999 and secondly, the funding ratio, which is similar to the stock fund ratio used by 
M&H but not identical. In the next section, the questions to be addressed are 
introduced. 
5.3 Empirical Investigation Of The Relationship Between 
Governance And Social Security Performance In The OECS 
In the context of social security funds the possible relationship between governance 
and performance can be subdivided into six main categories: (i) the appointment 
process, (ii) board and investment committee composition and size, (iii) investment 
policies, (iv) operational process, (v) portfolio composition and (vi) other factors. 
The key questions suggested by these areas are as follows: 
1. Does the appointment of the board, investment committee and director by the 
cabinet, minister or governor make a difference to the performance of the 
social security organisations? 
2(a) How does a tripartite board impact on the performance of the social security 
organisations? 
2(b) How does the composition of the investment committee impact the 
performance of social security organisations? 
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2(c) How does the size of the board and investment committee impact on 
performance? 
3(a) How does the initial intent of the government regarding the introduction of the 
social security organisations impact on performance? 
3(b) How do the restrictions imposed on foreign investment impact on the 
perfonnance of the organisations? 
3(c) What is the impact of the use of external managers on the performance of 
social security organisations? 
4. How does the portfolio composition impact on the performance of the 
organisations? 
5(a) What is the impact of the funding ratio on performance? 
5(b) How does the administrative expenses impact on performance? 
5(c) What is the impact of the benefit expenditure on performance? 
6(a) Does the sex of the director make a difference to the performance of the 
organisations? 
6(b) What impact does the political status of the country have on the performance 
of the organisations? 
6(c) Does the transition from a national provident fund to a social security system 
impact on performance? 
5.4 The Data Set 
The data were compiled from the audited financial statements, Acts of Incorporation 
of the respective countries and economic data from the Eastern Caribbean Central 
Bank (ECCB). The organisations, included in the study are the Anguilla Social 
Security Board (ASSB); the Antigua and Barbuda Social Security Board (ABSSB); 
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The British Virgin Islands Social Security Board (BVISSB); Dominica Social 
Security Scheme (DSSS); Grenada National Insurance Scheme (GNIS); Montserrat 
Social Security Board (MSSB); St. Kitts and Nevis Social Security Board (SKNSSB); 
St. Lucia National Insurance Scheme (SLNIS) and the St. Vincent and The 
Grenadines National Insurance Scheme (SVGNIS). 
The data are categorised in six groups: (i) appointing process, (ii) board and 
investment committee composition and size, (iii) investment policies, (iv) operational 
process, (v) portfolio composition and (vi) other factors. An in-depth examination 
will be presented of each category. 
5.4.1 The Appointing Process 
This classification covers the appointing process of the board, investment committee 
and executive director. The board is appointed either by the minister, governor or 
cabinet. The minister appoints six of the boards, two are appointed by the governor 
and one by cabinet. In four cases, the Acts do not stipulate the appointing body for 
the investment committee but it can be assumed that the same appointing authority of 
the board appoints the committee. In the five cases, where it is stipulated, the minister 
appoints the committee in four of those cases, with the board appointing the 
committee in one. The minister and the governor in three cases each, cabinet, board 
or Public Service Commission (PSC) in one case each appoints the director. The 
appointment and board composition have been dealt with in Chapter Four and the 
differences were presented in Table 4.1. 
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The appointment by the minister and cabinet can be classified together as they are 
both closely identified with the government. The appointment by the governor is 
meant to signify independence from the government, however there is no reporting 
relationship between the board and the director and the governor. All boards report to 
the minister and he is the one with the legislative power to give "general or specific 
directions to the board. " The same also holds true for the investment committee. The 
appointment of the executive director by the PSC is also meant to be a sign of 
independence from government as appointments by the PSC are constitutional 
appointments and basically once appointed, one cannot be dismissed "if the minister 
deems it expe ient so to do. " 
The executive director is also normally appointed by the sarne appointing authority of 
the board, however there are some exceptions. In Anguilla, British Virgin Islands and 
St. Kitts and Nevis, the board is appointed by the minister, but the governor in the 
first two cases and the board in the latter case appoint the director. In Antigua, the 
governor appoints the board but the appointment of the director is done by the PSC. 
This separation is meant to serve as a "check and balance" on demands of 
govemments. -i 
5.4.2 Board's Composition and Size 
The boards range in size from'five to nine members, with a mean of 6.56 and a 
median of 7. The investment committees are smaller, with a mean of 4.39 and a 
median of 5. 
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The Acts stipulate in all countries, except Dominica, that the board shall be tripartite 
with representatives from employees and employers. The percentage varies from 0% 
to 67%, with a mean of 46.2%. The inclusion of the representatives of employees and 
employers, classified as social partners, is meant to provide the board with not only a 
range of expertise but very importantly provide representation for the employees and 
employers in the decision-making process. The International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) favours Tripartism and the ILO had a great influence on the establishment of 
the structures in the OECS. There is meant to be consultation with various employees 
and employers' bodies' in the selection of the representatives, however, there is much 
variation in that process. This will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Seven. 
The boards of many social security systems are tripartite and many public pension 
systems, as well as private pension plans in the US include plan participants on the 
board. 
5.4.3 Investment Policies 
The stated investment policies encompass the restrictions imposed on the portfolio 
with regard to foreign investments and equity holdings as well as the use of external 
managers. The Acts prohibit foreign investment, without the express approval by the 
minister in only two instances, in Anguilla and St. Kitts and Nevis. In the other 
countries, there is no such legal restriction, but there are generally unspoken and in 
some cases explicit statements that investments should be concentrated in the 
domestic economy (Various Hansards, Anniversary Reports and Annual reports of the 
social security organisations in the OECS). 
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Foreign investment has been classified as investment outside the OECS area, even 
though the permission of the minister is needed in Anguilla and St. Kitts and Nevis, 
for any investment outside of the country. The reasons for including investment 
within the OECS as domestic investments are because (i) of the use of a common 
currency by the member states (ii) the agreements, which allow for free movement of 
people and capital within the region and (iii) the small percentage of funds invested 
within the region. 
The percentage invested in the foreign market is small, though there has been an 
increase in the last few years. The average over the period 1972 - 1999 was 6.31% 
and the average invested in the foreign market between 1990 - 1999 showed a slight 
increase to 8.16%. Three social security organisations, the BVISSB, MSSB and 
SKNSSB, have invested in the foreign market from inception. The foreign portfolio 
in St. Kitts and Nevis was acquired from the National Provident Fund, but there has 
been no increase of the portfolio holdings due to opposition by both the minister and 
the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB). In Montserrat, a portion of the portfolio 
has always been invested by external managers and in the British Virgin Islands 
(BVI); investments have always been made in the US market. There is however, in 
recent times, a move by two other organisations, the ASSB and the SLNIS to expand 
in the foreign market. 
The investments in the foreign market are usually done through the use of external 
managers, though in the BVI foreign investments in bonds and fixed deposits are 
managed in-house. The use of external managers in the management of a portion of 
the funds will therefore be tested for its influence on the performance of the 
163 
organisations. There are very few restrictions on equity save that in some countries; 
stipulations are made concerning the age and capitalisation of the company and the 
payment of dividends. There is however, little investment in equity. This may be as a 
result of the limited opportunities available in the local market and the restrictions on 
foreign investments, both implicitly and explicitly stated. The issue of equity and use 
of foreign investments will be revisited as part of the discussion of the portfolio 
composition in the next section. 
5.4.4 Portfolio Composition 
The table below summarises the average portfolio composition of the SSO over the 
period 1972 - 1999. It also presents information on the minimum and maximum 
holdings. 
Table 5.2 
Portfolio Composition of the Social Security Organisations in the OECS 
1972-1999 1990-1999 
Asset Class Holding Min Max Holding Min Max 
Equity 0.87 0 16 1.62 0 16 
Foreign Investment 6.31 0 60.4 8.16 0 52 
Fixed Deposit 49.69 2.31 100 48.32 3.5 90.2 
Government bonds 
and Treasury Bills 24.45 0 84.4 20.13 0 73.50 
Loans 16.25 0 55.8 18 0.10 52.50 
It should be noted that the investments in the foreign market comprise mainly 
investments in bonds and fixed deposits. The British Virgin Islands and Montserrat 
have the largest holdings of foreign investments and the British Virgin Islands, the 
largest holdings of equity. There is a heavy concentration in fixed deposits, followed 
by government bonds and treasury bills and loans. A detailed look at the portfolio 
composition of the SSO in the OECS is presented in Appendices 3 to 11. 
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Two of the reasons for the high concentration in government bonds and fixed deposits 
are the restrictions placed on foreign investment and the non-existence of a developed 
capital market. The concentration of so much of the reserves in fixed deposits poses 
risks not only to the social security system in the form of lower returns and inability to 
move the portfolio as desired, but also imposes risks on the banking sector. These 
factors are bound to impact on the performance of the systems and a more detail 
analysis is warranted. This is presented in the next section. 
5.4.4.1 Analysis of Portfolio Composition 
As at the end of 1999, the total reserve of the social security organisations in the 
OECS was about EC$ 2.3 billion (US$ 852m), with the invested portfolio just about 
EC$ 2 billion (US$ 741m). A reference back to Table 5.1 will show a slight shift in 
the investments from government bonds and fixed deposits into equity, loans and 
foreign investment in the 1990 - 1999 period when compared to the 1972 - 1999 
period. Over the last nine years (1990-1999) fixed deposits account for about 48%, 
government bonds and treasury bills 20%, socio-economic loans 18% with the 
remainder of the portfolio shared between equity, foreign investment and property. 
Within this average, there is some disparity, for example on average fixed deposits 
account for about 80% of the portfolio in Anguilla and only about 12% in Grenada 
(see Appendices 3 and 7). 
The composition of the portfolio may be explained by the fact that the capital market 
in the OECS is non-existent and there is a preference for local investments. In recent 
years, the ECCB has been involved in establishing a securities exchange but this is 
still not yet off the ground. We have already noted the reluctance of the government 
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to allow investments in the foreign market even where it is not legally prohibited. 
The ECCB is also not in favour of foreign investments by the social security 
organisations on the grounds that with the exception of Anguilla [and the British 
Virgin Islands] the organisations do not earn foreign exchange and this would result 
in the "breaking down of the reserves of the region, " (ECCB Minutes of Meeting with 
Officials of Social Security Schemes, May 19,1994). 
Some of the other reasons advanced for the non-investment in the foreign markets 
include the higher rates of interest that will be faced by the goverranent if it has to 
borrow monies from international and other foreign agencies. This in turn, it was 
argued will impact on the population in the form of higher taxes and increased 
pressure on businesses. Other reasons include the need to facilitate economic growth 
(as discussed in Chapter Three and will be addressed again in Chapter Seven) and to 
provide tangible benefits to the contributors of the system. 
These arguments are possibly valid but must be weighed against the needs of the 
organisations and the need for diversifying the portfolio. A look at the portfolio of the 
SSO will show a heavy concentration in either govenunent paper and/or loans to 
statutory bodies and government or in fixed deposits in commercial banks. In many 
of the cases, the bonds and loans are non-performing, and so while theoretically, these 
investments have positive return, in practice this is often not the case, as neither 
interest nor capital has been repaid. This also serves to overstate the rate of return, as 
interest income is accounted for on the accrual basis, in keeping with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
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There is also the case of loans that should have been retired twenty years ago still 
being on the books in arrears. As at December 1999, there were examples of five 
loans to statutory bodies in Antigua, two of which should have been repaid in 1980, 
two in 1986 and one in 1992 (Antigua & Barbuda Social Security board Annual 
Report, 1999). This situation is arguably not unique to Antigua, but because most of 
the Annual Reports do not report that level of detail, it would not be readily detectable 
except perhaps through interviews and access to the working papers of the accountant 
and auditors. There does not appear to have been much effort taken to get debtors to 
honour their obligations and in some cases, new loans are granted even while there is 
an outstanding loan in arrears. 
The Quebec Pension Plan provides a good example of how the emphasis and 
acceptance of the fiduciary responsibility can turn around a system. The Quebec 
Pension Plan was in a financial crisis in the late 1980's and a decision was taken in 
the early 1990's to form a subsidiary whose sole function would be the management 
of the investment portfolio on a professional and prudent basis. This arrangement has 
been in existence for more than five years now and over those years the portfolio has 
grown and the Quebec Plan brought back on a path of sustainability. The investment 
subsidiary determines the minimum interest rate and risk tolerance and all 
investments, irrespective of whether it is government sponsored investment or not, 
must first pass the return and risk test before it is accepted (Guay, 2001). 
Theodore and La Foucade (1999) argue that social security schemes frequently feel 
the hand of government pushing them in particular directions and this for most part 
does not facilitate efficient investment decisions governed by sound investment 
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principles. They assert "the interests of the state may sometimes block out the other 
investment principles when it is essential that they all mesh together as a cohesive 
whole". This blocking of the investment principles can only take place in an 
environment where the best interests of the SSO are subjugated to other interests. 
While recognising and accepting the influence, control and power of government, if 
there were a greater emphasis on good governance and fiduciary responsibility owed 
by not just the managers of the social security organisations, but also by the 
government, this situation would be ameliorated. 
As the then Leader of the Opposition declared, when commenting on government's 
indebtedness to the Dominica Social Security, the board has to "stand up" to the 
government, for if they do not, "people will find that they reach retirement age and 
there is no money, " (Tropical Star, 8/9/1999). This would be a terrible indictment on 
the board members and management, not only at the time, but even more so, of the 
past members. 
The portfolio's heavy concentration in fixed deposits appears to be a risky approach, 
compared to a more balanced portfolio of stock, bonds and fixed deposits. In St. Kitts 
and Nevis about 66% of the portfolio is invested in one commercial bank (St. Kitts 
and Nevis Social Security Scheme Annual Reports, Interviews, 2001). In St. Vincent 
about 80% is invested in commercial banks, with the majority of the investments also 
in one commercial bank and the same holds true in Anguilla (Respective Annual 
Reports). These organisations by the size of the investments carry with them the 
systemic risk of the commercial banks and in many cases have lost the flexibility to 
move their investments because of the possible impact on the health of the institution. 
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Yet, they are not compensated for the high level of assumed risk, as often the rates 
received from the commercial bank where most of the money is deposited is lower 
than at the other commercial banks (Interviews, 2001). Additionally, the social 
security organisations are not members of the board of directors of these banks. 
Given the size of the deposits of the social security organisations, in keeping with 
good corporate govemance, the social security organisations should arguably seek 
representation on the board of directors of these institutions. 
According to Nicholls (1996) with a concentration of their investment portfolio in the 
indigenous banks, the social security systems (SSS) are unduly exposed to the actions 
of these institutions. Theoretically, he argues, there is a great risk that the SSS can 
lose their entire portfolio if the commercial banks are imprudent in their investment 
decisions. This is of grave concern because the indigenous banks are often over- 
exposed to risks in a particular geographical location. Nicholls (1996) explains that 
the banks are in effect unit banks, and do not benefit from a diversified portfolio base 
through time and space, which would facilitate a smoother adjustment in the case of 
adverse clearings. Additionally, the social security organisations have no recourse to 
loss of their deposits in the commercial banking system. There are no deposit 
insurance or other guarantees and neither do these organisations engage in any 
monitoring of the performance of the banks. 
This overexposure is not only bad for the social security organisations but also for the 
commercial banks, for they become very vulnerable to the actions of the social 
security organisations. This serves as a major constraining factor on the social 
security organisations for arguments are often put across by the government, the bank 
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and even the ECCB that make it difficult, if not impossible, for the social security 
organisations to withdraw their funds. An appreciation and understanding of those 
risks would play an important role in ensuring that these funds are managed prudently 
and are not overly exposed to loss. This is also an important argument for the 
diversification of the portfolio outside of the local economy, since the local economy 
does not provide sufficient avenues for the proper diversification of the portfolio. 
Nicholls (1996) simulated the impact of a 5% withdrawal of deposits by the social 
security institutions on the indigenous commercial banks and estimated that this 
would lead to a decline of 17.2% in the loans to deposit ratio of the banks. He argues 
that it is in the interest of the social security organisations to avoid activities, which 
impose stress on ý the financial system generally, and the indigenous banks, in 
particular. It may, he argues; result in a "run" on the banks, which would in turn 
jeopardise the safety of the remaining assets of the social security organisations. 
This strengthens the case against the management of social security organisations, who 
deposited such large sums of money in the commercial banks and in one particular 
bank, without studying the implications for themselves as well as for the financial 
system. Nicholls (1996) advocates co-operation by the institutions given that both 
sides can do hann to each other, however, social security organisations need to ensure 
that they are adequately compensated for the additional risks that they bear. Samuel 
(1993) cautioned against the excess holding of deposits in the banking sector, but his 
caution appears to have fallen on deaf ears, as there has been no significant decline in 
holdings of fixed deposits. This may be due in part to the limited opportunities 
available locally, but also to the inflexibility which the social security face once the 
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monies are deposited in the banks, given the impact on the bank and the financial 
system. Samuel argued that the funds so deposited with the commercial banks are 
usually on short-term deposits, attracting low interest rates and are not always 
channelled into the productive sectors because of the bank's preference for short-term 
lending in the distributive and personal sectors. 
Theodore and La Foucade (1999) find surprising the high percentage of assets held in 
fixed deposits and argue that the long-term financial viability of the social security 
organisations in the OECS is questionable. They point out that the various regulations 
establishing the organisations specifically state that the reserves should be invested to 
reflect the type of benefits to be paid out and the period when it becomes necessary to 
realise the investments. They, thereby argue that a balance between the short-term 
and long-term assets is necessary for the scheme's viability. 
Nicholls (1996) highlights even more vividly the risks faced by the social security 
systems. He argues that the operational framework of the ECCB, the lender of last 
resort for the OECS, makes it difficult if not impossible for the Bank to perform that 
function because of the need for a 100% foreign currency backing. So whereas fixed 
deposits are meant to be safe and liquid investments, in the case of the fixed deposits 
of the social security organisations in the, OECS, this may not be the case. These 
investments may take on the characteristics of long-term illiquid assets, without the 
attendant return. While the impact of a sudden or large withdrawal of commercial 
bank deposits by the social security organisations is recognised, it is incumbent on the 
commercial banks,. especially the indigenous banks to widen their deposit base. 
Instead of being complacent in the knowledge that they have a ready and steady pool 
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of deposits, the commercial banks should be actively seeking to expand their base and 
thus reduce their own dependency on the social security organisations. 
The social security organisations, as was revealed in Chapter Two are the largest 
mobilisers of savings in the OECS, and from the examination and discussion of the 
portfolio composition, they play a major role in the financing of the local economy. 
In section 5.5, an examination of the size of the organisations in relation to the 
economy is provided. In the next section, the operational processes will be presented 
5.4.5 Operational Process 
The study by Mitchell (1998) on administrative costs in public and private retirement 
systems in the United States used administrative costs as a dependent variable to 
assist in evaluating the administrative costs implications of moving to a privately 
managed retirement system. In the Mitchell & Hsin (1997) study, which is used as 
the starting point for this study, administrative costs were not considered either as a 
dependent or independent variable. In this study not only the level of administrative 
expenses, but also the levels of benefits, reserves and the funding ratio are employed 
as independent variables to test for the relationship on performance. It should be 
noted that in this study the funding ratio is used as both a dependent and independent 
variable (not simultaneously) to determine not only the factors which influence the 
funding ratio, but also to test the effect of funding ratio on the rate of return. This is 
because funding ratio may be both influenced by and influences the rate of return. 
An investigation in the financial performance of the social security organisations will 
reveal rising benefit expenses. Benefit expenses have increased as the system has 
matured and more persons qualify for a benefit. The introduction of non-contributory 
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pensions as well as adjustments made to bring benefits in line with inflation have also 
resulted in the increases of benefit expenses. 
In the Table 5.3, a look at the benefit expenses in relation to GDP will be provided 
which will later be compared with a selected group of countries, provided in Table 
5.4. The benefit expenditure of the social security systems in the OECS is gradually 
increasing with a simple average of about 0.59% of GDP in 1990 to 1.19% of GDP in 
1998. Dominica consistently records the highest levels of spending among the OECS 
Member State though it does not have the highest age dependency (Table 5.5). This 
may be due to more generous benefit terms, both in terms of eligibility criteria and 
benefits. 
Table 5.3 
Benefit Expenditure of Social Security Systems in Relation to GDP In The 
OECS, Selected Years (%) 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Anguilla 0.68 0.65 0.77 0.88 1.04 1.01 1.14 1.24 1.31 
Antigua 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.96 1.16 1.30 1.30 1.36 1.36 
British Virgin Islands n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.43 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.40 
Dominica 1.19 1.50 1.79 1.97 2.07 2.15 2.23 2.49 2.41 
Grenada 0.43 0.45 0.50 0.58 0.62 0.75 0.82 0.84 0.92 
Montserrat 0.09 0.17 0.23 0.25 0.29 0.43 0.62 0.81 0.79 
St. Vitts & Nevis 1.20 1.18 1.08 1.26 1.20 1.42 1.61 1.71 1.80 
St. Lucia 0.09 0.38 0.43 0.53 0.56 0.63 0.71 0.79 0.88 
St. Vincent & 
The Grenadines 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.36 0.42 0.46 0.52 0.67 0.83 
Source: Author's Calculations based on GDP figures from the ECCB and the British Virgin Islands 
Statistical Office and the Financial Statements of the Organisations. 
Generally, however, the growing trend in the expenditure of benefits as a percentage 
of GDP is due in part to the maturity of the system, reflected in the dependency ratio 
(Table 5.5). 
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Table 5.4 
Public Pension Spending in Relation to GDP of Mandatory Pension Systems in 
Selected Countries 1993 - 1998 (%) 
Partially Funded 
Defined Benefit 
Centrally Managed DC 
(Provident Funds) 
Privately Managed 
DC 
Belize 0.2 Malaysia 1.0 Chile 5.8 
Jamaica 0.3 Singapore 1.4 Argentina 6.2 
Sweden 11.4 Kenya 0.5 Uruguay 15 
Canada 5.4 Tanzania Mexico 0.4 
Switzerland 12.6 Zambia 0.1 Peru 1.2 
United States 7.2 Uganda 0.8 Kazakhstan 5.0 
Japan 6.6 India Hungary 9.7 
Namibia Poland 14.4 
Philippines 1.0 Netherlands 
Costa Rica 3.8 Australia 4.6 
United Kingdom 10.2 Switzerland 
Honduras 0.6 UK 
Gambia Denmark 9.6 
Guyana 0.9 
Trinidad & Tobago 0.6 
Source: Adapted from Palacios & Pallares-Miralles (2000). 
This point will be made clearer when a comparison is done with the dependency ratio 
of the countries as well as when a comparison is done with a selected group of 
countries in terms of both benefit expenditure as a relation to GDP and dependency 
ratios (see Tables 5.4 and 5.6). 
The age dependency ratio, (presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6), is the ratio of the number 
of persons over the retirement age and those below 14 or 16, relative to the working 
population. The figures gives an indication of the demands that will be made on the 
system; however, the systems dependency ratio is a much better indicator of the 
impact of ageing on the performance of the social security organisations. The age 
dependency ratio gives an indication of the number of persons over the retirement age 
relative to the working population, while the systems dependency ratio is the number 
of those in receipt of a pension relative to the contributors. This infonnation is not 
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available for most of the countries, but it many cases the system dependency ratio will 
be higher than the age ratio. 
Table 5.5 
Projectiom of Age Dependency Ratios in the OECS 1980 - 2050 
Country 1980 1991 2000 2010 2020 2050 
Anguilla 10 14 18 22 24 28 
Antigua & Barbuda 16 15.8 15.6 15 14 25 
British Virgin Islands n/a 8.3 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Dominica 15.1 15.8 13.6 10 9.7 21.9 
Grenada 12.7 14.8 16.4 18.5 20 25 
Montserrat 23.2 22 27 n/a n/a n/a 
St. Kitts & Nevis 18.9 17.9 16.2 16.7 17.5 25 
St. Lucia 12 10.5 8.2 8.3 8.4 24.4 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 13.7 12.5 9.2 9.4 10 26.4 
Average* 14.3 13.9 13.5 13.8 14.4 24.7 
Calculated by weighting each country's dependency ratio by its share of the group's total (projected) 
population. The dependency ratio is calculated by expressing the population age 65+ as a percentage 
of the population aged between 15 to 64. It should be noted that in countries where the retirement age 
is 60, the dependency ratio would be higher than indicated by these figures. 
Source: Nicholls, 2001; Statistics Department, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 
Montserrat; Statistic Department, British Virgin Islands. 
These figures reveal that a drastic increase in the dependency ratio is expected 
between 2020 and 2050, and this means that there will be added pressure on the 
organisations to meet the benefit claims. These figures, however, do not take into 
account the impact of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). The 
Caribbean is reported to have one of the fastest growing incidences of AIDS, in the 
world. This may serve to severely increase the dependency ratio as a result of a 
significant portion of the. workforce dying prematurely until such time as a cure is 
found. AIDS will also impact negatively on the short-term benefits as the sufferers 
become ill and it may not significantly reduce the pension bill if the victims have 
survivors. However, these figures are significantly lower than those projected for 
some countries, reflected in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6 
Age Dependency Ratio of Selected Countries - Population 60+/population 20-59 
Country 1975 2000 2025 2050 
Caribbean Reizion 
Barbados 17 17 25 39 
Guyana 7 6 13 27 
Jamaica 12 10 14 30 
Trinidad & Tobago 9 10 18 32 
Latin America 
Argentina 12 16 19 29 
Chile 9 11 19 29 
Peru 7 8 13 26 
Uruguay 15 20 20 29 
OECD 
Canada 13 18 33 42 
Denmark 21 22 32 35 
Finland 16 22 37 38 
Germany 23 23 34 52 
United Kingdom 22 24 33 39 
United States 16 19 29 35 
Central and Eastern Europe, 
Croatia 16 21 30 38 
Kazakhstan 9 11 17 27 
Poland 14 17 27 35 
Russia 13 18 27 39 
Africa 
Cameroon 7 7 7 11 
Gambia 5 6 8 11 
South Africa 7 8 10 18 
Source: Gillion et al (2000) 
In many of the cases, the OECS dependency rates are lower than those of other 
Caribbean countries. A study by Jordan & Carter (2000) looking at the impact of the 
demographic changes on the social security system in Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad 
and Tobago and St. Lucia concluded that with the exception of St. Lucia, where the 
population is projected to remain relatively youthful, the systems in the other 
countries are in need of significant restructuring to remain sustainable in the future. 
The paper offered some suggestions, but like so many studies on the sustainability of 
social security systems, no attention was paid to the role of corporate governance and 
effective management in enhancing the sustainability of the systems. 
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However, data for selected groups of OECS countries indicate a relatively high youth 
dependency (Table 5.7). These figures indicate that, barring serious negative impact 
of AIDS, other terminal illness or natural catastrophe, the working population will be 
replenished for several years to come by the young. 
Table 5.7 
Youth Dependency For The OECS Countries 
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Anguilla n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Antigua & 
Barbuda n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n1a 
British Virgin 
Islands 40.5 40.5 40.5 40.3 40.1 40.1 40 39.3 39 
Don-dnica n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a rL/a n/a n/a 
Grenada 76 75.2 74.4 73.3 71.4 69.2 67.4 64.5 60.9 
Montserrat 44 n/a n/a n/a 44 46 52 51 42 
St. Kitts & Nevisn/a n1a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
St. Lucia 43.7 42.6 42 42 41.8 41.3 40.3 39.3 37.1 
St. Vincent & 
The Grenadines n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
The Youth dependency ratio is calculated as the population 0-14/pop 15 -59. 
Source: Statistics Department, British Virgin Islands; NIS, Grenada; Statistics Department Ministry of 
Finance & Economic Development, Montserrat, NIS, St. Lucia. 
It is interesting that, as will be discussed in Chapter Seven, the ageing population was 
identified as a major challenge by only a third of the OECS social security 
organisation in the Caribbean, while seventy-eight percent identified the prudent 
management of the investment portfolio. That does not mean that the organisations 
are not cognisant of the impact of ageing, but see prudent management of their 
investments as a key element in managing the ageing problem and in maintaining 
their relevance and in ensuring their sustainability. 
There is generally a strong correlation between the dependency ratio and pension 
spending. Using data on pension expenditure and dependency ratio from Palacios and 
Pallares-Miralles (2000) the correlation between spending and dependency ratio is 
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. 85 1. When data for the seven 
OECS systems not included in the data set is included, 
the correlation drops slightly to . 847. The results 
indicate that pension spending is 
very highly influenced by the dependency ratio, increasing as the dependency ratio 
increases. 
in addition to the benefit expenses, the administrative expenses have also been 
increasing. The administrative expenses have risen largely due to an increase in 
allowances for the board and investment committee fees and allowances, staff 
benefits, training and public relations. This, coupled with the increase in benefits, 
means that total expenses have also been increasing and in some schemes total 
expenses exceed 70% of all contributions received and in Dominica in 1999, it was as 
high as 92%. Other factors likely to impact on administrative expenses include the 
effectiveness and efficiency of contribution collections, control of expenses, 
management of the organisations as a whole and the optimisation of the portfolio. In 
the next section, a description of the other factors thought to influence perfonnance is 
presented. 
5.4.6 Other Factors 
These other factors include the sex of the executive director, the political status of the 
country and the age of the organisation. Two of the variables are self-explanatory and 
a description will be provided, only for the political status of the country. Three of the 
countries, Anguilla, BVI and Montserrat are still British dependent states and though 
there is internal self-government, there are still some political and economic ties with 
Britain. The study will also attempt to analyse the extent to which this impacts on the 
performance of the social security organisations. In the next section, an analysis of 
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the pension reserves in relation to the economy is provided as indicated in section 
5.4.4 earlier. 
5.5 Pension Reserves And The Economy 
The reserves of the social security organisations are significant in relation to GDP, 
and data for a selected number of years are presented in Table 5.8. The pattern 
reveals a steady increase of the reserves in relation to GDP and of the importance of 
the social security organisation in the local economy. In Anguilla and St. Kitts and 
Nevis, the social security reserves accounted for almost 50% of GDP in 1998, and 
there has been a significant increase in imPortance of the social security organisation 
in Montserrat since the Volcanic Crisis began in 1996. In 1995, the reserves were less 
than 16% of GDP, and in 1998, a doubling in importance to 31%, in just three years is 
evidenced. 
Table 5.8 
Reserves of The OECS Social Security Systems in Relation to GDP, Selected 
Years (%) 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Anguilla 22.73 25.78 29.53 29.54 32.30 35.74 39.68 41.65 45.39 
Antigua 16.26 18.83 20.40 20.99 20.98 23.51 23.40 23.48 23.85 
British Virgin Islands n/a n/a n/a n/a 16.64 17.21 18.16 18.37 19.45 
Dominica 20.95 21.69 22.52 23.52 23.77 25.19 25.54 26.60 27.47 
Grenada 11.70 12.65 13.38 17.07 18.52 19.80 20.68 21.36 22.11 
Montserrat 7.53 10.51 11.35 13.10 14.04 15.55 22.55 28.01 31.37 
St. Vitts & Nevis 32.05 34.94 36.02 37.47 38.06 41.11 43.62 44.66 46.62 
St. Lucia 15.29 16.01 16.66 18.40 19.84 20.64 22.97 25.02 26.31 
St. Vincent & 
The Grenadines 15.77 16.60 16.89 18.21 19.58 19.79 20.50 21 21.47 
Source: Author's Calculations based on GDP figures from the ECCB and the British Virgin 
Islands Statistical Office and the Financial Statements of the Organisations 
In Table 5.9, the percentage of GDP for a selected group of countries with different 
social security structure is presented for the years between 1987 and 1998 is 
presented. 
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Table 5.9 - 
Reserves in Relation to GDP of Mandatory Pension Systems in Selected 
Countries 1987 - 1998 (%) 
Partially Funded 
Defined Benefit 
Centrally Managed DC 
(Provident Funds) 
Privately Managed 
DC 
Belize 0.2 Malaysia 55.7 Chile 45 
Jamaica 0.3 Singapore 55.6 Argentina 3.0 
Sweden 32 Kenya 12.1 Uruguay 1.0 
Canada II Tanzania 9.4 Mexico 0.50 
Switzerland 7.1 Zambia 0.7 Peru 2.1 
United States 51 Uganda 0.6 Kazakhstan 0.50 
Japan 25 India 4.5 Hungary 0.40 
Namibia 0.4 Poland 1.10 
Philippines 11.2 Netherlands 87.3 
Costa Rica 5.4 Australia 61.0 
Switzerland 7.1 Switzerland 117 
Honduras 3.5 UK 74.7 
Gambia 11.1 Denmark 23.9 
Source: Adapted from Palacios & Pallares-Miralles (2000). 
Though a full comparison cannot be made because of the unavailability of data for all 
the countries over the same time span as for the OECS, a comparison of Tables 5.8 
and 5.9 reveals that social security organisations in the OECS are in the groups of 
countries where the reserves fonn a significant portion of GDP. A cursory look at 
Table 5.9 shows that there is no strong relationship between the type of pension 
system and the relative importance of the pension reserves in relation to the economy, 
though the largest values appear to be from defined contribution, fully funded, 
privately managed and defined contribution, fully funded publicly managed systems. 
The aim of this study is to examine the factors that impact on performance of social 
security organisations in the OECS and to identify some elements of best practice for 
enhancing performance. In the next section, the model specification is introduced. 
Performance is determined by both exogenous and endogenous factors. Some of the 
exogenous factors are the economic, political and social environment, while some of 
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the endogenous factors include the governance framework, the management structure 
and style and the policies. In this study the emphasis will be on the governance 
factors impacting on performance, however, a look will also be taken at the political 
I 
factor as represented by the appointment process of the board. 
5.6 Model SPeciflcation 
The model seeks to identify the factors which influence the performance and 
administration of social security organisations. Performance is measured by the rate 
of return on the investment portfolio and administration by the funding ratio. 
According to Mitchell and Hsin (1997) pension funding is important since better- 
funded plans standa, better chance of having assets on hands to pay promised benefits. 
This measure, however, can be problematic because of the denominator/numerator 
problcms. The ratio is opcn to manipulation and it is possiblc to show a high or stablc 
funding ratio, even if reserves are constant or falling, if the expenses are low or 
falling. Expenses can be manipulated by deferment or capitalisation of expenditure 
and thereby, show a positive, constant or rising funding ratio, even in the face of 
falling revenue. There is however, no evidence of this manipulation in the OECS. 
The OECS organisations do not mark-to-market their assets, accounting for assets by 
the lower-of-cost or market value. In many cases, market values are not ascribed to 
the investments. For example, government bonds and the domestic equity holdings 
and these investments are accounted for on a cost basis. This means that the 
computed rates of return do not reflect the true market return. 
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The formula used for computing the nominal rate of return derived from Mesa Lago 
(1991) and used by Theodore and La Foucade (1999) is: 
(Investment Return x 200) - (Investment Portfolio at the Start of the Year 
+Investment Portfolio at the End of the Year -Investment Return) 
The real rate of return using the formula from Mesa Lago, (1991) is: 
[(1 x Nominal Rate ofReturn -1 +Rate ofInflation) - 1Jx 100 
The formula used for computing the funding ratio is the one favoured by the actuaries 
(Various Actuarial Reports of the OECS Social Security Systems): 
[(Reserves at the End ofLastyear) -(TOtal Expenses of Current Year)] 
The model estimated has the following structural forms: 
6 
Y, = ao + aj EXj, t + elt (1) 
j-1 
6 
Y2 = bo + bj EXjt +eI, t (2) 
j-1 
6 
Y3 = co + cj EXj, t + elt (3) 
j-1 
Where Y, represents the variables reflecting the nominal rate of return; Y2 represents 
the real rate of return; Y3 represents the funding ratio, and X, to X6 represents the 
variables reflecting the appointment process, board composition, operational process, 
investment guidelines, portfolio composition and other factors, respectively. The 
error term is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero. The six 
independent variables are formed by assigning dummy variables or the actual 
numbers to each of the measures under the classification. 
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Table 5.10 
The Devendent And ExiDlanatorv Variables of The Model 
Variables Description 
Dependent Variables 
NRORML Nominal rate of return from inception to 1999 for each of the social security 
organisation 
RRORML Real rate of return from inception to 1999 for each of the social security organisation 
FRATIO Funding ratio from inception to 1999 for each of the social security organisations 
Explanatory Variables 
X, Appointing Process 
BDCAB Appointed of the board is done by Cabinet 
BDGOV Appointment of the board is done by the Governor 
DIRBD Appointment of the director is done by the board 
DIRCAB Appointment of the director is done by the Cabinet 
DIRGOV Appointment of the director is done by the Governor 
DIRPSC Appointment of the director is done by the PSC 
TUNIONPT The involvement of the trade unions in the board's nomination process 
EMPLINV The involvement of the employers' associations in the board's nomination process 
X2 Board Composition 
PARTICIP The % of board members representing both workers and employers 
BDINVCHN The chairman of the board holds the chairmanship of the Investment conunittee 
INVCOMP The % of Investment committee members that are non-board members 
BDSIZE The size of the board 
INVSIZE The size of the Investment committee 
X3 Operational Process 
ADMINEXP The level of administrative expenses (actual amounts) 
BENEFITS The level of benefits (actual amounts) 
RESERVES The level of reserves (actual amounts) 
X4 Investment Practices 
RESTRICT The presence of restrictions on foreign investments 
EXTMGRS The use of external managers 
GINTENT Governments intentions at inception of social security 
X5 Portfolio Composition 
GOVT The percentage of the portfolio invested in government bonds and treasury bills 
FDEPOSITS The percentage of the portfolio invested in fixed deposits 
LOANS The percentage of the portfolio invested in loans 
EQUITY The percentage of the portfolio invested in equity 
FOREIGN The percentage of the portfolio invested in foreign investments 
X6 Other Factors 
FEMDIR The director is female 
BRDEPEND The country is a dependency of Britain 
AGE The age of the social security system (years) 
NPF The existence of a national provident fund prior to the introduction of the social 
security system 
STDEV Standard deviation 
RSTDDEV Rolling standard deviation 
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The explanatory variables as already mentioned earlier have been classified into six 
groups, and are summarised, together with the dependent variables in Table 5.10. The 
correlation matrix is presented in Table 5.11 and the descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 5.12. Actual figures will be used for the quantitative measures and 
the qualitative measures are assigned dummy values of 0,1, if the answer to the 
question is "no" and "yes", respectively. 
Table 5.11 Correlations (Pearson) 
NRORML RRORML BDCAB BDGOV DIRBD DIRCAB DIRGOV DIRPSC 
RRORML 0.135 
BDCAB -0.235 -0.0si 
BDGOV 0.023 -0.074 -0.170 
DIRBD -0.20S -0.050 -0.090 -0.170 
DIRCAB -0.235 -0.051 1.000 -0.170 -0.090 
DIRGOV -0.029 -0.056 -0.187 0.012 -0.187 -0.187 
DIRPSC 0.080 -0.055 -0.137 0.806 -0.137 -0.137 -0.284 
PARTICIP -0.296 0.028 -0.032 0.293 0.300 -0.032 0.127 0.236 
TUNIONPT 0.017 0.119 -0.246 0.357 -0.246 -0.246 -0.511 0.557 
EMPLINV -0.097 0.088 -0.291 0.256 0.310 -0.291 -0.604 0.470 
RESTRICT -0.257 -0.081 -0.146 -0.275 0.618 -0.146 0.310 -0.221 
EXTMGRS -0.079 -0.052 -0.185 0.020 0.489 -0.185 0.507 -0.280 
GINTENT -0.162 -0.083 0.398 -0.086 -0.227 0.398 0.827 -0.344 
FRATIO -0.313 0.220 0.410 -0.246 0.046 0.410 0.020 -0.222 
NPF -0.077 0.069 0.236 -0.382 0.236 0.236 -0.472 -0.579 
EQUITY -0.006 -0.040 0.008 -0.144 -0.093 0.008 -0.126 -0.107 
FOREIGN -0.081 -0.007 -0.128 0.230 -0.073 -0.128 0.646 -0.190 
FDEPOSIT -0.143 -0.021 0.429 -0.152 0.024 0.429 0.401 -0.129 
GOVT 0.228 -0.029 -0.266 0.146 -0.170 -0.266 -0.536 0.287 
LOANS -0.037 0.109 -0.216 -0.252 0.393 -0.216 -0.500 -0.093 
FEMDIR -0.098 0.006 -0.090 -0.170 0.245 -0.090 0.173 -0.137 
BRDEPEND -0.029 -0.056 -0.187 0.012 -0.187 -0.187 1.000 -0.284 
BDINVCHN -0.270 -0.110 0.335 -0.178 0.335 0.335 0.696 -0.409 
AGE 0.265 0.005 -0.431 0.314 0.103 -0.431 -0.422 0.668 
INVCOMP 0.270 0.078 0.144 -0.279 -0.258 0.144 -0.633 -0.189 
INVSIZE -0.012 0.077 0.231 -0.793 0.231 0.231 -0.277 -0.807 
BDSIZE -0.210 0.025 0.652 0.221 -0.150 0.652 -0.185 0.178 
ADMINEXP 0.093 -0.035 -0.067 0.094 0.143 -0.067 -0.349 0.248 
BENEFITS 0.084 -0.052 -0.092 0.086 0.160 -0.092 -0.393 0.246 
RESERVES -0.061 -0.022 -0.011 -0.053 0.100 -0.011 -0.069 0.041 
STDEV 0.211 0.140 -0.089 -0.077 -0.745 -0.089 0.103 0.154 
RSTDDEV 0.160 0.011 -0.141 -0.064 -0.199 -0.141 0.079 -0.021 
PARTICIP TUNIONPT 
TUNIONPT 0.425 
EMPLINV 0.582 0.845 
RESTRICT 0.128 -0.398 
EXTMGRS 0.396 -0.445 
GINTENT 0.100 -0.618 
FRATIO 0.361 -0.010 
NPF -0.226 -0.078 
EQUITY -0-099 0.061 
FOREIGN 0.227 -0.348 
FDEPOSIT 0.126 -0.380 
GOVT -0.362 0.374 
LOANS 0.130 0.379 
FEMDIR 0.200 -0.152 
BRDEPEND 0.127 -0.511 
BDINVCHN 0.264 -0.734 
AGE -0.193 0.325 
INVCOMP -0.683 0.078 
INVSIZE -0.286 -0.245 
BDSIZE 0.571 0.320 
EMPLINV 
-0.049 
-0.166 
-0.731 
0.015 
0.054 
0.018 
-0.377 
-0.364 
0.293 
0.552 
-0.014 
-0.604 
-0.536 
0.375 
-0.065 
-0.113 
0.231 
RESTRICT 
0.210 
0.206 
-0.199 
-0.185 
-0.178 
-0.151 
0.441 
-0.343 
-0.021 
0.089 
0.310 
0.542 
-0.084 
-0.601 
0.024 
-0.487 
EXTMGRS GINTENT 
0.368 
0.251 0.250 
-0.017 -0.306 
-0.022 -0.113 
0.718 0.528 
0.068 0.625 
-0.478 -0.655 
-0.061 -0.592 
0.489 0.110 
0.507 0.827 
0.627 0.842 
-0.235 -0.642 
-0.434 -0.509 
0.000 -0.126 
0.049 0.201 
FRATIO 
0.109 
-0.053 
0.255 
0.173 
-0.384 
0.064 
0.231 
0.020 
0.268 
-0.295 
-0.047 
0.234 
0.581 
NPF 
0.155 
-0.097 
-0.304 
0.178 
0.384 
-0.097 
-0.472 
-0.165 
-0.370 
0.632 
0.810 
0.089 
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Table 5.11 Correlations (Pearson) (Con't) 
PARTICIP TUNIONPT EMPLINV RESTRICT EXTMGRS GINTENT FRATIO NPF 
ADMINEXP 0.062 0.249 0.323 -0.120 -0.013 -0.365 -0.143 0.021 
BENEFITS 0.004 0.247 0.330 -0-099 -0.047 -0.420 -0.219 0.057 
RESERVES 0.158 0.084 0.138 -0.077 0.163 -0.071 0.159 -0.047 
STDEV -0.066 0.398 -0.021 -0.484 -0.354 0.04S 0.192 -0.403 
RSTDDEV -0.048 0.108 0.002 0.005 -0.201 -0.005 0.074 -0.093 
EQUITY 
FOREIGN 0.028 
FDEPOSIT -0.219 
GOVT 0.019 
LOANS 0.221 
FEMDIR 0.210 
BRDEPEND -0.126 
BDINVCHN -0.152 
AGE -0.028 
INVCOMP 0.227 
INVSIZE 0.146 
BDSIZE 0.020 
ADMINEXP 0.492 
BENEFITS 0.518 
RESERVES 0.240 
STDEV 0.080 
RSTDDEV -0.164 
FOREIGN FDEPOSIT 
-0.123 
-0.350 -0.743 
-0.221 -0.527 
0.461 -0.101 
0.646 0.401 
0.482 0.621 
-0.348 -0.292 
-0.309 -0.464 
-0.165 -0.091 
0.136 0.142 
-0.095 -0.247 
-0.175 -0.245 
0.170 -0.141 
-0.073 0.068 
-0.104 0.176 
GOVT LOANS FEMDIR BRDEPEND BDINVCHN 
0.163 
-0.268 0.126 
-0.536 -0.500 0.173 
-0.717 -0.399 0.242 0.696 
0.411 0.181 0.010 -0.422 -0.564 
0.535 0.270 -0.169 -0.633 -0.635 
0.010 0.375 0.025 -0.277 0.006 
-0.241 -0.034 0.035 -0.185 0.111 
0.029 0.267 0.353 -0.349 -0.274 
0.051 0.295 0.245 -0.393 -0.317 
-0.141 0.195 0.480 -0.069 -0.013 
-0.069 -0.032 0.021 0.103 -0.370 
-0.084 -0.149 -0.191 0.079 -0.110 
AGE INVCOMP INVSIZE BDSIZE ADMINEXP BENEFITS RESERVES STDEV 
INVCOMP 0.172 
INVSIZE -0.401 0.534 
BDSIZE -0.342 -0.066 -0.056 
ADMINEXP 0.330 0.139 -0.075 0.061 
BENEFITS 0.368 0.184 -0.050 -0.002 0.921 
RESERVES 0.105 -0.013 -0.023 0.135 0.536 0.481 
STDEV 0.172 0.141 -0.177 0.131 0.019 0.004 0.111 
RSTDDEV 0.019 -0.007 0.013 -0.119 -0.054 -0.067 -0.090 0.287 
Table 5.12 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N N* Mean Median TrMean StDev 
NRORML 157 0 7.791 7.310 7.636 2.702 
BDCAB 157 0 0.0828 0.0000 0.0355 0.2765 
BDGOV 157 0.2420 0.0000 0.2128 0.4297 
DIRBD 157 0 0.0828 0.0000 0.03SS 0.276S 
DIRCAB 157 0 0.0828 0.0000 0.0355 0.2765 
DIRGOV 157 0 0.2803 0.0000 0.25S3 0.4506 
DIRPSC 157 0 0.1720 0.0000 0.1348 0.3786 
PARTICIP 157 0 46.20 57.00 47.64 20.89 
TUNIONPT 157 0 0.4013 0.0000 0.3901 0.4917 
EMPLINV 157 0 0.4841 0.0000 0.4823 0.5013 
RESTRICT 157 0 0.1911 0.0000 0.1560 0.3944 
EXTMGRS 157 0 0.2739 0.0000 0.2482 0.4474 
GINTENT 157 0 0.3631 0.0000 0.347S 0.4824 
FRATIO 150 7 16.198 15.035 15.830 6.326 
NPF 157 0 0.6178 1.0000 0.6312 0.4875 
EQUITY 149 8 0.872 0.000 0.577 2.026 
FOREIGN 149 8 6.31 0.00 4.17 15.34 
FDEPOSIT 149 8 49.69 46.60 49.41 26.66 
GOVT 149 8 24.45 13.20 23.13 22.74 
LOANS 149 a 
. 
16.25 12.90 15.51 13.06 
FEMDIR 157 0 0.0828 0.0000 0.0355 0.2765 
BRDEPEND 157 0 0.2803 0.0000 0.2553 0.4506 
BDINVCHN 157 0.4459 010000 0.4397 0.4987 
AGE 157 0 21.471 21.000 21.52S 4.470 
INVCOMP 157 0 45.69 33.30 45.21 30.02 
INVSIZE 157- 4.3949 5.0000 4.4255 0.7906 
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Table 5.12 (Con't) Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N N* Mean Median TrMean StDev 
BDSIZE 157 0 6.5605 7.0000 6.5106 1.1285 
ADMINEXP 157 0 2157555 1411262 1985411 1924854 
BENEFITS 157 0 4791524 2575593 4194877 5505546 
RESERVES 157 0 128743568 83260116 106598538 204806557 
STDEV 157 0 2.2542 2.3600 2.3080 0.7579 
RSTDDEV 121 36 1.136 0.660 0.994 1.225 
Variable SE Mean Minimum Maximum ol 03 
NRORML 0.216 0. '260 19.3SO 6.17S 8.930 
BDCAB 0.0221 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BDGOV 0.0343 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DIRBD 0.0221 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DIRCAB 0.0221 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DIRGOV 0.0360 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
DIRPSC 0.0302 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PARTICIP 1.67 0.00 67.00 40.00 57.00 
TUNIONPT 0.0392 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
EMPLINV 0.0400 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
RESTRICT 0.0315 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
EXTMGRS 0.0357 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
GINTENT 0.0385 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
FRATIO 0.517 3.780 39.890 11.817 19.100 
NPF 0.0389 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
EQUITY 0.166 0.000 16.000 0.000 0.600 
FOREIGN 1.26 0.00 60.40 0.00 0.00 
FDEPOSIT 2.18 2.31 100.00 31.00 68.70 
GOVT 1.86 0.00 84.40 6.30 42.40 
LOANS 1.07 0.00 55.80 5.45 26.50 
FEMDIR 0.0221 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BRDEPEND 0.0360 0.0000 1.0000 0., 0000 1.0000 
BDINVCHN 0.0398 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
AGE 0.357 14.000 28.000 18.000 25.000 
INVCOMP 2.40 0.00 100.00 25.00 60.00 
INVSIZE 0.0631 3.0000 7.0000 4.0000 5.0000 
BDSIZE 0.0901 5.0000 9.0000 5.0000 7.0000 
ADMINEXP 153620 87718 ý11903746 668803 3291664 
BENEFITS 439390 4589 24386864 657793 7188750 
RESERVES 16345343 724917 2286264411 25901289 173112406 
STDEV 0.0605 0.3800 3.1800 2.1100 2.5100 
RSTDDEV 0.111 0.050 5.350 0.360 1.225 
The dataset will be made available to other researchers by contacting the author. 
The traditional appointing process is expected to be negatively related to performance, 
especially the rate of return, as a board appointed by the cabinet or minister may be 
subject to demands by the government to invest in projects that do not necessarily 
yield the best returns. Though the appointment by the governor is meant to signify 
independence from government influence, because the governor is advised by the 
government in the nomination process, it is not expected that there will be any 
differences in the impact of a board appointed by the cabinet and that of the governor. 
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The only variable in this classification expected to show a positive impact is that of 
the director appointed by the PSC, since a PSC appointment is a constitutional 
appointment and once the appointment is made, the extent of political manipulations 
are limited. 
The impact of board composition is expected to be mixed, with the impact expected to 
be negative on the rate of return the greater the percentage of plan participants 
because of their more conservative outlook on rate of return, if the board chairman 
serves the dual role of investment committee chairman, and the larger the board. The 
impact is expected to be positive if the investment committee comprises a greater 
proportion of non-board members, because of the independence and breadth of 
experience. The first three variables however are expected to have positive impact on 
funding ratio as they may insist on controlling costs. 
The restrictions on foreign investment are expected to negatively influence the 
performance indicators as restrictions on investments lead to inefficient asset 
allocation, and as pointed earlier, the limited locally opportunities will serve to 
exacerbate the problem. The use of external mangers is expected to positively 
influence performance because of their more specialised. knowledge and expertise and 
access to information. 
The results of the portfolio composition are also expected to be mixed, with 
government bonds, fixed deposits and loans expected to have a negative influence as 
they are generally considered to be low-risk investments and equity and foreign 
investment positively impacting on performance as they are considered to be of 
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higher risk. The presence of a female director is expected to be indeterminate, while 
if the country is still a British dependent state, the impact is expected to be positive on 
perfon-nance. It is expected that there would be less goverranent interference in the 
management of the social security organisation. In the next section a brief rationale 
for using panel data as the methodology is discussed. 
5.7 Panel Data Analysis 
Given the size of the data set, nine social security organisations, and the fact that the 
organisations were established at different periods, panel data methodology was 
deemed to be the most appropriate approach for investigating the relationship between 
governance, performance and administration of social security organisations. By 
pooling the data, the number of observation increase, generating added degrees of 
freedom (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1998), thereby providing greater statistical 
significance to the results. This way, it allows for one to distinguish the effects of 
variables that may not be possible using either time series or cross section data. For 
example, in a time series analysis of the individual systems, it would not be possible 
to test for the impact of the main governance components, if there had been no 
changes in the appointments to the board from inception. 
The number of observations is also limited. Antigua is the oldest social security 
organisation in the sample and has been in existence for twenty-seven years, whereas 
the sample average is eighteen years. In a cross section, the number of observation 
would be only nine, which would severely limit the degrees of freedom given the 
number of explanatory variables* being tested. By using panel data, the number of 
observations has increased to one hundred and fifty-seven (157), although there is a 
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downside in terms of the assumptions of cross-sectional homogeneity. The arguments 
for and the possible drawbacks of using the panel approach are as follows: 
The use of panel data significantly diminishes the problems associated with 
missing variables, since the effects of missing variables are accentuated if the 
sample is small. For example, there were no data for three years for the 
British Virgin Islands. If the data were present the total number of 
observations would have been 160; the percentage missing was about 2%. If a 
time series data were used for the BVI, the number of observations would be 
reduced to 16, giving a missing percentage of 16%. Further, if cross section 
analysis were conducted for those missing years, the number of observations 
would have been reduced to 6, i. e. 30% lower. 
(2) Panel data reduce the problem of multicollinearity as the variables vary in two 
dimensions, time and cross-sectional. In principle, it also allows for more 
sophisticated models with less restrictive assumptions. It also allows for better 
identification of the independent variables affecting the dependent variable 
because it makes a distinction between residual heterogeneity associated with 
changes over time (period effects) and across the organisations (group effects) 
(Sinha, 1998). 
(3) On the other hand, while the panel approach assumes homogeneity of the data, 
the data may change over time and over the cross sections and this means that 
the error term is likely to consist of time-series related disturbances, cross- 
section disturbances and a combination of both (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1998). 
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This should however, not pose too much of a problem with this data set as 
many of the independent variables are homogenous over the time period and 
there is a substantial amount of homogeneity among the social security 
organisations in the OECS. This homogeneity of the data presents its own sets 
of problems, including the limitations on the number of variables that can be 
tested and on the splits that can be performed to test for stability of the data 
set. 
ý. 7.1 Techniques of Panel Data Use 
There are various techniques for panel data use, ordinary least squares, fixed effects 
and random effects model. 
In the ordinary least squares model, the time series and cross-section data are simply 
combined or pooled and the model is estimated using the ordinary least squares. 
Because it utilises the ordinary least squares, it also adopts the assumptions of that 
technique. It assumes linearity of the parameters, such that 
yi- PI +P2Xi+Ui 
The independent variables are also assumed to be non-stochastic and conditional 
mean value is of ui is zero, such that E(uil XI) =0 (Gujarati, 1995). The main 
problem with this model is the assumption of the constant intercept and slope. 
Thefixed effects model corrects for this shortcoming by introducing dummy variables 
that allow for intercept to vary over time and cross-section units. The model does not 
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allow for varying of the slope as this would make pooling of the data inappropriate 
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1998). The model is written as follows: 
yit -ý (7 + ßxit + Y2W2t + Y3W3 +---+ YNWNt + SAU + 834'3+ ---+ 
ÖT4T + eit 
Where 
Wit - 11,0 for the ith individual, i=2, --. N otherwise 
Z. t ( 1,0 for the tth time period, t=2, ..., T 
The number of dummy variables will be determined by (N-1) + (T - 1), to avoid 
perfect collinearity =ong the explanatory variables. 
The inclusion of the dummy variables, however assumes a lack of knowledge about 
the model, which is often described through the error term. 
The random effects or error-components model allows for the pooling of data in 
which the error terms may be correlated over time and across individual units. The 
modcl is writtcn as follows: 
Yit = a+ PXit T eit 
eit=ui +vi+ Wit 
Where ui - N(o, a2 ,)= cross section error terin 
vt - N(o, a2 time-series error term 
Wit - N(o, a2w)= combined error term 
191 
Other assumptions of the random effects model are that the individual components are 
not correlated and there is no autocorrelation across time and cross-section units. The 
fixed effects methodology is used for pooling the data in this study as a combination 
of both time series and cross-sectional analysis is employed. 
5.8 Interviews 
The mailed questionnaire is an inexpensive, yet appropriate method for collecting 
data, especially if the sample is large and widely dispersed (Barclay, 1998). 
However, mailed questionnaires often suffer from a low response rate and this was the 
reason why the face-to-face interview method was selected. Interviews were 
considered to be the best way of accessing the perspectives of the interviewee (Patton, 
1990), which would provide the context for the results from the panel data analysis. 
This perspective is regarded as important for not only have the concerns of the 
stakeholders in the OECS not been voiced, their perspective is considered to be 
meaningful, knowable (Patton, 1990) and important in providing context to the 
analysis of the governance factors on the performance of the social security 
organisations. 
There are three basic approaches to interviewing: (1) the informal conversational 
interview, (2) the general interview guide approach and (3) the standard open-ended 
interview. The informal conversational interview depends on spontaneous generation 
of questions, and is typical of a participant observation fieldwork. The general 
interview guide relies on an outline of issues to be discussed, but the order and 
wording of the questions are not standardised. The guide serves as a checklist to 
ensure that all relevant areas are covered. The standardised open-ended interview 
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comprises a set of carefully worded and arranged questions, asked to each interviewee 
in the same sequence. Flexibility in probing is limited but it reduces the possibility of 
bias by having different questions for different people, and is thus a more systematic 
approach in obtaining data (Patton, 1990). 
Standardised open-ended interviews were the main approaches used in collecting the 
qualitative data. However, in some cases, particularly with the directors and staff of 
the social security organisations, the informal and general interview guide approaches 
were used. This was specially used when clarifications were sought following 
intcrvicws with the othcr stakeholdcrs. 
Three separate interview questions were prepared: (1) one to be applied to the 
directors, board members and ministers; (2) one to trade unions, employers' 
associations and employers and (3) one to the insurance and financial sectors. Most 
of the questions were asked of all the groupings, however, there were questions 
unique to each grouping. An example would be trade unions would be asked whether 
workers saw their contributions as a tax or saving, while employers and their 
representatives would be asked whether they saw it as a tax impairing competitiveness 
or as a benefit to employees. The interview questions are reproduced in Appendices 
12a, b, and c. 
5.8.1 Selection oftheInterviewees 
The'interviews were selected with five main groupings, and the criteria for selection 
were seniority and knowledge of the social security issues. The criteria and 
description of each grouping are presented separately. The list of all those interviewed 
by category and country is provided for in Appendix 13. 
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5.8.1.1 The Board, Directors and Minister 
The analysis of this dissertation encompasses nine social security organisations. All 
of the directors were interviewed. Two of the directors were interviewed twice, 
during the pilot study in 1999 and again in 2001. In 1999, four countries were 
selected for a pilot study: Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Montserrat and St. Kitts & 
Nevis. The main reason why these four countries were selected for the pilot was the 
proximity to each other thus making air travel between them cheaper. 
In 2001, two of the directors who were in office no longer held the position. In 1999, 
Hudson Savarin was the director of the Dominica Social Security Scheme (DSSS), 
but in 2000, with a change in government, his appointment was terminated. Janice 
Jean Jacques has been acting director of the DSSB from July 2000 to present. In 
1999, Rawlins Jemmot was acting director of the Montserrat Social Security Board 
(MSSB), in 1999 Kenneth Scotland was appointed as director, and Jemmot reverted to 
his substantive post as deputy director. Mr Jernmot was not interviewed in 1999, as 
on the day of the scheduled interview, he was taken ill. He however, posted answers 
to the questions, on return to office. The 2001 interviews were held with Janice Jean 
Jacques and Kenneth Scotland of the DSSB and MSSB, respectively. 
It was hoped to have met the board and the minister in each of the territories, but this 
did not materialise. The board and minister were met only in Anguilla. In Anguilla, I 
sat in at a board meeting as an observer and had informal conversations with the 
board members, but a formal interview was conducted only with the chairman. 
Arrangements to interview the workers and the employers' representatives formally 
did not materialise due to time constraints. In the British Virgin Islands, an 
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appointment was made to interview the chairman of the board, but due to unforeseen 
circumstances on his part and the time constraint, the opportunity for rescheduling 
never presented itself. In Dominica, the term of the board had expired and a new one 
not yet re-appointed during the period of the fieldwork in the country. The list of 
persons interviewed in this category is presented in Table 5.13. 
From the table, it can be seen that a member of the board was not interviewed in only 
one country, Dominica but in every country a person associated with the policy 
making for social security was interviewed. 
Table 5.13 
The Board, Director and Minister Interviewed In The OECS 
Country Persons Interviewed 
Anguilla Director, chai an of the board, minister, first director and first 
chairman of the board, management and staff 
Antigua & Barbuda Director chairman of the board, workers representatives (I in 
1999), employers' representative (1999), management and staff 
British Virgin Islands Director, one each of the workers' representative and the 
employers' representative, management and staff. 
Don-dnica Director, permanent secretary in ministry of social security, 
management and staff 
Grenada Director, workers representatives, management and staff, former 
director 
Montserrat Director, government representative (1999), management and staff 
St. Kitts & Nevis Director, minister, one of the employers' representative (1999), 
management and staff, first director 
St. Lucia Director, one of the workers' representative, management and staff, 
first director 
St. Vincent & The 
Grenadines Director, chairman of the board, management and staff 
5.8.1.2 Workers'Representatives 
The aim was to interview the main trade unions in each of the countries. In some 
cases, all the trade unions were interviewed. The trade unions were identified from 
the "yellow pages" of the local telephone directories and from the other trade unions 
and the social security organisation. The executive directors of the social security 
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organisations were also asked for a list of trade unions operating in the country and 
the names of the union represented on the board. In many cases, the "yellow pages" 
provided an accurate estimate of the number of trade unions. Table 5.14 presents the 
list of trade unions interviewed in the OECS. 
Four countries, Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, provided interesting cases. In these countries, the trade union 
movement is almost non-existent. In Anguilla, there was just one general trade union, 
but the membership was about 20 persons and it has been dormant for many years. 
The other unions were the Civil Service Union (CSU), Teachers Union (TU), Nurses 
Association (NA) and Police Welfare Association (PWA). These, however, are 
mainly professional associations, with the bargaining on behalf of nurses and teachers 
conducted by the CSU. Interviews were conducted with the general union, CSU and 
the TU. 
Table 5.14 
Trade Unions Interviewed in the OECS 
Country Trade Unions 
Anguilla Anguilla Public Service Union, Anguilla Teachers' Union, Anguilla Trades 
and Labour Union, Anguilla Youth Council2l 
Antigua & Barbuda Antigua Workers Union, Antigua Trades and Labour Union, Antigua and 
Barbuda Union of Teachers 
British Virgin Islands British Virgin Islands Taxi Men's Association 
Dominica Dominica Amalgamated Workers Union, Waterfront and Allied Workers 
Union, Dominica Trade Union, Dominica Public Service Union, Dominica 
Association of Teachers, Dominica Police Welfare Association 
Grenada Technical and Allied Workers Union, Bank and General Workers Union, 
Grenada Trade Union Council 
Montserrat Montserrat Police Welfare, Montserrat Nurses Association, Montserrat 
Union of Teachers, Montserrat Allied Workers Union 
St. Kitts & Nevis St. Kitts and Nevis Trades and Labour Union 
St. Lucia National Workers Union, St. Lucia Civil Service Union, Vieux Fort Seamen 
and Dock Workers Union, St. Lucia Teachers Union 
St. Vincent & The 
Grenadines National Workers Movement, St. Vincent and the Grenadines Public 
Service Union 
21 The Anguilla Youth Council is not a trade union, but given the absence of general trade unions, it 
was chosen as a representative of persons not belonging to the professional trade unions. 
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Interviews in Anguilla revealed that the main reason for the absence of a trade union 
culture is due to the fact that Anguilla had not been exposed to slavery, hence there 
was no need to unite against an oppressive class. Most of the persons engaged in 
small-scale family-owned subsistence fanning. It was also posited that Anguillans are 
an individualistic people and only come together for a cause, like they did for the 
revolution that resulted in the separation from the unitary state of St. Kitts, Nevis, 
Anguilla in 1967. 
In the British Virgin Islands, there was no listing of trade unions in the "yellow 
pages, " but investigation revealed that there were two. Several attempts to contact the 
union's executive over the four-day period, while in the BVI, proved futile. It was 
also revealed that there is not a trade union culture in the BVI. In St. Kitts and Nevis, 
there is only one general trade union, the St. Kitts and Nevis Trades and Labour 
Union,, and that union is associated with the Labour Party, the party forming the 
current goverrunent. The general secretary was interviewed. 
In St. Vincent, there are three trade unions, but only one union has full time serving 
officers and staff. In the other unions, like in Anguilla and Montserrat, the members 
of the executive are "part-time" trade unionist, for they work their normal hours at 
their regular employment and attend to the affairs of the union after working hours. 
Interviews were conducted with two of the unions. Efforts over a three-week period 
to reach one of the other unions, from which incidentally one of the workers' 
representatives was drawn, failed. 
1 197 
5.8.1.3 Employers'Representatives 
There are three main employers' associations in the OECS, the Employers Federation, 
the Chamber of Commerce and the Hotel and Tourism Association. There were 
however some variations. There were no Employers' Federation in Anguilla, British 
Virgin Islands and St. Kitts and Nevis. In two of these countries, it will be 
remembered the trade union movement was almost non-existent. Since the 
Employers' Federation serves as the trade union for employers, it may explain the 
absence. In Anguilla, the Anguilla Chamber of Commerce and Industry was launched 
in April 2001. In the British Virgin Islands, there is a joint Chamber and Hotel 
Association. Table 5.15 below indicates the associations interviewed in the OECS. 
Table 5.15 
Employers' Associations Interviewed in the OECS 
Country Associations 
Anguilla Hotel & Tourism Association, Chamber of Business and 
Commerce 
Antigua & Barbuda Employers' Federation, Chamber of Commerce 
British Virgin Islands Chamber of Commerce and Hotel Association 
Dominica Employers Federation, Conservation Association 
Grenada Employers' Federation, Chamber of Commerce 
Montserrat n/a 
St. Kitts and Nevis Chamber of Commerce 
St. Lucia Hotel and Tourism Association, Employers Federation 
St. Vincent & The 
Grenadines Employers' Federation, Chamber of Commerce 
Montserrat is the only place where the employers' representatives were not 
interviewed. The employers' organisations have been don-nant because of the 
volcanic crisis. 
5.8.1.4 Employers 
Though the representatives of the employers were interviewed, a sample of companies 
was identified for interviews. Though there was no scientific process in the selection 
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of the companies, a cross section of industries was sought. Initially, emphasis was on 
the larger companies, but it was soon realised. that this would provide a bias and so the 
sample was extended to include smaller companies and companies in the informal 
sector. The companies were identified from the "yellow pages, " and this was later 
double-checked with staff at the social security organisations, to verify size of 
workforce and industry. 
The persons targeted for the interviews were the human resource managers in the 
large companies. The owners or managers were targeted in the smaller companies, on 
the basis that in the small companies the owner or mangers would be the ones dealing 
directly with the social security and in setting policies for the company. In most of 
the cases, the interviewee was the target group, however in some cases the 
interviewee was the financial controller who dealt with social security matters. In a 
few cases (3), the manager was unavailable and the assistant was interviewed. Some 
of the respondents were unaware of the company policies on certain issues relating to 
social security. In some countries a larger number of employers were interviewed and 
this was as a result of their availability and also location. In some countries, example, 
Grenada, the employers were in diverse locations and not centred in the Capital and 
this posed some difficulty in getting around. 
5.8.1.5 Insurance And Finance Companies 
The main purpose of interviewing companies in the insurance and finance sectors was 
to obtain information relating to the level of private pension provisions in the OECS, 
and of the attitude of the insurance companies with respect to privatisation of the 
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social security organisations. The "yellow pages", verified by the social security staff 
methodology of selecting the insurance companies was also employed. 
It turned out that the methodology needed to be refined, as every insurance company, 
even some big ones, do not offer life insurance, and consequently, did not and could 
not provide packages aimed at retirement. In some cases, this was known at the 
beginning of the interview. The approach was then limited to identifying the life 
insurance companies. If a company operated a regional branch and an interview had 
been conducted in one country, that company was excluded from the sample in the 
other countries. On reflection, this should not have been done, as while the policies 
would be the same, the opportunity for obtaining first hand data of the number of 
private pension administered was lost. Only two finance companies offering private 
pension arrangements were identified in the OECS and both were interviewed. 
5.8.2 Access to Interviewees 
Access to the social security organisations to the ministers, boards, executive directors 
and staff of the social security organisations has been easy. The executive directors 
have been open and candid in their interviews, even in the one instance where the 
executive director was uncomfortable with the idea of interviewing staff and the 
board. In this instance while access to the board was not provided, access to the staff 
was made easy. 
This research effort would have not been possible without their assistance as the data 
in many cases resides only in their institution. The requests for information were 
generally always met, and they never tire of meeting requests, answering questions, 
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providing clarifications, even after the visit to the organisations. During the field 
visit, in many of the cases, a staff member, usually the statistician was assigned to 
provide the statistical information needed. 
Where the data collected were incomplete, the reason was the unavailability rather 
than the unwillingness to provide it. This is noteworthy and has to be commended. 
For many researchers, access to organisations, especially to senior management is 
difficult and one of the main challenges of their research. This, however, was not the 
case in this research effort. 
Access to the social security stakeholders was also easy and they must be commended 
for their generosity of spirit, their willingness to share and impart knowledge and for 
their time. In many cases, the appointments were arranged at short notice, yet the 
interviewees made the time. In only a few instances, maybe no more than three, was 
there an initial wariness to share and persons did not want the interview taped. 
However, after talking about general issues, example cricket (one topic to surely get a 
Caribbean person to speak! ), persons opened up and shared freely. 
5.9 Other Data Sources 
To confirm some of the findings from the interviews and provide answers to 
questions, primary sources of data were used. Heavy reliance was placed on the Acts 
of Incorporation, Actuarial Reviews, the Minutes of the Debate of Parliament at the 
reading of the National Provident Fund Act, Social Security Act or National Insurance 
Scheme Act. Early files, addresses by ministers, reports commissioned by the social 
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security organisations, and newspaper articles were also used to complement the 
information received and to frame the direction of this dissertation. 
5.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the data set was presented and described as well as the questions to be 
tested. The earlier empirical work done on corporate governance in a public pension 
setting was also presented, and the Mitchell & Hsin (1997) study was identified as the 
starting point for the analysis of this study. The way, in which this would be done, 
was also identified. In this chapter, a comparative analysis of the OECS systems and 
those in a selected group of countries, with respect to dependency ratio, spending and 
reserves in relation to GDP and importance of the social security systems was also 
presented. In the next chapter, the results of the multivariate analysis using OLS will 
be presented. 
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CHAPTER SIX - RESULTS OF REGRESSIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the multivariate analysis based 
on the methodology, data and explanations provided in Chapter Five. The dependent 
variables have been regressed on a variety of explanatory variables which capture 
governance structure, made up of the appointing process to the board and the board's 
composition, investment policies, portfolio composition, operational processes and 
other factors. 
The chapter is organised as follows: in section two the sensitivity analysis to test the 
robustness of the results is presented, followed by the overall analysis of the results 
which is presented in section three. A comparative analysis of this study and the 
Mitchell & Hsin (1997) study is provided in section four. In section five, the results 
are presented based on a variety of combinations of the six explanatory variables 
classification. A brief discussion on the optimal structure for social security 
organisations is presented in section six and the conclusions of the chapter are 
contained in section seven. 
6.2 Specification Tests 
Specification tests were conducted to test the robustness of the results, particularly in 
respect of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, for which the Lagrange Multiplier 
Statistic and the Durbin-Watson test were used. 
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Tests were also performed to test the stability of the data by dividing the sample into 
different time periods. The regressions were also performed for the period 1990 - 
1998,1994 - 1998 and the results were not significantly different, though in some 
cases the strength of the relationship was reduced. 
The results for the rate of return also factored in the risk of the return. There is no 
established capital market in the OECS and so it is difficult to measure the risk of the 
portfolio. It was therefore decided to measure the standard deviation of the past 
results on both a constant and a rolling five-year basis. This was performed 
individually for each social security organisation and the value derived was included 
in the panel data. Two fortnulas, were used to calculate the risk of the portfolio: the 
constant standard deviation of both the nominal and real rate of return and the rolling 
standard deviation of both the nominal and real rate of return over a five-year period. 
The constant standard deviation was calculated by finding the standard deviation of 
the rate of return over the entire period. In the case of the rolling five-year standard 
deviation, the return for five years would be measured, then the first year would be 
removed while the next year added, until all of the returns were included. Ideally ex 
ante risk measures would have been used, but these were not available. Using ex post 
measures may have introduced an element of endogeneity but this is unlikely to be 
significant. The results generally showed a stronger level of significance in almost 
every instance when the standard deviation is used as a risk measure. Outliers were 
removed from the equation, and the results also generally remained unchanged. 
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The sensitivity analysis suggests that the results are relatively robust to a range of 
alternative formulations. They confirm that the governance and portfolio composition 
are important variables in determining the performance of social security 
organisations and that there is a need to manage the investment portfolio 
independently. 
6.3 Overall Analysis of The Results 
Some factors significantly impacted on the rates of return and the funding ratios. It 
appears that in many cases the factors which appeared to lead to a lowering of the 
rates of return had a positive impact on funding ratios. This may suggest that the 
funding ratio may serve as an indicator of the risk averseness of the organisation. 
This may appear anomalous but it is not. Risk averseness will be reflected in 
investments of low risks which will lead to lower rates of return, while at the same 
time there may be an emphasis on cost control and collection of contributions and 
other income due,, which will result in a higher funding ratio. If this pattern is 
consistent throughout the analysis, this may signify that two separate approaches are 
needed for the management of the investment portfolio and the organisation as a 
whole. The coefficients of the explanatory variables often differ depending on 
whether nominal or real rate of return is used as the independent variable, but 
generally the direction of the relationship is the same. 
The explanatory variables used also appeared to be more applicable to explaining the 
determinants of the funding ratio than the rates of return. The variables, excluding 
those which were highly correlated, were tested in a multivariatc analysis, using panel 
data, to determine whether the factors which were significant in a smaller setting 
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would still be significant. The results are presented in Table 6.1. Only one 
explanatory variable was significant for all three dependent variables: the appointment 
of the board by the cabinet. The board's appointment by the cabinet had a negative 
influence on the rates of return, both nominal and real, but had a positive influence on 
the funding ratio. 
Table 6.1 
Determinants of Investment Returns and Funding Ratios in OECS Social 
Security System 1972 - 1999 (t-values against a null of zero are in brackets) 
Explanatory Variable NRORML RRORML F RATIO 
X, Appointing Process 
BDCAB -2.84 -6.54 15.36 
(-2.30) (-2.63) (8.57) 
BDGOV 2.17 -5.07 -7.18 
(1.31) (-1.46) (-2.42) 
DIRBD 1.13 0.11 8.03 
(0.53) (0.02) (2.09) 
TUNIONPT -0.39 1.74 10.88 
(-0.46) (0.84) (9.02) 
X2 Board Composition 
INVCOMP 0.08 0.07 0.09 
(3.02) (1.29) (1.77) 
INVSIZE 1.25 -0.96 0.87 
(0.98) (-0.40) (0.37) 
X3 Investment Policies 
EXTMGRS 0.47 -1.20 3.13 
(0.52) (-0.69) (1.93) 
X4 Portfolio Composition 
EQUITY -0.13 -0.24 -0.19 
(-1.21) (-0.77) (-0.96) 
FOREIGN -0.01 0.10 0.29 
(-0.32) (1.41) (5.46) 
GOVT -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 (-1.45) (-1.50) (-2.92) 
LOANS 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 (0.37) (-0.77) (-1.12) 
X5 Operational Process 
BENEFITS 7. OE76 5.6E-6 -2.9E-6 (1.32) (2.38) (-3.18) 
RESERVES -0.00 -2. OE-6 -0.00 
(-0.71) (-0.62) (-0.30) 
FRATIO -0.07 3.48 n/a 
(-1.51) (2.49) 
X6 Other Factors 
AGE -0.18 -0.09 0.26 (-1.38) (-0.37) (1.05) 
NPF 4.99 -0.94 4.64 (-2.77) (-0.27) (-1.42) 
Adjusted R2 29.8% 32.8% 65.9% 
No of Observations 138 123 138 
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This is consistent with the arguments that independence and autonomy from 
government are needed with respect to the management of the investment portfolio, 
while accountability and transparency are vital ingredients in the overall management 
of the social security organisations. This appears to be confirmed by the statistical 
significance of the composition of the investment committee, made up of members 
who are non-board members and the negative impact of the board appointed by the 
governor on the funding ratio. The results with regard to the composition of the 
investment committee appear to support the arguments of agency theorists, presented 
in Chapter Four, who view the outside directors as contributing to the "breadth " of an 
organisation, bringing in skills and competencies that are absent and providing 
independent assessments of actions considered and taken by organisations (Kesner & 
Johnson, 1990; Bacon & Brown, 1975; Vance, 1983). The negative influence of the 
board appointed by the governor on the funding ratio may arise from the lack of 
accountability of the board to the governor who appoints it. 
The results of the investment committee composition is also significant, albeit at the 
10% level on the funding ratio, suggesting in addition, the role for the investment 
committee as one of a "check and balance" on management (Vance, 1983). The other 
factor which influences the nominal rate of return, is the transitioning of the social 
security system. If the social security system replaced a provident fund system, this 
appears to lower the rate of retum. This may be due to the earlier payments of 
benefits, in particular pension benefit, as a result of the transitioning provisions for 
former members of the National Provident Fund. Another reason may be the 
practices of government under the provident fund system. If the government had big 
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borrowings or had defaulted on its payments, this trend is likely to continue under the 
social security system and this would impact negatively on the rate of return achieved. 
Two factors which are significant in explaining the real rates of return, are the benefit 
expenses and the funding ratio. The positive coefficient on the benefits is unexpected 
but is consistent with the conclusion that because benefit expenses are not indexed to 
inflation, as the rate of inflation rises, the value of the benefits decline, thereby 
lowering the costs to the social security organisation. 
Seven factors were significant at the 5% or 1% level with two additional factors being 
significant at the 10% level when the funding ratio is regressed on them. Four of the 
seven factors positively influence the funding ratio. They are the board appointed by 
the cabinet, the director appointed by the board, the involvement of the trade unions in 
the nomination process and the percentage invested in the foreign market. The three 
factors which have a negative influence on the funding ratio are the board appointed 
by the governor, the percentage invested in govenunent bonds and benefit expenses. 
These factors indicate that the governance, portfolio composition and operational 
factors are significant determinants of the funding ratio, with the board composition 
and investment policies also playing important roles. 
The positive coefficients on the explanatory variables in the appointing process 
suggest that accountability, transparency and partnership-building are important 
determinants of funding ratio. This is confirmed by the negative coefficient on the 
board appointed by the governor, where there is no reporting relationship between the 
governor and the board he/she appoints, once appointed. 
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it is surprising that when the explanatory variables are all combined in a multivariate 
analysis, that the portfolio composition is insignificant with regards to both the 
nominal and real rate of return, but is significant in relation to the funding ratio. This, 
however, suggests that diversification of the investment portfolio is important in terms 
of the overall administration of the social security organisations. The investment in 
government bonds is insignificant with regards to the rate of return but negatively 
impacts on the funding ratio, suggesting that the default on the interest and principal 
due from those bonds i eopardises the sustainability of the social security systems. 
As expected benefit expenses negatively influence the funding ratio. This gives 
support to the arguments that as the system and age dependency increases so too will 
the benefit expenditures under any system (Barr, 1987; Myers, 1998). The two 
factors which are significant at only the 10% level on the rate of return are the 
composition of the investment committee and the use of external managers. They are 
both positive and suggest that as more independent persons are involved, they bring in 
not only expertise and professionalism, but also serve as a "check and balance, " 
which fosters accountability and thus performance. 
The results indicate that the explanatory variables used are better at explaining the 
funding ratio, which is a proxy for the overall management of the social security 
system, than the rate of return. They also indicate that there are elements of "best 
practice" for both the management of the investment portfolio and the social security 
system. Elements important for enhancing the portfolio returns are independence and 
autonomy in the decision-making and the recruitment of qualified and trained 
personnel. 
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Best practice in the overall management of the system includes the need for 
autonomy, accountability, transparency, partnership building, diversification of the 
investment portfolio, professionalism, careful analysis of investment options and the 
collectability of monies due to the organisation. 
6.4 Comparison of The Results With Mitchell & Hsin (1997) 
In this section, a comparison with the results obtained by Mitchell & Hsin (1997) is 
presented. This analysis will also serve to highlight the contribution of this study and 
the areas in which it has extended the work of Mitchell & Hsin, presented in Chapter 
Five. In Table 6.1, the determinants of the investment returns and funding ratios in 
the OECS social security organisations were presented. 
In Tables 6.2 and 6.3, the determinants of the investment returns and funding ratio of 
the US State and local pension plans are presented. In Table 6.3, only the results for 
the stock funding ratio will be presented as this is the measure tested in this study and 
also because the stock funding measure is a more reliable measure than the flow 
funding measure. The description of the variables was presented in Chapter Five 
(Table 5.1). 
An examination of the Tables 6.1,6.2 and 6.3, will reveal that this study did not 
replicate the study by Mitchell and Hsin (1997), but rather used it as a building block 
to explain the factors that influence the performance of the social security 
organisations in the OECS. The performance measures used are similar, in that both 
studies use the rate of return and the funding ratio. There are however, some 
differences in the measurement of the performance variables. In this study, the rates 
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of returns are the individual rates of return from the inception to 1999, while in the 
Mitchell & Hsin (M&H) (1997) study the rates of return were the return achieved for 
one year (1990) and the average over a five-year period (1986-1990). There is also 
some differentiation in the calculation of the funding ratio in the two studies, with this 
study using the ratio of current expenses to reserves of the past year, while the M&H 
(1997) study focuses on the pension obligation. 
Table 6.2 
Determinants of Investment Returns in US State and Local Pension Plans 
(Mitchell & Hsin, 1997) 
Explanatory VarlabIes 1990 Return 5 Yr Av Return 
Pension Board Composition 
BDELAC -0.01 -0.02 
BDELRT -0.17** -0.002 
Pension Management Practices 
ADINVST -0.34 -1.24** 
INVINHS 0.80 0.60 
TOPIOMG -0.49 -0.32 
TOPIO*EXT -0.08 1.03 
Pension Investment Practices 
INSTATE -0.08* -0.02 
PRUDMAN 0.83 0.33 
STKMAX -0.03 0.57 
Pension Reporting Practices 
INDINVPF -1.16 -0.57 
FREQVAL 0.70 0.13 
W 11.3 12.4 
N 158 132 
** r'--1.96; *t 'al. 65(< 1.96) 
There were only three explanatory variables that were similar to this study and that of 
Mitchell & Hsin (1997): the percentage of plan participants on the board, the use of 
external managers in the management of the investment portfolio and the in-state 
investment of the portfolio. In this study, the instate investment is represented by the 
percentage invested in loans. The percentage of plan participants was highly 
correlated with the composition and size of the investment committee, and it was 
removed from the multivariate analysis of all the variables and is instead represented 
by the involvement of the trade unions in the nomination and appointment process of 
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the board. This provides the opportunity for testing the relationship of the plan 
participants without sacrificing the relationship test of the investment committee. In 
this study, a test was not conducted for the percentage of retired persons elected to the 
board. 
Table 6.3 
Determinants of Funding Ratio in US State and Local Pension Plans (Mitchell & 
Hsin, 1997) 
Explanatory Variables Stock Funding Ratio 
Pension Board Composition 
BDELAC -0.20** 
BDELRT -0.61* 
Pension Management Practices 
BDBENOK -1.34 
BDACTOK 13.02* 
LIABINS 13.47** 
ACCINHS 11.14** 
Pension Reporting Practices 
REPSOLO 4.86 
GIVERPT 8.62 
AMORTPER -1.25** 
Pension AssumPtions 
NMOT -4.30 
PORTABLE -13.35** 
NEXPROR -0.51 
INFL -3.24 
Other Factors 
UNEMPD -6.07** 
FUNDLAW 0.12 
BENNOCUT 3.41 
DEFPOS 7.78 
SPECTAX 3.68 
R2 28.9 
N 217 
Source: Mitchell & Hsin (1997) ** t ý: 1.96; *t ýtl. 65(< 1.96) 
The results of this study echo that of M&H (1997) with regards to the involvement of 
plan participants on rate of return as being insignificant, but unlike their results which 
showed plan participants having a negative effect on the funding ratio, the results of 
this study shows that the involvement of plan participants has a positive and 
significant influence on the funding ratio. The study also echoes their results with 
respect to the use of external managers on the rate of return, finding that the use of the 
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cxtcrnal managers does not appear to have a statistically significant effect on the rate 
of return. They found that instate investment had a negative influence on the rate of 
return but only for the one year return (1990) and at the 10% level of significance. 
The findings from this study finds that the investment in loans has a positive influence 
on the nominal rate of return but negatively impacts on the real rate of return and on 
funding ratio, however, the results are not statistically significant. This also compares 
with the result of Munnell and Sunden (1999) who using the same data set as M&H 
(1997) found that instate investment was positive and significant when the returns 
were averaged over five years but insignificant for the annual return. They explained 
that the difference in their results arise from the fact that M&H (1997) imputed 
missing values while they did not. 
In this study tests were conducted not just on the board composition, but also on the 
appointment process and the investment policies in terms of the restrictions imposed 
on foreign investments. M&H (1997) tested for the effect of maximum limits on 
stock, while the actual percentages of stock are used in this study. They found the 
restrictions on equity holdings to be insignificant. The holding of equity in the OECS 
social security organisations is insignificant on the three performance measures. This 
may be because of the small amounts invested in equity. A discussion on the 
portfolio composition was provided in Chapter Five. 
The Rý on the multivariate analysis for this study is significantly higher than that of 
M&H (1997) and suggests that the explanatory variables used in this study do a better 
job of explaining the influences on rates of return and funding ratio of the social 
security system in the OECS, than theirs provided for the US PERS market. The Rý 
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for the nominal rate of return in this study is 29.8% compared with 11.3% and 12.4% 
of the M&H study. The Rý for the funding ratio in this study is 65.9%, compared with 
28.9% for the M&H study. The higher Rý in both studies for funding ratio than rates 
of return seems to provide confirmation that the explanatory variables used to 
measure governance do a better job at explaining the relationship with the funding 
ratio than with the real rate of return. 
6.5 The Results By Classification of The Explanatory Variables 
The results will be presented for the three dependent factors and the classification of 
the explanatory variables 
6.5.1 Governance Structure 
The governance structure is captured by two explanatory variables, the appointing 
process (XI) and the board composition (X2). The appointing process variable X, 
captures the appointment of the board and director and also the involvement of the 
trade unions and employers' organisations in the nominating and appointing process. 
In Chapter four, it was argued that while the Acts of Incorporation in many of the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) makes provision for consultation 
with the workers and employers' representatives, there is great disparity in how this 
process takes place. Here, the aim is to determine the impact of the involvement of 
the shareholders. 
The trade union involvement and that of the employers' representatives are very 
highly positively correlated across social security funds, and the decision was taken to 
drop out the employers' representatives' involvement in the multivariate analysis, as 
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otherwise the director appointed by the governor would have to be eliminated from 
the equation. This is because of the high negative correlation between the two 
variables., ' The board and the director being appointed by the cabinet were highly 
positivcly corrclatcd and so too the board that is appointcd by the govemor and the 
director appointed by the PSC. The decision was taken to exclude the director 
appointed by the cabinet and PSC from the equations, to enable the effect of the 
board's appointing process to be tested. The results of the appointing process are 
captured in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. 
The board composition variable X2 captures the percentage of the board that 
represents workers and employers, the percentage of the investment committee 
members who are non board members, the chairman of the board serving in the dual 
role of chairman to the investment committee and the size of the board and investment 
committee. The percentage of plan participants is highly correlated with the 
composition of the investment committee and the size of the board. In the 
multivariate analysis the percentage of plan participants was excluded from the 
multivariate regressions, as the involvement of plan participants is captured by the 
variable involvement of trade unions. The results are presented in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. 
6.5.2 The Appointing Process 
The results in Table 6.4, relate to the explanatory variable XI, which captures the 
appointing process from equation 1 to 3 in Chapter Five. The results of the univariate 
analysis are presented in Table 6.5. 
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Essentially equivalent results are obtained whether nominal or real rate of return are 
used as dependent variables, except that in a few instances, example with respect to 
the board being appointed by the governor and director appointed by the PSC, the 
sign of the coefficient changes. In a few instances the significance level also changes. 
When the funding ratio is used as the dependent variable, the results appear to be 
almost opposite to those for the rates of return. This may also be an indication of risk 
averseness as mentioned in section 6.3. If the organisation is risk averse, this will be 
reflected in investments of low risks which will result in lower rate of return, and at 
the same time, there will be an emphasis on cost reduction and efficient collection of 
contributions and other monies due to the organisation. This will then result in an 
increase in the funding ratio. 
The results in Table 6.4 show that three variables impact negatively on both nominal 
and real return, namely the appointment of the board by the cabinet and the director 
by the board and govemor. - 
Table 6.4 
Results of Appointing Process Of The SSO In The OECS - Multivariate Analysis 
(t-values against a null of 0 are in brackets) 
Variables NRORML RRORML FRATIO 
X, Appointing Process 
BDCAB 4.32 -5.26 13.94 
(4.98) (-3.44) (7.55) 
BDGOV 0.24 -2.55 -3.99 
(0.46) (-2.71) (-3.66) 
DIRBD 4.05 -5.09 6.10 
(4.67) (-3.32) (3.39) 
DIRGOV -2.41 -2.63 6.11 
(-3.64) (-2.12) (4.37) 
TUNIONPT -2.31 -1.17 6.60 
(-3.54) (-0.97) (4.79) 
No of Observations 151 134 145 
Adjusted R2 16.4% 13.5% 31.4% 
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The appointment of the board by the governor has no statistical significance in 
relation to nominal rate of return but is very significantly negative in terms of real 
return. This may suggest that the investments made are not good hedges for inflation. 
Also, while the involvement of the trade unions is highly negatively significant in 
terms of nominal rate of return, it becomes insignificant, though still negative in 
relation to real return. 
Most of the variables explaining the appointing process impact negatively on the rates 
of return. This seems to suggest two things: one the persons involved in the 
investment process are risk averse and so the lower rate of return represents the 
investment in safer assets, whose returns are ultimately lower. Secondly, it may also 
suggest that non-optimal investment decisions are taken as the boards and directors 
are subject to pressure from central government or other government agencies. The 
appointments by the governor is meant to signify independence from government, but 
the results indicate that with regard to the board, this independence may be one more 
of appearance than fact. 
In looking at the results for the funding ratio, all the factors, with the exception of the 
board appointed by the governor, are positive. The funding ratio incorporates the 
management of several components, such as contribution collection, expense control 
and the investment of the portfolio, and the results appear to suggest that 
accountability and transparency are important elements in the management of the 
funding ratio and consequently of the organisation. The board appointed by the 
cabinet becomes accountable to not just the minister, but also the cabinet and so there 
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may be greater pressure to ensure performance, as the cabinet ministers cannot use as 
a scapegoat the fact that the appointment is done by the minister or governor. 
The positive effect of the involvement of the trade unions on the funding ratio also 
serves to confirm the importance of accountability and transparency on performance. 
It also suggests the importance of partnerships in the success of social security 
systems. The fact that the board appointed by the governor has a significantly 
negative influence on the funding ratio may suggest that because there is no reporting 
link between the board and the governor, there is little, if any accountability to the 
appointing authority. It may therefore suggest the need for a reporting relationship 
between the board and the appointing authority, which implies that accountability is 
an essential element for performance. 
The results of the explanatory variables of the appointing process, perfonned in a 
single regression are presented in Table 6.5. The results show that some factors 
maintain their relationship when regressed in a multivariate analysis, while the 
interrelationships between some factors alters the relationship on performance. The 
appointment of the director by the governor individually has no statistically influence 
on the three performance measures, but when combined with the other variables 
measuring the appointing process, its impact is negative on the rates of return and 
positive on the funding ratio. 
In some cases the level of significance is increased when regressed in a multivariate 
analysis, for example the influence of the board appointed by the governor on the real 
rate of return and the director appointed by the board on both measures of the rates of 
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return, (see Table 6.4). It is however, surprising that the director appointed by the 
governor has a positive impact on the fimding ratio given there is also no reporting 
relationship between the director and the govemor. This may be explained by the fact 
that while there is no direct reporting relationship between the director and the 
govemor, the director reports to the board. 
Table 6.5 
Results of Appointing Process Of The SSO In The OECS - Univariate Analysis 
(t-values against a null of 0 are in brackets) 
Variables NRORML RRORML FRATIO 
X, Appointing Process 
BDCAB -2.29 -2.77 9.53 
(-3.01) (-2.12) (5.47) 
BDGOV 0.14 -1.93 -3.60 
(0.28) (-2.08) (-3.08) 
DIRBD -2.01 -2.57 1.02 
(-2.61) (-1.97) (0.55) 
DIRCAB -2.29 -2.77 9.53 
(-3.01) (-2.12) (5.47) 
DIRGOV -0.18 -0.86 0.28 
(-0.36) (-0.99) (0.24) 
DIRPSC 0.57 -1.62 -3.69 (1.00) (-1.45) (-2.76) 
TUNIONPT 0.07 1.13 -0.33 (0.16) (1.41) (-0.31) 
EMPLINV -0.52 8.97 0.20 
(-1.21) (1.03) (0.19) 
No of Observations 156 134 150 
When the funding ratio is regressed on the director appointed by the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) the result is negative and significant. The PSC is the arm of 
govenu-nent responsible for making appointments to the Civil Service and the 
appointments by the PSC are usually constitutional appointments and persons so 
appointed are not easily dismissed. In addition, the director, though appointed by the 
PSC, does not report to the PSC but instead reports to the board and minister, who do 
not have the power to dismiss him, though the minister can request a transfer to 
another posting. This may foster an attitude of complacency and would appear to 
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confirni the position of the World Bank (1994) and others that the public service is 
essentially inefficient. The result was surprising as it was expected that the greater 
autonomy enjoyed by the director appointed by the PSC would lead to higher 
performance, as there was security of tenure. It is argued that the results suggest that 
autonomy without accountability leads to poor performance, and it is this rather than 
the alleged inherent inefficiency of the public service, which leads to poor 
perfomiance. 
6.5.3 The Board Composition 
The results for the board composition, represented by X2, in the equations I to 3 in 
Chapter Five are presented in Tables 6.6 and 6.7, depicting the results from the 
multivariate and univariate analyses, respectively. The variable "PARTICIP" is 
highly correlated with both the variables "INVCOMP" (negative), showing the 
percentage of investment committee members who are not members of the board and 
"BDSIZE" (positive) and it was excluded from the multivariate analysis. 
Table 6.6 
Results Of Board Composition Of The SSO In The OECS - Multivariate 
Analysis (t-values against a null of 0 are in brackets) 
Variables NRORML RRORML FRATIO 
X2 Board Composition 
INVCOMP 0.03 0.04 -0.01 
(2.63) (1.63) (-0.60) 
BDINVCHN -0.05 -1.10 1.91 
(-0.08) (-0.97) (1.54) 
INVSIZE -0.77 -0.01 2.53 
(-2.08) (-0.02) (3.45) 
BDSIZE -0.48 -0.36 3.22 
(-2.60) (-1.11) (9.30) 
No of Observations 151 134 145 
Adjusted W 12.1% 9% 44.6% 
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A weakening of the relationship can be observed in most cases, when a multivariate 
analysis is performed. The composition of the investment committee impacts 
positively on the rate of return and is insignificant in relation to the funding ratio, in 
both regressions. The dual role performed by the chairman of the board also serving 
as the chairman of the investment committee is insignificant when regressed in a 
multivariate analysis but negative with respect to the rates of return and positive on 
funding ratio in the individual regressions. 
The results indicate that the greater the number of persons independent of the board 
on the investment committee the higher the return. This suggests that persons from 
outside the organisation and board bring in a different perspective to bear on 
investment decisions and may tend to offset some of the conservative tendencies of 
the board, especially where it is tripartite. It may also suggest that the outsiders bring 
in expertise and knowledge not resident within the board and the organisation and 
provide some independence from management, as posited by Kesner and Johnson 
(1990). 
The size of the board and investment committee impacts negatively on the nominal 
rate of return but it is insignificant with respect to the real rate of return, though still 
negative, in the univariate analysis. This may suggest that the larger the board and 
investment committee, the slower the decision and this may result in lost investment 
opportunity. 
It can again be observed that the influence on the funding ratio is largely positive by 
the same variables that are largely negative on the rate of return. When all the factors 
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arc regressed together, the size of the investment committee and the board are the 
factors with statistical significance implying that the larger the board and committee, 
the greater the level of expertise and knowledge, but also suggest that the larger 
boards encourage -partnerships with various social partners. This partnership may be 
instrumental in fostering greater compliance, transparency and accountability, which 
impacts positively on the management of the social security organisations. 
Table 6.7 
Results Of Board Composition Of The SSO In The OECS - Univariate Analysis 
(t-values against a null of 0 are in brackets) 
Variables NRORML RRORML FRATIO 
X2 Board Composition 
PARTICIP -0.04 -0.04 0.10 
(-3.77) (-2.04) (4.40) 
INVCOMP 0.02 0.05 -0.01 (3.31) (3.78) (-0.39) 
BDINVCHN -1.45 -2.57 3.39 
(-3.36) (-3.41) (3.38) 
INVSIZE -0.08 0.73 1.97 
(-0.27) (1.42) (3.01) 
BDSIZE -0.50 -0.35 3.20 
(-2.60) (-1.02) (8.55) 
No of Observations 151 134 145 
6.5.4 Investment Policies 
This section looks at the influence of the restrictions placed on foreign investments, 
the use of external managers and the initial intent of government with respect to the 
funds accumulated by the social security system. This corresponds to X3 in equations 
I to 3 in Chapter Five. The results are presented in Tables 6.8 and 6.9. 
When combined, the restrictions on foreign investment variable which was negative 
and significant when regressed singularly becomes insignificant, though still negative. 
When the rate of return is regressed on the use of external managers, the coefficient is 
positive, as expected but insignificant. As expected, the initial intent of safety leads 
to a lowering of the rates of return, as greater emphasis is placed on safety, which 
results in low risk investment decisions. 
The imposition of restrictions on foreign investment has a negative impact on the 
funding ratio; both individually and when combined with the other factors. This 
suggests that not only is the restriction leading to non-optimal investment decisions, 
but the cost of monitoring compliance also appears to be high. 
Table 6.8 
Results Of Investment Policies Of The SSO In The OECS - Multivariate 
Analysis (t-values against the null of 0 are in brackets) 
Variables NRORML RRORML FRATIO 
X3 Investment Policies 
RESTRICT -0.90 -1.40 -7.64 (-1.39) (-1.27) (-5.53) 
EXTMGRS 0.72 1.52 0.43 
(1.17) (1.46) (0.33) 
GINTENT -1.45 -2.68 6.55 (-2.24) (-2.46) (4.74) 
No of Observations 151 134 145 
Adjusted R2 
_7.6% 
9.0% 23.1% 
The use of external managers has a positive impact on the funding ratio in the 
univariate analysis but becomes insignificant when combined with the other 
regressors. This implies that if there are restrictions on the portfolio with regards to 
foreign investments and other investments decisions, the use of external managers 
may not be optimal as the SSO do not benefit from the full array of expertise and 
resources at the disposal of the external managers. For example, the Montserrat 
Social Security Board (MSSB) with about forty percent of the portfolio managed by 
an external manager in the ten year period 1989 - 1999 had less than one percent 
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invested in equity and a look at the investment schedule will show a heavy 
concentration in US govermnent treasury bills and bonds and fixed deposits (MSSB 
Financial Statements 1989 - 1999). The British Virgin Islands Social Security Board 
(BVISSB) has employed the services of external managers for at least five years, yet 
1999 was the first year in which the portfolio had equity investments (16%) (BVISSB 
Financial Statements, 1982 -1999). (See Appendices 5&8 detailing the portfolio 
composition for these organisations). This suggests that the expertise of these 
managers is not being fully utilised. It may also suggest that the returns after fees and 
commissions may not be adding value to the overall portfolio of the organisations. 
Table 6.9 
Results Of Investment Policies Of The SSO In The OECS - Univariate Analysis 
Variables NRORML RRORML FRATIO 
X3 Investment Policies 
RESTRICT -1.72 -2.84 -3.01 
(-3.19) (-3.13) (-2.37) 
EXTMGRS -0.45 -0.54 3.39 
(-0.91) (-0.61) (3.02) 
GINTENT -0.88 -1.77 3.22 
(-1.94) (-2.23) (3.08) 
No of Observations 151 134 145 
6.5.5 Portfolio Composition 
This section looks at the influence of the portfolio composition on the performance of 
the social security organisations. The asset classes regressed is the percentage 
invested in equity, foreign investments, fixed deposits, government bonds and 
treasury bills and loans. Fixed deposits are highly negatively correlated with 
government bonds and loans and in the combined regressions fixed deposits are 
excluded. The results are presented in Tables 6.10 and 6.11. The results correspond 
to the variable X4presented in equations I to 3, in Chapter Five. 
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The results in Table 6.10 are surprising with respect to the influence of the portfolio 
composition on the rates of return and the funding ratio. The portfolio composition 
appears to have a greater influence on the funding ratio than on the rate of return of 
the portfolio. When regressed together only govenunent bonds appear to significantly 
affect the nominal rate of return and only equity impacts upon the real rate of return. 
This suggests that equity may be a good hedge during periods of inflation and that 
government bonds of the OECS are not as risk-free as is assumed. This offers some 
confirmation to the position taken by Mounbaga (1998), presented in Chapter Three, 
that government debt in microstates is a risky investment. This may be due to the risk 
of default by government on both interest and principal payments. In Chapter Five, 
evidence was provided of government's default on interest and principal payments in 
some of the OECS countries. 
Table 6.10 
Results Of Portfolio Composition Of The SSO In The OECS - Multivariate 
Analysis (t-values against a null of 0 are in brackets) 
Independent Dependent Variables 
Variables NRORML RRORML FRATIO 
X4 Portfolio Composition 
EQUITY 0.02 0.52 -0.24 (0.22) (2.10) (-0.98) 
FOREIGN -0.01 0.02 0.07 
(-0.36) (0.49) (1.82) 
GOVT 0.03 0.01 -0.10 (2.68) (0.47) (4.09) 
LOANS -0.02 0.02 0.08 
(-1.11) (0.53) (2.01) 
No of Observations 144 127 138 
Adjusted R' 3.4% 1.8% 15% 
The negative influence of government bonds and bills on the funding ratio, when 
regressed either in a multivariate or univariate single framework suggests that the 
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default by government of its obligations jeopardises the sustainability of the social 
security system. The investment in fixed deposits negatively influences the rate of 
return, though the influence on the nominal rate of return is significant at only the 
10% level. The significance at the 5% level on the real rate of return also provides 
some confirmation that fixed deposits are not good hedges for inflation and 
investments in fixed deposits during inflationary period will lower and negatively 
impact on the rates of return. The positive influence of fixed deposits on the funding 
ratio may be due to the lower monitoring costs. 
Table 6.11 
Results Of Portfolio Composition Of The SSO In The OECS - Univariate 
Analysis (t-values against a null of 0 are in brackets) 
Variables NRORML RRORML FRATIO 
X4 Portfolio Composition 
EQUITY -0.00 0.56 -0.12 
(-0.02) (2.43) (-0.47) 
FOREIGN -0.02 -0.00 0.10 
(-1.02) (-0.14) (2.74) 
FDEPOSITS -0.01 -0.03 0.04 
(-1.69) (-2.01) (2.25) 
GOVT 0.03 0.02 -0.10 (2.82) (0.79) (4.65) 
LOANS -0.01 0.03 0.02 
(-0.57) (1.19) (0.58) 
No of Observations 144 127 138 
The percentage invested in foreign investments is insignificant in relation to the rates 
of return, and this may be because of the limited amount of investments in the foreign 
market. The use of foreign investments appears to be positively related to the funding 
ratio. It is difficult to draw conclusions from this, but it appears to suggest that funds 
which do not have immediate claims to their resources can take greater investment 
risks by investing in the foreign market. The investment in loans is insignificant with 
regards to the three perfonnance factors individually, but positively influences the 
226 
funding ratio in a multivariate framework. This may again suggest that diversification 
of the portfolio is beneficial to the overall performance of the social security systems. 
6.5.6 Operational Process 
This classification looks at the influences of administrative expenses, benefit 
expenses, reserves and the funding ratio on performance. Actual values are used for 
the first three variables. This classification corresponds to X5 in equations I to 3, in 
Chapter Five. Administrative expenses are highly positively correlated with benefit 
expenses, implying that as benefit expenses increase, so too do administrative 
expenses and they have been excluded from the combined regressions. The results 
are presented in Tables 6.12 and 6.13. 
Table 6.12 
Results Of Operational Process Of The SSO In The OECS - Multivariate 
Analysis (t-values against a null of 0 are in brackets) 
Variables NRORML RRORML FRATIO 
X5 Operational Process 
BENEFITS 6. OE-7 7. OE-7 -4. IE-6 (1.41) (3.76) (4.16) 
RESERVES -0.00 -3. OE-7 I. OE-7 
(-0.43) (-2.89) (3.79) 
FRATIO -0.11 0.23 n/a 
(-3.61) (3.12) 
No of Observations 151 134 145 
Adjusted W 11.1% 10.6% 12% 
The increase in the real rates of return as benefit expenses increase is unexpected, 
however this indicates that as inflation rises, the value of the benefits fall, thus leading 
to a lowering of the costs to the SSO. This is consistent with economic theory. As 
expected, benefits impact negatively on the funding ratio as the higher the 
expenditures, the lower the reserves and consequently the lower the funding ratio. 
Table 6.13 
Results Of The Operational Process Of The SSO In The OECS - Univariate 
Analysis (t-values against a null of 0 are in brackets) 
Variables NRORML RRORML FRATIO 
X5 Operational Process 
ADMINEXP 1.3E-6 4.7E-6 --4.5E-6 
(1.15) (1.90) (-1.70) 
BENEFITS 4. OE-7 1.8E-6 2.3E-6 
(1.07) (2.64) (-2.58) 
RESERVES -0.00 LOE-7 0.00 
(-0.73) (1.90) (1.96) 
FRATIO -0.13 0.06 nla 
(4.32) (0.97) 
No of Observations 151 134 145 
The decline in nominal rate of return as the funding ratio increases may be caused by 
the denominator effect as explained in Chapter Five, however, it may also suggest that 
there is less emphasis placed on maximising returns if the funding ratio is high. There 
may also be a higher incidence of government and private sector default on 
contributions and interest payments. There appears to be some evidence to confirm 
this in the OECS. In the early years when the funding ratio was high, as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter, very few organisations had the investments of the 
portfolio as a priority. There were also little concerted efforts to get government and 
the private sector to honour obligations to the social security organisation. In more 
recent times, the investment of the portfolio is seen to be a big priority and the social 
security organisations are engaged in negotiations with government to reduce its 
obligations and are actively seeking redress from defaulting employers in the private 
sector. 
6.5.7 Other Factors 
In this category of explanatory variables, the variables included are the sex of the 
director, the political status of the country as captured by 'BRDEPEND', the age of 
the social security organisation and the transition method of the organisation towards 
the establishment of a social security system as measured by 'NPF. ' This represents 
variable X6 as presented in Chapter Five. 
Tables 6.14 
Results of The Other Factors Of The SSO In The OECS - Multivariate Analysis 
(t-values against a value of 0 are in brackets) 
Variables NRORML RRORML FRATIO 
X6 Other Factors 
FEMDIR -0.63 -0.18 7.06 
(-1.11) (-0.17) (6.11) 
BRDEPEND 1.91 1.84 -7.53 
(2.33) (1.27) (4.49) 
AGE 0.30 0.30 -0.94 
(3.87) (2.18) (-5.93) 
NPF 1.29 2.86 -4.25 
(1.81) (2.17) (-2.93) 
No of Observations 151 134 145 
Adjusted R" 8% 2% 29.1% 
When regressed individually (Table 6.15), only two of the factors have some 
statistical significance (sex of the director and age of the organisation) and none is 
significant for all the dependent variables, however, when regressed in a multivariate 
analysis (Table 6.14) they all take on significance on one variable or the other, and 
some on the three dependent variables. If the executive director of the social security 
system is female, there is no statistically significant influence on the rate of return, but 
it is positive and significant with respect to the funding ratio. 
This may suggest that female executive directors are more conscientious in 
controlling costs and in the management of contributions, and are more risk averse 
than male executive directors. However, it must be noted that in no case did a female 
executive director hold that position from inception of the organisation. In the case of 
British Virgin Islands, the executive director took office in 1990, in St. Kitts and 
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Nevis in 1995 and in St. Lucia in 1999. It may be argued that they found a good 
foundation on which to build. The executive director of the British Virgin Islands 
Social Security Board (BVISSB) when asked to comment on her success (that was 
during the fieldwork and before this analysis was conducted) acknowledged that the 
fonner director had "really laid the foundation for us to follow. " 
Tables 6.15 
Results of The Other Factors Of The SSO In The OECS - Univariate Analysis (t- 
values against a null of 0 are in brackets) 
Variables NRORML RRORML FRATIO 
X6 Other Factors 
FEMDIR -0.15 0.31 5.27 
(-0.27) (0.31) (4.26) 
BRDEPEND -0.14 -0.86 0.00 
(-0.28) (-0.99) (0.00) 
AGE 0.16 0.11 -0.41 
(3.36) (1.29) (-3.70) 
NPF -0.50 1.04 1.64 
(-1.09) (1.25) (1.55) 
STDEV 0.75 9.19 1.58 
(2.69) (1.66) (2.37) 
STDDEV 0.31 0.52 0.36 
(1.77) (0.12) (0.81) 
No of Observations 151 134 145 
The political status of the country, the age and the transition from a provident fund to 
a social security system positively influence the rates of return and negatively impact 
on the funding ratio when regressed in a multivariate analysis. This may suggest that 
as the systems age and the transitioning measures introduced at the inception begin to 
take effect, it increases the level of benefits, which reduces the funding ratio. 
However as the funding ratio declines, steps are implemented to enhance the return on 
I 
the investment portfolio. 
It is surprising that the dependent territories political status, as measured by 
'BRDEPEND, ' has a negative influence on the funding ratio in the multivariate 
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analysis. It was expected that at best, there would be less govermnental influence in 
the dependent states and hence fewer restrictions, which would impact positively on 
the rates of return and the funding ratio, and at worst, the influence would be 
indeterminate. 
The results suggest that the older the social security system the lower the funding ratio 
and the higher the rate of return. This may be explained by the fact that the older 
systems pay out more in benefit payments having more claims to pensions than the 
younger system, and the need to ensure that these obligations are met lead to great 
emphasis on enhancing the rates of return earned on their investments. 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter the results from the quantitative analysis were presented. They showed 
that some factors appear to be more successful in terms of generating higher returns or 
maintaining more satisfactory funding ratios. The key factors, which appeared to be 
successful at generating higher returns were an investment committee made up of a 
greater number of non-board members, suggesting that the breadth of experience and 
expertise, as well as independence and autonomy in decision-making had positive 
value. The autonomy and independence needed to enhance investment decisions 
appear to be confirmed by the negative influence of the appointment of the board by 
the cabinet. 
Autonomy, independence and expertise also appear to be important in generating and 
maintaining higher funding ratios, but many additional factors have a bearing on the 
sustainability of social security systems. These include accountability, transparency 
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and partnership building signified by the positive influence of the cabinet appointment 
of the board and director, the director being appointed by the board, and the 
involvement of trade unions in the nominating and appointment process of the board, 
together with the negative influence on funding ratio resulting from the appointment 
of the board by the governor. It was argued that the lack of a reporting relationship to 
the governor by the board might be one factor accounting for the negative impact on 
the sustainability of the system. Diversification of the portfolio was also identified as 
a success factor as well as collectability of the returns earned on the investments. 
This suggests that careful analysis has to be carried out to ensure that the default risks 
are minimised. 
These results indicate that persons appointed to the boards need to recognise the 
importance of their appointments and the fiduciary responsibility entrusted in them. It 
also suggest that those responsible for the appointments to the board have to ensure 
that the persons nominated and appointed are not only properly qualified but have the 
character and qualities needed to foster a climate of accountability, transparency and 
excellence. 
Chapter Seven presents the findings from the interviews conducted with the social 
security stakeholders in the OECS. The trade unions, employers' bodies and a select 
group of employers as well as those on the board and management of the 
organisations will be presented. Links will be made wherever possible with the 
findings presente in C apter Six. 
CHAPTER SEVEN - THE VOICE OF THE STAKEHOLDERS 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the social, economic and 
political pressures that underpin the management of the social security organisations 
in the Organisation of The Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). It will also 
contextualise the results of the multivariate analysis presented in Chapter Six. The 
importance of governance is not just what it is but very importantly what it is 
perceived to be, so the perceptions of the social security stakeholders are relevant. 
A straightforward analysis of the findings of the interviews will be presented, and 
while no statistical tests were performed on the responses, it is an important analysis 
because of the seniority and number of the respondents, and hence quality of the data. 
The respondents were senior persons involved either in the policy-making or the 
implementation of the social security systems in the OECS. It therefore gives voice to 
the stakeholders: the government, employers and workers. In this chapter, links will 
be identified with various themes presented in Chapters Two, Three, Four and Six. 
The purpose of the interviews and the persons interviewed were presented in Chapter 
Five, but a brief recap of the categories and number of persons interviewed will now 
be presented. One hundred and eight-two persons were interviewed, including 9 
social security directors, 21 board members, both past and present, 30 trade union 
representatives, 19 employers' associations representatives, 37-six employers and II 
insurance companies. Interviews were also conducted with management and staff of 
the social security organisations and their contributions will be utilised when the 
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challenges facing the social security organisations (SSO) are discussed in section 7.7. 
The main findings from the insurance companies, as well as the findings in relation to 
private pension provisions by the stakeholders in the OECS were presented in Chapter 
Three and will not be repeated here. However, reference may be drawn to some of 
the findings. 
By and large the social security stakeholders argue that social security is an important 
service and the social security organisations are fulfilling their mandate, though they 
identify new roles including the provision of medical coverage and unemployment 
benefits. Social security has played an important role in the economy, and while there 
is support for foreign investment and for the social security organisations, to play a 
part in the development of the regional stock market, it was argued that proper 
analyses had to be undertaken to ensure that the primary responsibility of providing 
benefits, especially old age benefits were not jeopardised. The stakeholders shared a 
concern that the nomination and appointment processes of the board were too 
politicised and that govenunent interfered in the operations of the organisation and 
directed investments into low-earning projects. They argued for a board that was 
independent of government made up of persons with the necessary qualifications and 
character and called for greater accountability to stakeholders. These 
recommendations for a more effective social security organisation are consistent with 
the findings of Chapter Six. 
The results were analysed along three main themes and the chapter will be structured 
accordingly. The themes are (i) social security role, board representation and 
governance, (n) redistribution and structural elements of social security and (iii) 
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investments. Before the analysis of the themes a minor finding relating to the name of 
the organisations will be presented in section two. The themes will be presented in 
sections three to five, respectively. Section six will present an overall analysis with 
the findings from Chapter Six, and in section seven the challenges identified by the 
board, management and staff of the social security organisations will be presented. 
The conclusions of the chapter will be presented in section eight. 
7.2 What Is In A Name? 
The social security systems are either called "'social security schemes, " or "national 
insurance schemes. " In the Caribbean, the word "scheme" has a very negative 
connotation and throughout the interviews in all of the islands, this negative 
connotation was brought up. One respondent declared: "I hate, hate that name. It 
conjures such negative images: scheme! " 
This may have been one reason why there was so much opposition to the introduction 
of social security systems, and why there is still some resistance to the system, even 
after such a long time after its inception. Another respondent said, when the system 
was being introduced the acronym for "national insurance scheme (NIS) was spelt in 
the reverse to read, "SIN, " signifying the opposition to the system. It may be an idea 
to re-name those institutions where the word "scheme" is included in the name, for a 
name is an important mechanism for conveying intentions and purpose. 
Based on the interviews, it does not appear that there was such negative reaction to 
the introduction of the national provident funds and most of the negative reaction to 
the introduction of social security is the fact that persons thought that their money 
235 
would be used for purposes other than for what it was intended: which is to provide 
protection in the event of various contingencies. At the inception of the social 
security systems many persons saw the social security contributions as a tax and 
another means of government to raise funds and were worried that government would 
use the funds without due consideration to its true purpose. This perception may have 
been formed based on the use made of the monies accumulated by the National 
Provident Funds (NPFs). In some of the countries, a significant amount of the monies 
were invested in goverranent securities. One possible way of changing the negative 
perceptions of the stakeholders would be action by defaulting govenunents to clear 
their debt to the social security organisations. In the next section, the main findings of 
the interviews will be presented. 
7.3 Role of Social Security, Board Representation And Governance 
The aim was to identify what persons saw as the role of the social security systems, 
whether they knew of their representatives, the nomination process and feedback 
mechanisms in place. The questions 2 and 4 of the interview questions, relate to this 
section (Appendices 12 a, b, c). 
7.3.1 The Role ofSocial Security 
Everyone interviewed identified the role of the social security system as the provision 
of sickness, maternity, death and age benefit, and the vast ma ority of persons opined j 
that the system fulfilled its mandate as specified (see Table 7.1). However, many felt 
that the systems needed to provide wider coverage of benefits to include in particular 
medical and unemployment coverage. 
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Table 7.1 
Is the Social Security Organisation Fulfilling Its Mandate? 
Board Directors TUnions EmpAssoc Emplyers TOT 
22 
Yes 21 9 15 13 26 84 
No 4 37 
Partly 11 6 8 25 
Total 21 9 30 19 37 116 
In Chapter Three, the assertion was made that the Caribbean people were averse to 
unemployment coverage fearing it would encourage laziness, but this appears to be 
changing. The view expressed was that if people had contributed to the system for an 
extended period of time, they should still be entitled to benefits while they were in 
search of new employment. A few persons expressed the view that the social security 
organisations should consider establishing an organisation to assist in job creation and 
job placement. 
7.3.2 Board Representation 
Quite a few persons, particularly in Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands and 
Montserrat, were unaware that the board composition was legislated. In many 
instances, for example in Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Montserrat 
and St. Kitts and St. Vincent, the board was nominated without the consultation with 
established trade unions and employers organisations. When this point was raised 
with the executive directors and the government ministers in the countries, reference 
was made to the legislation which in almost all cases, stipulates that the nominations 
are made after consultation with bodies of trade unions, employers organisations or 
person or persons (emphases added) whom the minister believes is representative of 
workers and employers on the island. 
22 Tunions = Trade Unions; EmpAssoc = Employers' Associations; Emplyers - Employers; TOT = Total 
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It is for this reason that it is argued that while the present nomination process follows 
the "letter of the law, " it fails to honour the "spirit of the law. " The "spirit of the 
law, " requires consultation with the established trade unions and employers 
organisations to determine the persons best suited to represent workers and employers 
on the organisation. The results from Chapter Six, suggest that the involvement of the 
trade unions, and by extension the employers associations (since the two are highly 
positively correlated) in the nominating and appointing process are important 
elements in the sustainability of social security systems. However, there appears to be 
little consultation with the, trade unions and employers' organisations in the 
appointment process (see Table 7.2). There is also little evidence of feedback and 
reporting mechanisms between the representatives on the board with the constituents 
whom they supposedly serve. 
Table 7.2 
Are You Involved in the Nomination Process of the Social Securitv board? 
Board Directors TUnions EmpAssoc Emplyers TOT 
Yes 10 7 17 
No 9 20 12 37 78 
Total 9 30 19 37 95 
Some trade unionists stated that they refuse to channel any requests or concerns via 
the appointed representatives as not only has there not been any attempt by these 
representatives to communicate with them, but also doing so would legitimise a 
process that they believe is improper. 
It appears that some form of feedback takes place only in Grenada, where the trade 
union representatives present an annual report to the Grenada Trade Union Council 
(GTUC) and the employers' representatives to the Grenada Chamber of Commerce 
(GCC). A report by the employers' representatives on the board of the GNIS is 
usually included in the annual report produced by the GCC. However, there is little 
238 
evidence that the information is fcd back to the rank and file members of the various 
organisations that make up the GTUC. In the other countries, though the board 
members stated that they provided feedback to constituents, there was no evidence of 
a systematic process in doing so. 
While the representatives of the trade unions and employers organisations voice 
concern over this lack of transparency and accountability, there appears to be only 
three instances of this concern being formally communicated to government: by the 
Dominica Employers Federation sometime in the late 1980s, the Anguilla Public 
Service Union in April of 2001 and the St. Lucia National Workers Union. With the 
exception of Grenada, there also appears to be lack of co-operation among the trade 
unions in the OECS, with none of them taking a joint position on issues, even if they 
agree that they are important. In St. Lucia, the government has provided funds for the 
establishment of a trade union congress, but this has not taken effect. The trade union 
congress is defunct in St. Vincent, and in Dominica even if there have been talks for 
the establishment of a TUC this has not materialised. In 1999, there were plans for 
the establishment of a TUC both in Antigua and Barbuda and Montserrat, but these 
too have not yet materialised. 
There was a general consensus that the board nomination process was subject to 
political manipulations. The fact that in many cases the boards are usually changed 
when a government changes was often cited as evidence of this political 
manipulation. It was claimed that some of the persons appointed to the boards were 
not suitably qualified and were more interested in granting government wishes than in 
safeguarding the interests of the organisations. This view was also shared by some 
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executive directors and one board chairman, though they acknowledged that persons 
chosen, irrespective of whether there was consultation or not, to represent workers 
and employers looked out for the interests of these groups. 
Another piece of evidence cited to support the charge of politicisation is the 
termination of the appointments of the executive director. In some countries, 
Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Kitts and Nevis, executive directors' contracts 
have not been renewed or have been tenninated with a change of goverment. It is 
also interesting that in Grenada an entire board was terminated in 1999, because it 
was alleged that the government wanted the removal of the trade union 
representatives, but when the same names were submitted by the nominating 
organisations, the board remained largely unchanged. 
The general consensus was that there needs to be more attention paid to ensure that 
persons appointed to the boards have not just the required qualifications but also the 
necessary qualities. Integrity was seen as a key component needed for appointment to 
the board. This view is in keeping with the arguments presented in Chapter Four, 
where it was argued that directors, inside as well as outside needed to be persons not 
only with the required expertise but very importantly persons with integrity. This 
appears to suggest at jo escriptions should be developed for the board's positions 
and they should serve as a guide in the nomination and appointment of persons to the 
board. 
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7.3.3 The Role of The Social Partners 
The unions and employers organisations, however accept the fact that they have not 
been as proactive as they should be and the trade unions in St. Lucia acknowledged 
that they have sometimes failed to participate when they have been invited to do so. 
It however appears that Grenada, the only country with a functioning TUC is the only 
one where there is "real" consultation with the trade unions and employers' bodies 
concerning the nomination and appointment of board members, though this does not 
appear to have lessened the charges of political manipulation against the government. 
It is also the only place where there is some form of systematic feedback to the other 
trade unions and to the nominating body of the employers' representatives. 
In addition, many of the respondents stated that the request for the interview was the 
first time'that they had given thought to social security. This in itself speaks volumes 
and it signifies'two things, viz. (1) social security has become so much part of the 
fabric of life in the OECS that it is taken for granted, and (2) that though social 
security is the largest mobiliser of savings and will account for the bulk of income in 
retirement for a significant portion of the population, there is a general sense of 
apathy towards it. The social partners have to recognise that part of the reason for 
what they perceive as a lack of transparency, accountability and politicisation is a 
result of this indifference on their part. Organisations are more wont to be transparent 
and accountable if the people whom they serve demand it. 
However, the trade unions and employers' organisation argue that they have a 
meaningful part to play in the management of the social security organisation. They 
argue that their participation on the board would add to the breadth and depth of 
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experience, as they would bring in not only different skills and expertise but also the 
perspective of the workers and employers to bear on the decisions. The trade unions 
also see their involvement as a means of effecting compliance to social security, as 
they would be able to reach their members more effectively. The Dominica Trade 
Union asserts that it was instrumental in getting the members of the Hucksters 
Association to become members of the Dominica Social Security. The trade unions 
also argue that they could play a major role in obtaining compliance by employers. It 
is argued that this is a role that the trade unions should play, even without being 
represented on the board, for the compliance of employers is in the best interest of the 
workers, whom they represent. 
The findings from Chapter Six appears to suggest that there is some validity to these 
claims for they showed that the involvement of a higher percentage of outsiders on the 
investment committee resulted in higher returns and that the involvement of the trade 
unions (a proxy for plan participants) leads to a higher funding ratio, which indicates 
a greater level of overall managerial efficiency. This is consistent with the theme in 
the corporate governance literature, which points to the strength and value of the 
outside directors (Kesner & Johnson, 1990, Knepper, 1978; Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978, Weisbach, 1990). 
They also assert that their presence on the board would serve to provide the social 
security organisations with greater autonomy from the dictates of government. The 
evidence however does not support this claim, for in the three countries where the 
trade unions are involved in the nomination process, namely Antigua & Barbuda, 
Grenada and St. Lucia government owes millions of dollars in contribution and 
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interest payments. They also acknowledge that they have a part to play in sensitising 
their membership and the public to the benefits of social security and in preparing for 
retirement. 
7.4 Redistribution and the Structural Elements of the Social 
Security Organisations 
This section is concerned with the stakeholders' position in terms of the contributions 
and the future of the social security system. The answers to this section are derived 
from questions 3 and 9-11 of the interview questions. The results are provided in 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4. 
7.4.1 Contribution: TaxlBurden Or Benefit? 
The question relating to the contributions being viewed as a tax or benefit was not 
posed to the board members. The results in Table 7.3 indicate that by and large the 
social security contribution is not seen as a tax or a burden, but rather as a benefit to 
both workers and employers. 
Table 7.3 
Is The Social Securitv Contributions A Tax/Burden? 
Board Directors TUnions EmpAssoc Employers TOT 
Yes 8 2 2 12 
No 17 17 35 69 
Unsure 5 5 
Mixed 9 9 
Total 9 30 19 37 95 
The executive directors posited that the reaction to the contributions was mixed, with 
the younger workers seeing it as a tax and burden, while the older workers and those 
already in retirement see it as a benefit. Workers sometimes argued that the benefits 
were inadequate, however, the payment of the contributions to the system was seen as 
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"a. matter of course, " and a means of providing them with protection against various 
contingencies. The employers' organisations and most of the employers interviewed 
did not see the contribution as a burden or impairing their competitiveness. They 
argued that since every company was obliged to pay the contributions, there was no 
competitive edge in the local economy. In fact, they saw the contributions as a 
benefit not just to the employees but also to themselves. The provision of social 
security benefits, especially old age pension, has removed the pressing need to 
provide private pension provisions. Some organisations, actually disbanded their 
pension system with the introduction of social security system, while others modified 
the contributions to existing private plans to the difference between original 
contributions and social security contributions. However, as discussed in Chapter 
Three, companies are now reinstating or introducing pensions to provide some 
complementary coverage to that provided by the social security organisation. 
The smaller companies, especially those in the informal sector, however, view the 
social security contributions not so much as a burden but affecting their ability to 
compete as some of the other small companies do not comply. They claim that some 
companies contract out work to avoid paying social security on behalf of workers, and 
in an open bid, a company that does not pay social security will have a cost 
advantage. The social security organisations have recognised this problem, and this 
was one of the motivations in some islands to extend compulsory coverage to the self- 
employed. 
While, persons generally accepted the payment of their contributions and some self- 
employed persons expressed a willingness to pay increased contributions for a more 
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comprehensive coverage of benefits, there was some resistance expressed to an 
increased of contributions, especially among small businesses. The resistance centred 
on the perception that the organisations "have a lot of money, " and so there is no need 
to increase contributions, and the lack of consultation before the introduction of new 
measures. 
The only increase in the contribution rate has been an increase in the employers' 
contribution level with the introduction of employment-injury coverage. The 
increases to contribution income have been derived mainly from the increases in the 
contribution ceiling (refer to Table 3.5). There are some misconceptions relating to 
the increases in the contribution ceiling, for one trade unionist in Anguilla noted that 
"it seems that every time we get an increase, two days later, you hear that the ceiling 
has been increased. " This indicates a lack of understanding of the relationship 
between the contribution ceiling and the pension received. The higher the 
contribution ceiling, the closer would be the actual pension to the average wage 
earned by the employee, and while this entails a higher contribution, it also means a 
higher pension payable by the social security organisation. 
It is also evidence of the failing of the public relations efforts and in all of the SSO 
communication was noted as one of the shortcomings. In St. Kitts and Nevis, the 
contribution-ceiling was recently increased, yet many of the employers claimed that 
there was no consultation or communication before the implementation day. In 
Grenada, employment injury benefit was implemented in January 2000 and employers 
also claimed that they were not informed prior to the introduction. This also indicates 
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a failure on the part of the employers' representatives to communicate to their 
constituents. 
7.4.2 Evasion And "Free Riding" 
Some self-employed persons who were delinquent in paying argued that their 
resistance was not resentment of the contributions paid, but of the inadequacy of the 
coverage provided. Most of them argued that the exclusion of unemployment injury 
coverage of the employment injury means that they must pay an extra premium for 
private insurance to get that protection. In some countries, the self-employed are only 
entitled to long-term benefits and this also lessens the attraction for compliance. 
Some of the self-employed persons have even expressed a desire to pay a higher 
contribution to benefit from employment injury benefit. The British Virgin Island 
Social Security Board (BVISSB) is the only one providing the self-employed with 
employment injury benefits. The other social security organisations do not provide 
the benefit because they fear that it will be open to abuse. This sparks of an element 
of distrust, which is not lost on the self-employed, for as one self-employed taxi- 
driver in St. Kitts noted, "this is discriminatory ... if I am too much risk for them, then 
they too, are too much risk for me. " The management of the BVISSB reports that 
there has not been an abuse of the system by the self-employed. The key to success in 
the management of this benefit, as in all other benefits, is effective monitoring of the 
benefits, ensuring that benefits are paid when it is due in the right amounts. 
Some also said their delinquency was as a result of poor financial management, which 
resulted in high and delinquent debtors. These findings appear to contradict the 
position of those who argue that evasion is caused by high contribution rates (World 
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Bank, 1994, James, 1997). However, evasion for whatever reason has to be tackled 
for it leads to the "free-rider" problem, which compromises the integrity of the system 
and places an undue burden on those who contribute. 
7.4.3 To Privatise Or Not? 
Notwithstanding the charges of politicisation, lack of communication and 
transparency levelled at the social security organisations, all the stakeholders 
interviewed agreed that social security was important, played a crucial role in society 
and would be even more relevant to the future. The stakeholders argue that if social 
secunty were pnvatised, the emphasis would be on profit at all costs and persons most 
in need of protection would be uncovered. One board member in Antigua claimed 
that having visited Chile and Peru, the pýrported benefits of the privatised system 
have not been realised and that "the people are in a terrible state. " 
Many also point to the poor experience of privatisation in the Caribbean. Given the 
mis-selling pension crisis in the UK, as was outlined in Chapter Two this reservation 
of privatisation may be well placed. It was in light of this, that privatisation was not 
seen as an option for the social security organisations in the OECS (Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4 
Should Social Security Be Privatised? 
Board Directors TUnions EmpAssoc Employers TOT 
Yes 1326 
No 21 9 29 15 35 109 
Undecided II 
Total 21 9 30 19 37 116 
It was also argued that government would not privatise the social security system, and 
thereby deprive itself of a ready supply of cash and the opportunity to exercise 
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political patronage. It is not difficult to understand the resistance to privatisation of 
the social security system by most of the stakeholders. The trade unionists are 
fundamentally opposed to privatisation seeing it as promoting capital against labour. 
The governments, especially those who are in arrears, would also not favour 
privatisation as they would lose control over the Board's appointment process, as well 
as the ability to direct the investments into specific project. Private companies may 
also be less tolerant of govenunent's huge debt (it is however argued that these 
conditions can exist in a publicly managed organisation if those in charge of its 
management have the integrity and courage to demand autonomy and accountability). 
The social security management and staff may oppose privatisation for fear of job 
losses. Two groupings of people may be expected to be in favour of privatisation - 
governments who are in "good standing" with respect to contributions and interest 
payments and employers/employers representatives - yet there is a widespread 
opposition to the idea. . 
The reasons for opposing privatisation were consistent 
throughout, as it was argued that social security was a responsibility of the State to 
ensure that there was at least minimum pension coverage for workers. One employer 
argued that the main reason for those advocating privatisation was to "get their hands 
on the 'juicy' funds of social security, " but social security should never be privatised. 
He however argued that in ideal world, there should also be private pension plans to 
complement the pension provided by the State. The insurance companies, on the 
other hand were all in favour of privatisation and some stated that they would 
welcome such a decision as they have the infrastructure in place to manage the 
pensions for contributors. They did not see the social security organisations as 
248 
competitors as they argued that they provided a better, more efficient service and 
opined that social security only had the advantage because it was mandatory. 
By and large, the stakeholders believed that the organisations were well managed and 
that the current structure of the social security organisations as a statutory body 
afforded the autonomy to manage in the best interest of the organisation, while at the 
same time giving government an oversight function. They argued that the structure 
was in place and all that was needed to make it work were a board and management 
team with autonomy, integrity and professional capabilities. 
7.4.4 Future Role For Social Security 
Everyone interviewed saw a future role for social security. Many advanced that there 
would be an even more urgent need for social security to provide income and other 
social protection as the economy becomes more globalised. It was argued that social 
security had to become more proactive in meeting the needs of members. There was a 
growing stance, though not shared by everyone, including some board members, that 
in addition to unemployment benefits, the social security systems should provide a 
non-contributory pension system for those who for whatever reason were unable to or 
did not contribute and were in need. Some of the other areas, which were identified 
as areas for expansion, included the provision of medical and health insurance, the 
inclusion of all categories of workers and the re-examination of the eligibility criteria 
for the seasonal workers, especially those in the construction industry. 
These findings clearly demonstrate that persons in the OECS believe in redistribution 
and do not see contributions to the social security systems as overly burdensome. 
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This 'is consistent with the arguments made by Barr (1987) and Kingson and 
Williamson (1998) that a society's attitude towards social security is dependent on its 
sense of social justice and value system. It is also consistent with the view that the 
provision of social security is a basic human right, which fosters social cohesion 
(Beattie, 2000 & Scholz et al, 2000). 
7.5 Investments 
The, section refers to questions relating to the investments of the portfolio and to 
perceptions on the role of the social security system in economic development and 
capital market development. The questions relating to this section are questions 5-7. 
The results are presented in Tables 7.5,7.6 and 7.7. 
7.5.1 Role In Economic Development 
All stakeholders opined that social security had played and is playing a major role in 
economic development, and all, with the exception of one person foresaw a future 
role in that area. The one person who was undecided about the future role for social 
security in economic development argued that it would be acceptable if government 
were not directly involved in the decision-making process. There were however, 
some reservations, that notwithstanding the recognition of a role in economic 
development that, this was a secondary role to the primary role of preserving the 
capital accumulated and safeguarding contributors' interests. 
It was argued that if the social security organisations invested in job-creating 
activities, this would benefit the system, as it would ensure a steady supply of workers 
to help sustain the system. This position would find support with the World Bank 
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(1994) who argued that social security systems had to facilitate growth, but not with 
Thompson (1998) who argues that there are other mechanisms by which government 
can achieve growth and that the main function of the system was the provision of 
bcncfits. 
Table 7.5 
Is There A Role For The Social Security Organisation in Economic 
Development? 
Board Directors TUnions EmpAssoc Employers TOT 
Yes 21 9 29 19 37 115 
No 
U sure 11 
Total 21 
-9 
30 19 37 116 
The three most cited areas for investment and development were housing, education 
and medical benefits in that order. Housing is seen as a key activity in which the 
social security can engage. This was particularly so in Montserrat, where many 
persons lost their homes due to the volcanic crisis on the island. The Eastern 
Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) has, however, advised the social security 
organisations to refrain from investing in the housing market. This advice seems to 
have gone unheeded for a number of the social security organisations, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis have invested in housing, though 
not always directly. 
Education was seen as another important area as it is believed that by upgrading the 
skills base of the country and investing in the region's main resource, this would help 
spur growth. Medical coverage was seen as also crucial, for as one of the Hotel and 
Tourism's executive director noted, sickness and death of loved ones are largely 
responsible for poverty in the Caribbean. This may explain why many of the 
companies offer medical coverage to employees. Other areas identified were 
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investment in sports and youth activities; investment in activities geared towards the 
retired persons ranging from provision of seed capital for a new career to provision of 
a recreational centre for the retired. 
7.5.2 Role In Capital Market Development Of The OECS 
There was also support for the development of the OECS regional stock market that is 
being spearheaded by the ECCB (see Table 7-6). Those who supported the initiative 
argued that the establishment of a functioning regional market would provide the 
opportunity for greater diversification of the portfolio within the region. Those who 
rejected the idea or were undecided argued that until the stock exchange was running 
efficiently, then the funds should not be risked, while others argued that this was just 
no role for a social security organisation. The social security main function was the 
protection of "poor people's money. " 
Table 7.6 
Is There A Role For The Social Security Organisation In The Capital Market 
Development In The Caribbean? 
Board Directors TUnions EmpAssoc Employers TOT 
Yes 16 5 13 7 19 60 
No 33645 21 
Unsure 21 11 8 13 35 
Total 21 9 30 19 37 116 
There is a preoccupation in the OECS with the protection of "poor people's money, " 
and this theme recurs and is echoed by the ministers, executive directors, board 
members, employees and employers' representatives and employers. It is a curious 
moniker given that social security is all contributors' money, the poor as well as the 
rich. This may explain in part, that notwithstanding the lack of transparency and 
accountability in the management of the social security organisation and the lack of 
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activism on the part of stakeholders, the organisations are relatively well managed. 
As one minister remarked, "people are very sensitive of government using social 
security funds and that is good as it keeps government, the minister and everybody in 
check. " 
7.5.3 Foreign Investment of The Social Security Funds 
Everyone who supported the role for the social security organisations in capital 
market development of the OECS, supported investments in the foreign market, but 
not everyone who supported a role for foreign investment supported a role in capital 
market development (see Table 7.7). This may because investing in a more 
established stock exchange may be deemed safer than in a newly developed one, 
albeit a regional one. 
Table 7.7 
Is There A Role for Forein Investment in the Investment Portfolio? 
Board Directors TUnions EmpAssoc Employers TOT 
Yes 16 9 21 14 24 84 
No 4333 13 
Unsure 162 10 19 
Total 21 9 30 19 37 116 
Foreign investment was deemed to be necessary to diversify and enhance the returns 
on the portfolio. Caveats, were however raised and included the need to ensure that if 
external managers were used they were reputable, that proper analysis of all 
investment decisions were undertaken, and that training of in-house staff to develop 
expertise and competencies and effective monitoring of the decisions and managers 
were put in place. 
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The consensus was clear that foreign investment, while beneficial must not be to the 
detriment of the local economy. Those who objected argued that the monies collected 
locally had to be invested locally and that there were sufficient local opportunities to 
provide adequate returns. The results from the regressions, while showing that 
foreign investments have no statistically significant impact on the rate of return 
earned on the investment portfolio, positively impacts on the funding ratio. This 
thereby suggests that those who see foreign investment as beneficial to the overall 
viability of the system may be correct. In the next section, the overall analysis with a 
link wherever possible to Chapter Six will be presented. 
7.6 Overall Analysis of Interview Findings 
From the interviews, the social security stakeholders in the OECS posited that some 
of the elements of success for social security organisations are a tripartite board with 
the relevant training and expertise, a board accountable to stakeholders, autonomy 
from government in the management of the organisations, a diversified portfolio and 
govenunent to perfonn the role as regulator. 
These elements appear to be consistent with the results of the multivariate analysis 
discussed in Chapter Six, from which at least six elements of success for social 
security organisations were identified. They are accountability; 
professionalism/knowledge/expertise; transparency, independence/autonomy; 
working in partnerships; a recognition and acceptance of a fiduciary responsibility to 
stakeholders; and the diversification of the investment portfolio. 
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The stakeholders argue that the social security organisations had a part to play in 
economic development, albeit a secondary role, and argued that this could be done 
without jeopardising their viability. The results of the multivariate analysis are also 
consistent with this finding as it showed that there was no statistical significance of 
investment in national economic projects and performance. This appears to support 
the position of Mounbaga (1995) and Theodore and La Foucade (1999) who argue 
that for microstates, one of the functions of the social security organisations has to be 
social utility and economic development. 
There does not appear to be any significant differences in the positions taken by the 
different groups of stakeholders, except in some areas between employers in the 
formal sector and those in the informal sector. There appears to be strong support for 
social security by both workers and employers. Three areas where there is some 
differences in position relate to the fulfilment of the mandate, charges of politicisation 
and contributions. 
Generally, the social security system is seen as fulfilling its mandate, however, the 
trade unions, more than any other grouping holds it does so only partially. They call 
for increased coverage of benefits to include unemployment, medical insurance and 
increased benefits. It is to be noted, however, that the employers' associations and 
employers also called for increased benefits and expanded coverage. 
Though all sides acknowledged some level of politicisation of the process, the trade 
unions, especially in Dominica and Grenada, the employers' associations in Dominica 
and Grenada, and employers in Antigua & Barbuda and Dominica, asserted that there 
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was too much political involvement. In these countries, government is the largest 
delinquent in terms of both contributions due and interest payments and there is also a 
significant holding of government bonds and/or loans to statutory bodies. In 
Dominica and Grenada, there have also been frequent turnover of boards and directors 
in the past five or so years. In fact one of the trade union leaders in Grenada declared 
that he might bring a lawsuit against the government, the board and executive director 
of the social security organisation for politicisation of the National Insurance Scheme. 
However, in most cases, the minister, the board and the executive directors of the 
organisation denied this charge. 
Contributions are seen as a benefit rather than a tax, and while some trade unions state 
that some of their members would rather not pay the contribution, all of the 
employers' organisations stated that their members saw the contributions as a benefit 
to employees and some saw it also as a benefit to their companies. There was also a 
link between the trade unions who see the nomination process as being politicised and 
those who view the contribution of social security as a tax rather than a benefit and in 
social security not fulfilling its mandate. The opinion of the employers' associations 
with regard to contributions appeared to be confirmed by the interviews with 
employers when the majority of those interviewed voiced the same sentiments, that 
the contributions did not impair their competitiveness. Most of the companies 
interviewed operated only within the domestic economy, however, the companies, 
which operated on an international level also, stated that the contributions to social 
security did not impair their international competitiveness. This appears to be a 
differentiating feature of the OECS when compared with the industrialised countries, 
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where it is often argued that social security contributions impair international 
competitiveness because of higher labour costs (ISSA, 1996). 
The evidence on the social security contributions impairing international 
competitiveness is itself not clear and some see social security being used as just 
another scapegoat in the arguments against imposing further taxes on employers. In 
addition, the report of the ILO Director General to its European Regional Conference 
in 1995 noted, "some countries with high social charges are competitive (Germany); 
some with low social charges have become less competitive (United Kingdom); 
others with low social charges are competitive (Japan) and still others with high social 
charges are uncompetitive (Norway), " (ISSA, 1995). This argument, like the 
funded/pay-as-you-go debate will depend on a society's value system. 
Some of the smaller companies, however, saw the contribution as a burden and 
impairing their competitiveness if compliance was not enforced. It should be noted 
that it was not the contributions per se, but the "free rider" problem, caused by the 
inability of the social security organisations to ensure effective compliance by the 
self-employed and companies in the informal sector that was identified as the main 
problem. This suggests the need for the social security organisations to enhance their 
compliance mechanisms, especially in the informal sector. Section 7.7.1 presents 
evidence that efforts are being expended in this area. 
The self-employed also argued that the coverage provided by social security for them 
was inadequate due to the limited number of contingencies for which they were 
covered and the eligibility criteria for claiming benefits. This seems to suggest that 
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this grouping of employers should be represented separately on the board, as many do 
not belong to the more recognised employers' associations, from where board 
nominations are sometimes derived. This may suggest that a multipartite board 
rather than a tripartite board is what is required in the OECS. 
There appears to be a reversal of the trend with regards to private pension. In some 
countries, example Grenada, there appears to have been private pension arrangements 
prior to the introduction of the social security systems, and the trade unions fought 
hard to ensure that the plans, though modified and scaled down were not abandoned. 
In some other countries, example St. Kitts and Nevis, some of the private plans were 
disbanded with the introduction of social security. Today, there appears to be 
resurgence in the introduction of private plans. 
Two reasons were provided for the trend towards private pension funds: one is the 
recognition by the trade unions that the social security is only one component in the 
plan for retirement and the other a recognition by the employers that their workers 
should be able to maintain a similar if not the same lifestyle in retirement enjoyed 
during their working life. This is again seen as a differentiating feature of the 
employers in the OECS. 
Yet interestingly or ironically, while there is this new impetus to provide private 
pensions, little work is done in assisting workers to plan for retirement. From the 
interviews conducted, only six out of the thirty trade unions, one of the nineteen 
employers' association and two of the thirty-seven employers interviewed provided 
retirement planning seminars to their employees. At the time of the interview, none 
258 
of the social security organisations had conducted a retirement planning seminar for 
members, though plans were well on the way by the St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
National Insurance Scheme for the hosting of its first ever retirement planning 
seminar for members. 
It was generally believed that while social security will form the main source of 
income in retirement for a significant proportion of the population in the OECS, many 
people continue to make alternative arrangements for retirement. Social security is 
not seen to reduce the incentive to save by members. The findings of St. Rose (1982) 
which showed an increase in savings after the introduction of social security systems 
appears to confirm this belief 
Social security was seen by all those interviewed as an important organisation and 
many asserted that the decision to introduce the system was the single most important 
decision in the history of the OECS. The social security system is seen as being more 
relevant for the future and many argued that if the systems are well managed, and 
many believe they are, the systems will be able to cope with the challenges, including 
that of demography facing the industry. Privatisation was not seen as an option for 
the social security system in the OECS. 
The board, management and staff of the social security systems were asked to identify 
the challenges facing their organisation and to outline their plans for managing those 
challenges. These will be presented in the next section. 
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7.7 The Challenges Facing the Social Security Systems in the 
OECS 
The challenges identified by the social security organisations during the interviews 
are presented in Table 7.8. This table has been compiled not only from responses of 
the executive directors, but also includes the responses of board members, the 
minister, management and the staff of the respective organisations. 
Table 7.8 
Challenges and Issues Identified by the Social Security Organisations in the 
OECS in 2001 
Country 2001 
Anguilla Delivery of first class service, computerisation, becoming a customer- 
driven, knowledge-based, future-oriented organisation, balancing the need 
for portfolio diversification and the role in economic development. 
Antigua & Barbuda Investments, compliance and evasion, government, s default and arrears, 
education and sensitisation of the public, communication within the 
organisation, legislative review, demographic factors, globalisation and 
trade liberalisation. 
British Virgin Islands IT system, investments, education of the public, mobility of the population, 
, compliance 
Don-dnica Compliance, proactive investing, proper management, increased public 
confidence, demographic impact, networking with regional social security 
organisations, economic situation 
Grenada Investments, compliance, communication within the organisation, the board, 
education of the public, greater transparency, strengthening of the 
legislation. 
Montserrat Computerisation, education of the public, review of contribution level, 
demographic factors, economic climate, board's structure. 
St. Kitts & Nevis Investments, compliance, greater managerial autonomy, breaking culture of 
complacency, public awareness, costs control, reduction in claim 
turnaround. 
St. Lucia Compliance, OECS and CARICOM Reciprocal Agreements, bring up staff 
levels of training and technology, providing support for NIPRO, brokering a 
deal with the UK Social Security Department on behalf of pensioners from 
the system residing in St. Lucia with regards to inflation adjusted benefits 
St. Vincent & 
The Grenadines Reframing of investment guidelines, AIDS, inclusion of the community, 
information sharing with regional social security organisations, reaching the 
informal sector 
260 
These challenges include, in some countries, issues not only relating to the delivery of 
service but to the management structure of the organisation. The main challenges 
include compliance, investments and education and sensitisation of the public. In 
some organisations, in addition to these challenges, more direct challenges were 
identified relating to the management style of the organisation. 
In those organisations, problems with internal communication were seen to be huge 
and this in turn affected the morale of staff. In some of those organisations, it was 
asserted that there seems to be little managerial autonomy, with the board playing too 
big a role in the day-to-day operations. It should be noted that where this was brought 
to the attention of management, this was denied, though one executive director 
asserted that the minister was too involved in the day-to-day operations. The 
ministers interviewed claimed that they do not get involved in the day-to-day 
operations but argued that when their constituents brought matters to their attention, 
they had a responsibility to seek answers. 
In the pilot study in 1999, all the executive directors also identified evasion as a 
challenge. The other challenges identified were the growth of the informal sector, the 
need for greater diversification of the portfolio, control of administrative expenses and 
health and demographic issues. In 2001, control of administrative expenses, though 
rising, has not been identified as a challenge and health and demographic issues have 
declined in significance. Compliance and investments remain priority areas for the 
organisations. In 1991, some of the social security organisations identified their 
challenges in a survey conducted on behalf of the International Social Security 
Association (ISSA). This will be reproduced in Table 7.9. 
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Table 7.9 
Challenges, Issues or Problems Faced by the OECS Social Security 
OrganisationS23 in 1991 
Country 1991 
24 Anguilla Increased benefits rates, introduction of EIB , introduction of SEB3, public 
relations section, printing of social security handbooks 
Antigua n/a 
British Virgin Islands Strengthen legislation, especially with regards to compliance, proper staff 
training at all levels, the changing needs of the community, thus the 
continual need for review and changes 
Dorriinica Computerisation of all operations, qualified managerial staff, public 
relations and information, increases in benefits, improved office 
accommodation 
Grenada Staff training at all levels, public information & education, proper reporting 
by public sector, expertise in coniputerisation, expanding coverage of 
services 
Montserrat n/a 
St. Fitts & Nevis Processing short-term benefit within 48 hours, collection of contribution 
arrears, protection of self-employed persons, reciprocal agreements with 
other countries, issuing laminated photo identification 
St. Lucia Making the system of National Insurance more acceptable to its clients 
(reduce their hostility), providing health care for contributors, reciprocal 
agreements, play a more visible role in the country's development, ensuring 
that all contributions due and payable, and all returns, are collected, the 
finances are kept in a way that it will always be able to meet all 
commitments 
St. Vincent & 
The Grenadines - n/a 
Source: Tamagno, 1992 
In 1991, the social security organisations were mainly interested in expanding 
coverage both in terms of new benefits and new sector of workers, public 
education/awareness, computerisation and staff training. Ten years on, public 
" The answer to the survey in 1991 by the ISSA may have been completed solely by the director, for 
the challenges identified in 2001; the answers come from the director as well as staff in the 
organisations. 
24 EIB Employment Injury Branch 
21 SEB Self Employed Branch 
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education and sensitisation still remain key issues but the focus has shiftcd to the 
management of the investments and compliance. In 1991, only two of the six 
organisations (33.3%) listed compliance as a challenge and none mentioned 
investments. In 2001, compliance, evasion and investments were issues for seven of 
the nine organisations (78%). 
The challenge for investments was multifaceted. The organisations recognised that 
they had a role to play in economic development but also recognised the need to 
diversify the portfolio and enhance returns. However, they also acknowledged the 
constraints of an undeveloped financial local system. As one executive director 
pointed out, "I often ask myself why are we investing in the US market and not in our 
local economy, but the opportunities just do not exist locally. " While the 
management recognises the need for diversification and even investing 
internationally, they often face tremendous constraints. 
There is, as discussed in Chapter Five, resistance by the government and the ECCB to 
investments in the foreign market, even if they are well aware of the local limitations. 
There is also evidence of a growing awareness by management of the fiduciary 
responsibilities entrusted in ý them and this tends to accentuate the problems 
encountered with managing the investments. 
The issue of compliance is also a burning one, and it includes not only compliance by 
the private sector, but also by the government and the self-employed. In many of the 
countries, it has recently been made mandatory for the self-employed to contribute 
and there is still an uphill battle in getting ftill compliance. The self-employed sector 
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poses several problems, the key one being the identification of those persons. From 
the interviews three reasons were identified for the non-compliance of some in the 
informal sector, (i) the inadequacy of coverage (ii) the ineffectiveness of compliance 
mechanisms by the social security organisations which enable some to evade and 
thereby gain a cost advantage when tendering for bids and (iii) cash flow management 
problems. Social security organisations have to be more vigilant and more proactive 
in obtaining compliance not just from the self-employed but the employers in the 
fonnal sector. 
Two of the social security organisations, Antigua & Barbuda and St. Lucia, are 
moving towards forensic audit and the aim is not only to improve compliance but also 
to ensure that the amounts reported and paid are accurate. The system has already 
been implemented in St. Lucia and is in the advanced stages of planning in Antigua & 
Barbuda. The social security organisations must also bear some of the responsibility 
for the evasions and poor compliance by the employers, as they have not been 
proactive in the management of the accounts and in effective follow-up. Some of the 
measures introduced to manage the situation include the publication of defaulting 
employers in the local newspapers and the creation of payment plans whereby the 
defaulter employer pays the current contributions and payment of the arrears over a 
period of time. Defaulters have also been brought before the Courts and where the 
Law permits, example in Antigua, assets have been impounded and businesses closed 
down. 
The management of the social security organisations however, recognises that closing 
down businesses is a measure of last resort for this not only increases unemployment 
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but also reduces their contribution base. The government is the worst defaulter, in 
many of the cases, as was presented in Chapter Three, yet no court action has been 
brought against any goverranent. The issue of government's delinquency will be 
dealt with in more detail in section 7.7.2. 
Demographic issues have also been identified as a key challenge, not only in the sense 
of the growing retired population, but also the impact of AIDS and in the case of the 
British Virgin Island, the high mobility of the population. There are a large number 
of transient workers in the BVI. The reciprocal agreements signed by the OECS and 
CARICOM countries are also challenges and will necessitate social security 
organisations becoming fully cognisant with the legislation. They will also need to 
ensure that they have compatible computer systems and that there is increased 
dialogue among and between them. This dialogue should centre not just on the 
legislation, but perhaps the time has come for greater and wider co-operation and 
networking among the social security organisations in the OECS so that they can 
learn from each other and provide benchmarks for performance. This has been 
recognised by some of the directors and managerial staff in Dominica and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines as a way forward for the social security organisations in the 
Caribbean. 
A few years ago (around 1998) the idea of joint investing of the investment portfolio 
of the SSO in the OECS was submitted by the ECCB, but this does not appear to have 
borne any fruit. In fact, the idea of joint investing of the portfolio first made the 
rounds, in the 1970's when the ILO/UNDP Caribbean Office proposed the 
establishment of a Social Security Fund Investment Committee to be set up by Inter- 
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Governmental Agreement among the Eastern Caribbean Common Market (the 
forerunner to the OECS) member territories. The terms of reference of the Committee 
were never fully developed but it was to invest generally the surplus funds of the 
individual social security organisations (Joseph, 1975). The idea was seriously 
considered and applauded for its originality (Joseph, 1975), but it never took effect. 
Education and sensitisation of the public as well as delivering quality service and 
becoming a more transparent organisations have also been identified as challenges but 
these and the other challenges identified can be effectively managed only if the 
management and staff are trained, committed and have the resources to deliver. Yet 
in five of the nine social security organisations (56%) the need for effective 
management both at the board and managerial levels, training and greater 
communication within the organisation have been identified as challenges. The 
management of the organisation as well as the calibre of staff employed then become 
the lynchpin in the success of the social security organisations and in them fulfilling 
their mandate and being relevant to the needs of current and future members. 
Management is cognisant that in order to deliver the quality service that is being 
demanded and will be demanded in the future that staff must not only have the right 
training and skills but must also have an attitude and willingness to serve. In 
keeping with this commitment the training budgets of the social security 
organisations have increased over the years and all the organisations have a training 
policy, which refunds employees in full or partially for undertaking educational 
programs. Please refer to Appendix 14 for the expenditure on staff training from 
1990-1999. 
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At the same time, staff argues that for the institution to remain viable and deliver its 
promises to contributors, the board and management must provide effective 
leadership and guidance. Some staff and executive directors question the selection 
process of the board members and assert that the board needs to be more proactive 
and that the minister should ensure that the persons appointed to the board have the 
necessary expertise. Some of the board chairmen also expressed concern over the 
board's appointment process and contend that government will have to review their 
policy of board member selection and choose people with not only technical 
expertise but persons with integrity and honesty. 
Some staff members also argued that management too had to take a more a proactive 
stance and had to establish the boundaries between the board, charged with policy 
making and the director charged with the day-to-day management of the 
organisation. In Antigua & Barbuda and St. Kitts & Nevis, staff was particularly 
concerned about the organisational culture and called for greater communication 
within the organisation and for a change from a culture of complacency to one of 
action and service. Some of the organisations, for example the ones in Dominica, 
Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, have conducted 
strategic reviews of their operations with a view to enhancing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of operations and to foster a culture of excellence. Some of the 
organisations, exwnple Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, have also 
conducted a human audit to not only better place employees but also towards 
identification of key areas in need of strengthening as they prepare for the challenges 
ahead. 
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A more in-depth analysis will be presented below of two of the challenges, namely, 
compliance and evasion and the education and sensitisation of the public. A 
discussion on the management of the investment portfolio was presented in Chapter 
Five. 
7.7.1 Compliance and Evasion 
The majority of the income of social security organisations in the OECS comes from 
contribution income. Employers and employees, in many cases in equal proportion, 
pay the contribution, though where employment injury is offered as a benefit; 
employers contribute between one-half to two percent (1/2% - 2%) more. In the early 
years of operation, contribution income tended to rise steadily, but the rate of increase 
is expected to decline gradually. The actuaries for the individual organisations 
anticipate that all things being equal, the organisations will reach maturity, that is the 
stage where contribution income equals expenses, between 2008 - 2012. In 
Dominica, this has already happened as total expenses have already exceeded 
contribution income. 
Arguably, the decline in the growth of contribution income is due to not only the 
increasing dependency ratio, but more so the increasing rate of evasion and 
delinquency in the countries. There is a fairly big informal sector as demonstrated in 
Chapter Three and this makes it difficult to monitor and collect the contributions, 
even if it is now mandatory in most of the countries for all employed persons, self- 
employed included, to contribute to the social security system. In addition, there is a 
huge delinquency rate, not only by the private sector, but also more importantly by the 
goveniment. 
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7.7.1.1 Government's Arrears 
In some of the countries, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia, 
government is the biggest delinquent, and this also gives rise to a form of the "free 
rider" problem, and it means that government is not only engaging in "forced 
borrowings, " but this also distorts the return earned on the investments. As explained 
in Chapter Five, because interest income is accounted for on an accrual basis, it 
overstates the rate of return earned on government investments. Though government 
does not pay in the contributions, the social security organisations must honour claims 
made by government employees on the system as their contributions have been 
deducted though not remitted to the social security organisations. This puts serious 
financial pressure on the system and also reduces the system moral authority to 
enforce compliance by the private sector. As mentioned earlier, one possible way to 
change the negative perceptions of the stakeholders in the OECS is the 
implementation of good' governance principles which include the payment by 
govemments of its debt to the SSO. 
In Grenada, in 1992, the board took a decision that it would not prosecute any 
defaulters in the private sector unless government made good on their arrears. In an 
interview with the former chairman of that board, he argued that he found it morally 
wrong to prosecute someone who owed a few thousand dollars while government 
owed millions. This served to apply some pressure on the government and the 
govcmmcnt came to an agreement whereby lands were offered in part payrncnt of the 
arrears and the balance in cash (Grenada National Insurance Scheme Annual Report, 
1993, Interviews). The government is however reported to have relapsed back into 
delinquency. 
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The exchange of land in payment of arrears of both contribution and interest payment 
is a common feature in the OECS. This has also been done in Antigua, Dominica, 
and St. Lucia. While this reduces the obligation, it is in fact exchanging a liquid asset 
for a non-liquid one. In many cases, years after the land has been assigned, it 
continues to lie idle, thus yielding no return to the organisation. In some cases 
government wants to prescribe the use of the property. 
In his 2000 Budget Address, the Minister of Finance of the Government of Dominica 
recognised the govenunent's indebtedness to the social security organisation and 
outlined two options in reducing the indebtedness. One was conversion of the debt to 
a suitable long-tenn instrument with amortisation over 20 to 30 years. The second 
was the transfer of landholdings to the organisation "under specific conditions which 
could include a commitment to use such property for the advancement of a viable 
investment programme that is consistent with Government's development objectives. " 
He outlined hotel/resort development; export oriented non-banana agriculture or 
housing as some areas for investment. 
An analysis of the two options will show that the first in no way reduces government 
debt, nor does it address government's non-payment as this instrument could itself 
become non-performing and does nothing to improve the cash flow position of the 
organisation. The second reduces government's debt and has the potential of return, 
though it is not very liquid. However, the use of the property should be a prerogative 
of the board, not the Government. This hints at the role of govenunent as regulator, 
policy-maker and executor in its relationship with the social security organisations, as 
was identified in Chapter Four. It is however, noteworthy, that no government has 
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been prosecuted for defaulting, notwithstanding the fact that the Attorney General of 
the British Virgin Islands, indicated that the board could prosecute the goverranent for 
non-compliance (BVI Hansards, 1979). 
7.7.1.2 Evasion And Arrears By The Private Sector 
Evasion and contribution arrears by the private sector are growing problems. In 
recent times, the organisations are taking a more proactive stance to reduce evasion 
and arrears, and in some countries, legislative reform has been undertaken to 
strengthen the powers of the institution. In St. Lucia, the Act was amended to allow 
the social security organisation to gamish the assets of the defaulters and to apply a 
warrant without having to resort to the Courts. Garnishing is also permissible in 
Antigua and Barbuda, the British Virgin Islands and St. Kitts and Nevis and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines. In St. Kitts and Nevis, the Acts also allows for officers 
of companies to be held personally liable and to be prosecuted for evasion. Some 
organisations have resorted to more active monitoring to help reduce evasion, for 
example in St. Kitts and Nevis, an important part of the inspectors' duties include 
66scouting, " whereby a group of inspectors visit various areas to monitor new 
developments, and employment activities. In Antigua and Barbuda, assets of 
companies have also been impounded and the companies closed in some cases. The 
SSO also appears to have stepped up their court actions against defaulting private 
sector employers and self-employed persons. 
Since the organisations, have recognised that it is not in the best interest of the 
organisation and the economy to close a business and the impounding of assets are a 
last-resort measure, creative methods for dealing with this problem will have to be 
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devised. In some countries there have been collaborations between the government 
and the social security. In Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands and Montserrat, the 
Labour Department will not issue a work permit without getting a "bill of good 
standing, " from the social security board. These departments also forward a copy of 
every work permit granted to the social security organisation, so that they can monitor 
the companies. In St. Kitts and Nevis, before government projects are awarded, a 
"good standing certificate" has to be received from the social security. This 
certificate is issued before the award of each project. 
There is a need for more collaborative work between the social security and the 
stakeholders in reducing evasion. The trade unions and employers' organisations can 
serve as valuable partners in the fight against evasion and it appears that in none of 
the countries is there a partnership between these groups. The trade unions can 
include the payment of contributions, as part of their collective bargaining and the 
employers' bodies, like the Chamber of Commerce, Employers' Federation and Hotel 
and Tourism Association can impress upon their membership the importance of 
compliance. 
It is also in the interest of the trade unions to ensure that employers remit the 
contributions to the social security. There have been instances where trade unions 
have made this an issue, but it does not appear that this has been done on a systematic 
basis and not as a result of any collaborative work with the social security 
organisations. The fight against evasion, also calls for greater vigilance by the social 
security organisations, and for the inclusion of the contributors in that fight. The NIS, 
St. Lucia, has implemented this last approach with great success. (In 1999-2000, the 
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NIS launched a series of advertisements encouraging contributors to come in to check 
on their contribution and to ensure that the employer remitted the contributions 
deducted from their salaries). 
7.7.2 Education and Sensitisation of the Public 
The education and sensitisation. of the public continues to be a major challenge 
despite the efforts made by the organisations to make social security a household 
name. In every social security organisation in the OECS, while it is agreed that there 
has been improvement in the public perception from the inception of the organisation, 
there still appears to be a lack of knowledge and awareness of the objectives and 
benefits offered by the organisation. There also appears to be some hostility towards 
the organisation. This negative feeling can be traced to the establishment of the 
organisations, when many people opposed the system fearing that it was just one more 
avenue for taxation by the government. After benefits began to be paid, there was 
greater acceptance by the public, as they were able to see some tangible returns, but 
this still does not appear to have wiped out all traces of resistance. 
This situation demands that social security organisations go to the root cause of this 
problem, for unless it is tackled, this hostility, apathy and ignorance by the public to 
social security will continue. Social security organisations may need to commission 
a customer survey to identify the reasons for the problems and devise solutions to the 
situation. This also calls for more attention to be paid to research and to 
strengthening the statistical and analytical arms of the organisations. There must be 
an appreciation that reaching out to the public is a key component for success. 
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The social security organisations may also wish to consider extending their education 
and sensitisation programs to not just focus on the benefits and rights and obligations 
with regard to the social security organisations, but also to impart a message that 
contributors need to see social security as one pillar in their plan for retirement. The 
social security organisations have a vital role in getting that message across and in 
facilitating the process whereby persons can make alternative and complementary 
arrangements for their retirement. It is in light of this, as was argued in Chapters 
Three and Six that the social security organisations need to build partnerships with 
government and the insurance companies to devise affordable alternatives for persons 
to prepare for retirement. The partnerships may also be expanded to include the trade 
unions, employers associations and employers. As mentioned previously, the 
National Insurance Scheme of St. Vincent and the Grenadines has taken the first step 
towards achieving this objective, when it hosted a retirement planning seminar in 
April 2001, for members. 
The commonality of the challenges among the SSO in the OECS suggests that there 
is advantage to be obtained if the organisations work together on resolving certain 
issues. The reciprocal agreements are another factor fostering greater co-operation 
and communication among them. They are all members of International Social 
Security Association (ISSA) and CEIS, however it is arguable that they may also 
benefit additionally from a smaller grouping with each other. 
7.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the aim was to provide the social, economic and political context that 
underpin the management of the social security organisations in the OECS and to give 
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voice to the stakeholders, government, employers and employees. While many 
claimed to not have given much thought to the subject of social security before the 
request of the interview, many had strong positions on the subject area. They were 
concerned about the perceived politicisation of the nominating and appointing process 
of the board and believed that they had a role to play in ensuring the sustainability of 
the system and identified several factors for success. These factors included 
transparency and accountability, tripartite board representation, autonomy of the 
organisations, qualified and trained personnel and diversification of the investment 
portfolio. 
They also argued that social security has played an important role in the economy and 
see an even more important and relevant role for the institution in the future. They 
argued that social security had a secondary role to play in economic development and 
that this would provide benefits for the system as this would stimulate growth and 
employment and thus provide new members for the continued existence of the 
system. These findings appear to be supported by the multivariate analysis testing the 
impact of governance on the performance of the social security organisations in the 
OECS. 
Some of the conclusions that were presented throughout the analysis will be summed 
up here. They include the need for strengthening staff and system capabilities, a 
review of the operational and strategic processes of the organisations with a view to 
enhancing communication within the organisation and the delivery of service to 
clients. It was also recommended that there be clear separation of functions between 
government as regulator, the board as policy-maker and management as 
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implementers. This recommendation was made in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, 
and the fact that it re-appears here is an indication of its importance. A multipartite 
board with representation of government, employers and workers was made, with the 
added recommendation that employers in the informal sector should also be 
represented because of the difference in their positions, capacity and capability from 
those in the fonnal sector. 
The need to strengthen compliance measures by initiating creative measures in a bid 
to foster greater compliance, especially among those in the informal sector was 
considered to be important. In light of this, the board and management of the social 
secunty organisations are also urged to bring some pressure to bear on the defaulting 
governments, as compliance by government serves to enhance the moral authority of 
the organisations in enforcing compliance from the private sector. 
The public awareness programs should focus not solely on the rights and obligations 
of members but should sensitise the public of the need for complementary provisions 
to that provided by the social security system. It is also recommended that 
goverranent, the social security and the other stakeholders work in partnership with 
the insurance companies to provide affordable complementary packages for members 
and the public, as a whole. In keeping with this, the social security organisations will 
also have to review the social security package offered and identify how the package 
could be better tailored to the needs of the people in the OECS. Finally, it is 
recommended that the social security organisations in the OECS work closer with 
each other to not only share experiences but to provide benchmarks for performance, 
to ensure that they remain viable, relevant institutions well into the future. 
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In the next Chapter, overall conclusions of the dissertation, the policy 
recommendations, the limitations of the study, the areas of contributions of this study 
and the action for future research are presented. 
CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
Given the welfare importance and economic sigrifficance of social security funds, 
studies of their management and perfon-nance, particularly on an international 
comparison basis are few. This dissertation is intended to help fill this gap by 
providing a comparative analysis of the structure, governance and performance of 
social security funds of the countries, which comprise the Organisation of the Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS). 
in this chapter the main findings will be presented in section two, followed by policy 
implications and recommendations in section three. The chapter concludes with the 
contributions of the study and the identification of future research interests in section 
four. 
8.2 Main Findings 
Social security systems have undergone various transitions and have evolved from 
fully funded, defined benefit, publicly managed systems to partially funded or pay-as- 
you-go defined benefit publicly managed systems to fully funded, defined 
contribution, privately managed systems. There are however, many variations of 
these system types. The main factors leading to the transitions have been poor 
financial and managerial performances. The countries undergoing the full transitions 
have been mainly those in Latin America and Central & Eastern Europe. However, in 
some cases, like in the United States, Finland and the Caribbean, the decision to 
change from a fully funded to a partially funded or PAYG system was a deliberate 
political choice. These transitions have given rise to the debate on reform of social 
security systems, and while the debate is often portrayed as one of funded vs. pay-as- 
you-go financing, it is more one of public vs. private management and ultimately one 
of the defined nature of the system: defined benefit vs. defined contribution. It was 
argued that the choices made would depend not only on the level of economic 
development but also on the value system of a society. 
In the debate on the reform of social security systems, privatisation is often seen as 
the panacea for government's interference and inefficiency but privatisation in and of 
itself is no panacea. The study identified from the use of panel data in a multivariate 
analysis, at least six corporate governance elements that were important for enhancing 
performance of the social security organisations in the OECS. They were autonomy 
and independence from government, accountability to stakeholders, transparency of 
operations, partnership-building with stakeholders, professionalism and expertise of 
board members, management and staff, and diversification of the investment 
portfolio. Integrity of board members and management was also identified, as an 
important characteristic needed for success. The findings of the study with respect to 
the percentage of the investment committee members who were non-board members 
were consistent with the arguments of agency theorists that outside directors add 
breadth and so enhance the performance of organisations (Kesner & Johnson, 1990, 
Weisbach, 1990). 
The social security stakeholders in the OECS were not in support of the privatisation 
of the social security system. While one could identify reasons why some groups 
would not support privatisation, for example, the government does not want to pay its 
contribution or give up borrowing at below the market rate, employees and trade 
unions fear loss of jobs, even those like the employers and employers associations 
who do not appear to have any motive, opposed the idea of privatisation. It was 
argued that social security is a responsibility of the State. This may be due to the 
value system operating in the Caribbean, supporting the arguments by Barr (1987) 
and Kingson & Williamson (1998) that a society's views on social security is largely 
dependent on its value system. 
The interview findings also reveal that the vast ma ority of those interviewed posit j 
that the social security fulfils its mandated role, has a role to play in economic 
development and capital market development of the OECS and see a role for foreign 
investment in the bid to diversify the investment portfolio. That notwithstanding, the 
nomination and appointment processes of the board were seen to be a politicised 
affair, and this was more keenly expressed by the trade unions in Dominica and 
Grenada. 
The portfolio composition is very heavily weighted towards fixed deposits, 
government bonds, treasury bills and goverranent loans. The high exposure to 
government paper and fixed deposits increases the risks of the portfolio as explained 
in Chapter Five. The high percentage in fixed deposits also mean that the social 
security organisations (SSO) actions can have negative impacts on the financial 
sector, and Nicholls (1996) estimated that a 5% withdrawal of deposits by the SSO 
would lead to a decline in the loans to deposit ratio of 17.2%. There is very little 
investment in equity with an average of 8.14% in the period 1990 - 1998, and of 
foreign investments. This may be due to the limited opportunities available in the 
local economy as well as the implicit and explicit objections to foreign investments by 
the government and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. The results of the 
multivariate analysis indicate that the funding ratio, a measure of the sustainability 
and administration of the SSO would be enhanced if the portfolio were diversified, to 
include foreign investments. 
in some countries, Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia, te 
government has the largest arrears of both contribution and interests income. This 
situation places tremendous financial pressures on the SSO, as benefits must be paid 
to members even if no contributions were remitted on their behalf The incidence of 
defaulting governments could be traced to the motive of the government at the 
inception of the social security organisation. Governments who saw the introduction 
of the social security as an important element in facilitating economic development 
and financial sector deepening were more likely than not to default on payments of 
contributions and interest payments. In those Countries, there was also a higher 
concentration in government paper and in investments in loans to government or 
government-appointed agencies. This problem of government defaulting has 
implications for the governance of the SSO, as it undermines the ability of the board 
and management to effectively manage. The problem has to be tackled because it is a 
form of the "free-ridef" problem and reduces the moral authority of the SSO to 
enforce compliance from the private sector, which is a growing and endemic problem. 
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8.3 Policy Implications And Recommendations 
The results suggest that the involvement of plan participants serves as an important 
"check and balance" to ensure that decisions are taken consistent with the risk-return 
profile of the social security organisation. The plan participants, however, report little 
involvement in the process. It is therefore suggested that government expands the 
board to make it multipartite by including not just representatives of workers and 
employers but also representatives of retired persons, and segments the employer 
representation to include employers in the informal sector. It cannot be emphasised 
enough however, having the representatives of the various groupings are not enough. 
It is ensuring that the right persons with the prerequisite qualifications, experience and 
character are nominated and appointed to the boards. In this regard, it is 
recommended that job descriptions be prepared to serve as a guide in the nomination 
and appointment of members. Board members and management must also recognise 
the importance of their appointments and the fiduciary responsibility entrusted in 
them. 
Accountability is also a key element and the nominating organisations also have a role 
to play in ensuring that there is accountability. It is in light of this that it is 
recommended that the various nominating and other organisations institute a reporting 
mechanism whereby at least annually the respective board member(s) meet with the 
groups of workers and employers to report on their activities over the past year. The 
social security organisations, need to also take steps to improve on their accountability 
mechanisms. While the financial statements of all the SSO were laid before 
parliament, (in many cases these statements were laid more than a year after the 
financial year ended) and two organisations published the financial statements in a 
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local newspaper, there does not appear to be a systematic approach in disseminating 
the information to contributors. 
It is therefore recommended that abbreviated financial statements should be published 
in at least the most widely circulated local newspaper and copies of the financial 
statements disseminated to the trade unions and employers associations for 
dissemination to their members. It is also recommended that the SSO meet at least 
once a year with members at a general meeting to not only provide information on the 
projects undertaken but to inform members of future plans and to obtain feedback 
from those whom they serve. This may also provide the opportunity to identify the 
root causes of the apathy of the social security contributors. It is also recommended 
to enhance not only accountability but also transparency that in addition to the tri- 
annual actuarial reviews, independent tri-annual strategic and operational reviews are 
carried out. 
The results of the multivariate analysis suggest the need to diversify the portfolio to 
include greater investments in both equity and foreign investments and it would be 
beneficial if government, the social security organisations and the Eastern Caribbean 
Central Bank engage in discussions to fonnulate a policy for the inclusions in the 
portfolio. A look at the qualification and skill profile of staff in two social security 
organisations and discussions with the directors and human resource managers in the 
others reveal that there is an absence of training in investments. It is therefore 
recommended that the SSO invest in acquiring those skills, by training existing staff 
or recruiting persons with those skills. 
Government's indebtedness to the system undermines not just the financial stability of 
the social security organisations but also the moral authority to demand compliance 
from the private sector and the self-employed persons, and it is recommended that the 
defaulting governments make good their payments and endeavour to maintain a 
e4clean slate" with the social security organisations. 
8.4 Contribution To The Body of Knowledge And Future Research 
Interests 
This study is thought to be the first of its kind in analysing the impact of corporate 
governance on a social security system. While the study has focused on the OECS, it 
can serve as a platform for future work in the area not only in the developing world 
but also the developed world. The analysis of the role of corporate governance in the 
sustainability and viability of social security organisations by identifying the 
governance factors that impact on performance is an important contribution and it is 
hoped that it leads to a re-examination of the refonn initiatives. 
By focusing on the OECS, it has added to the literature not just on the area of social 
security but also in the area specific to the OECS, for the Caribbean and in 
particularly the OECS, is often ignored by researchers. This dissertation traced the 
transition process and identified the trajectories, which shaped the relationship of the 
government with the social security organisations in the OECS and analysed the 
impact of management issues on the perfonnance. It has also resulted in the creation 
of a database of financial and governance indicators of the social security 
organisations in the OECS. It also for the first time gave voice to the stakeholders of 
the social security organisation in the OECS. 
One of the areas for future work is the extension of the study to a larger data set by 
including other Caribbean countries, Latin America, Europe and America. Another 
area is the study of how the SSO boards work and a study of interest is to follow a 
board from its appointment to its end of term, studying its relationship with the 
govemment and the stakeholders, both intemal. and extemal of the organisation. A 
third area of future interests is the analysis of other corporate governance variables, 
example, the qualifications of the board and management on the performance of the 
OECS organisations and other organisations. A fourth area is the study of 
compensation policy on the pcrfortnance of the board and of the organisation. A fifth 
area of interest is the role of stakeholders in enhancing the governance of the social 
secunty organisations. 
This study, it is hoped will infonn and lead to a re-examination of the refomi debate 
to include the role of governance in the reform and sustainability of social security 
organisations worldwide. 
285 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aaron, Henry, (1966), "The Social Insurance Paradox, " Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political ScienceVol. 32, No. 3, August. 
Aaron, Henry, (1982), "The Economic Effects of Social Security, " Studies of 
Government Finance, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., USA. 
Abel-Smith, Brian (1992) "The Beveridge Report: It's Origins and Outcomes, " 
Intemational Social Securitv Review Vol. 45 (1/2). 
Ahmad, Ehtisharn; Dreze, Jean; Hills, John & Sen, Amartya (1991) "Social Security 
in Developing Countries, " Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Alderfer, Clayton, P (1986) "The Invisible Director on Corporate Boards", Harvard 
Business Reviewý_November-December. 
Allahar, Bertille (1992) "Strategic Planning in Social Security Organisations: The 
Experience of Trinidad and Tobago, " in Current Issues in the Management and 
Financing of Social Security in the Americas, Social Security Documentation: 
Amcrican Serics No. 15, ISSA, Gcncva. 
Alleyne, W. Frank (1996a) "Enhancing Accountability And Transparency In The 
Management Of Social Security In The Anglophone Caribbean, " Seventh Meeting o 
Heads of CARICOM Social Security Organisations. Tortola. 
Alleyne, W. Frank (1996b) "The Future of Social Security in the English-Speaking 
Caribbean, " New InSight, January - April, Barbados. 
Alleyne, W. Frank (1998) "Social Security And The Changing Enviromnent, " New 
InSi ght, September - December, Barbados. 
Alleyne, W. Frank (1997) "Financing Public Servants' Retirement Benefits, " Tenth 
Meeting of Heads of ISSA Member Organisations in the English-Speaking Caribbean. 
26-28 May, Barbados. 
Alleyne, Frank (2000) "Suggestions for a Workers' Checklist for Negotiating a Public 
Pension Reform in the Caribbean in Drouin & Plamondon (Eds. ) Issues in Social 
Security Financing in the Caribbean, Issues in Social Protection Discussion Paper 
No. 8, ILO. Geneva. 
Ambachtsheer, P. Keith & Ezra, D. Don (1998) "Pension Fund Excellence: Creating 
Value for Stakeholders, " Wiley Frontiers in Finance, John Wiley and Sons. Inc. New 
York. 
Amihud, Yakow & Baruch, Lev (198 1) "Risk Reduction As A Managerial Motive For 
Conglomerate Motives, " Bell Journal of Economic_s., _Vol. 
12 
Anderson, Dennis, (1988), "Economic Growth and the Returns to Investment, " World 
Bank Discussion Papcrs 12, The World Bank, Washington, D. C., USA. 
Andrews, R. Kenneth (1981) "Replaying The Board's Role in Formulating Strategy, " 
Harvard Business Review. May-June. 
Anguilla (1980) "Social Security Ordinance (1980) No. 13 of 1980, " Government of 
Anj--, uilla, Anguilla. 
Antigua and Barbuda (1972) "Social Security Act and Regulations, No. 3 of 1972, " 
Government of Antigua and Barbuda, Antigua and Barbuda. 
Arenas de Mesa, Alberto and Bertranou, Fabio, (1997), "Learning From Social 
Security Reforms: Two Different Cases, Chile and Argentina, " World Development. 
Vol. 25, No. 3. 
Arthur, L. Kenneth, Jr. & Theyer, A. Bruce (1995) "Otto Von Bismarck and the 
Origins of the Welfare State, " Social Development Issues. Vol. 17(2/3). 
Asher, G. Mukul (1998) "The Future of Retirement Protection in Southeast Asia, " 
Intemational Social Security Review, Vol. 5 1. No. 1. 
Asher, G. Mukul (1999) "The Pension System in Singapore, " SP Discussion Paper 
No. 9919, The World Bank, Washington, D. C. USA. 
Asociacion Gremial de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, (1994), `rhe 
Private Pension Funds System in Chile, " International Bulletin. 
Atje, Raymond & Jovanovic, Boyan, (1993), "Stock Markets and Development, " 
European Economic Review. Vol. 37, pp. 632-640. 
Atkinson, A. B& Hills, John (1991) "Social Security in Developing Countries: Are 
There Lessons for Developing Countries? " in Ahmad et al (Eds. ) Social Security in 
Developing Countries Clarendon Press. Oxford. 
Auerbach, Alan, J., and Kotlikoff, Laurence, J., (1987), "Dynarnic Fiscal Policy, " 
Cambridge University Press. 
Augusztinovics, Maria (1999) 'Tension Systems And Reforms In The Transition 
Countries, " Economic Survey Of Europe, Economic Commission For Europe And 
United Nations. Vol. 3. 
Bacon, Jeremy & Brown, K. James (1975) "Corporate Directorship Practices: Role, 
Selection And Legal Status Of The Board, " Conference Board. New York. 
Bacon & Woodrow (1997a) "Review of Investment Policies And Legislative 
Framework For Social Security Funds In The Caribbean Dependent Territories, " 
Bacon & Woodrow. 
Bacon & Woodrow (1997b) "Review of Investment Policies And Legislative 
Framework For Social Security Funds In The Caribbean Dependent Territories, " 
Bacon & Woodrow. Supplementary Report - Anguilla. 
Bacon & Woodrow (1997c) "Review of Investment Policies And Legislative 
Framework For Social Security Funds In The Caribbean Dependent Territories, " 
Bacon & Woodrow. Supplementary Report - Montserrat. 
Baldwin, Peter (1992) "Beveridge in the Long Duree, " International Social Securit 
Review. Vol. 45 (1/2). 
Ball, Robert M., (1978), "Social Security: Today and Tomorrow, " New York 
Columbia Press, New York. 
Baran, P. A. & Sweezy, P. M. (1966) "Monopoly Capital, " Monthly Review Press, 
New York. 
Barclay, Adrianna Lou Anne (1998) "Foreign Investment In The Caribbean: 
Multinational Enterprise Motivation, Investment Behaviour & Corporate Strategy, " 
Doctoral Thesis Universityof Warwick. 
Barker, Dean (1997) "Saving Social Security With Stocks: The Promises Don't Add 
Up, 99 The Twentieth Centuly Fund, Inc. /The Centuly Foundation. 
Barr, Nicholas, (1987), "The Economics of the Welfare State, " George Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson Ltd. 
290 
Barrientos, Armando, (1993), "Pension Reform and Economic Development in 
Chile, " Development Policy Review. Vol. 11. 
Barrientos, Armando (1998) "Supplementary Pension Coverage in Britain, " Ei[scal 
Studies, Vol. 19 (4). 
Barro, Robert, J., (1974), "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? " Journal of Political 
EconqM Vol. 82, No. 6. 
Barro, Robert J.; & Sala-I-Martin, Xavier, (1995), "Economic Growth, " McGraw-Hill 
International Editions, Singapore. 
Baysinger, Barry; Hoskisson, E. Robert (1990) "The Composition of Boards of 
Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy, " Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. I 5(l). 
Baysinger, D. Barry; Kosnik, D. Rita; Turk, A. Thomas (1991) "Effects of Board and 
Ownership Structure on Corporate R&D Strategy, " Academy of Management Journal, 
Vol. 34(l). 
Beattie, Roger, (1995), "International Experience in Social Governance: United 
Kingdom, "' in Cichon, Michael and Samuel, Lenia (eds. ) Making Social Protection 
Work: The Challenge of Tripartism for Countries in Transition, Intemational Labour 
Organisation and Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, republic of Cyprus. 
291 
Beattie, Roger and McGillivray, Warren, (1995), "A Risky Strategy: Reflections on 
the World Bank Report Averting the Old Age Crisis, " International Social Securit 
Review. Vol. 48, Nos. 3-4. 
Bencivenga, R. Valerie; Smith, D. Bruce & Starr, M. Ross (1996) "Equity Markets, 
Transactions Costs, and Capital Accumulation: An Illustration, " The World Bank 
Economic Review. Vol. 10 (2). 
Berle, A. A. & Means, G. G. (1932) "The Modem Corporation And Private Property, " 
McMillan, New York. 
Beveridge, William (1924) "Insurance for All and Everything, " The New Way Series, 
Council of the Liberal Summer Schools. 
Blake, David, (1995), "Pension Schemes and Pension Funds in the United Kingdom, " 
Oxford University Press. 
Blake, David (1997) "Pension Choices and Pensions Policy in the United Kingdom, " 
in Valdes-Prieto, Salvador (Ed. ) The Economics of Pensions: Principles, Policies and 
International Experience, Cambridge University Press. 
Blommestein, J. Hans & Funke, Norbert (Eds. ) (1998) "Institutional Investors in the 
New Financial Landscape, " OECD. 
292 
Blundell, Richard and Johnson, Paul, (1997), "Pensions and Retirement in the UK, " 
Working Paper 6154, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Blundell, Richard and Johnson, Paul, (1998) "Pensions and Labor-Market 
Participation in the United Kingdom, " The American Economic Journal, Vol. 88(2), 
May. 
Boeker, Warren (1992) "Power and Managerial Dismissal: Scapegoating at the Top, " 
Administrative Science Quarterly. No. 37. 
Borden, Karl (1995) "Dismantling the Pyramid: The Why and How of Privatizing 
Social Security, " SSP No. I The Cato Institute, Washington, DC. 
Borsch-Supan, Axel (1999) "Rethinking Pension Refonn: Ten Myths About Social 
Security Systems: Comments, " Paper Presented at the Conference New Ideas About 
Old Age Security, Sept 14-15, The World Bank, Washington, D. C. 
Borsch-Supan, Axel (2000) "A Model Under Siege: A Case Study of the Gennan 
Retirement Insurance System, " The Economic Journal. Issue No. I 10 (February). 
Borsch-Supan, Axel & Schnabel, Reinhold (1998) "Social Security And Declining 
Labor-Force Participation In Gennany, " The American Economic Review. Vol. 
88(2). 
1 293 
Borzutzky, Silvia (1985) 'Tolitics and Social Security Reform, " in Mesa-Lago, 
Carmelo (Ed. ) Yhe Crisis of Social Security and Health Care: Latin American 
Experiences and Lessons, University of Pittsburgh. PA, USA. 
Bosworth, Barry (1996) "Fund Accumulation: How Much? How Managed? " in 
Diamond et al (Eds. ) Social Security: "at Rolefor the Future? National Academy of 
Social InsuranceWashington, DC. 
Bosworth, P. Barry; Dombusch, Rudiger & Laban, Raul (Eds. ) (1994) "The Chilean 
Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges, " The_Brookings Institution. Washington, 
DC. 
Boyd, John & Smith, Bruce (1996) "The Coevolution of the Real and Financial 
Sectors in the Growth Process, " The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10(2). 
Braithwaite, C. Joy (1995) "Challenges Facing Social Security In The Regional 
Integration Process, " (unpublished) National Insurance Board of Trinidad & Tobago, 
Trinidad. 
Brenzel, Logan (2000) "Is National Health Insurance The Way Forward For 
Caribbean Countries? " Journal Of Eastern Caribbean Studies. Vol. 25(2), June. 
Brodsky, E. & Adarnski, M. P. (1984) "Law Of Corporate Officers And Directors: 
Rights, Duties & Liabilities, " Callajzhan & Co, Illinois. 
294 
Brooks, Sarah & James, Estelle (1999) "The Political Economy of Pension Reform, " 
World Bank Research Conference. 
Brown, L. Roberts (1996) "Social Security and Retirees: Two Views if the 
Projections, " in Dimnond et al (Eds. ) Social Security: Hat Role for the Future? 
National Academy of Social Insurance, Washington, DC. 
Brown, Robert, (1997), "In Defense of Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Financing of 
Social Security, " North American Actuarial Journal., Vol. 1, No. 4, October. 
Brudney, Victor (1982) "The Independent Director - Heavenly City or Potemkin 
Village? " Harvard Law Review. Vol. (95). 
Burgess, Robin & Stem, Nicholas (1991) "Social Security in Developing Countries: 
What, Why, Who and How? " in Ahmad et al (Eds. ) Social Security in Developing 
Countries, Clarendon Press, Oxford., 
Burkhauser, V. Richard & Turner, A. John (1982) "Social Security, Preretirement 
Labor Supply, and Saving: A Confirmation and a Critique, " Journal of Political 
EconomL Vol. 90(3). 
Burnham, J. (194 1) "The Managerial Revolution, " John Dgy & Company. New York. 
Byrne, A. John; Brown, Leslie (1997) "Directors In The Hot Seat, " Business Week, 
December 8. 
Byrne, A. John; Grover, Ronald; Melcher, A. Richard (1997) "The Best And Worst 
Boards, " Business Week, December 8. 
Cadbury Report (1992) "Report Of The Committee On The Financial Aspects Of 
Corporate Governance, " Burgess Science Press, London. 
Cagan, Phillip (1965) "The Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Savings, " National 
Bureau of Economic Research, New York. 
Cangiano, Marco; Cottarelli, Carlo & Cubeddu, Luis (1998) "Pension Developments 
and Reforms in Transition Economies, " Working Pgper of the International Monet 
Fund, 
Carroll, T. Daniel (198 1) "Boards and Management: Ten Challenges and Responses, " 
Harvard Business Review. September-October. 
Castillo, Bustos, (1993), "Analysis of a National Pension Scheme: The case of Chile, 
Comments, " Intemational Labour Review. Vol. 132, No. 3. 
Central Provident Fund of Singapore (1996) " Annual Report 1996. " 
Chand, Sheetal, K. and Jaeger, Albert, (1996), "Aging Populations and Public Pension 
Schemes, " Occasional Paper 147, International Monetajy Fund. Washington, D. C. 
1 296 
Charlton, Roger, McKinnon, Roddy & Konopielko, Lukasz (1998) "Pensions Reform, 
Privatisation and Restructuring in the Transition: Unfinished Business Or 
inappropriate Agendas? Eurove-Asia Studies, Vol. 50(8). 
Chen, Yung-Ping (1989) "Low Confidence in Social Security is not Warranted, " 
Joumal of Aging & Social Policy, Vol. 1 (1/2). 
Chen, Yung-Ping (1995) "The Key Issues in the Privatisation Debate, " in Stephenson, 
Kevin (Ed. ) Social Security: Timefor a Change, JAI Press, London, England. 
Cichon, Michael & Samuel, Lenia (Eds. ) (1995) "Making Social Protection Work: 
The Challenge of Tripartism in Social Governance for Countries in Transition, " 
International Labour Organisation, Geneva. 
Cichon, Michael (1999) "Notional Defined Contribution Schemes: Old Wine in New 
Bottles? " Intemational Social Security Review. Vol. 52 No. 4. 
Cichon, Michael (2000) "Reflections on a Financing Strategy for Caribbean Social 
Security Schemes, in Drouin & Plamondon (Eds. ) Issues in Social Security Financing 
in the Caribbean, Issues in Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 8, ILO. Geneva. 
Clark, Roger & Filinson, Rachel (1998) "A Cross-National Test of Propositions from 
the Neo-Pluralist Perspective on Social Security Expenditures, " Journal of Aging and 
Social PoliMVol. 10(2). 
Cochran, P. L; Wood, R. A. & Jones, T. B. (1985) "The Composition Of Boards Of 
Directors And Incidence Of Golden Parachutes, " Academy of Management Journal. 
Vol. 28. 
Collyrnore, R. Branston (1995) "Pensions In The Public Service - An Overview, " 
New InSight. September - December, Barbados. 
Corporate Director's Guidebook (1978) Prepared by the Committee on Co1porate 
Laws. Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law. American Bar Association. 
Reprinted in Boards & Directors. Vol. 3(l) 
Corsetti, Giancarlo, and Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus, (1995), "Pension Reform and 
Growth, " Policy Research Working Paper 1471, The World Bank. 
Corsetti, Giancarlo, and Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus, (1997), "Pension Refonn and 
Growth, " in Valdes-Prieto, Salvador (Ed. ) The Economics of Pensions: Principles, 
Policies and International Experience, Cambridge University Press. 
Cox, Donald; Eser, Zekeriya & Jimenez, Emmanuel (1998) "Motives for Private 
Transfers Over the Life Cycle: An Analytical Framework and Evidence for Peru, " 
Joumal of Development Economics, Vol. 55. 
Craigwell, Michael (1998) "Alternatives for the Construction of a CARICOM 
Regional Stock Market Index, " Social and Economic Studies, Special Issue Vol. 
47(2&3). 
Cutler, M. David (1996) "Reexamining the Three-Legged Stool, " in Diamond et al 
(Eds. ) Social Security: nat Role for the Future? National Academy of Social 
Insuranceý_Washington, DC. 
Daily, M. Catherine; Dalton, R. Dan (1993) "Board of Directors Leadership and 
Structure: Control and Performance Implication, " Entrgpreneurship Theoly an 
Practice. 
Daily, M. Catherine; Schewenk, Charles (1996) "Chief Executive Officers, Top 
Management Teams, And Boards of Directors: Congruent or Countervailing Forces? " 
Joumal of Management. Vol. 22(2). 
Daily, M. Cathcrinc; Johnson, L. Jonathan (1997) "Sourccs of CEO Powcr And Firm 
Financial Performance: A Longitudinal Assessment, " Journal of Management Vol. 
23(2). 
Davis, E. Philip (1995) "Pension Funds: Retirement Income Security and Capital 
Markets: An International Perspective" Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
De Gregorio, Jose & Guidotti, Pablo E., (1995), "Financial Development and 
Economic Growth, " World Development, Vol. 23, No. 3 
De Landro (1995) "A Comparative Study Of Social Security Legislation In The 
English-Speaking Caribbean And The Possibility of Its Harmonisation, " The National 
Insurance Board of Trinidad & Tobago, Port-of-Spain. 
Delgado-Izazola, Luz, Ana (1995) "Social Security in the English Speaking 
Caribbean, " Interamerican Conference on Social Security. 
Demarco, Gustavo & Rofinan, Rafael (1998) "Supervising Mandatory Funded 
Pension Systems: Issues and Challenges, " SP Discussion Paper No. 9817, The World 
Bank , Washington, DC, USA. 
Demirguc-Kunt, Ash & Levine, Ross, (1996a) "Stock Markets, Corporate Finance, 
and Economic Growth: An Overview, " The World Bank Economic Review. Vol. 10, 
No. 2. 
Demirguc-Kunt, Ash & Levine, Ross, (1996b) "Stock Market Development and 
Financial Intermediaries: Stylized Facts, " The World Bank Economic Review. ol. 
10, No. 2. 
Demirguc-Kunt, Ash & Maksimovic, Vojislav (1996c) "Stock Market Development 
and Financing Choices of Firms, " The World Bank Economic ReviewVol. 10, No. 2. 
Diamond, P. A., (1977), "A Framework for Social Security Analysis, " Journal of 
Public Economics. Vol. 8 
Diamond, Peter, (1996a), "Proposals to Restructure Social Security. " Journal of 
Economic Perspectives. Vol. 10, No. 3, Summer. 
300 
Diamond, A. Peter (1996b) "The Future of Social Security, " in Diamond et al (Eds. ) 
Social Security "at Role for the Future? National Academy of Social Insurance, 
Washington, DC. 
Diamond, Peter (1997) "Insulation of Pensions from Political Risk, " in Valdes-Prieto, 
Salvador (Ed. ) Yhe Economics of Pensions: Principles, Policies and International 
Experience, Cambridge University Press. 
Diamond, Peter (1998) "The Economics of Social Security Reform, " VVT 6719, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, MA, USA. 
Diamond, Peter (1999a) "rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths About Social 
Security Systems: Comments, ", Paper Presented at the conference New Ideas About 
Old Age Security, September 14-15, The World Bank, Washington, D. C. 
Diamond, Peter (1999b) "Social Security Reform, With a Focus on Sweden, " Lindahl 
Lectures, Oxford University Press, (Forthcoming). 
Diamond, Peter, & Gruber, Jonathan, (1997), "Social Security and Retirement in the 
US, " Working Paper 6097, National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge, MA. 
Diamond, A. Peter; Lindeman, C. David; & Young, Howard (Eds. ) (1996) "Social 
Security: What Role for the Future? " National Academy of Social Insurance, 
Washington, DC. 
301 
Diamond, Peter, & Myers, Robert, (1996), "Social Security Reform in Chile: Two 
Views", in Diamond, Lindeman & Young (Eds. ) Social Security: "at Role for the 
Future? National Academy of Social Insurance. Washington, DC. 
Diamond, Peter & Valdes-Prieto (1994) "Social Security Reforms, " in Bosworth et al 
(Eds. ) The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges, The Brookings 
Institution, 
_Washington, 
DC. 
Dicks-Mireaux, L. Louis-David & King, A. Mervyn (1983) "Portfolio Composition 
and Pension Wealth: An Econometric Study in Bodie & Shoven (Eds. ) Financial 
Aspects of the USpension System 
Dixon, John (2000) "A Global ranking of National Social Sccurity Systcms, " 
Intemational Social Security Review, Vol. 53(l). 
Dominica (1975) "Social Security Chapter 31: 01 of Dominica, No. 38 of 1975, " 
Government of Dominica, Dominica. 
Drouin, Anne (2000) "The Investment Of Public Pension Funds: Some Observations 
From The ILO, " in Drouin, A. & Plamondon, P. (eds. ) Issues In Social Security 
Financing In The Caribbean, Issues in Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 8, 
International Labour Office. Geneva. 
302 
Duggan, E. James (1995) "Social Security and Fiscal Sustainability in the Twenty- 
First Century, " in Stephenson, Kevin (Ed. ) Social Security: Time for a Change, JAI 
Press, London, England. 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (1995) "Investment Profile Of The ECCB Area 
Social Security Schemes - Update, " Money & Capital Market Development Unit, 
Eastem Caribbean Central Bank. Basseterre. 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (1999) "Review of Pension Provisions In The ECCB 
Area, " Eastem Caribbean Central Bank. Basseteffe. 
Espina, Alvaro (1996) "Reform of Pension Schemes in the OECD Countries, " 
Intemational Labour Review. Vol. 135(2). 
Estes, M. Robert (1980) "Corporate Governance in the Courts? " Harvard Business 
Review, July - August. 
Euzeby, Chantal (1998) "Social Security in the Twenty-First Century, " International 
Social Security Review. Vol. 51 (2). 
Fama, F. Eugene (1980) "Agency Problems And The Theory of the Firm, " Journal of 
Political Economyý: Vol. 88(2). 
Fama, F. Eugene & Jensen, C. Michael (1983) "Agency Problems And Residual 
Claims, " Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. XXVI, June. 
Farrell, L. James Jr. (1989) "A Fundamental Forecast Approach to Superior Asset 
Allocation, " Financial Analysts Journal, May-June. 
Feldstein, Martin, (1974), "Social Security, Induced Retirement and Aggregate 
Capital Accumulation, " Journal of Political EconomL" Vol. 82, No. 5. 
Feldstein, S. Martin (1975) "Unemployment Insurance: Time for Reform, " Harvard 
Business Review, March-April. 
Feldstein, Martin (1997) Privatising Social Security: The $10 Trillion Opportunity, " 
Cato Project On Social Security Privatisation. 
Feldstein, Martin, (1982), "Social Security and Private Saving: Reply, " Journal of 
Political EconoLnL Vol. 90, No. 3. 
Feldstein, Martin; Ranguelova, Elena, (1998), "Individual Risk and Intergenerational. 
Risk Sharing in an Investment-Based Social Security System, " Working Paper 6839, 
National Bureau of Economics Research. 
Ferrara, J. Peter (Ed. ) (1985) "Social Security: Prospects for Real Reform, " Cato 
Institute, Washington, DC, USA. 
Ferrara, J. Peter (1995) "A Private Option for Social Security, " in Stephenson, Kevin 
(Ed. ) Social Security: Timefor a Change, JAI Press. London, England. 
Feuer, M. (1974) "Personal Liabilities Of Corporate Officers And Directors, " Prentice 
Hall. New Jersey. 
Figgie, E. Harry, Jr (1981) "Defusing The Pension Liability Bomb, " Harvard 
Business Review. November -December. 
Firstenberg, P. B. & Malkiel, B. G. (1980) "Why Corporate Boards Need Independent 
Directors", Management Review. April. 
Fletcher, P. Leonard (1976) "The Provident Fund Approach To Social Security In The 
Eastern Caribbean, " Journal Of Social PolicL Vol. 5(j). 
Forbes, P. Daniel (1999) "Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding 
Boards of Directors As Strategic Decision Making Groups, " Academy of 
Management Review. July. 
Forde, Penelope (1999) "Macroeconomic Impact Of Some Social Security Systems in 
The Caribbean, " ILO Regional Meeting on Social Security Financing fo 
Rgpresentatives of Workers' Associations, Trinidad. 
Fox, Louise & Palmer, Edward (1999) "New Approaches to Multi-Pillar Pension 
Systems: What, in the World is Going On? " SP Discussion Paper, The World Bank, 
Washington, DC, USA. 
Foxley, Alejandro & Sapelli, Claudio (1999) "Chile's Political Economy in the 1990s: 
Some Governance Issues, " in PerTy et al (Eds. ) Chile: Recent Policy Lessons and 
Emerging Challenges, " The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Fultz, Elaine & Ruck, Markus (2000) "Pension Reform in Central & Eastern Europe: 
AN Update On The Restructuring Of National Pension Schemes In Selected 
Countries, " International Labour Office. Central & Eastern European Team, 
Budapest. 
Galbraith, K. John (1967) "The New Industrial State, " New American Librga. New 
York. 
Gbossa, Lambert (1999) "Comparisons of the ILO & The World Bank Perspectives 
Concerning Public Pension Schemes, " International Labour Office, Geneva. 
George, Ambrose (2000) "2000/2001 Budget Address, " Ministry for Finance & 
Planning, Government of The Commonwealth of Dominica-"Roseau. 
George, Ambrose (2001) "2001/2002 Budget Address, " Ministry for Finance & 
Planning, Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica., Roseau. 
Ghaffar, A. Rosalan (1998) "Observations on Funding and Investment: Employees 
Provident Fund of Malaysia, " in ISSA Asia and Pacific Series NO. 20, Financin 
Retirement Benefits: The Asia and Pacific Experience " Geneva. 
306 19 
Gillion, Colin, & Bonilla, Alejandro, (1992) "Analysis of a National Private Pension 
Scheme: The Case of Chile, " Intemational Labour Review, Vol. 13 1, No. 2. 
Gillion, Colin (2000) 'The Development and Reform of Social Security Pensions: 
The Approach of the Intemational Labour Office, " Intemational Social Securit 
ReviLeLw, Vol. 53 (1). 
Gillion, Colin; Turner, John; Bailey, Clive & Latulippe, Denis (Eds. ) (2000) "Social 
Security Pensions: Development and Reform, " International Labour Office. Geneva. 
Glaessner, Thomas, Charles; & Valdes-Prieto, Salvador, (1998), "Pension reform in 
Small Developing Countries, " Working Paper 1983, The World Bank. 
Gobin, Maurice (1969) "Social Security For Trinidad & Tobago, " International Social 
Security Review, Vol. 2. 
Godoy, Oscar & Valdes-Prieto, Salvador (1997) "Democracy and Pensions in Chile: 
Experience with Two Systems, " in Valdes-Prieto, Salvador (Ed. ) The Economics of 
pensions: Principles, Policies and International Experience, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Gordon, M; Mitchell, S. Olivia & Twinney, M. (Eds. ) (1997) "Positioning Pensions 
for the 21" Century, " Pension Research Council, PA, University of Pennsylvania 
Press. 
307 
Grarnlich, Edward, (1996), "Different Approaches for Dealing with Social Security, " 
Joumal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 10, No. 3, Summer. 
Greaves, E. Evelyn (2000) "An Assessment of Social SecurityNational Insurance in 
the Caribbean: The Workers Perspectives, " in Drouin & Plamondon (Eds. ) Issues in 
Social Security Financing in the Caribbean, " ILO. Geneva. 
Gruber, Jonathan and Wise, David, (1997) "Social Security Programs and Retirement 
Around the World, " Working Paper 6134, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Grenada (1983) "National Insurance Laws Regulations - National Insurance Law, 
1983; People's Law No. 14 of 1983, " Government of Grenada, Grenada 
Guay, Richard (2001) Funding Pensions: The Example of The Caisse de Depot et 
Placement du Quebec (CDP), presented at ILO SOCFAS Training Workshop For 
Field Experts, Intemational Labour Organisation, Feldafing. 
Guillermard, Anne-Marie, (1999) "Equity and Redistribution Between Generations: 
A Challenge for the Future of Pensions and all Social Protection Schemes, " 
Intemational Social Security Review. Vol. 52, No. 3. 
Gutierrez, A. C. (1989) "Economic Aspects of Social Security and Financial 
Organisation of Social Security Schemes, " Paper presented at an ISSA Training 
Course on Social Security Administration for the English-Speaking Caribbean, 18 - 
28, April, Castries. 
Hambrick, C. Daniel (1987) "The Top Management Team: Key To Strategic 
Success, " Califomia Management Review. Fall. 
Hans-Werner, Sinn (2000) "Why a Funded Pension System is Useful and Why it is 
not Useful, " Working Paper 7592, National Bureau of Economic Research,. -MA, 
USA. 
Harrison, J. Richard (1987) "The Strategic Use of Corporate Board Committees, " 
Califomia Management Review, Fall. 
Heller, Peter S., (1998), " Rethinking Public Pension Reform Initiatives, " 
International Monetga Fund, Washington, D. C. 
Hemming, Richard, (1998), "Should Public Pensions be Funded? " Working Paper, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C. 
Hemming, Richard, (1999), "Should Public Pensions be Funded? " International 
Social Security Review-Vol. 
Henry, Frederica, Valda (2000a) "rhe Importance of Social Security Reserves and 
their Investment for Economic Development, " in Drouin, A& Plamondon, P. Issues 
in Social Security Financing in the Caribbean, Issues in Social Protection Discussion 
Paper 8, The International Labour Office, Geneva. 
Henry, Frederica, Valda (2000b) "Multi-Tier Social Security Systems: Sweden, 
Uruguay and Chile, " in Drouin, A& Plamondon, P. Issues in Social Security 
Financing in the Caribbean, Issues in Social Protection Discussion Paper 8, The 
International Labour Office. Geneva. 
Henry, Frederica, Valda (2000c) "An Investigation Into the Attitudes and Perceptions 
of Social Security Stakeholders in the Caribbean, " Unpublished. 
Henry, Frederica, Valda (2000d) "Social Security at the Crossroads: A Look at the 
Caribbean, " Presented at Social Security in the Global Village Conference, 
(unpublished) ISSAHelsinki. 
Henry, Frederica, Valda (2000e) "Practical Approaches in Resource Mobilisation for 
Social Protection, " Coping in Dire Circumstances: Traditional and Modern Schemes 
ofSocial Protection in the Context ofDevelopment, The United Nations Expert Group 
MeelLng, Cape Town. - 
Herbertsson, Tryggvi Thor; Orszag, Michael, Orszag, Peter (2000) "Retirement in the 
Nordic Countries: Prospects and Proposals for Future Reforms, " Tema Nord Report 
No. 2000: 548, Nordic Council of Ministers. Copenhagen. 
Hennan, E. S. (1981) "Corporate Control, Corporate Power, " Cambridge Universit 
Press, New York. 
1 310 
Hippolyte, Emma & Louis, Augustin (2000) 'Troposal On Social Security Reform In 
St. Lucia, " (unpublished) St. Lucia National Insurance Scheme, Castries. 
Hodge, A. Timothy (2000) "Social Security: From Foundation To Optimisation, " 
Feature Address Marking Social Security Week, Anguilla. 
Holzmann, Robert, (1995), "Pension Reform, Financial Market Development and 
Economic Growth: Preliminary Evidence from Chile, " European Institute. 
Holzman, Robert (1997a) "On the Economic Benefits and Fiscal Requirements of 
Moving From Unfunded to Funded Pensions, " Research Report No. 4 American 
Institute for Contemporga Gennan Studies. John Hopkins University, Washington, 
USA. 
Holzmann, Robert (1997b) "Starting Over in Pensions: The Challenges Facing 
Central and Eastcm Europe, " Joumal of Public PolicL Vol. 17, Part 2, May-August. 
Holzmann, Robert (1999) "Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths About Social 
Security Systems: Comments, " Paper Presented at the conference New Ideas About 
Old Age Security, The World Bank. Washington, D. C. 
Holzmann, Robcrt (2000a) "Thc World Bank Approach to Pcnsion Refbrný' 
Intemational Social Security Review, Vol. 53 (1). 
k6- 311 
Holzmann, Robert (2000b) "Can Investments if Emerging Markets Help to Solve the 
Aging Problem? " SP Discussion Paper, The World Bank. Washington, DC. 
Holzmann, Robert; Packard, Truman & Cuesta, Jose (2000) "Extending Coverage in 
Multi-Pillar Pension Systems: Constraints and Hypotheses, Preliminary Evidence and 
Future Research Agenda, " Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 0002, The World 
Bank. Washington, D. C. 
Hsin, Ping-Lung & Mitchell, S. Olivia (1994) "rhe Political Economy of Public 
Pensions: Pension Funding, Governance and Fiscal Stress, " Revista de Analisis 
Economico. Vol. 9(l). 
Hsin, Ping-Lung & Mitchell, S. Olivia (1997) "Public Pension Plan Efficiency, "' in 
Gordon et al (Eds. ) Positioning Pensions for the 21" Century, " Pension Research 
Council. PA, University of Philadelphia Press. 
Hsin, Ping-Lung & Mitchell, S. Olivia (199? ) "Managing Public-Sector Pensions" in 
Schieber et al (Eds. ) Public Policy Toward Pensions, MIT Press. MA, USA & 
London, England. 
Iglesias, Augusto & Palacios, J. Robert (2000) "Managing Public Pension Reserves, 
Part I: Evidence from the International Experience, " SP Discussion Paper NO. 0003, 
The World Banký_Washington, DC. 
ILO/FNPF (1983), "Social Security: Principles and Practice, " South Pacific Sub- 
Regional Seminar. 
International Labour Office (1996) "Social Protection in the Philippines, " 
International Labour Office, Geneva. 
International Labour Office (1997a) "Social Security Financing, " International 
Labour Office, Geneva. 
International Labour Office (1997b) "Pension Schemes, " International Labour Office. 
Geneva. 
international Labour Office (2001) "Social Security - Issues, Challenges, Prospects, " 
Provisional Record, Eighty-ninth Session, International Labour Conference. Geneva. 
International Monetary Fund (1993) "Social Security Refonns And Social Safety Nets 
In Reforming And Transfonning Economies, " International Monetary Fund. 
Washington. 
International Monetary Fund (1997) "Good Governance: The IMF's Role, " 
International Monetary Fund. " Washington. 
International Social Security Association (1996) "Developments and Trends in Social 
Security Throughout The World, 1993 - 1995: Social Security in the 90s: The 
Imperatives of Change, " NUSA DUA, 25h General Assembly. Report 1, Geneva. 
International Social Security Association (1997) "Organisation and Management of 
Pension Schemes: Optimising Services and Results - Administrative and Financial 
Management, " 7th American Regional Conference of IS ; A, Uruguay. 
International Social Security Association (1998) "The Future Of Social Security, " The 
Stockholm Initiative, Federation Of Social Insurance Offices. Stockholm. 
Iyer, N. Subramaniam (1993) "Principles of Social Insurance Financing With Special 
Emphasis on the Present Situation of Central and Eastern Europe, " in Social Security 
Documentation, European Series No. 20, International Social Security Association. 
Geneva. 
James, Estelle (1996a) "Providing Better Protection and Promoting Growth: A 
Defence of Averting the Old Age Crisis, " International Social Security Review. Vol. 
49(3). 
James, Estelle (1996) "Social Security Around the World, " in Diamond et al (Eds. ) 
Social Security: Hat Role for the Future? National Academy of Social Insurance. 
Washington, DC. 
James, Estelle, (1997a), "New Systems for Old Age Security: Theory, Practice and 
Empirical Evidence, " Policy Research Working Paper 1766, World Bank. 
1 314 
James, Estelle, (1997b), 'Tension Reforrn: Is There a Tradeoff Between Efficiency 
and Equity? " Policy Research Working Paper 1767, World Bank. 
James, Estelle (1999) "Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths About Social Security 
Systems: Comments, " Paper Presented at the conference New Ideas About Old Age 
Security, -September 14-15, The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Jensen, C. Michael & Meckling, H. William (1976) "Theory Of The Finn: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs And Ownership Structure, " Journal of Financial 
Economics,, 
-No. 
3. 
Jinchang, Zhang; Jiagui, Chen & Rosner, Jurgen, Hans (2000) "Current and Future 
Problems of Capital Accumulation in the Chinese Pension System, " International 
Social Security Review. Vol. 53(4). 
Jonczyk, Jan (1993) "Problem of Social Insurance Financing in Poland and Other 
Participating Countries of Central and Eastern Europe Arsing from a Centrally- 
Planned to a Market Economy, " in Social Security Documentation, European Series 
No. 20, International Social Security Association. Geneva. 
Jordan, Alwyn & Carter, Adrian (2000) "The Impact of Demographic Change On 
Pension Scheme Financing In The Caribbean, " Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies, 
Vol. 25(l), March. 
Joseph, A. E. Lloyd (1975) "A Report On Harmonisation Of Social Security Schemes 
In The Eastern Caribbean Countries, " International Labour Organisation. Caribbean 
Office, Trinidad. 
Judge, Q. William, Jr (1992) "Institutional And Strategic Choice Perspectives On 
Board Involvement In The Strategic Decision Process, " Academy of Management 
Joumal. Vol. 35(4). 
Jutting, Johannes (2000) "Social Security Systems in Low-Income Countries: 
Concepts, Constraints and the need for Cooperation, " International Social Segqdty 
Review. Vol. 53(4). 
Kane, T. Cheikh (1995) "Uruguay: Options for Pension Refonn, " ESP Discussion 
Paper Series No. 68, The World Bank. Washington, D. C. 
Kapteyn, Arie & De Vos, Klaas (1998) "Social Security And Labor Force 
Participation in the Netherlands, " The American Economic Review. Vol. 88. 
Karni, Edi (1999) "Optimal Unemployment Insurance: A Guide to the Literature, " SP 
Discussion Paper No. 9906 The World Bank. 
Kay, J. Stephen (2000) "The Politics of Postponement: Political Incentives and the 
Sequencing of Social Security Reforms in Argentina and Uruguay, " Conference Paper 
Social Security in the Global Village, September 25-27, The Intemational Social 
Security Association. Geneva. 
16 
Kerr, Jeffrey & Bettis, A. Richard (1987) "Boards of Directors, Top Management 
Compensation, And Shareholder Returns, " Compensation, And Shareholder Returns, " 
Academy of Management Joumal. Vol. 30(4). 
Kesner, F. Idalene & Johnson, B. Roy (1990) "An Investigation Of The Relationship 
Between Board Composition And Stockholder Suits, " Strategic Management Journal. 
Vol. 11. 
Kingson, Eric R.; & Williamson, John B., (1998) "Understanding the Debate Over the 
Privatization of Social Security, " Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, Vol. 25, 
No. 3. 
Knepper, W. E. (1985) "Liability Of Corporate Officers And Directors, " (pocket 
supplement) Allen Smith Coml2anL Indiana. 
Kopits, George (1993) "Reforming Social Security Systems, " Finance & 
Dcyclopment. Junc. 
Kotlikoff, J. Laurence, (1993) "Generational Accounting: Knowing Who Pays, And 
When, For What We Spend, " The Free Press. New York. 
Kotlikoff, Laurence, J; Smetters, Kent, A; Walliser, Jan, (1998), "Social Security and 
the Real economy: Evidence and Policy Implications - Social Security: Privatization 
and Progrcssivity, " The Amcrican Economic Review. Vol. 88, No. 2, May. 
Kotlikoff, Laurence, J., and Summers, Lawrence, H., (1981), "The Role of 
Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, " Journal of Political 
EcongMy, Vol. 89(4). 
Kosnik, D. Rita (1987) "Greem-nail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate 
Govemance, " Administrative Science Quarterly. No. 32. 
Krishnamurthi, Sudhir (1998) "Investing Pension Fund Assets, " in ISSA Asia and 
Pacific Series No. 23, Social Security in Asia and the Pacific: The Road Ahead. " 
Geneva. 
Laban, Raul & Larrain, B. Felipe (1994) "The Chilean Experience with Capital 
Mobility, " in Bosworth et al (Eds. ) The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and 
Challenges, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 
La Foucade, Dianne, Althea (1995) "A Review of the Evolution and Performance of 
Social Security Schemes in the English-Speaking Caribbean, " Interamcrican 
Conference on Social Security & The National Insurance Board, Trinidad, -Mexico 
and Trinidad. 
Layne, William (1992) "Financing of Social Security: New Perspectives in the Light 
of Current Economic Developments: The Experience of Barbados, " in Current Issues 
in the Management and Financing of Social Security in the Americas, Social Security 
Documentation: American series No. 15, ISSA. Geneva. 
Leaper, Robert (1992) "The Beveridge Report in its Contemporary Setting, " 
Intemational Social Security Review. Vol. 45 (1/2). 
Leimer, Dean, R., & Lesnoy, Selig, D., (1982), ""Social Security and Private Saving: 
New Time Series Evidence, " Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 90, No. 3. 
Lesnoy, D. Selig & Hambor, C. John (1975) "Social Security, Saving, and Capital 
Formation, " Social Security Bulletin Vol. 38 (7) July. 
Levine, R, & Zervos, Sara, (1996) "Stock Market development and Long Run 
Growth, " The World Bank Economic Review. Vol. 10, No. 2. 
Levine, R, & Zervos, Sara, (1998), "Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, " 
The American Economic Review. Vol. 88, No. 3, June. 
Lieberson, Stanley & O'Connor, F. James (1972) "Leadership And Organisational 
Performance: A study Of Large Corporations, " American Sociological Review. Vol. 
37(2). 
Liverpool, J. 0. Nicholas (1996) "Comparative Study of Social Security Legislation 
in the English Speaking Caribbean and the Possibility of its Hannonisation, " in Social 
Security in the Caribbean: Management, Health Care Harmonisation, Caribbcan 
Series No. 7, ISSA. Geneva. 
Longman, Phillip (1989) "Social Security and the Baby Boom Generation, " Journal o 
Aging & Social PolicL Vol. 1(1/2). 
Louden, J. K. (1982) "The Director, A Professional's Guide To Effective Board 
Work", American Management Associations. New York. 
Mace, M. L. (1971) "Directors: Myth And Reality, " Harvard University Graduate 
School of Business Administration. Mass. 
Mace, L. Myles (1976) "Designing A Plan For The Ideal Board, " Harvard Business 
Review, 
-November-December. 
MacGregor, Susanne (1992) "Come Back Beveridge: All is Forgiven, " Poverty. No. 
82, Summer. 
MacKellar, F. Landis (2000) "A Dilemma, Not a Problem: Population Aging and 
Peter G. Peterson's Gray Dawn, " Discussion Paper, International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Austria. 
Mackenzie, G. A; Gerson, Philip; Cuevas, Alfredo, (1997), "Pension Regimes and 
Saving, " Occasional Papcr 153, International Monctary Fund. Washington, DC. - 
Malloy, M. James (1985) "Statecraft and Social Security Policy and Crisis: A 
Comparison of Latin America and the United States, " in Mesa-Lago, Carmelo (Ed. ) 
The Crisis of Social Security and Health Care: Latin American Experiences and 
Lessons, " University of Pittsburgh., PA, USA. 
Martin, John (1998) "Harmonisation Of Social Security System In Trinidad & 
Tobago, " Planning & Research Division, National Insurance Board of Trinidad & 
Tobago. 
Matijascic, Milko (2000) "A Path in Contradiction: Brazilian Social Security in the 
1990s, " Conference Paper Social Security in the Global Village, September 25-27, 
The International Social Security Association. Geneva. 
Maupome-Carvantes, Octavio (1999) "Critique of Mexico's New Social Security 
Act, " North American Actuarial Joumal.,, Vol. 3 (3). 
Mauro, Paolo (1995) "Corruption and Growth, " The Quarterly Joumal-of Economics, 
August. 
McFarlan, F. Warren (1981) "Portfolio Approach To Information Systems, " Harvard 
Business Review. September-October. 
McGillivray, Warren (1997) "Redefining The Role Of Social Security, " New InSig, 
- 
N. 
July - December, Barbados. 
McGillivray, Warren (2000a) "Pension Reform: Where Are We Now? " International 
Social Security Review. Vol. 53 (1) 
McGillivray, Warren (2000b) "Contribution Evasion: Implications for Social Security 
Pension Schemes, " Third APEC Reizional Forum on Pension Fund Reform. Bangkok, 
Thailand. 
McGreevey, William, (1990), "Social Security in Latin America: Issues and Options 
for the World Bank, " World Bank Discussion Papers I 10, The World Bank. 
McKinnon, Ronald 1., (1973) "Money and Capital in Economic Development, " The 
Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C. 
McKinnon, Ronald I., (ed. ) (1976), "Money and Finance in Economic Growth and 
Development: Essays in Honor of Edward S. Shaw, " Marcel Dekker. Inc.. New York 
Basel 
McIlis, Chris, (1998), "rhc Macroeconomics of Pcnsions: Pay-As-You-Go, Funding 
and Other Matters, " HM TreasuiyLondon. 
Mesa-Lago, Cannelo (1989) "Ascent to Bankruptcy: Financing Social Security in 
Latin America", University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo (1985a) "The Crisis of Social Security and Health Care: Latin 
American Experiences and Lessons, " Latin American Monograph and Document 
Series No. 9, University of Pittsburvh, PA, USA. 
Mesa-Lago, Cannelo (1985b) " Altemative Strategies to the Social Security Crisis: 
Socialist, Market and Mixed Approaches, " in Mesa-Lago, Camielo (Ed. ) The Crisis of 
Social Security and Health Care: Latin American Experiences and Lessons, Latin 
American Monograph and Document Series No. 9, University of Pittsburgh. - 
A, 
USA. 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, (1989), "Chile: Pioneer in Adoption and Privatization, " in 
Mesa-Lago (ed. ) Ascent to Bankruptcy: Financing Social Security in Latin America, 
University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, (1991a), "Portfolio Performance of Selected Social Security 
Institutes in Latin America, " World Bank Discussion Papers 139, The World Bank. 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, (1991b), "Social Security and Prospects for Equity in Latin 
America, " World Bank Discussion Papers 140, The World Bank. 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo (1991c) "Social Security In Latin America and the Caribbean: A 
Comparative Assessment, " in Ahmad et al (Eds. ) Social Security in Developing 
Countries, " Clarendon Press. Oxford. 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo (1996) "Pension System Reforms in Latin America: The 
Position of the International Organisations, " CEPAL Review. Vol. 60, December. 
Midgley, James (1996a) "New Themes in International Social Welfare: Introduction, " 
Joumal of Sociology and Social Welfare, Vol. XXI I1 (1), March. 
Midgley, James (1996b) "roward A Developmental Model Of Social Policy: 
Relevance Of The Third World Experience, " Journal of Sociology and Social 
Welf. are Vol. XX 111 (1), March. 
Midgley, James, (1999), "Has Social Security Become Irrelevant, " International 
Social Security Review. Vol. 52, No. 2. 
Midgley, James (1996) "Toward A Developmental Model Of Social Policy: 
Relevance Of The Third World Experience, " Journal Of Sociology & Welfare. Vol. 
XXI 11 (1) March. 
Miles, David, (1998), "The Implications of Switching From Unfunded to Funded 
Pension Systems, " National Institute of Economic Review. 
Miles, David & lben, Andreas (1998) "The Reform of Pension Systems: Winners and 
Losers Across Generations in the UK and Germany, " 
Mintzberg, H. (1983) "Power In And Around Organisations, " Prentice-Hall. New 
Jersey. 
Mitchell, S. Olivia, (1988), "Worker Knowledge of Pension Provisions, " Joumal of 
Labour Economics. Vol. 6, No. 1. 
Mitchell, S. Olivia (1997) "Building an Enviromnent for Pension Refonn in 
Developing Countries, " SP Discussion Paper, The World Bank. 
Mitchell, S. Olivia (1998) "Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement 
Systems, " in Feldstein, Martin (Ed. ) Privatizing Social Security, The University o 
Chicago Press. Chicago and London. 
Mitchell, S. Olivia (1999) "Managing Pensions in the 21't Century: Design 
Innovations, Market Impact and Regulatory Issues for Japan, " WP 99-20, Pension 
Research Council., University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA> 
Mitchell, S. Olivia & Andrews, S. Emily (1981) "Scale Economies in Private Multi- 
Employer Pension Systems, " Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Vol. 34 (4). 
Mitchell, S. Olivia & Barrcto, Ataliba, Flavio (1997) "After Chile, What? Second- 
Round Pension Reforms in Latin America, " Working Paper 6316, National Bureau of 
Economic Research. MA, USA. 
Mitchell, S. Olivia & Hsin, Ping-Ling (1997) "Public Pension Governance and 
PerforTnance, " in Valdes-Prieto, Salvador (Ed. ) Die Economics of Pensions: 
Principles, Policies and International experience, Cambridge University Prcss. 
Mizruchi, S. Mark (1983) "Who Controls Whom? An Examination Of The Relation 
Between Management And Boards Of Directors In Large American Corporations? " 
Academy ofManagernent Review Vol. 8(3). 
Mizruchi, S. Mark & Bunting, David (1981) "Influence In Corporate Networks: An 
Examination Of Four Measures, " Administrative Science QuarterlL Vol. 26. 
Modigliani, Franco (1988) "The Role of Intergenerational. Transfers and Life Cycle 
Saving in the Accumulation of Wealth, " Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 2 (2), 
Spring. 
Montserrat (1986) "Social Security Ordinance No. 26 of 1986, " Government of 
Montserrat, 
-Montserrat. 
Morgan, E. Victor (1984) "Choice in Pensions: The Political Economy of Saving for 
Retirement, " Institute of Economic Affairs, London. 
Mounbaga, Emmanuel (1995) "The Investment Of Social Security Reserves During 
Periods Of - Crisis: The Experience of Cameroon, " International Social Securit 
Review, Vol. 48(2). 
Munnell, Alicia, (1977), "The Future of Social Security, " Brookings Institution. 
Munnell, H. Alicia & Sunden, Annika (1999) "Investment Practices of State and 
Local Pension Funds: Implications for Social Security Reform, " WP 99-9, Pension 
Research Council. University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA> 
Myers, Robert, (1961), "Social Security: The Years Ahead, " in Social Security in the 
United States Four Lectures Presented at the University of California, Berkeley. 
Myers, Robert (1995a) "Social Security: If It Ain't Broken, Don't Fix It, " in 
Stephenson, Kevin (Ed. ) Social Security: Timefor Change, JAI Press Inc. London & 
Connecticut. 
Myers, Robert, (1995b), "The Chilean System: A Model for Others? " in Stephenson, 
Kevin (Ed. ) Social Security: Timefor Change, JAI Press Inc. London & Connecticut. 
National Insurance Board of Trinidad & Tobago (1997) "Pension Reform In The 
English Speaking Caribbean: The Case of Trinidad & Tobago, " Conference Paper 
Social Security In Yhe Americas, Interamerican Conference on Social SecuritL 
Mexico. 
Nero, Jennifer & Felix, Linda (1998) "A Review Of The Retirement Situation In The 
ECCB Area, Eastem Caribbean Central Bank. 
Ney, Steven (2000) "Thinking About Pension Reform: Discourses, Politics, and 
Public Participation, " Conference Paper Social Security in the Global Village, 
September 25-27, International Social Security Association, Helsinki. 
Nicholls, Garth (1996) "Implications For Financial Stability: Social Security 
Deposits, " Research & Information Department, Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, 
Basseterre. 
Nicholls, Garth (1999) "Social Security Issues In The OECS, " Research & 
Information Department, Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. Basseterre. 
Nicholls, Garth (2001) "Emerging Issues For The Eastern Caribbean Currency 
Union's Social Security Schemes, " Journal Of Eastern Caribbean Studies. " Vol. 
26(l), March. 
Nitsch, Manfred, (1996), "The Chilean Model for Social Security Reforms in Eastern 
Europe? " Discussion Paper, Institute of Latin American Studies (LAI). University o 
Berlin. 
Nitsch, Manfred & Schwarzer, Helmut (1996) "Recent Developments in Financing 
Social Security in Latin America, " Issues in Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 1, 
International Labour Office. Geneva. 
Oppenheim, Carey (1993), "Picking Over the Welfare State, " Poverty. No. 85. 
Organisation of 
Organisation For Economic Co-Operation & Development (1999) "OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance, " Ad Hoc Task Force On Corporate Governance, 
Organisation For Economic Co-operation & Development. Paris. 
Orszag, R. Peter & Stiglitz, Joseph (1999) "Rethinking Pension Refonn: Ten Myths 
About Social Security Systems, " Conference Paper, New Ideas About Old Age 
Security, September 14-15, The World Bank. Washington, DC. 
Osmani, S. R (1991) "Social Security in South Asia, " in Ahmad et al (Eds. ) Social 
Security in Developing Countries, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Ostaszewski, Krzysztof (1997a) "Privatising The Social Sccurity Trust Fund? Don't 
Let The Government Invest, " Cato Project On Social Security Privatisation. 
Ostaszewski, Krzysztof (1997b) "Discussion In Defense Of Pay-As-You-Go 
(PAYGO) Financing Of Social Security, " North American Actuarial Journal. ol. 
1(4). 
Palacios, Robert & Pallares-Miralles, Montserrat (2000) "International Patterns of 
Pension Provision, " SP Discussion Paper, The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA. 
Parsons, T. (1960) "Structure And Process in Modem Societies, " The Free Press, 
Illinois. 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey (1972) "Size And Composition Of Corporate Boards Of Directors: 
The Organisation And Its Enviromnent, " Administrative Science Quarterly.. No. 17. 
Perez, C. Robert (1995) "No Way to Run a Railroad: Social Security Funds Should 
Invest in Common Stocks! " in Stephenson, Kevin (Ed. ) Social Security: Time for a 
Change, JAI PressLLondon, England. 
Perez, Robert & Malley, Susan (1983) "Asset Allocation and the Social Security 
System, " Financial Management, Spring. 
Perrin, Guy (1992) "The Beveridge Plan: The Main Principles, " International Social 
Security Review, Vol. 45 (1/2). 
Perry, Guillermo & Leipziger, M. Danny (Eds. ) (1999) "Chile: Recent Policy Lessons 
and Emerging Challenges, " The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Plamondon, Pierre; Drouin, Anne; Binet, Gylles; Cichon, Michael; McGillivray, 
Warren; Bedard, Michel & Perez-Montas, Hernando (forthcoming) "Actuarial 
Practice in Social Security, " Quantitative Methods in Social Protection Series, 
International Labour Office, Geneva. 
Ploug, Niels (1995) "The Welfare State in Liquidation? " International Social Securijy 
Review, Vol. 48 (2). 
Porter, Edward, John (1995) "Individual Social Security Retirement Accounts, " in 
Stephenson, Kevin (Ed. ) Social Security: Time for a Change, JAI Press, London, 
England. 
Prinz, Christopher (1997) "Old Age Provision for Women: Bismarck or Beveridge? " 
Fourth International Research Seminar on "Issues in Social Security" FKF/FISS. 
Queisser, Monika, (1995), "Chile and Beyond: The Second Generation Pension 
Reforms in Latin America, " International Social Security Review, Vol. 48, Nos. 3-4. 
Queisser, Monika, (1998a), "The Second Generation Pension Reforms In Latin 
America, " Development Center, Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and 
Development 
Queisser, Monika (1998b) "Regulation and Supervision of Pension Funds: Principles 
and Practices, " Intemational Social Security Review. Vol. 51 (2). 
Queisser, Monika (2000) "Pension Reform and International Organisations: From 
Conflict to Convergence, " International Social Security Review. Vol. 53 (2). 
Quinn, F. Joseph & Mitchell, S. Olivia (1996) "A New Look at Social Security 
Reform, " Perspectives on Work. pgs. 70-73. 
Reilly, Frank K., (1994) "Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management, " Fourth 
Edition, The Dj3Lden Press. 
Reisen, Helmut & Williamson, John (1997) "Pension Funds, Capital Controls and 
Macroeconomic Stability, " in Valdes-Prieto, Salvador (Ed. ) The Economics of 
Pensions: Principles, Policies and International Experience, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Rocha, Roberto; Hinz, Richard & Gutierrez, Joaquin (1999) "Improving Regulations 
and Supervision of Pension Funds: Are There Lessons From the Banking Sector? " 
Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 9929, The World Bank. Washington, D. C. 
Rodriguez, L. Jacobo (1999) "Chile's Private Pension System at 18, " Benefits and 
Compensation Intemational. December. 
Rofman, Rafael (1995a) "Effects of Social Security on Lifetime Income Distribution 
in Argentina, " PSP Discussion Paper Series, The World Bank. 
Roftnan, Rafael (1995b) "Effects of Social Security on Lifetime Income Distribution 
in Brazil, " PSP Discussion Paper Series, The World Bank. 
Rofman, Rafael & Demarco, Gustavo (1999) "Collecting and Transferring Pension 
Contributions, " Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 9907, The World Bank, 
Washington, D. C. 
Romano, J. Trevor (1998) "Protecting The Interest of Workers: A Critical Role For 
Government In The Regulation Of Pension Provision, " (unpublished) National 
Insurance Board of Trinidad & Tobago., Port-of-Spain. 
Ross, G. Stanford (2000) "Doctrine & Practice in Social Security Pension Reforms, " 
Intemational Social Security Review. Vol. 53(2). 
Rostow, E. V. (1959) "To Whom And To What End Is Corporate Management 
Responsible, " in E. S. Mason (Ed. ) Yhe Corporation In Modern Society, Atheneum, 
New York. 
Sala-I-Martin, Xavier, (1994), "A Positive Theory of Social Security, " Discussion 
Paper No. 1025, September, Centre for Economic PL)IigL London. 
Samuel, Wendell, (1993), "National Insurance/Social Security Schemes in the OECS 
Region, " Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, St. Kitts. 
Samuel, Wendell (2000) "The Harmonisation Of Social Security In The Caribbean, " 
in Theodore, Karl & La Foucade, Althea (eds. ) Current Issues In Social Security: 
Pensions, Poverty And Health, Interamerican Conference On Social Security. 
Samuelson, Paul, (1958), "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model With or Without the 
Social Contrivance of Money, " The Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 66. No. 6. 
Swnwick, A. Andrew (1998) "Discount Rate Heterogeneity and Social Security 
Refomi, " Joumal of Development Economics. Vol. 57. 
Santamaria, Marco (1995) "What can the United States Learn from Chile? " in 
Stephenson, Kevin (Ed. ) Social Security: Time for Change, JAI Press, London, 
England. 
Schieber, J. Sylvester & Shoven, B. John (Eds. ) "Public Policy Toward Pensions, " 
, MA, USA and London, England. MIT kress 
Schwarz, M. Anita & Demirguc-Kunt, Ash (1999) "Taking Stock of Pension Reforms 
Around the World, " SP Discussion Paper No. 9917, The World Bank. Washington, 
DC, USA. 
Sebastien, J. St. Bernard (1994) "Enhancing Retirement Income - Social Security 
Reform, " Paper Presented at Meeting Of Eastern Caribbean Central Bank And Heads 
OfSocial Security Schemes in the OECS, Basseterre. 
Sebastien, J. St. Bernard (1995) "Mobilising Capital: Coordinated Investment 
Management Of Social Security Reserves, " Paper Presented at ECCB Meeting With 
Social Security Schemes, Tortola. 
Shaw, Edward S., (1973), "Financial Deepening in Economic Development, " Oxford 
University Press. New York 
Shome, Parthasarathi & Saito, A. Katrine (1980) "Social Security Funds in Singapore 
and the Philippines: Ramifications of Investment Policies, " Labour and Society. Vol. 
5, No. 1, January 
Sinha, Rajeeva (1998) "Corporate Govemance: A Study of The Corporate 
Govemance of Quoted Finns In The UK, " Doctoral Thesis University of Warwick., 
Srinivas, P. S; Yermo, Juan, (1999), "Do Investment Regulations Compromise 
Pension Fund Performance? Evidence from Latin America, " World Bank. 
Srinivas, P. S; Whitehouse, Edward & Yermo, Juan (2000) "Regulating Private 
Pension Funds' Structure, Performance and Investments: Cross-Country Evidence, " 
Pension Primer, The World Bank. 
Stanton, David, (1998), "Latin American and European Approaches: United 
Kingdom, " in International Social Security Association, The Future of Social 
Security: The Stockholm Conference 29 June -I July. 
Stanton, I. David & Dapre, Bob (1998) "Financing Social Security Pensions: The 
ExPerience of Australia, " in Financing Retirement Benefits: The Asia and Pacific 
Experience, The Asia and Pacific Series No. 20, International Social Securit 
Association, Geneva. 
St. Christopher and Nevis (1977) "St. Christopher and Nevis Social Security Act No. 
13 of 1977, " Govemment of St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Christopher and Nevis. 
Stephenson, Kevin; Horlacher, David & Colander, David (1995) "An Overview of the 
U. S. Social Security System: Problems and Options, " in Stephenson, Kevin (Ed. ) 
Social Security: Timefor a Change, " JAI Press IncLondon, England. 
Stiglitz, Joseph (1999) "On Liberty, The Right to Know, and Public Discourse: The 
Role of Transparency in Public Life, " Oxford Amnesty Lecture. 
St. John, Susan & Willmore, Larry (2000) "Two Legs Are Better Than Three: New 
Zealand As A Model For Old Age Pensions, " Conference Paper Social Security in the 
Global Village, September 25-27, International Social Security Association, Geneva. 
St. Lucia (1978) "National Insurance Act No. 10 of 1978, " Government of St. Lucia, 
St. Lucia. 
Stohr, R. A. (1975) "Legal Responsibilities, Liabilities And Protection Of Corporate 
Directors, " in Bacon, J. & J. K. Brown (eds. ) Corporation Directorship Practices: 
Role, Selection And Legal Status Of The Board, Conference Board And The American 
Society Of Corporate Secretaries Inc. New York. 
Stolte, D. Myron (1981) "Pension Plan Sponsors: Monitor Yourselves, " Harvard 
Business Review, March -A nl. 
St. Rose, M (1982) "A Preliminary Assessment Of The Impact of Social Security 
Schemes On The Propensity To Save In The Eastern Caribbean, " Savings For 
Development. United Nations. 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1986) "National Insurance Act No. 33 of 1986, " 
Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
Tamagno, Edward (1992) "Report On The Results Of The Survey Of The Needs 
Concerns Of Social Security Institutions In The English-Speaking Caribbean, " 
Department of National Health & Welfare. Canada 
Taylor, David (1998) "Social Identity and Social Policy: Engagements with 
Postmodern Theory, " Journal of Social Policy. Vol. 27(3). 
Taylor, David (1999) "Latin America and Foreign Capital in the Twentieth Century: 
Economics, Politics and Institutional Change, " WP 7394, National Bureau of 
Economic ResearchiMA, USA. 
Theodore, Karl (1997) "Planning and Implementation of Medical Care Systems, " 
Tenth Meetiniz of Heads of ISSA Member Organisations in the English-Speaking 
Caribbean. May 26-28, Barbados. 
Theodore, Karl (2000a) "Assessment of Social Security Provisions in the Caribbean, " 
in Drouin & Plamondon (Eds. ) Issues in Social Security Financing in the Caribbean, 
Issues in Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 8, ILO. Geneva. 
Theodore, Karl (2000b) "Caribbean Social Security And The New Economic Order, " 
in Theodore, Karl & La Foucade, Althea (eds. ) Current Issues In social Security: 
Pensions, Poverty And Health, Interamerican Conference On Social Security. Studies 
Series 53. 
Theodore, Karl & La Foucade, Althea (1999) "Social Security Investments in the 
Caribbean: From Inception to 1995, " An Economic Perspective on Reform, l't 
Edition, University of the West Indies, Trinidad. 
Theodore, Karl & La Foucade, Althea (2000) (eds. ) "Current Issues In Social 
Security: Pensions, Poverty And Health, " Interamerican Conference On Social 
SecLnty,., Studies Series 53. 
Thompson Carlos (1998a) "The Evolution Of Social Security in Trinidad & Tobago, " 
Research Department, National Insurance Board Of Trinidad & Tobago. 
Thompson, Carlos (1998b) "The Role Of The National Insurance Board In Meeting 
United nations Declaration On Social Economic And Cultural Rights In Trinidad & 
Tobago, 99 Paper Presented at The Social Policy Conference, University of The West 
Indies, St. Augustine. 
Thompson, Lawrence, (1998), "Older and Wiser: The Economics of Public Pensions, " 
The Urban Institute Press, Washington, D. C., USA. 
Tomes, Igor (1995) "From Waste to Targeting in Social Security: A Central and 
Eastern European Reflection, " in Social Security Tomorrow: Pemanence and 
Change, International Social Security Association. Geneva. 
Torres, I. Cannela (1996) "Social Security in the Philippines: A Country Study, " in 
Towards Social Security for the Poor in the Asia-Pacific Region, Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations, New York. 
Tortola (1979) "Social Security Ordinance (1979) No. 17 of 1979, " Government of 
Tortola, Tortola. 
Turner, A. John (2000) "Mandatory Defined-Contribution Pension Systems: Progress- 
or Regression? " International Social Security Review. Vol. 53(4). 
United Nations Development Programme/Intemational Labour Organisation (1976) 
"Financial And Actuarial Study Of The National Provident Fund And The Proposed 
Social Security Scheme - Project Findings And Recommendations, " International 
Labour Organisation. Geneva. 
Urquhart, Kelvin (1996) "Factors Influencing Social Security Systems, " Keynote 
Address at Twentieth Anniversary Of The Dominica Social Security Board, Roseau. 
Urquhart, Kelvin (1991) "Trends & Problems Of Social Security In The English 
Speaking Caribbean, " ISSA Training Course On Social Security Administration For 
The English-Speaking Caribbean, British Virgin Islands. 
Useem, Michael & Hess, David (1999) "Governance and Investments of Public 
Pensions, " VVT 99-11, Pension Research Council, University of Pennsylvania, PA, 
USA. 
Useem, Michael & Mitchell, S. Olivia (2000) "Holders of the Purse Strings: 
Governance and Performance of Public Retirement Systems, " WP 2000-3, Pension 
Research Counccil University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA. 
Vagts, F. Detlev (1981) "CEOs And Their Lawyers: Tension Strains The Link, " 
Harvard Business Review. March-April. 
Valdes-Prieto, Salvador (1997a) "The Economics of Pensions: Principles, Policies 
and International Experience", Cambridge University Press. 
Valdes-Prieto, Salvador, (1997b), "Financing a Pension Refonn Toward Private 
Funded Pensions, " in Valdes-Prieto, Salvador (Ed. ) Yhe Economics of Pensions: 
Principles, Policies and International Experience, Cambridge University Press. 
Valdes-Prieto, Salvador, (1999), "Reply to the Article: Do Investment Regulations 
Compromise Pension Fund Performance? Evidence From Latin America, " by P. S. 
Srinivas and Juan Yenno, Revista de Analisis Econornico, Vol. 14, No. 1, June. 
Valencia, Renato, C., (1998), "Observations on Funding and Investment: Social 
Security System of The Philippines, " in ISSA, Financing Retirement Benefits: The 
Asia and Pacific Experience. 
Vance, S. C. (1964) "Boards Of Directors: Structure And Performance, " University of 
Oregon Press, Oregon. 
Vance, S. C. (1983) "Corporate Leadership, Boards, Directors And Strategy, " 
McGraw-Hill. New York. 
Van Voorhis, A. Rebecca, (1999) "A Socio-Economic Analysis of the Three Paths to 
Social Security Reform, " Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare. June, Vol. XXVI, 
No. 2. 
Venti, F. Steven & Wise, David (1998) "The Cause of Wealth Dispersion At 
Retirement: Choice or Chance, " The American Economic Review. Vol. 88(2). 
Vittas, Dimitri (1993) "Swiss Chilanpore: The Way Forward for Pension Refonn? " 
In International Social Security Association, The Implications for Social Security o 
Structural Adjustment Policies, Studies and Research, No. 34, Geneva. 
... r Vittas, Dimitri, (1995), "Strengths and Weaknesses of the Chilean Pension Reform, " 
Financial Sector Development Dgpartment. World Bank. Washington, D. C. 
Vittas, Dimitri (1997) "The Argentine Pension Reform and its Relevance for Eastern 
Europe, " Financial Sector Development Department, The World BannWashington, 
D. C. 
Vittas, Dimitri, (1998a), "Regulatory Controversies of Private Pension Funds, " Policy 
Research Working Paper 1893, The World Bank Development Research Group. 
Washington, D. C. 
Vittas, Dimitri (1998b) "Links Between Pension Reform, Insurance and Financial 
Markets, " in ISSA Asia and Pacific Series No. 23, Social Security in Asia and the 
Pacific: The Road Ahead, Geneva. 
Vittas, Dirnitri (1998c) "Institutional Investors and Securities Markets: Which Comes 
First? " presented at the ABCD LAC Conference, El, Salvador. 
Voirin, Michel (2000) "An Ambitious Venture: Commentary on "A Global Ranking 
of National Social Security Systems, " International Social Security Review. Vol. 
53(4). 
Wallich, Christine, (1983), "Savings Mobilization Through Social Security: The 
Experience of Chile During 1916-77, " World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 533, 
The World Bank., Washington, DC. 
Walsh, P. James & Seward, K. James (1990) "On The Efficiency Of Internal And 
External Corporate Control Mechanisms, " Journal of Management Review. Vol. 
15(3). 
Weaver, L. Carolyn (1995) "Social Security Investment Policy: What is it and How 
Can It be Improved? " in Stephenson, Kevin (Ed. ) Social Security: Timefor a Change, 
JAI Press, London, England. 
Weisbach, S. Michael (1988) "Outside Directors and CEO Tumover, " Joumal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 20. 
Westphal, D. James & Zajac, J. Edward (1995) "Who Shall Govem? CEO/Board 
Power Demographic Similarity and New Director Selection, " Administrative Science 
Quarterly. No. 40. 
Whitehouse, Edward (1998) "Pension Reform in Britain, " Social Protection 
Discussion paper No. 9810, The World Bank. Washington, D. C. 
VAitehouse, Edward (2000) "Pension Reform, Financial Literacy and Public 
Information: A Case Study of the United Kingdom, " Social Protection Discussion 
Paper No. 0004, The World Bank. Washington, D. C. 
Williams, H. M. & Shapiro, I. S. (1979) 'Tower And Accountability: The Changing 
Role Of The Corporate Board Of Directors, " Camegie-Mellon University Press, New 
York. 
Wilson, M. Theresa (1999) "Opting Out: The Galveston Plan and Social Security, " 
Working Paper 99-22, Pension Research Council, PA, USA. 
Wiseman, M. Robert (1998) "A Behavioural. Agency Model Of Managerial Risk 
Taking, " Academy of Management Review. January. 
Wolfson, Nicholas (1984) "The Modem Corporation: Free Market Versus 
Regulation, " McGraw-Hill. New York. 
World Bank, (1994), "Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and 
Promote Growth, " A World Bank Policy Research Report, Oxford University Press. 
Wrensford, C. Steve (2001) "The Board's Investment Managers Challenges, 
Opportunities And A Job Description, " St. Kitts & Nevis Social Security Board. 
Zald, N. Mayer (1969) "The Power And Functions Of Boards Of Directors: A 
Theoretical Synthesis, " American Journal of Sociology, No. 75. 
Zajac, J. Edward (1990) "CEO Selection, Succession, Compensation And Firm 
Perfon-nance: A Theoretical Integration And Empirical Analysis, " Strategic 
Management Joumal. Vol. 11. 
OTHER PUBLICATIONS 
Anguilla Social Security Board (2001) "Business Unusual: Taking The Anguilla 
Social Security Scheme Into The New Millennium, " 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat (November 1993) "CARICOM 
Agreement On Social Security, " CARICOM. 
-Georgetown. 
CARICOM (undated) "A Guide To The CARICOM Social Security Agreement, " 
CARICOM, Georgetown. 
Compton, Francis (unpublished) "Social Security - An Instrument of Development, " 
St. Lucia National Insurance Scheme., Castries. 
Esquivel, Manuel (April 7,1994) "Feature Address And Fonnal Opening By The 
Prime Minister of Belize, " Fifth Meeting Of CARICOM Heads OfSocial Security. 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (May, 19,1994) "Meeting With Officials Of Social 
Secunty Sc emes, " St. Lucia. 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (November, 17,1994) "Meeting With Officials Of 
Social Security Schemes, " Nevis. 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (May, 18,1995) "Meeting With Officials Of Social 
Security Schemes, " Tortola. 
Government of Montserrat (1999) "Social Welfare Review Report. " 
Government of Trinidad & Tobago (1961) "Report of The Committee Appointed By 
Government To Consider And To Recommend Provisions For The Approval Of 
Private Superannuation Schemes. " 
Government of Trinidad & Tobago (1971) "Social Security In Trinidad & Tobago: 
The National Insurance Scheme For Trinidad & Tobago, Considered By The 
Tripartite Conference On Social Security And Approved By Cabinet. " 
Government of Trinidad & Tobago (1972) "Address Made In Parliament By The 
Minister of Labour, Social Security And Co-operatives on The National Insurance 
System, " Government Printely. Trinidad. 
Grenada National Insurance Scheme (October 11,1982) "Progress Report - National 
Insurance Scheme, " From Chairman of the National Insurance Scheme Committee. 
Grenada National Insurance Scheme (November 17,1982) "Letter From Chairman of 
National Insurance Committee to The Prime Minister". 
Grenada National Insurance Scheme (December 3,1982) "Minutes Of National 
Insurance Committee Meeting. " 
Grenada National Insurance Scheme (1982) "An Outline of Grenada's Proposed 
National Insurance Scheme. " 
Grenada National Insurance Scheme (2000) "Retreat Report: Optimising Our N. I. S. " 
Grenada People's Revolutionary Government (November 24,1982) "National 
Insurance Scheme Draft legislation, " Cabinet Conclusion No. 470. 
Payne, E. St. John (September 16,1978) "Speech Made by The Minister Responsible 
For Social Security At The Opening Of The Social Security Building". 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (June 21,1991) "Convention On Social 
Security In The Organisation Of Eastern Caribbean States, " OECS. Grenada. 
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Appendix la 
Comparative Analysis Of The Position Of the ILO, And World Bank 
General Principles 
_- - 
ILO Perspective World Bank Perspective 
Proposed Pension System No Universal Approach; But A Pension Universal Approach Aimed At Merging The System Based On The Culture And Habits Different Social Programmes 
Of Its Society 
Essentially Focused On The Economic 
A Perspective Not Strictly Focused On Perspective 
economic Factors; It Should Reflect The 
Type Of Regulatory System Surrounding 
The Social And Economic Environment 
Objectives Of Pension 
I ý. Public Pensions Should Provide Regular 1*: Old Age Public Pensions Should 
Income Security Above A Minimum Increase National Savings 
System Subsistence Level In Old Age 
2"6: Old Age Public Pensions Should 
Promote The Development Of Contractual 2": Providing Insurance Protection In The 
Savings Event OfSpecified Continizencies 
Functions Of The Pension Horizontal And Vertical Redistribution Of Capital Formation via Mandatory Public Income To The Different Occupational Pension Savings Scheme 
System GroupsOfWorkers 
Limited Income Redistribution Targeted To 
The Poor 
Structure Of The Pension 
First Pillar: First Pillar: 
Universal Safety Net Covering Those Not Mandatory Component OfA Limited 
System Protected By Any System; Means-Tested Proportion; Public Administration; Financed 
Benefits; Financed From State Budget From State Budget 
Second Pillar. Second Pillar: 
Mandatory Coverage; Contributory Basis; Mandatory Participation; Private 
Public Or Private Administration With A Administration; Pensions Determined On 
Public Mandate Defined In Either Case, An Individual basis Without Any Solidarity; 
Eamings-Related Pensions On A Solidarity Fully Funded Through Mandatory 
Basis; Partially Funded Or Operating On A Retirement Savings And/Or Employer. 
PAYG Basis Sponsored Occupational Pension Schemes 
ThirdPillar. - 77tird Pillar: 
Voluntary & Complementary Pensions; Voluntary Participation; Complementary 
Fully Funded pensions Through Individual Retirement 
Savings; Fully Funded 
Financing Method Defined Benefit Pensions: 
Defined Contribution Pensions: 
Pensions Are Legally Determined Contributions Are Fixed While Pensions 
According To a Benefit Formul a, In Line Are Not Determined Until The Time Of 
With ILO Convention No. 67. Retirement. This Is A Technique For The 
Advance Funding Of Pensions Excluding 
Partial Funding: Any Redistributive Mechanism -The Cost 
Providing Means To Achieve Redistribution Is Known While The Benefit Is Unknown 
For Intra & Inter General ional Solidarity 
Full Funding: 
An Individual Savings Approach Under 
Which Each Worker Is only Accountable 
For Him/Herself 
Role Of The State The State Is Responsible For Setting Laws A Minimal Role OfThe State Providing Concerning Social Protection; Subsidies As Each Worker Is Personally 
Accountable For Old Age Protection 
The State Acts As The Financial Guarantor According To His/1 ter Means In The 
OfThe System And It Has The Means To Context ofA Competitive Market 
Provide Security To The Entire Population 
Minimum Subsistence Pension To The Poor 
Overall Strategy The Priority Of The System Is To Promote Maintain A Minimal Public Pension Scheme National Solidarity By Means Of A Social 
Safety Net And Then To Promote Pensions Should Mainly Serve To Promote 
Occupational Solidarity Through The National Savings. Individual Savings 
Extension ofCoverage To All Workers Programmes And Employer-Sponsored 
Occupational Pension Schemes 
The State Should Regulate Complementary 
pension Schemes 
boUrCt: A"CdkromLdxssa(1999) 
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Comparative Analysis Of The Position Of The ILO And World Bank 
Specific Provisions ILO Perspective World Bank Perspective 
Difficulties Encountered Difficulties Due To The Ageing Difficulties Due To 
By Public Pension Of The Population Demographic Factors [& 
Systems (Demographic Factors) And The Inefficiencies of Operations] Fall In Activity Rates As A 
Result Of The Rise In 
Unemployment And Under- 
Employment 
Level Of Benefits According To ILO Conventions Benefits Are Too Generous In 
102,128 & 131, The Minimum Public Pension Systems 
& Maximum Pensions For 
Someone Who Has 
Accumulated 30 Years Of 
Contributions Are 40% & 65%, 
Respectively, Of Pensionable 
Earnings 
Relations Between The Link Does Not Have To Be There Must Be A Direct Link 
Contributions And Established At The Individual Between Contributions And 
Benefits Level But Has To Exist AT The Benefits At The Individual Global Level. This Is Done In Level Such That Each Person 
Order To Emphasise On The Should Receive Equal To The 
Function Of Universal Accumulated Contributions As 
Coverage, To Link Benefits A Matter Of Equity 
With The Needs And To 
Reinforce Solidarity This Eliminates Distortions 
Administration The "ILO Enquiry On The Cost Private Pension Schemes 
Of Social Security" Shows That Perform Better Than Public 
The Administrative Expenses Systems: Administrative Costs 
Of Public Pension Systems Are Are Lower; The Quality Of 
Not Higher Than Those Of Service Is Higher; No External 
Private Systems Pressures Exists 
The Best Guarantee For Quality 
And Independence Of 
Administration Lies In The 
Participation Of Social Partners 
As Recommended By 
Convention No. 102 
Impact Of The Pension Based On The Lack Of The Global Impact Of Pension 
System On The Economy Consensus Among Economists Schemes On The Different 
With Respect To The Impact On Economic Sectors (Including 
The Economy, It Appears That Production, Savings And 
The Neo-Liberals Consider The Capital) Is Negative 
Impact To be Negative, While 
The Keyncsians Perceive The Mandatory Individual 
Positive Aspects Retirement Savings Schemes 
Represent The Best Solution To 
Provide Old Age Income 
Protection 
bource: Aaaptea rrom Ljbossa (iggg) 
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Appendix lb 
Summary Of Social Security Reforms in Latin America And Central 
And Eastern Europe 
Country Funded Pillar, Safety Net Status Of Old Transition 
Privately System Mechanism 
Managed 
Argentina Optional Second First Pillar Flat Reformed, But Open Compensatory 
Pillar Pension To New Workers Pension For 
Previous Years Of 
Service 
Australia Mandatory Second Means-Test First Fully Functional Not Needed, Second 
Pillar Pillar Pillar Added First 
Bolivia Primary System Annual Pension Closed To New Compensatory 
Benefit For Those Workers And Those Pension 
At Least 21 Years Below The Age of 
of Age in 1995 out 35 
of shares in state- 
owned firms 
Chile Primary System Minimum Pension Closed To New Recognition Bonds 
Guarantee Workers Payable At Time Of 
Retirement 
Colombia Optional Primary Minimum Pension Slightly Reformed, Recognition Bonds 
System Guarantee But Open To New 
Workers 
El Salvador Primary System Minimum Pension Closed To New Recognition Bonds 
Guarantee Workers And Those 
Under The Age Of 
35 
Hungary Optional Primary Eamings-Related Closed To New Compensatory 
System First Pillar Entrants Pension 
Kazakhstan Primary System Minimum Pension Closed Completely Compensatory 
Guarantee Pension 
Mexico Primary System Minimum Pension Closed Completely Current Workers 
Guarantee Retain Rights To 
State Pension If 
Higher 
Peru Optional Primary None Open To New Recognition Bonds 
System Workers At Time Of 
Retirement 
Poland Mandatory Second Notional Accounts Closed To New Notional Initial 
Pillar First Pillar Entrants And Capital 
Workers Under The 
Age of 30 
Sweden Mandatory Second Notional Accounts Conventional DB Compensatory 
Pillar First Pillar Closed pension In 
Transition To 
Notional Accounts 
United Kingdom Optional Second Flat First Pillar Open To All Compensatory 
Pillar Pension Calculated 
Based On Last 
Contribution 
Uruguay Optional Second Earnings Related Reformed, But Open Years Of Service 
Pillar First Pillar, But To New Workers Rccognised For 
With Ceiling Those Under 40, But 
Under New 
Formula; Older 
Cohorts Get 
Reformed Benefits, 
I Phased In 
auurcc. 5cnwarz a L. )emirguc-runt (i ggg: zs) 
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Legend for Table 4.1 
Abbreviations Meaning 
Min Minister 
Min* Minister with the concurrence of the Leader of the Opposition 
MinCab Minister on the advice of Cabinet 
MinR Minister on the recommendations of the association of trade 
unions and employers associations 
MinC Minister after consultation with the association of trade unions 
and employers associations 
MinN, Min*N No provisions made specifically for consultation or 
recommendations with anyone for the appointment. In the case 
of the British Virgin Islands, the Act stipulates there will be 
two persons representing the government, but specifies that the 
Chairman and the Deputy Chairman shall be made in 
concurrence of the Leader of Opposition, and so in effect the 
two persons representing government are the Chairman and 
Deputy. 
Gov Governor-General 
GovC Govemor-in-Council 
Govc Governor General after consultation with the employees and employers' 
bodies 
GovM Governor-General on advice of the Minister 
Cab Cabinet 
PSC Public Service Commission 
BOD Board of Directors 
BOW Board of Directors with approval of the Minister 
Bod+ The Board of Directors appoints but the remuneration of the Director is with 
the approval of the Minister 
Dir Director 
Dir* Director on advice of the Board 
Dir+ Director with the approval of the Board 
N/A The Act does not make any specific mention of the appointment of a Deputy 
Chairman 
ANG Anguilla 
ANT Antigua and Barbuda 
BVI British Virgin Islands 
DOM Dominica 
GRE Grenada 
MON Montserrat 
SKB St. Kitts and Nevis 
SLU St. Lucia 
SVG St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
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Anguilla Social Security Board Portfolio Composition 
Percentages 
Years 
0 Foretgn Investments 
0 Other lnvwbTw3nts 
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Antigua & Barbuda Social Security Board Portfolio 
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British Virgin Islands Social Security Board Portfolio 
Composition 
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Dominica Social Security Scheme Portfolio Composition 
Percentages 
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Grenada National Insurance Scheme Portfolio 
Composition 
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Montserrat Social Security Board 
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St. Kitts & Nevis Social Security Board Portfolio 
Composition 
Percentage 
, 
13 Foreign lnvmtrrwft 
N Other Investments 
13 Loans 
0 Governrnent Bonds &T Bdis 
a Rxed Deposits 
13 Equity 
Year 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Appendix 10 
St. Lucia National Insurance Scheme Portfolio 
Composition 
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St Vincent & The Grenadines National Insurance Scheme 
Portfolio Composition 
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Appendix 12a 
Interview Questions For Ministers, Board Members And Social 
Security Directors 
I (a) What do you see as your role as Minister/Social Security Director? 
l(b) Has Government ratified the ILO Conventions on Social Security? 
2(a) What do you see as the role of social security9 
2(b) Do you think that Social Security fulfils its mandate to its members? 
2(c) If yes, how so? If no, how have they failed? 
3 How do members of the Social Security view their contribution: as a tax or 
benefit? 
4(a) Are there employees/employers' representatives on the Board of the Social 
Security? 
4(b) How are the representatives selected for membership on the Board of the 
Social Security? 
4(c) Are you involved in the nominating and appointing process of the Board 
members? 
4(d) How do you evaluate their representation and perfonnance? 
5(a) What are your views on the investment of the funds accumulated by the Social 
Security? 
5(b) What role do you see for foreign investment in the portfolio of the Social 
Security? 
6 What role do you see for the Social Security in the economic development for 
the country9 
7 What role do you see for the Social security in the development of capital 
markets in the OECS region? 
8(a) Do you provide a private pension for employees? 
8(b) What are the eligibility criteria? 
8(c) Is the private plans harmonised with the pension provided by the Social 
Security? If so, what are the mechanisms of the harmonisation? 
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Interview Questions For Ministers, Board Members And Social 
Security Directors 
8(d) Do you provide retirement planning programmes for your employees 
contributors? 
8(e) If so, what kind of programmes and what's the frequency? If not, do you plan 
to introduce any in the future? 
9 To what extent is the pension provided by the Social Security the main form of 
income for your members/employees in retirement? 
10 What role do you see for Social Security in the future, and how do you see the 
institution fulfilling that role? 
11 What are your views on the privatisation of Should Social Security? 
12 How do you respond to the charges made about the "politicisation" of the 
nominating and appointing process of the Board of the Social Security 
Organisation? 
13 How do you respond to the charges made about the interference by 
government in the investment and management operations of the Social 
Security Organisation? 
14 What are the challenges facing the Social Security Organisation? 
15 Please feel free to provide any other information on the Social Security issues 
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Interview Questions For Workers And Employers9 Representatives 
And Employers 
I (a) How many members/employees belong to your organisation? 
I (b) Are they all members of the Social Security System? 
2(a) What do you see as the role of social security? 
2(b) Do you think that Social Security fulfils its mandate to its members? 
2(c) If yes, how so? If no, how have they failed? 
3 How do your members/employees view their contribution: as a tax or benefit? 
4(a) Are there employees/employers' representatives on the Board of the Social 
Security? 
4(b) Are the representatives from your organisation? 
4(c) How are the representatives selected for membership on the Board of the 
Social Security? 
4(d) How do you evaluate their representation and performance? 
5(a) What are your views on the investment of the funds accumulated by the Social 
Security? 
5(b) What role do you see for foreign investment in the portfolio of the Social 
Security? 
6 What role do you see for the Social Security in the economic development for 
the country9 
7 What role do you see for the Social security in the development of capital 
markets in the OECS region? 
8(a) Do you provide a private pension for members/employees? 
8(b) What are the eligibility criteria? 
8(c) How many of the employers where you are the bargaining agent/whom you 
represent provide a private pension plan for their workers? 
8(d) Are these private plans harmonised with the pension provided by the Social 
Security? If so, what are the mechanisms of the harmonisation? 
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Interview Questions For Employees And Employers' Representatives 
And Employers 
8(e) Do you provide retirement planning programmes for your employees? 
8(f) If so, what kind of programmes and what's the frequency9 If not do you plan 
to introduce any in the future? 
9 To what extent is the pension provided by the Social Security the main form of 
income for your members/employees in retirement? 
10 What role do you see for Social Security in the future, and how do you see the 
institution fulfilling that role? 
11 What are your views on the privatisation of Social Security? 
12 Please feel free to provide any other information on the Social Security issues 
Appendix 12 c 
Interview Questions For Insurance And Finance Companies 
I What are your views on Social Security Provisions in your country? 
2(a) Do you provide any retirement planning seminars for clients, both individually 
and in groups? 
2(b) If so, how is the programme structured? 
2(c) How many of these programmes have you conducted? 
3(a) What retirement packages do you offer? 
3(b) How long have you offered this programme? 
3(c) How many of thcsc packagcs havc you sold? 
3(d) Are these programmes offered on an individual basis or group basis? 
4(a) Do you provide and administer private pension plans for and on behalf of 
employers? 
4(b) If so, how long have you offered this service? 
4(c) How many private pension plans do you administer on behalf of employers? 
5 (a) Are these retirement products and pension plans harmonised with Social 
Security? 
5(b) If so what are the harmonisation mechanisms? 
How do you view the Social Security Organisation? 
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List Of Interviewees 
Anguilla 
Board Members: Current and Past 
Mr Victor Banks 
Minister of Finance and Social Security 
The Valley 
Mr Ronald Webster 
Former Chief Minister 
The Valley 
Mr Marcel Fabian Fahie 
Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Economic Development Investment & Commerce 
The Secretariat 
P0 Box 60, The Valley 
Mr Colville L. Petty 
Writer/Historian and Curator 
P0 Box 966, The Valley 
Mr Ralph Hodge 
Chairman of the Board 
Anguilla Social Security Board 
P0 Box 243, The Valley 
Executive Director 
Mr Timothy Hodge 
Director 
Anguilla Social Security Board 
P0 Box 243, The Valley 
Workers'Representatives 
Mr Alkins Rogers 
President 
Anguilla Civil Service Association 
P0 Box 1320, The Valley 
Mr Leroy Hill 
President 
Anguilla Teachers Union 
The Valley 
Mr Ricky Ruffin 
Past President 
Anguilla Youth Council 
The Valley 
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List Of Interviewees 
Mr Kelly Richardson 
President 
Anguilla Hotel & Allied Workers Union 
The Valley 
Employers'Representatives 
Ms Mimi Gratton 
Executive Director 
Anguilla Hotel & Tourism Association 
'Me Valley 
Mr Courtney Devonish 
Vice President 
Anguilla Chamber of Commerce & Industry 
The Valley 
Employers 
Mr Wendell Proctor 
Managing Director 
Proctor & Sons 
The Valley 
Ms Connie Brooks 
Managing Director 
Ashley & Sons 
The Valley 
Meridith & Jeremiah Gumbs 
Rendezvous Bay 
The Valley 
Dr Phyllis Banks-Fleming 
Human Resource Manager 
Cap Julica Hotel 
The Valley 
Ms Ann Gumbs 
Financial Controller 
Mallihouna, Hotel 
The Valley 
Mr Cephas Webster 
Manager 
Quality Construction 
The Valley 
Mr Oliver Brooks 
Manager 
Oliver Brooks Construction 
The Valley 
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List Of Interviewees 
Insurance Companies 
Ms Monica Gumbs 
Manager 
ALICO Insurance 
The Valley 
Otli er Stakeholders 
Mrs Meridith Gumbs 
Labour Commissioner 
Government of Anguilla 
The Valley 
StaffMembers ofAnguilla Social Security Board 
Mrs Yolanda Gumbs 
Deputy Director 
Mrs Dorice Fleming 
Accountant 
Ms Lena Sasso 
Benefits & Contributions Manager 
AntiLyua and Barbuda 
Board Members: Current 
Mr Leroy King 
Chairrmn of the Board 
Antigua & Barbuda Social Security 
P0 Box 1125, St. John's 
Executive Director 
Mr Lennox Gardner 
Director 
Antigua & Barbuda Social Security 
P0 Box 1125, St. John's 
Workers'Representatives 
Mr Maurice Christian 
President/Workers' Representative On The Board 
Antigua & Barbuda Labour Union 
P0 Box 1125, St. John's 
Appendix 3 (Con't) 
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List of Interviewees 
Mr Wigley George 
President/Employers' Representatives On The Board 
Antigua Trades & Labour Union 
P0 Box 3, St. John's 
Ms Vemest 1. Mack 
Asst General Secretary 
Antigua & Barbuda Teachers Union 
Sweetes 
Employers'Representatives 
Mr Lionel Boulous 
Executive Director 
Antigua & Barbuda Chamber of Commerce 
North Street, St. John's 
Mr Henderson Bass 
Secretary 
Antigua Employers Federation 
P0 Box 298, St. John's 
Employers 
Ms Sharon Knight 
Personnel Officer 
Antigua Commercial Bank 
P0 Box 95, St. John's 
Mr Norris 0 Scholar 
Divisional Manager/Human Resources 
Cable & Wireless (West Indies) Ltd 
P0 Box 65, St. John's 
Mr Leslie Williams 
Deputy Port Manager 
Antigua & Barbuda Port Authority 
P0 Box 1052, St. John's 
Mrs Lucette James-Wint 
Asst. Training Officer 
LIAT 
P0 Box 819, St. John's 
Mr Paul Ashe 
Manager 
Barclays Bank PLC 
High Street 
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List Of Interviewees 
Insurance Companies 
Mr Asman Strann 
Business Manager 
Royal & Sun Alliance 
Long & Temple Streets 
St. John's 
Mr Henson James 
Agency Manager 
British American Life Insurance Company 
St. John's 
StaffMemhers Antigua & Barhuda Social Security Board 
Mr Eversleigh Warner 
Compliance Manager 
Mr Edward Jules 
Financial Controller 
Ms Bernadine Issac 
Human Resource & Public Relations Manager 
Mr Luther Mills 
Data Processing Manager 
British Virdn Islands 
Board Memhers: Current 
Mr Andrel Smith 
Employers Representative 
BVI Social Security Board 
Mr John Rymer 
Workers' Representative 
BVI Social Security Board 
Executive Director 
Mrs Antoinette Skelton 
Director 
British Virgin Islands Social Security Board 
P0 Box 698 
Road Town 
Tortola 
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Workers Representatives 
Mr Stanton 
President 
BVI Nurses Association 
Employers'Representatives 
Ms Nadine Battle 
Executive Director 
BVI Chamber of Commerce & Hotel Association 
P0 Box 376, Road Town 
Mr Michael Herbert 
13VI Taxi Association 
Road Town 
Employers 
Ms Cyralene Williams 
Human Resource Assistant 
The Moorings 
Road Town 
Social Security Staff 
Mrs Jeanette Scatliffe-Boynes 
Deputy Director/ Human Resource & Public Relations Manager 
Mr Clarence Faulkner, JR. 
Investment Manager 
Mr Joseph Williams 
Senior Inspector 
Mr Alwon Smith 
Inspector 
Mr Roy Barry 
Financial Controller 
Ms Linda Scatliffe 
Contributions Supervisor 
Ms Shirleen Stoutt 
Benefits Supervisor 
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, 
Dominica- 
Mýnister's Office 
Mr John Toussaint 
Minister of Health & Social Security 
Goverrunent of Dominica 
Roseau 
Mr John Fabian 
Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Health & Social Security 
Roseau 
-t 
Board Members: Past 
Nlr Hudson Savarin 
Foin r Director 
Dominica Social Security 
P0 Box 772, Roseau 
Executive Director 
Ms Janice Jean Jacques 
Acting Director 
Dominica Social Security 
P0 Box 772, Roseau 
Workers'Representatives 
Ms Fedeline Moulon 
General Secretary 
Dominica Amalgamated Workers Union 
P0 Box 137, Roseau 
Mrs Scotland 
General Secretary 
Waterfront & Allied Workers Union 
Roseau 
Mr Bernard Nicholas 
General Secretary 
Dominica Trade Union 
Independence Street 
Roseau 
Mr Thomas Letang 
General Secretary 
Dominica Public Service Association 
Valley Road 
Roseau 
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Mr Michael Augustine 
General Secretary 
Dominica Association of Teachers 
7B oyds Avenue 
Roseau 
Sergeant Cleville Mills 
President 
Police Welfare Association 
Dath Road 
Roseau 
Employers'Representatives 
Mr Athie Martin 
Executive Director 
Dominica Hotel & Tourism Association 
P0 Box 109, Roseau 
Mr Chris A. Joseph 
Industrial Relations, Research & Infonnation Officer 
Dominica Employer' Federation 
P0 Box 1783, Roseau 
EmplOyers 
Ms Verlie Shaw 
General Manager 
Roseau Co-operative Credit Union 
P0 Box 175, Roseau 
Mr Vincent Elwin 
General Manager 
Dominica Port Authority 
p0 Box 243, Roseau 
Mr Benoit Bardouille 
Accountant 
Dominica Port Authority 
p0 Box 243, Roseau 
Mrs Bertilia Leblanc-McKenzie 
Human Resource Officer 
Dominica Electricity Services 
p0 Box 1593, Roseau 
Mrs Audrey Thomas 
Personnel Manager 
Dominica Coconut Products 
p0 Box 18/1655, Roseau 
Mrs Leslie-Ann Green 
Personnel Manager 
0D Brisbane & Sons (D/ca) Ltd - Brizee Mart 
P0 Box 2, Roseau 
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Mrs Marion Dominique-Taylor 
Personnel Manager 
Dominica Water & Sewerage Conipany 
P0 Box 185, Roseau 
Ms Mavis Christain 
Head of Personnel & Administration 
H. H. V. Whitchurch & Co. Ltd 
p0 Box 71, Roseau 
Insurance & Finance Companies 
NU Marina Daisy 
Branch Administration Manager (Ag) 
Colonial Life Insurance Company (T/dad) Ltd 
17 Great George Street 
Roseau 
Nls Joan Oscar 
Nlanager 
American Life Insurance Company 
P0 Box 503, Roseau 
Nfr Anthony Moore 
Former Chief Executive Officer 
Dominica Unit Trust Corporation Ltd 
P0 Box 837, Roseau 
StaffMembers Dominica Social Security 
Mr Francis Letang 
N4anager Public Relations, Compliance and Statistics 
Mr Augustus Ettienne 
Internal Auditor 
Ms Josette Harney 
Personnel & Administrative Officer 
Mrs Emanuella Darymple 
Manager/ Contributions & Claims 
Mrs Ignatis Morgan 
Systems Analysts 
Mr Sylvester Mark 
Senior Supcrvisor/Contributions 
Mr Raymus Thomas 
Supervisor Compliance 
Ms Christabel Antoine 
Senior Supervisor/Benefits 
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NIs Hermia Mason & Ms Felicia Butler 
Senior Clerk/Contributions 
iN4s Aldith Lewis 
Senior Clerk/Accounts 
Grenada 
-4pard 
Members - Current And Past 
Mr Stanley Roberts 
General Secretary Taxi Association/Member of the Board Representing Workers 
P0 Box 175, St. George's 
Mr Chester John 
Former Chairman of the Board 
CLICO International Life Insurance Company 
Young Street 
St. George's 
Mr Le Roi Robinson 
Former Director 
Grenada National Insurance Scheme 
Mr Chester Humphrey 
President General 
Grenada Technical & Allied Workers Union 
P0 Box 405, St. George's 
Execu6e Director 
Mr Ashton Frame 
Director (Ag) 
Grenada National Insurance Scheme 
p0 Box 322, St. George's 
Workers'Representatives 
N4r Derek Allard 
President General/Member of the Board Representing Workers 
l3ank & General Workers Union 
P0 Box 329, St. George's 
Mr Andre Lewis 
General Secretary 
Grenada Technical & Allied Workers Union 
p0 Box 405, St. George's 
Mr Dennis Thomas 
Executive Officer 
Grenada Union of Teachers 
p0 Box 452, St. George's 
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Employers'Representatives 
Mr Justin Francis 
Executive Director 
Grenada Employers' Federation 
P0 Box 129, St. George's 
Mr Christopher De Riggs 
Executive Director 
Grenada Chamber of Industry & Commerce 
P0 Box 129, St. George's 
Ms Alice M Thomas-Roberts 
Executive Director 
Grenada Hotel Association 
P0 Box 440, St. George's 
Employers 
Mr Desmond DJ John 
Managing Director 
DJ's Bobcat & Construction Services 
P0 Box 279, St. George's 
Mr Chris Warner 
Sales & Marketing Manager 
W. E. Julien & Co. Ltd 
P0 Box 76, St. George's 
Mrs Helen Radix 
Personnel Officer 
Jonas Brown & Hubbards 
St. George's 
Mr Anthony Jagan 
Human Resource Manager 
Grand Beach Resort 
Insurance Companies 
Mr Chester John 
Agency Manager 
CLICO International Life Insurance Company 
St. George's 
NIS StaffMembers 
Mr Louis A. Williams 
Accountant 
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Mr Dorset Cromwell 
Actuary/Statistic and Research Manager 
Mrs Janice Pierre 
Human Resource Manager 
Mr Alfred Logic 
Manager Compliance 
Montserrat 
Board Members - Past 
Mr C. T. John 
Financial Secretary 
Government of Montserrat 
P0 Box 292, Plymouth 
Mr Winston Jemmot 
Former Acting Director 
Executive Director 
Mr Kenneth Scotland 
Director 
Montserrat Social Security Board 
P0 Box 170, Plymouth 
Workers'Representatives 
Mrs Angela Skerritt 
President 
Montserrat Nurses Association 
Cudjoe Head Clinic, Cudjoe Head 
Mr Fitroy Martin 
First Vice President 
Montserrat Allied Workers Union 
Plymouth 
Me Easton Farrell 
President 
Public Service Union 
Plymouth 
Mr Gregory Jules 
President 
Montserrat Union of Teachers 
Geralds 
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Mr Steven Foster 
President 
Montserrat Police Association 
P0 BOX 177, Brades 
Social Security Staff ofMontserrat Social Security Board . F- 
Ms Paulette Ward 
Administrative Assistant 
Ms Diane Kirby 
Inspector 
Mrs Joyce Chambers 
Supervisor of Benefits 
St. Kitts And Nevis 
Minister 
Mr Timothy Harris 
Minister Responsible for Social Security 
Basseterre 
Board Members - Current A nd Past 
Mr Anthony Gonsalves 
Barrister-at-Law & Solicitor/Member of the Board Representing Employcrs 
P0 Box 449, Basseterre 
Mr Michael Morton 
Director/Former Member Of The Board Representing Employers 
St. Kitts Nevis Anguilla Trading and Development Co. Ltd 
P0 Box 142, Basseterre 
Mr Caines 
Former Chairman 
St. Kitts & Nevis Social Security Board 
Mr Robert Manning 
Former Director 
St. Kitts & Nevis Social Security Board 
Executive Director 
Mrs Sephlin Lawrence 
Director 
St. Kitts & Nevis Social Security Board 
P0 Box 79, Basseterre 
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Workers I Representatives 
Mr Stanley Franks 
General Secretary 
St. Kitts & Nevis Trades & Labour Union 
Basseterre 
Employers'Representatives 
Mr Kishu Chandiramani 
President 
St. Kitts & Nevis Chamber of Commerce 
P0 Box 78, Basseterre 
Mr Val Henry 
Executive Director 
St. Kitts & Nevis Hotel & Tourism Association 
Basseterre 
Mr Norris Martin 
President/ Liamigua Taxi Association 
Basseterre 
Employers 
Mr Oriel Hector 
Chief Personnel Officer 
St. Kitts & Nevis Sugar Manufacturing Corporation 
Basseterre 
Mr Thomas Williams 
General Manager 
St. Christopher Air & Sea Ports Authority 
P0 Box 963, Basseterre 
Mr Scott Caines 
Financial Controller 
St Kitts Nevis Anguilla Trading and Development Co. Ltd 
P0 Box 142, Basseterre 
Mr Theophilius Edwards 
Plant Manager 
St. Kitts Masonry Products Ltd 
P0 Box 142, Basseterre 
Mr J. S. Rawlins 
Head of Human Resources & Support 
Cable & Wireless St. Kitts & Nevis Ltd 
P0 Box 86, Basseterre 
Mr Valentine Monish 
Manager - Human Resources 
P0 Box 45, Basseterre 
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Mr Clement Williams 
Independent Taxi Driver 
Basseterre 
Mr Stanley Franks 
Diamond Security 
Basseterre 
Mr Ken Perkins & John Mauby 
Ocean Terrace Inn 
Basseterre 
Mr Charles Brisbane 
0. D. Brisbane & Sons Ltd 
Basseterre 
Mr Richard Kershee 
Carib Manufacturing Co. Ltd 
Basseterre 
Finance and Insurance Companies 
Mr Ronald Philip 
Manager 
The Barbados Mutual Life Assurance Society 
P0 Box 835, Basseterre 
Ms Nesta Seaton 
Administration Manager 
St Kitts-Nevis Insurance Co. Ltd 
P0 Box 142, Basseterre 
Mr Faron Lawrence 
General Manager 
P0 Box 1324, Basseterre 
StaffMembers St. Kitts & Nevis Social Security Board 
ms Angela Liburd 
Internal Auditor 
Mr James Bradshaw 
MIS Manager 
Ms Marilyn Johnson 
Manager Finance and Accounts 
Ms Joyce Fyffield 
Accountant 
Ms Angela Grey 
Benefits Manager 
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Mr Steven McMahon 
Manager Compliance 
Mr Chesil Hamilton 
Manager, Public Relations 
Other Stakeholders 
Mr Osborne 
Former Sugar Factory Supervisor 
Mr Warren Thomas 
Former Sugar Factory Worker 
Mr Martin Phipps 
Sugar Factory Worker 
St. Lucia 
Board Members: Past 
Mr. Francis Compton 
Former Director 
St. Lucia National Insurance Scheme 
Executive Director 
Ms Emma Hippolyte 
Director 
St. Lucia National Insurance Scheme 
The Waterfront 
Castries 
Workers Representatives 
Mr Lawrence Poyette 
General Secretary 
St. Lucia Civil Service Union 
Mr Kentry Jn. Pierre 
General Secretary 
St. Lucia Teachers' Union 
P0 Box 82 1, Castries 
Mr Michael Hippolyte 
President 
St. Lucia Seamen Union 
P0 Box 166, Castries 
Mr Peter Fevrier 
First Vice President 
National Workers Union 
P0 Box 713, Castries 
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Mr Modeste Downes 
Vieux Fort Dock Workers Union 
Vieux Fort 
Employers'Representatives 
Mrs Eileen Paul 
Administrative Manager 
St. Lucia Hotel & Tourism Association 
P0 Box 545, Castries 
Mr Henry Phillips 
Industrial Relations Consultant 
St. Lucia Employers' Federation 
P0 Box 160, Castries 
Employers 
Mr Errol Charles 
Human Resource Manager 
Juliens 
P0 Box 279, Castries 
Ms Elizabeth Clarke 
Human Resources Manager 
WASCO 
Castries 
Ms Judy Augiste 
Assistant Human Resource Officer 
Sandals La Toc Hotel 
Castries 
StaffMembers ofSt. Lucia National Insurance Schente 
Mr Lincoln Mathurin 
Deputy Director 
Mr Louis Augustin 
Human Resource Manager 
Mrs Realle Hypolitte 
Manager Cornpliance 
Mr Patrick Kallicharan 
Statistician 
Mr Desmond Dujon 
Public Relations Manager 
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St. Vincent & The Grenadines 
Board Members: Current 
Mr Creighton 
Chairman 
St. Vincent & The Grenadines National Insurance Scheme 
P0 Box 305, Kingstown 
Executive Director 
Mr Reginald Thomas 
Executive Director 
St. Vincent & The Grenadines National Insurance Scheme 
P0 Box 305, Kingstown 
Workers Representatives 
Mr Noel Jackson 
General Secretary 
National Workers Union 
P0 Box 1290, Kingstown 
Mr Lanceford Weekes 
President 
St. Vincent & The Grenadines Civil Service Association 
Kingstown 
Employers'Representatives 
Mr Leroy St. Rose 
Executive Director 
The St. Vincent & The Grenadines Chamber of Industry & Commerce 
P0 Box 134, Kingstown 
Major St. Claire Leacock 
President 
St. Vincent & The Grenadines Chamber of Industry & Commerce 
Kingstown 
Mrs Dawn Smith 
Executive Director 
St. Vincent & The Grenadines Hotel & Tourism Association 
Kingstown 
Employers 
Mr Junior Bacchus 
Human Resource Manager 
ECGS 
Kingstown 
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Mr Neville Greaves 
CK Greaves & Co, Ltd 
Kingstown 
Mr Lancelot Stevensson 
Accountant 
St. Vincent & The Grenadines Port Authority 
Kingstown 
Mr Ronald Bailey 
Human Resources Manager 
St. Vincent & The Grenadines National Commercial Bank 
Kingstown 
Insurance Companies 
Mr Sam Goodluck 
Manager 
VINSURE 
P0 Box 2 10, Kingstown 
Staff Members - St. rincent And The Grenadines National Insurance 
Scheme 
Ms Minerva Glassgow 
Deputy Director 
Mr Lennox Tinim 
Financial Controller 
Mr Avil Harry 
Senior Inspector 
Appendix 14 
Expenditure on Training By The Social Security 
Organisations In The OECS 
Aancmnt EC$ 
Yom 
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0 Dorninica 
0 Grenada 
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E St. Kitts and Nevis 
13 St. Lucia 
E St. Vincent and the Greraidtrm 
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